Shame and Guilt: The Psychology of Sacramental Confession

Abstract

Altered states challenge an individual's established construction of reality, the personalized mythology by which one operates. Sometimes those altered states offer a glimpse into aspects of being that the mythology is unable to embrace. Experiences of this nature may challenge the prevailing mythic structure. This confrontation between the established construction of reality and the view provided in the altered state may inspire a profound and wholesome shift in the person's sense of being, or it may lead to destabilizing conflicts with previously unquestioned belief systems and patterns of behavior. This article discusses the lure—and the dilemmas — of attempting to incorporate directly into one's life the raw creativity of a powerful and inspiring altered state, the challenges of reconciling such experiences with one's existing mythology, and it presents a framework for facilitating such a reconciliation.     

Act with authority: Romantic desire at the nexus of power possessed and power perceived

The social psychological literature and the evolutionary literature on power suggest different routes by which power might inspire romantic desire: the former highlights the appealing actions of the powerful, whereas the latter demonstrates that people desire powerful individuals upon learning of those individuals' powerful status. We predicted that, in an initial face-to-face interaction, both elements must align for the powerful to inspire romantic desire. In a live mixed-sex interaction, participants experienced the most romantic desire for an opposite-sex target who (a) actually possessed power and (b) was perceived by the participant to possess power. This interaction was mediated by observable behavior—the extent to which the target controlled the conversation and was given legitimacy by the group—indicating that the powerful do not behave powerfully around unaccommodating subordinates. Power manipulations implemented in only one person's mind may not approximate how power functions in real social interactions.     

Person‐centred positive emotions,object‐centred negative emotions: 2‐year‐olds generalize negative but not positive emotions across individuals

Prior work suggests that young children do not generalize others' preferences to new individuals. We hypothesized (following Vaish et al., 2008, Psychol. Bull., 134, 383–403) that this may only hold for positive emotions, which inform the child about the person's attitude towards the object but not about the positivity of the object itself. It may not hold for negative emotions, which additionally inform the child about the negativity of the object itself. Two‐year‐old children saw one individual (the emoter) emoting positively or negatively towards one and neutrally towards a second novel object. When a second individual then requested an object, children generalized the emoter's negative but not her positive emotion to the second individual. Children thus draw different inferences from others' positive versus negative emotions: Whereas they view others' positive emotions as person centred, they may view others' negative emotions as object centred and thus generalizable across people. The results are discussed with relation to the functions and implications of the negativity bias.     

Exposing information sharing as strategic behavior: power as responsibility and “Trust” buttons

Online platforms' success depends on individual's information sharing (IS). However, previous research showed that “knowledge is power” is a default‐perception in organizations and that individuals share relatively unimportant information while keeping the important private information for themselves. Trust has also been identified as important enabler of IS. We examined the role of power construed as responsibility for others' outcomes and of a “Trust” button, a theory‐inspired technological feature, using a 2(Power construals: opportunity vs. responsibility) × 2(Buttons: “Like” vs. “Like‐or‐Trust”) × 2(Information sharedness as within‐subjects factor; public, private) design. Findings showed that construing power as responsibility and “Trust” button's presence increased the sharing of private information; clicking behavior yielded insights into the underlying mechanisms. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Empathic forecasting: How do we predict other people's feelings?

When making affective forecasts, people commit the impact bias. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on their affective experience. In three studies we show that people also commit the impact bias when making empathic forecasts, affective forecasts for someone else. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on someone else's affective experience (Study 1), they do so for friends and strangers (Study 2), and they do so when other sources of information are available (Study 3). Empathic forecasting accuracy, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's actual affective experience, was lower than between-person forecasting correspondence, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's affective forecast. Empathic forecasts do not capture other people's actual experience very well but are similar to what other people forecast for themselves. This may enhance understanding between people.     

Reasonology and False Beliefs

Abstract

Whereas some philosophers view all reasons for action as psychological states of agents, others—objective favourers theorists—locate the overwhelming majority of reasons for action outside the agent, in items that objectively favour courses of action. (The latter may count such psychological states as a person's belief that demons dance in his kitchen as a reason for him to seek psychiatric help.) This article explores options that objective favourers theorists have regarding cases in which, owing significantly to a false belief, an agent performs an action for which there is no objective favourer. Topics addressed include whether such theorists, including Jonathan Dancy himself, should accept Dancy's thesis that ‘intentional, deliberate, purposeful action is always done for a reason’ and whether there are two different concepts of reasons for action, one geared to action-evaluation and the other to action-explanation.     

Taking Blame for Other People's Misconduct

Taking blame for another person's misconduct may occur at relatively high rates for less serious crimes. The authors examined individual differences and situational factors related to this phenomenon by surveying college students (n = 213) and men enrolled in substance abuse treatment programs (n = 42). Among college students, conscientiousness and delinquency predicted their likelihood of being in a situation in which it was possible to take the blame for another person's misconduct. Situational factors, including the relationship with the perpetrator, the seriousness of the offense, feelings of responsibility for the offense, and differential consequences between the offender and the blame taker, were associated with college students’ decisions to take the blame. Among substance abuse treatment participants, individuals who took the blame for another person's misconduct were more extraverted, reported feeling more loyalty toward the true perpetrator, and indicated more incentives to take the blame than individuals who did not take the blame. Links between theories of helping behavior and situational factors that predict blame taking are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Metaphor in intergroup relations

Belonging to groups and relating to other groups are central parts of our lives, but they confront us with abstract ideas (e.g., identity and power) and nebulous feelings. To make sense of it all, people rely on conceptual metaphors: cognitive tools that ground abstractions in dissimilar, more concrete ideas that are easier to grasp. We review some common metaphors that people use in intergroup contexts—metaphors that draw on knowledge of such familiar experiences as physical cleansing and warmth sensations. We review evidence that these metaphors are not mere figures of speech, but have a systematic and practically important influence on intergroup attitudes and behavior. Most of this work shows that reliance on metaphor contributes to prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, sometimes without the person's awareness. Yet we consider the hopeful possibility that citizens, politicians, and researchers can harness the power of metaphor to promote intergroup harmony and peace.     

Attributionism and Counterfactual Robustness

In this journal (AJP 2016), Vishnu Sridharan presents a novel objection to attributionism, the view according to which agents are responsible for their conduct when it reflects who they are or what they value. The key to Sridharan's objection is that agents can fulfil all attributionist conditions for responsibility while being under the control of a manipulator. In this paper, we show that Sridharan's objection falls prey to a dilemma—either his manipulator is counterfactually robust, or she is not—and that neither of its horns undermines attributionism.     

The desirability of beliefs: preschoolers' appreciation of fact beliefs and subsequent emotions

In this study, we investigated the extent to which preschool children's own knowledge about reality biases their understanding that others' beliefs about reality govern others' emotions and not reality itself. Therefore, an increasing tension was created between the beliefs of the protagonist and the participant, by providing varying degrees of evidence about the validity of the protagonist's belief. Children of between 4 and 5 years of age were asked to predict the protagonist's emotion, given the protagonist's desire and the protagonist's belief. The results show that, to a certain extent, preschool children take others' beliefs into account when predicting others' emotions. When the outcome is clear, children probably feel tied to reality, and in the case of false beliefs, their knowledge about reality biases their emotion predictions, as was also evident in ‘false belief’ research (Wimmer H, Perner I. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition 13: 103–128). However, when it is uncertain what the actual outcome will be, then it is not the likelihood of others' beliefs but the desirability of the outcome that biases children's predictions of others' emotions. In other words, when the actual outcome is yet unclear, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds show a tendency for wishful thinking in their predictions of others' emotions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Sound of Social Cognition: Toddlers’ Understanding of How Sound Influences Others

Understanding others' perceptions is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. Children's construal of visual perception is well investigated, but there is little work on children's understanding of others' auditory perception. The current study assesses toddlers' recognition that producing different sounds can affect others differentially—auditory perspective taking. Two- and 3-year-olds were familiarized with two objects, one loud and one quiet. The adult then introduced a doll, and children were randomly assigned to one of two goals: either to wake the doll or to let her sleep. Children's object choice and the sound intensity they produced significantly varied in the predicted direction as a function of the goal task. These findings reveal young children's understanding of the effects of sound on other people's behavior and psychological states.     

To Have–or Not to Have–Another Child: Family Planning Attitudes,Intentions, and Behavior1

Two hundred eighty-two respondents, representing 141 married couples with either one child (N= 71 couples) or two children (N= 70 couples), were interviewed about their considerations and intentions regarding whether or not to have another child. Reports of their actual subsequent family planning behavior were obtained 12 months later via a mailed questionnaire. The data was gathered and analyzed according to Fishbein's attitude-behavior model which stipulates that the individual's actual behavior is a function of one's behavioral intention. This intention, in turn, is determined by two multiple factors: (a) the individual's beliefs about the consequences of performing the behavior multiplied by his/her evaluation of those consequences, and (b) one's normative beliefs multiplied by one's motivation to comply with the perceived norms. The results provided substantial support for the model; both behavioral intention and actual behavior were successfully predicted from the attitudinal and normative components of the model. It was also shown that the behavioral intention mediates the relationship between the model's attitudinal and normative components and actual behavior.     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

The psychological implications of believing that everything is one

ABSTRACT

A variety of philosophical, religious, spiritual, and scientific perspectives converge on the notion that everything that exists is part of some fundamental entity, substance, or process. People differ in the degree to which they believe that everything is one, but we know little about the psychological or social implications of holding this belief. In two studies, believing in oneness was associated with having an identity that includes distal people and the natural world, feeling connected to humanity and nature, and having values that focus on other people’s welfare. However, the belief was not associated with a lower focus on oneself or one’s concerns. Participants who believed in oneness tended to view themselves as spiritual but not necessarily religious, and reported experiences in which they directly perceived everything as one. The belief in oneness is a meaningful existential belief that has numerous implications for people’s self-views, experiences, values, relationships, and behavior.     

Explaining the Relationship between Religiosity and Political Participation: The Mediating Roles of Transcendent Accountability and Religiopolitical Awareness

Prior research tends to find a positive relationship between religiosity and political participation. Explanations of this relationship have focused mostly on religiosity-generated organizational resources (e.g., civic skills), while paying less attention to psychological resources. We simultaneously examined different aspects of religiosity (belief, behavior, and belonging) and political participation (electoral and nonelectoral) in a structural equation model with two psychological resources as mediators: (1) “transcendent accountability”—seeing oneself as responsible to God or a higher power for one's impact on other people and the environment, and (2) “religiopolitical awareness”—perceiving the influence of one's religion and/or spirituality on one's political views and activities. Results from analyzing survey data from a US representative sample showed that transcendent accountability and religiopolitical awareness, whether together or awareness only, mediated positive relationships between religiosity (belief, private and public behaviors, and membership) and political participation (voting and other political activity), highlighting key psychological motivators of political participation.     

Distinguishing between level and impact of rumination as predictors of depressive symptoms: An experience sampling study

Rumination—repetitively thinking about one's emotional state, its causes and consequences—exacerbates negative mood and plays an important role in the aetiology and maintenance of depression. Yet, it is unclear whether increased vulnerability to depression is associated with simply how much a person ruminates, or the short-term impact rumination has on a person's negative mood. In the current study, we distinguish between the level versus the impact of rumination, and we examine how each uniquely predicts changes in depressive symptoms over time in an undergraduate sample. Using experience sampling, we assessed students’ (N = 101) subjective experiences of positive and negative affect and their use of rumination and distraction in daily life for seven days. Participants also reported their depressive symptoms before and after the experience sampling. Increases in depressive symptoms over the week were predicted by how much people ruminated, but not by its impact on negative mood.     

Thought and the social community

The anti‐Cartesian idea that a person's thoughts are not entirely fixed by what goes on inside that person's head is suggested by Hegel, and echoed in Wittgenstein and Frege. An argument for the view has recently been given by Tyler Burge. This paper claims that Burge's data can be explained better by an individualistic theory. The basic idea is that an individual's thoughts are specified analogically, in ordinary discourse, through the model of a language. Though the modelling‐sentences are public, the thoughts of the individual are inner states whose identity does not depend upon those sentences. They have content naturally, whether or not content happens to be ascribed to them.     

How Can We Study Heroism? Integrating Persons,Situations and Communities

Heroism—an individual's commitment to a noble purpose, usually aimed at furthering the welfare of others, and involving the willingness to accept the consequences of achieving that purpose—has received little attention from political psychologists, even though a person is arguably as liable to act heroically as she is to act in a morally reprehensible manner. Specifically, important questions remain in how heroes can be identified beforehand and how such behavior can be successfully studied and promoted. We posit that recent work in genocide studies, positive psychology, personality psychology, ecological psychology, and moral psychology provides new and promising directions for better understanding heroic behavior. These developments can provide the tools for understanding the complex interplay of factors—including traits, situations, and communal beliefs—motivating heroic behavior.