Getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard,MacIntyre and Some Problems with Narrative

As part of the widespread turn to narrative in contemporary philosophy, several commentators have recently attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for the narrative cause, most notably in John Davenport and Anthony Rudd's recent collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue. I argue that the aesthetic and ethical existence‐spheres in Either/Or cannot adequately be distinguished in terms of the MacIntyre‐inspired notion of ‘narrative unity’. Judge William's argument for the ethical life contains far more in the way of substantive normative content than can be encapsulated by the idea of ‘narrative unity’, and the related idea that narratives confer intelligibility will not enable us to distinguish Kierkegaardian aesthetes from Kierkegaardian ethicists. ‘MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians’ also take insufficient notice of further problems with MacIntyre's talk of ‘narrative unity’, such as his failure to distinguish between literary narratives and the ‘enacted dramatic narratives’ of which he claims our lives consist; the lack of clarity in the idea of a ‘whole life’; and the threat of self‐deception. Finally, against the connections that have been drawn between Kierkegaardian choice and Harry Frankfurt's work on volitional identification, I show something of the dangers involved in putting too much stress on unity and wholeheartedness.     

Integrity and the Value of an Integrated Self

What is integrity and why is it valuable? One account of the nature of integrity, proposed by John Cottingham amongst others, is The Integrated Self View. On this account integrity is a formal relation of coherence between various aspects of a person. One problem that has been raised against this account is that it isn’t obvious that it can account for the value of integrity. In this paper I will respond to this problem by providing an account of the value of an integrated self. I will do so by first looking closely at two examples from literature: John Sassal in John Berger’s A Fortunate Man and Tetrius Lydgate in George Eliot’s Middlemarch. Based on my comparison of these two case studies I will argue that an integrated self is valuable as it makes people more likely to act in line with their moral judgements.     

Exploring the Relationship Among the Undesired Self,Health, and Mood in Older Adults1

Longitudinal data from older adults were analyzed to examine the impact of health factors on undesired and ideal self‐discrepancies; and the association of these 2 self‐discrepancies on moods. Results showed that after controlling for self‐assessed health (SAH), fatigue/lack of energy was associated with the undesired but not the ideal self. A second set of analyses revealed that the undesired self‐discrepancy predicted moods only at high levels of SAH. The ideal self was only associated with anxiety, but only at low levels of SAH. This evidence supports the idea that health‐related factors are relevant for the self‐discrepancies of older adults, especially the undesired self‐discrepancy. We expanded prior evidence by demonstrating that the effects of self‐discrepancies on mood are moderated by SAH.     

A Wholehearted Defense of Ambivalence

Despite widespread agreement that ambivalence precludes agency “at its best,” in this paper I argue that ambivalence as such is no threat to one’s agency. In particular, against “unificationists” like Harry Frankfurt I argue that failing to be fully integrated as an agent, lacking purity of heart, or being less than wholehearted in one’s choices, tells us nothing about whether an agent’s will is properly functioning. Moreover, it will turn out that in many common circumstances, wholeheartedness with respect to some motive or course of action is itself a defect in an agent’s will.     

Some functions of the self personified by the father.

I have presented clinical material in order to illustrate a series of fantasies of parental intercourse which represent the self in successive stages of individuation from early projective identification to later introjective identification. From this is abstracted the idea of 'father' both as a component of the self representation and as the personification of the urge towards continuing development. Evidence is also gathered from the clinical material, supported by mythological parallels, to suggest that the whole process, including those components explicitly identified with the mother, is subsumed under an identification of the deintegrating self, its identity and integrity, with 'the father'.     

Person, personality, self, and identity: a philosophically informed conceptual analysis

Who is the person, or self, associated with personality disorder and its treatment? How are we to account for a self conceptualized in terms of schemas and representations, that at the same time--as self--scrutinizes these schemas and representations (as in cognitive therapy for personality disorders)? Five approaches to personhood are examined: metaphysical, empirical, transcendental, hermeneutical, and phenomenological. An elementary sense of selfhood is tied to all one's experiences and activities; this sense of self is experientially irreducible and conceptually connected to a primordial form of self-relatedness. After examining these issues, I formulate four provisional conclusions: (a) the separation between person and roles (functions, personality features) is a modern fiction--persons are not neutral bearers of roles and functions; (b) the concept of personality in DSM-IV refers to nonhomogeneous behaviors such as feelings, moods, inclinations, temperaments, and habits, and these behaviors differ with respect to their distance to the core self; (c) there exists an enormous variety of ways of self-relating and this variety may affect the contents of the core self under certain circumstances; and (d) the concept of person may be primitive; that is, irreducible and referring to a background of unity and integrity.     

Concepts of present self,expected self,and ideal self in vocational preferences and expectations

This study investigated the hypotheses that similarity of ideal self and occupational stereotypes are important in determining the vocational preferences of adolescents, while similarity between expected self and occupational stereotypes is important in determining their occupational expectations. Subjects were 97 male and 88 female high school students. Findings were consistent with the view that ideal self played an important role in determining vocational preferences for males and females. However, contrary to expectations, ideal self was more strongly associated than expected self with vocational expectations for females, though not for males.     

Phenomenology of Bodily Integrity in Disfiguring Breast Cancer

In this paper, I explore the meaning of bodily integrity in disfiguring breast cancer. Bodily integrity is a normative principle precisely because it does not simply refer to actual physical or functional intactness. It rather indicates what should be regarded and respected as inviolable in vulnerable and damageable bodies. I will argue that this normative inviolability or wholeness can be based upon a person's embodied experience of wholeness. This phenomenological stance differs from the liberal view that identifies respect for integrity with respect for autonomy (resulting in an invalidation of bodily integrity's proper normative meaning), as well as from the view that bodily integrity is based upon ideologies of wholeness (which runs the risk of being disadvantageous to women). I propose that bodily integrity involves a process of identification between the experience of one's body as “Leib” and the experience of one's body as “Körper.” If identification fails or is not possible, one's integrity is threatened. This idea of bodily integrity can support breast cancer patients and survivors in making decisions about possible corrective interventions. To implement this idea in oncology care, empirical‐phenomenological research needs to establish how breast cancer patients express their embodied self‐experiences.     

The Significance of the Emergence of Language and Symbol in the Development of the Young Infant

In this paper I have suggested that the mother–child dyad is the foundation for integrity between the psychic self and the physical self, and the capacity of these to relate to the external environment. I have also argued that the development of language and symbol are creative agents in the development of consciousness in the young infant, and that the emergence of language and symbol are an expression of the opening of a potential space which allows differentiation from the mother and facilitates the infant’s ability to distinguish fantasy from fact and self from other. Sharn Waldron is a psychotherapist residing and working in Suffolk, England and is a registered member with the UKCP through the Forum for Independent Psychotherapists. She has contributed numerous papers for international psychotherapeutic journals, is a contributor to Pear’s Cyclopedia and writes freelance for Penguin and the National Health Service in the United Kingdom.     

The Place of Self‐Respect in a Theory of Justice

This essay provides a critical examination of Rawls' (and Rawlsians') conception of self‐respect, the social bases of self‐respect, and the normative justification of equality in the social bases of self‐respect. I defend a rival account of these notions and the normative ideals at stake in political liberalism and a theory of social justice.

I make the following arguments: (1) I argue that it is unreasonable to take self‐respect to be a primary social good, as Rawls and his interpreters characterize it; (2) secondly, drawing on a distinction made by Darwall, I argue that recognition respect provides a far more suitable notion of respect for a theory of justice than Rawls' notion of appraisal respect; (3) thirdly, I argue that Rawls' treatment of self‐respect and the social bases of self‐respect as empirical conceptions should be rejected in favor of normative notions of a reasonable or justified self‐respect and equality in reasonable social bases of self‐respect; (4) I argue that Rawls' notions of political liberalism and public reason provide a way of grounding a notion of the reasonable social bases of self‐respect in political ideals of the person implicit in modern economic institutions, and family relations, ignored by Rawlsians—but as central to reasonable social bases of self‐respect and justice, as Rawlsians' ideal of persons as free and equal citizens.     

Self‐deception and pragmatic encroachment: A dilemma for epistemic rationality

Self‐deception is typically considered epistemically irrational, for it involves holding certain doxastic attitudes against strong counter‐evidence. Pragmatic encroachment about epistemic rationality says that whether it is epistemically rational to believe, withhold belief or disbelieve something can depend on perceived practical factors of one's situation. In this paper I argue that some cases of self‐deception satisfy what pragmatic encroachment considers sufficient conditions for epistemic rationality. As a result, we face the following dilemma: either we revise the received view about self‐deception or we deny pragmatic encroachment on epistemic rationality. I suggest that the dilemma can be solved if we pay close attention to the distinction between ideal and bounded rationality. I argue that the problematic cases fail to meet standards of ideal rationality but exemplify bounded rationality. The solution preserves pragmatic encroachment on bounded rationality, but denies it on ideal rationality.     

Islamist Women's Agency and Relational Autonomy

Mainstream conceptions of autonomy have been surreptitiously gender‐specific and masculinist. Feminist philosophers have reclaimed autonomy as a feminist value, while retaining its core ideal as self‐government, by reconceptualizing it as “relational autonomy.” This article examines whether feminist theories of relational autonomy can adequately illuminate the agency of Islamist women who defend their nonliberal religious values and practices and assiduously attempt to enact them in their daily lives. I focus on two notable feminist theories of relational autonomy advanced by Marina Oshana and Andrea Westlund and apply them to the case of Women's Mosque Movement participants in Egypt. I argue that feminist conceptions of relational autonomy, centered around the ideal of self‐government, cannot elucidate the agency of Women's Mosque Movement participants whose normative ideal involves perfecting their moral capacity.     

Reflexivity,Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self: A Buddhist Model

The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of ?āntarak?ita (eighth century common era) to develop an account of the relation between consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. I will argue, first, that phenomenal consciousness is reflexive or self-illuminating (svaprakā?ya). Second, I will argue that consciousness necessarily involves minimal subjectivity. Third, I will argue that neither the reflexivity nor the subjectivity of consciousness implies that there is any entity such as the self or ego over and above reflexive consciousness. Fourth, I will argue that what we normally think of as ‘the self’ is best understood as a complex, multi-layered process (aha?kāra, ‘I-making’) that emerges within the pre-egoic flow of subjective consciousness.     

Indian students' perceptions of the ideal self, the ideal leader, the ideal teacher, Indira Gandhi and the business executive.

The Activity Vector Analysis (AVA) was administered to three samples drawn from a population of graduate students at an Indian university. Results indicated a high positive relationship among the perceptions of the ideal self, ideal teacher, and ideal leader. Likewise, the consensual profile of Indira Gandhi was found to be quite similar to the ideal self cluster (r = .96). The collective perception of the business executive, however, was only remotely similar to the other two character profiles.     

With a little help from my friends: Understanding how social networks influence the pursuit of the ideal self

The present investigation examined how people utilize their social networks when pursuing the ideal self. Participants who spent time with social partners who possessed their desired ideal self characteristic experienced movement toward their ideal self when the partner provided behavioral affirmation (eliciting behaviors consistent with the ideal self), but experienced movement away from their ideal self when the partner provided perceptual affirmation (perceiving them as if they already possessed the desired characteristic). High self-esteem participants were especially likely to seek out social partners of the latter type, who saw them as their ideal selves, but did not offer behavioral assistance. This research highlights the importance of social networks for understanding the conditions in which social partners promote vs. hinder ideal self progress.     

Good Work

Work is on one side a central arena of self‐making, self‐understanding, and self‐development, and on the other a deep threat to our flourishing. My question is: what kind of work is good for human beings, and what kind bad? I first characterise work as necessary productive activity. My answer to my question then develops a perfectionist account of the human good: (1) the good is the full development and expression of human potentials and capacities; (2) this development and expression happens over a lifetime through appropriate practice. Work is thus a problem of human development, and I address that problem by considering three central human capacities: that we are passionate choosers, skilled makers, and social negotiators. For each, I ask: what does this capacity need from our work if it is to develop towards full and flourishing expression? Answering that question leads to a three‐part account of good work as requiring: (1) a distinctive kind of pleasure, involving both unselfconscious flow and supervisory self‐attention; (2) skill, which I describe via the ideal of craft; and (3) democracy, which I define as a form of life in which each is able to develop and use both expressive and receptive capacities.     

Self-discrepancies and emotional vulnerability: how magnitude, accessibility, and type of discrepancy influence affect

Two studies examined whether the type of emotional change experienced by individuals is influenced by the magnitude and accessibility of the different types of self-discrepancies they possess. In both studies, subjects filled out a measure of self-discrepancy a few weeks prior to the experimental session. Subjects were asked to list up to 10 attributes each for different self-states--their actual self, their ideal self (their own or others' hopes and goals for them), and their ought self (their own or others' beliefs about their duty and obligations). Magnitude of self-discrepancy was calculated by comparing the attributes in the actual self to the attributes in either the ideal self or the ought self, with the total number of attribute pairs that matched being subtracted from the total number of attribute pairs that mismatched. In Study 1, subjects were asked to imagine either a positive event or a negative event and were then given a mood measure and a writing-speed task. Subjects with a predominant actual:ideal discrepancy felt more dejected (e.g., sad) and wrote more slowly in the negative event condition than in the positive event condition, whereas subjects with a predominant actual:ought discrepancy, if anything, felt more agitated (e.g., afraid) and wrote more quickly in the negative event condition. In Study 2, subjects were selected who were either high in both kinds of discrepancies or low in both. Half of the subjects in each group were asked to discuss their own and their parents' hopes and goals for them (ideal priming), and the other half were asked to discuss their own and their parents' beliefs concerning their duty and obligations (ought priming). For high-discrepancy subjects, but not low-discrepancy subjects, ideal priming increased their dejection whereas ought priming increased their agitation. The implications of these findings for identifying cognitive-motivational factors that may serve as vulnerability markers for emotional problems is discussed.