Adaptive calibration of children's physiological responses to family stress: the utility of evolutionary developmental theory: comment on Del Giudice et al. (2012) and Sturge-Apple et al. (2012)

Children's physiological reactions to stress are presented from the broader theoretical perspective of adaptive calibration to the environment, as rooted in life history theory. Del Giudice, Hinnant, Ellis, and El-Sheikh (2012) focus on children's physiological responses to a stressful task as a consequence of their history of family stress. Sturge-Apple, Davies, Martin, Cicchetti, and Hentges (2012) focus on the ways that children respond to a novel laboratory manipulation as a combined function of their temperament patterns and the harshness of their parental environment. The theoretical perspective employed provides an overarching framework that not only accounts for the findings presented here but also has heuristic value for future research on responses to early environmental risk. Future work in this area will benefit by inclusion of additional sympathetic nervous system (SNS) markers and neurotransmitters, inclusion of the role of gene expression in adaptive calibration, broader consideration of protective factors in the child's environment, and longitudinal work demonstrating the effects of adaptive calibration on children's future life history strategies and outcomes.     

Assessment of ADHD symptoms: comment on Gomez et al. (2003)

R. Gomez, G. L. Burns, J. A. Walsh, and M. A. de Moura (2003) examined the degree to which parent and teacher ratings of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms are accounted for by trait, source, and error variance. The importance and limitations of Gomez et al.'s findings are discussed in the context of clinical and research assessments of children suspected of having ADHD. Gomez et al.'s findings make clear that multimethod and multisource assessment protocols should be used in diagnosing children with this disorder. Further, clinicians and researchers must avoid relying too heavily on 1 source of data when evaluating the severity and frequency of ADHD symptoms.     

Publication bias in psychological science: comment on Ferguson and Brannick (2012)

It is well documented that studies reporting statistically significant results are more likely to be published than are studies reporting nonsignificant results--a phenomenon called publication bias. Publication bias in meta-analytic reviews should be identified and reduced when possible. Ferguson and Brannick (2012) argued that the inclusion of unpublished articles is ineffective and possibly counterproductive as a means of reducing publication bias in meta-analyses. We show how idiosyncratic choices on the part of Ferguson and Brannick led to an erroneous conclusion. We demonstrate that their key finding--that publication bias was more likely when unpublished studies were included--may be an artifact of the way they assessed publication bias. We also point out how the lack of transparency about key choices and the absence of information about critical features of Ferguson and Brannick's sample and procedures might have obscured readers' ability to assess the validity of their claims. Furthermore, we demonstrate that many of the claims they made are without empirical support, even though they could have tested these claims empirically, and that these claims may be misleading. With their claim that addressing publication bias introduces subjectivity and bias into meta-analysis, they ignored a large body of evidence showing that including unpublished studies that meet the inclusion criteria of a meta-analysis decreases (rather than increases) publication bias. Rather than exclude unpublished studies, we recommend that meta-analysts code study characteristics related to methodological quality (e.g., experimental vs. nonexperimental design) and test whether these factors influence the meta-analytic results.     

The validity of dietary restraint scales: comment on Stice et al. (2004)

In 4 empirical studies, E. Stice, M. Fisher, and M. R. Lowe calculated the correlations between some widely used dietary restraint scales and food intake. Failing to find substantial negative correlations, they concluded that these scales were invalid. The current article challenges this conclusion. For one thing, there is some evidence that restrained eaters do eat less than do unrestrained eaters under controlled experimental conditions favoring self-control. Dietary restraint is also associated with tendencies toward disinhibition under conditions favoring loss of self-control; such disinhibition often masks (but does not invalidate) the construct of dietary restraint. For these and other reasons, the assessment of food intake at a single eating episode may not capture overall dietary restriction. Finally, how much one eats does not necessarily indicate whether one has eaten less than one desired to eat. The authors suggest that the existing restraint scales do in fact validly assess restriction of food intake, albeit in a more complex fashion than is evident from simple correlations in single episodes.     

Evaluating the MSCEIT V2.0 via CFA: comment on Mayer et al. (2003)

This investigation uncovered several substantial errors in the confirmatory factor analysis results reported by J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, D. R. Caruso, and G. Sitarenios (see record 2003-02341-015). Specifically, the values associated with the close-fit indices (normed fit index, Tucker-Lewis Index, and root-mean-square error of approximation) are inaccurate. A reanalysis of the Mayer et al. subscale intercorrelation matrix provided accurate values of the close-fit indices, which resulted in different evaluations of the models tested by J. D. Mayer et al. Contrary to J. D. Mayer et al., the 1-factor model and the 2-factor model did not provide good fit. Although the 4-factor model was still considered good fitting, the non-constrained 4-factor model yielded a non-positive definite matrix, which was interpreted to be due to the fact that two of the branch-level factors (Perceiving and Facilitating) were collinear, suggesting that a model with 4 factors was implausible.     

Questioning the goal-switching account of the AB: comment on Ferlazzo et al. (2007)

Identification of the second of two targets (T2) is impaired when presented less than about 500?ms after the first (T1; Attentional Blink: AB). Although the AB is known to be remarkably robust across many manipulations, [Ferlazzo, F., Lucido, S., Di Nocera, F., Fagioli, S., &; Sdoia, S. (2007). Switching between goals mediates the attentional blink effect. Experimental Psychology, 54, 89–98; Ferlazzo, F., Faglioli, S., Sdoia, S., &; Di Nocera, F. (2008). Goal-completion processes affect the attentional blink. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 20, 697–710] found it to be substantially attenuated when the observers were set to accomplish a single goal (e.g. reporting the sum of the T1 and T2 digits) instead of a dual goal (reporting T1 and T2 separately). The larger AB obtained with the dual-goal set was ascribed to the attentional switch necessitated by the goal-switch between T1 and T2. This conclusion is questionable on three grounds: non-equivalent scoring procedures across conditions, range of inter-target lags, and unreliability of the baseline level. These issues were addressed in the present study. Contrary to Ferlazzo et al.’s conclusions, we found no AB attenuation in the single-goal, relative to the dual-goal condition.     

Possible confounds and their resolution in multivariate genetic analyses: comment on Bussell et al. (1999)

Assumptions behind the twin, sibling, and stepsibling design used in the Nonshared Environment in Adolescent Development study are considered. The D. A. Bussell et al. (1999) analyses of behavior in relationships indicate effects of both genetic and common-environment factors. Possible real and artifactual sources of the common environment include assortative mating, sibling interaction, failure of the equal environments assumption, and contaminated measures. Another potential source, specific to this study, is the effect of an individual in the mutual ratings of relationship with sibling, which would lead to a larger common-environment effect across variables than within variables. This alternative model did not indicate that there was a mutual rating effect. Univariate analyses confirm that the common-environment effect is present for both sibling and parent-child relationships. Most other potential sources of common environment, such as sibling interaction, do not account for the data.     

Mediated and convergent lexical priming in language production: a comment on Levelt et al. (1991)

Levelt et al. (1991) argued that modular semantic and phonological stage theories of lexical access in language production are to be preferred over interactive spreading-activation theories (e.g., Dell, 1986). As evidence, they show no mediated semantic-phonological priming during picture naming: Retrieval of sheep primes goat, but the activation of goat is not transmitted to its phonological relative, goal. This research reconciles this result with spreading-activation theories and shows how the absence of mediated priming coexists with the convergent priming necessary to account for mixed semantic-phonological speech errors. The analysis leads to the proposal that the language-production system may best be characterized as globally modular but locally interactive.     

An evaluation of a computational model of lexical access: comment on Dell et al. (1997)

The computational model of lexical access proposed by G. S. Dell, M. F. Schwartz, N. Martin, E. M. Saffran, and D. A. Gagnon (1997) is evaluated. They argued that fits of their model to naming data obtained from normal and brain-damaged patients support assumptions regarding interactivity in the lexicon, global damage in aphasia, and continuity between normal and aphasic naming behavior. Additional analysis reveals that the model fits the empirical data poorly and that the claims Dell et al. made on the basis of the model's performance would not follow even if the model were accurate. Although use of a novel automatic regression procedure improved the model's fit, it cannot account for 5 of Dell et al.'s 21 patients (24%), and its limitations were found to be inherent in its design. It is argued that claims such as those made by Dell et al. can only be addressed by considering evidence from multiple related tasks and by comparing multiple computational models.     

Depression, autonomic function, and cardiorespiratory fitness: comment on Hughes, et al. (2010)

A recent paper by Hughes and colleagues suggested that dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system in depressed cardiac patients was partly explained by reduced physical activity and fitness. Other data demonstrate that exercise training and improvements in fitness not only lead to improvements in autonomic function in coronary patients but also reduce depression and depression-related increased mortality.     

Bringing culture to basic psychological theory--beyond individualism and collectivism: comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeir (2002) offered a comprehensive literature review on individualism and collectivism that forwards valuable suggestions for ways to enhance future research conducted within this framework. The author argues that although their criticisms of much contemporary social psychological research on individualism and collectivism are valid, even more fundamental problems need to be recognized as characterizing work within this tradition, such as the insufficiently subtle nature of the views held of culture, the limited attention given to meanings, and the downplaying of contextual variation. The author suggests adopting more nuanced and process-oriented conceptions of culture and more contextually grounded views of its impact on psychological functioning as a way of realizing the promise of cultural psychology to broaden and provide insight into basic psychological theory.     

Supernumerary phantoms: a comment on Grossi, et al.'s (2002) spare thoughts on spare limbs

A recently published case report of a supernumerary phantom limb in a man with left-sided hemiplegia did not take note that this phenomenon has been extensively documented in the neurological literature for well over 100 years. The present comment provides a brief introduction to the clinical and experimental approaches to supernumerary phantom limbs. It also emphasizes the theoretical importance of this condition for understanding the neurological mechanisms subserving the experience of having a body.