Does decision making transfer across similar and dissimilar sports?

ObjectivesThe ability to make decisions under time pressure is crucial to performance in sport. However, there remains a paucity of research that examines whether the skills underpinning decision-making transfer across similar or dissimilar sports. We examine whether decision making transfers from soccer to other sports that may be deemed to be either similar (basketball) or dissimilar (tennis) based on sports taxonomy.MethodsSkilled soccer players (N = 20) completed a video-based temporal occlusion test designed to measure decision-making involving offensive sequences of play from soccer, basketball, and tennis. Participants were required to decide on an appropriate action to execute for each situation presented.ResultsResponse accuracy was higher in the soccer decision-making task compared to the basketball and tennis tasks. Furthermore, accuracy scores were higher on the basketball compared to the tennis task.ConclusionsThere appears to be some positive transfer of decision-making between sports that share similar elements, supporting the importance both of specificity and generality in expert performance.     

Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions

Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB-users’ decision behaviour in a memory-based decision task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-irrelevant information.     

Take The First: Option-generation and resulting choices

Experimental decision-making research often uses a task in which participants are presented with alternatives from which they must choose. Although tasks of this type may be useful in determining measures (e.g., preference) related to explicitly stated alternatives, they neglect an important aspect of many real-world decision-making environments—namely, the option-generation process. The goal of the present research is to extend previous literature that fills this void by presenting a model that attempts to describe the link between the use of different strategies and the subsequent option-generation process, as well as the resulting choice characteristics. Specifically, we examine the relationship between strategy use, number and order of generated options, choice quality, and dynamic inconsistency. “Take The First” is presented as a heuristic that operates in ill-defined tasks, based on our model assumptions. An experiment involving a realistic (sports) situation was conducted on suitable participants (athletes) to test the predictions of the model. Initial results support the model’s key predictions: strategies producing fewer generated options result in better and more consistent decisions.     

Should I Drive Today? Development of a daily driving decisions model for older adults

BackgroundOlder adults in communities make daily decisions about how to meet their transportation needs so they can access services and stay socially connected. With the aging of populations in developed countries, the travel decisions of older adults will have increasing impacts. Research studies have identified different sets of factors that contribute to certain travel decisions, but little research has been directed towards understanding how individuals select information from all available factors, what information they include in their decisions under different circumstances, and the processes they use in making their transportation decisions.MethodsThis exploratory study involved 20 men and 17 women, mean age 78.6 years (range 70–96), who drove weekly. All participants were involved in each phase of the 3-phase study. In Phase 1, a review of the literature and interviews with the participants was used to collect information, and inductive thematic analysis was employed to construct a draft conceptual model of older driver decision-making. In Phase 2, participants completed a stated preference task of written scenarios to demonstrate their decision-making strategies. Results were tabulated and used to refine a final Daily Driving Decisions model. In Phase 3, a card sorting decision task was used to test the model with participants.ResultsThe final dynamic Daily Driving Decisions Model was confirmed to describe decision processes used by the participants in making decisions about how they would meet their transportation needs. The model describes three categories of factors used in decisions, labelled Motivators, Constraint/Enablers and Context, each containing four attribute themes. A significant finding was the variable use of the same item to either constrain or enable the decision to drive depending on the variation of other factors in the scenario. Participants demonstrated use of compensatory and noncompensatory (heuristic, habitual) decision processes that were accommodated by the model.ConclusionThe proposed Daily Driving Decisions Model addresses a gap in our understanding of how older drivers make their decisions about meeting their transportation needs. The model presents a template for classifying the types of information used, ignored or discarded by older adults, and the pathways that they take to arrive at their decisions. The model provides opportunities for further research in testing the influence of other factors such as urban/rural residence, income, health status and culture on driving decisions. Further, the model can be used by practitioners to gain insight into the decision-making behaviours of individuals and to develop interventions to enhance their decision-making skills.     

Subjective experience guides betting decisions beyond accuracy: evidence from a metamemory illusion

The goal of this research was to test whether subjective memory experiences drive accuracy regulation decisions above and beyond objective memory indices. In four experiments (n?=?115) subjective recollection (i.e., reporting “Remember” in the Remember-Know task) was dissociated from memory accuracy by manipulating retrieval during a two-alternative forced-choice recognition task: in the Match condition the distracter was a novel exemplar of the target (e.g., a studied and an unstudied toaster) and in the Non-match condition the distracter was a novel exemplar of another studied but untested item (e.g., a studied toaster and an unstudied birdhouse). Participants were more accurate on Match trials, but reported subjective recollection more frequently on Non-match trials. Critically, participants also bet more often on Non-match trials to the detriment of their score (Experiment 1). This pattern persisted when participants were additionally required to retrieve details about items (Experiment 2) and when confidence assessments were collected (Experiment 3). Finally, participants bet more on Non-match trials even when subjective judgments were not elicited, suggesting that the decision process does not require reporting on subjective experience (Experiment 4). These results indicate that subjective memory experiences guide decision-making independent of objective accuracy and thus are critical to accuracy regulation.     

A Bayesian analysis of human decision-making on bandit problems

The bandit problem is a dynamic decision-making task that is simply described, well-suited to controlled laboratory study, and representative of a broad class of real-world problems. In bandit problems, people must choose between a set of alternatives, each with different unknown reward rates, to maximize the total reward they receive over a fixed number of trials. A key feature of the task is that it challenges people to balance the exploration of unfamiliar choices with the exploitation of familiar ones. We use a Bayesian model of optimal decision-making on the task, in which how people balance exploration with exploitation depends on their assumptions about the distribution of reward rates. We also use Bayesian model selection measures that assess how well people adhere to an optimal decision process, compared to simpler heuristic decision strategies. Using these models, we make inferences about the decision-making of 451 participants who completed a set of bandit problems, and relate various measures of their performance to other psychological variables, including psychometric assessments of cognitive abilities and personality traits. We find clear evidence of individual differences in the way the participants made decisions on the bandit problems, and some interesting correlations with measures of general intelligence.     

Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants’ memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants’ memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants’ decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.     

Risking Everything in Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder: An Analogue Decision-Making Study

An experiment examined decision-making processes among nonclinical participants with low or high levels of OCD symptomatology (N?=?303). To better simulate the decision environments that are most likely to be problematic for clients with OCD, we employed decision tasks that incorporated “black swan” options that have a very low probability but involve substantial loss. When faced with a choice between a safer option that involved no risk of loss or a riskier alternative with a very low probability of substantial loss, most participants chose the safer option regardless of OCD symptom level. However, when faced with choices between options that had similar expected values to the previous choices, but where each option had some low risk of a substantial loss, there was a significant shift towards riskier decisions. These effects were stronger when the task involved a contamination based, health-relevant decision task as compared to one with financial outcomes. The results suggest that both low and high symptom OC participants approach decisions involving risk-free options and decisions involving risky alternatives in qualitatively different ways. There was some evidence that measures of impulsivity were better predictors of the shift to risky decision making than OCD symptomatology.

     

Creative Metacognitive Feelings as a Source of Information for Creative Self-efficacy,Creativity Potential,Intrapersonal Idea Selection,and Task Enjoyment

Creativity scholars try to untangle the commonalities and differences between creative self-beliefs: creative self-efficacy, creative self-concept, creative metacognition, and creative role identity. While these efforts are already contributing significantly, we would like to suggest that for creative metacognition, we need to go beyond the assessment of confidence beliefs and regulation and include creative metacognitive feelings and intrapersonal idea selection as two additional components. To test the validity of our proposition, this study examined the influence of creative metacognitive feelings on creative self-efficacy, creative potential, accurate intrapersonal idea selection (agreement between individuals’ selection of their most creative idea and two independent judges’ selection of the participants’ best idea), and task enjoyment. To elicit metacognitive feelings, participants were randomly assigned to remember and write down two or six instances in their lives in which they generated novel and useful ideas that helped solve a problem. Participants then completed a questionnaire assessing creative self-efficacy, ease of recall as a proxy of metacognitive feelings, performance on a divergent thinking task, and task enjoyment. Results showed an indirect influence of recalling fewer examples on creative self-efficacy through its influence on metacognitive feelings. Metacognitive feelings then had an indirect influence, through creative self-efficacy, on creative potential and task enjoyment.     

Sport-specific decision-making in a Go/NoGo reaction task: difference among nonathletes and baseball and basketball players

The present study examined whether Go/Nogo reaction time (RT) is a relevant index of the sport expertise relating to sport-specific decision-making. 57 male university students, 20 basketball players, 24 baseball players, and 13 sedentary students as a control group, performed a Simple RT task and Go/NoGo RT task which had baseball specific stimulus-response relations. Participants in baseball and basketball differed further in having high, medium, and low experience in the sports. For comparisons across sports, the basketball and the baseball players had significantly shorter reaction times than the nonathletes in both tasks. In contrast, reaction times varied significantly across experience for the baseball players in the Go/NoGo RT task but not for basketball players. These results suggested that Go/NoGo RT could be used as an index of expertise for sport-specific decision-making, if stimulus-response relation in Go/NoGo RT task has a natural relation for a particular sport-domain.     

Decision Strategies and the Confidence–Accuracy Relationship in Face Recognition

The decision strategy used to select a choice set from an array of alternative options is known to affect the composition of the final choice set. Specifically, individuals incorporate more answers into their choice set when it is created by eliminating implausible items than when the set is created through the inclusion of plausible options. This difference is accounted for in a decision framework that posits a general reluctance to change the status quo (i.e., actively include or exclude an item). We extended this work to investigate, not only the decisions themselves, but also metacognitive judgments (i.e., confidence in the accuracy of the choice set). In two face recognition experiments, we tested the impact of decision strategy (Experiment 1) and confidence judgment strategy (Experiment 2) on the confidence–accuracy relationship. In Experiment 1, participants completed two blocks of recognition trials, one under inclusion (marking previously seen faces) and one under elimination (marking previously unseen faces) instructions. We observed superior resolution (i.e., discrimination between correct and incorrect) for inclusion trials, but only when they were completed prior to use of the elimination strategy. In Experiment 2, all participants completed face recognition trials under inclusion instructions, but we manipulated the strategy used to assess confidence. Again, we observed a significant impact of strategy on confidence–accuracy resolution. Thus, we observed that both the strategy employed to reach a decision and that employed to assess confidence affected the confidence–accuracy relationship. We discuss theoretical and applied (particularly for eyewitness identification and multiple‐choice testing) implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

High School Final Year Students’ Career Decision-Making Self-Efficacy,Attachment Styles and Gender Role Orientations

The purpose of this research was to investigate the relation between final year high school students’ career decision-making self-efficacy and attachment styles. The research group consisted of 808 final year students selected at random and receiving high school education in the province of Trabzon, Turkey in the 2013–2014 academic years. Participants completed a Personal Data Form prepared by the researchers, the Career Decision-Making Self-Efficacy Scale in order to measure career decision-making self-efficacy, the Relationship Scales Questionnaire and the BEM Gender role Inventory. Results showed that career decision making efficacy was significantly correlated with the secure and fearful and attachment styles, and career decision making self-efficacy varied according to gender roles. Subjects with masculine and feminine gender roles had greater career decision making self-efficacy than those with indeterminate roles, and those with androgynous roles had greater career making self-efficacy than those with masculine, feminine or indeterminate gender roles.     

Culture of honour theory and social anxiety: Cross-regional and sex differences in relationships among honour-concerns,social anxiety and reactive aggression

According to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007), certainty-associated emotions increase risk taking compared with uncertainty-associated emotions. To date, this general effect has only been shown in static judgement and decision-making paradigms; therefore, the present study tested the effect of certainty on risk taking in a sequential decision-making task. We hypothesised that the effect would be reversed due to the kind of processing involved, as certainty is considered to encourage heuristic processing that takes into account the emotional cues arising from previous decisions, whereas uncertainty leads to more systematic processing. One hundred and one female participants were induced to feel one of three emotions (film clips) before performing a decision-making task involving risk (Game of Dice Task; Brand et al., 2005). As expected, the angry and happy participants (certainty-associated emotions) were more likely than the fearful participants (uncertainty-associated emotion) to make safe decisions (vs. risky decisions).     

Beyond the gambling paradigm: internal controllability in decision-making.

Much research within decision-making has used the standard gambling paradigm, where decision outcomes depend only on chance. Many real life decisions, however, imply personal control over decision outcomes. This paper addressed the question of how internal controllability influences decision-making. Internal controllability is assumed (i) to enhance unrealistic optimism and (ii) to result in a better cost:benefit ratio. Both tendencies support each other and predict an enhanced attractiveness for internal and controllable choice options. Participants read a scenario and made a decision afterwards. Results supported the prediction: decision-makers take the option they can personally control. This finding widens the narrow perspective inherent in much previous research based on the gambling paradigm.     

Feedback on health status and peer popularity influences social risk decision-making processes in adolescents and young adults

Cognitive and dual-processes models, involving cognitive and socio-emotional components, for adolescents’ risky behaviour have been proposed. This study tested their predictions by manipulating the presence or absence of feedback about gains and losses in health and peer popularity in a decision-making task with peers. Risky (e.g., taking or refusing a drug) and ambiguous decisions (e.g., eating hamburger or hotdog) were examined in 256 adolescents (aged 13–14; 15–16; 17–18) and young adults (aged 19–20). Participants made more risky choices and required less decision time when receiving feedback about the negative consequences on health and positive consequences on peer popularity. Decision times were comparatively larger for risky than for safe options in late adolescence and young adulthood. Results supported the dual-processes model showing that, though late cognitive changes were observed that could eventually lead to the selection of safe options, feedback gains in peer popularity outweighed unhealthy consequences leading to risky decisions.     

Development of decision making: sequential versus integrative rules

Decisions can be made by applying a variety of decision-making rules-sequential rules in which decisions are based on a sequential evaluation of choice dimensions and the integrative normative rule in which decisions are based on an integration of choice dimensions. In this study, we investigated the developmental trajectory of such decision-making rules. In the Gambling Machine Task, participants choose between options that differ in three dimensions: frequency of loss, amount of loss, and certain gain. The task was administered to 231 children and adolescents (age range=8-17 years). Latent group analysis of their performance allowed precise classification of the underlying decision rules. The majority of participants used sequential decision rules, and the number of evaluated dimensions in these rules increased with age. Integrative rule use decreased with age. We discuss these results in light of traditional developmental theories and fuzzy trace theory.     

Training fast and frugal heuristics in military decision making

Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can be learnt and are as effective as analytic decision methods.     

Decision-making quality of younger and older adults in familiar and unfamiliar domains

Age-related differences in purchasing decisions were examined as a function of age and familiarity. On each trial, participants received purchasing options which varied in quality but ultimately cost the same amount of money. On half the trials, participants made decisions about items familiar to younger adults and on the other half of the trials, participants made decisions about products familiar to older adults. The participants’ task was to choose the option that provided the best value for the money. We were particularly interested in participants’ performance when inferencing was required to select the optimal option from the two choices. Younger adults outperformed older adults in unfamiliar but not familiar domains. It appeared that both younger and older adults used inferencing and elaborative processing to make the best decision in familiar domains but that only younger adults used inferencing and elaborative processing in unfamiliar domains.     

Contextual framing of loss impacts harm avoidance during risky spatial decisions

Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to spatial decisions. To investigate the impact of context on perceptual sensorimotor behavior, we superimposed two moral dilemmas (which we call help and harm) on a spatial decision-making paradigm. The basic task required participants select a target area while avoiding an overlapping nontarget area. Although the visuospatial task was constant, the moral context was changed when participants had to execute either a drone missile strike on enemies in the harm context or deliver ammunition to allies in the help context. Participants more strongly avoided losses in the harm context, reflected by a greater selection bias away from the nontarget (i.e., allies) on drone strike trials. These findings suggest that the contextual framing of a subjective perceived loss on a spatial decision can drive avoidant motor execution behavior.