The hippocampus and memory for "what," "where," and "when"

Previous studies have indicated that nonhuman animals might have a capacity for episodic-like recall reflected in memory for "what" events that happened "where" and "when". These studies did not identify the brain structures that are critical to this capacity. Here we trained rats to remember single training episodes, each composed of a series of odors presented in different places on an open field. Additional assessments examined the individual contributions of odor and spatial cues to judgments about the order of events. The results indicated that normal rats used a combination of spatial ("where") and olfactory ("what") cues to distinguish "when" events occurred. Rats with lesions of the hippocampus failed in using combinations of spatial and olfactory cues, even as evidence from probe tests and initial sampling behavior indicated spared capacities for perception of spatial and odor cues, as well as some form of memory for those individual cues. These findings indicate that rats integrate "what," "where," and "when" information in memory for single experiences, and that the hippocampus is critical to this capacity.     

The interclinician reliability of Rorschach interpretation in four data sets

To examine agreement on Rorschach Comprehensive System (CS; Exner, 2004) interpretations, 55 patient protocols were interpreted by 3 to 8 clinicians across 4 data sets on a representative set of 29 characteristics. Substantial reliability was observed across data sets, although a problematic design produced lower results in one. Unexpectedly, a Q-sort task had slightly lower reliability than a simple rating task. As expected, scales that summarized judgments had higher agreement than judgments to individual interpretive statements, and some clinicians produced more generalizable inferences than others. Interpretations for all clinicians were more strongly associated with patients' psychometric true scores (aggregated judgment M range = .82 to .92) than with the judgments of other clinicians (range = .76 to .89). Compared to meta-analyses of interrater reliability in psychology and medicine, the findings indicate these clinicians could reliably interpret Rorschach CS data.     

Diagnostic thinking processes: evidence from a constructive interaction study of electrocardiogram (ECG) interpretation

This paper examines the use of different types of knowledge at different levels of expertise in the domain of electrocardiogram (ECG) interpretation. Analyses of constructive interaction protocols from expert, novice and intermediate subjects working in same-skill pairs on six ECG traces indicated that: novice and intermediate pairs produced proportionately more trace characterizing statements than the other groups; expert pairs produced proportionately more clinical hypothesis statements and proportionately fewer but more complex biomedical inference statements than the other groups. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interpreting instructional cues in task switching procedures: the role of mediator retrieval

In 3 experiments the role of mediators in task switching with transparent and nontransparent cues was examined. Subjects switched between magnitude (greater or less than 5) and parity (odd or even) judgments of single digits. A cue-target congruency effect indicated mediator use: subjects responded faster to congruent cue-target combinations (e.g., ODD-3) than to incongruent cue-target combinations (e.g., ODD-4). Experiment 1 revealed significant congruency effects with transparent word cues (ODD, EVEN, HIGH, and LOW) and with relatively transparent letter cues (O, E, H, and L) but not with nontransparent letter cues (D, V, G, and W). Experiment 2 revealed significant congruency effects after subjects who were trained with nontransparent letter cues were informed of the relations between cues and word mediators halfway through the experiment. Experiment 3 showed that congruency effects with relatively transparent letter cues diminished over 10 sessions of practice, suggesting that subjects used mediators less as practice progressed. The results are discussed in terms of the role of mediators in interpreting instructional cues.     

Teachability of Reflective Processes in Written Composition

Reflective thought, as sustained in writing, is attributed to two-way communication between a content problem space and a rhetorical problem space. An instructional experiment involving sixth-graders aimed at helping them sustain such a two-way process independently, in place of the more typical one-way process of generating content and writing it out. Instruction included modeling of thinking aloud, both by instructors and students, use of cues to stimulate self-questioning during planning monologues, and direct strategy instruction emphasizing dialectical synthesis of conflicting ideas. Increased numbers of reflective statements in thinking-aloud protocols and rated reflectiveness of compositions indicate gains were made at the level of reflection on individual ideas.     

Take a look at the bright side: effects of contrast polarity on gaze direction judgments

Observers are inaccurate when judging the gaze direction of eyes shown in negative rather than positive polarity. On the basis of this polarity effect, it has been proposed that gaze is perceived as directed from the dark part of the eye. Our experiment investigated whether direction judgments simply follow this heuristic, as has been suggested. Participants judged the gaze direction of eyes shown at different eccentricities in positive or negative polarity. The error pattern revealed that most errors were incorrect "straight" judgments, suggesting that judgments do not merely follow the heuristic "the dark part does the looking." We suggest that gaze judgments are based on the outcome of a competition between gaze direction signals: Whereas luminance cues may indicate that gaze is directed from the dark part of the eye, geometric cues may indicate the opposite. This interpretation is supported by reduced overall error rates, and fewer incorrect "straight" responses, for more extreme gaze directions.     

Judgments of Sexual Harassment Court Case Summaries

Understanding third-person judgments of sexual harassment is important because of their role in bystander intervention, popular opinion, and perhaps even labeling experiences as harassment. We employed Brunswikian principles of representative design (sampling from natural environments and allowing environmental factors influencing judgments to intercorrelate) and multiple regression plus relative weight analyses to examine judgments about summaries of actual U.S. sexual harassment court cases. Potential factors influencing judgments (cues) were identified and coded by raters. Results suggest that naturally occurring cues were intercorrelated to some extent, and people use different aspects of these rich situations to make judgments. We also found that some less-studied cues (i.e., target's withdrawal from the workplace, number of incidents) are more important than that the previous research would suggest, while some often-studied cues (i.e., status of the harasser, target's response to the harasser) are less important. Participants overall used very few cues, even when many were available. Future research should employ Brunswik's representative design to use more realistic scenarios that allow for intercorrelated, naturally occurring cues. Especially if results can be replicated, theories about how judgments of sexual harassment are made can be developed that reflect the complex realities of sexual harassment judgments that our study revealed. Representative design could also be employed to help theory development in other scenario-based areas of organizational research. Ours is the first study of judgments of sexual harassment that used a Brunswikian approach to study actual court case summaries. This has allowed for a unique examination of this complicated phenomenon.     

Inferring Emotions From Multiple Cues: Revealing Age-Related Differences in "How" Without Differences in "Can"

This study examined differences in children's use of social cues to make emotional inferences. Children ages 4, 5, and 8 years were presented with stimuli that depicted another child in affectively congruous and affectively incongruous expression/situation combinations. The intensity of positive and negative facial expressions was varied across situations. Subjects judged the target's feelings and selected among the alternative facial expressions or situations the one they had just seen. No significant age-related differences were found in the extent to which children registered and used both the expressive and situational information when making emotional inferences. The main experimental measure asked children to explain their judgments. In explaining their judgments, subjects' rationales indicated that they: (a) used both the situational and expressive cues; and (b) were sensitive to congruous versus incongruous cues, and even to mild versus strong incongruous cues. Children's rationales also reflected a sensitivity to expressive and situational negativity. For each age group, the rationales were more elaborate when the cues were problematic. Characteristic strategies, however, were also found for each age group. These distinct strategies may reflect social-life changes in children's social "theories" of emotion.     

Arguments from Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias

Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (Informal Log 33:57–79, 2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert judgments under uncertainty are not significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not influenced by the cognitive biases novice judgments are influenced by, and find it wanting, too, because of empirical evidence suggesting that experts are vulnerable to pretty much the same cognitive biases that novices are vulnerable to. If this is correct, then the basic assumption at the core of accounts of arguments from expert opinion, namely, that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, remains unjustified.     

Individual differences in thinking-aloud performance

A key method in current research on thinking is to have subjects think aloud as they work on some task. Considerable individual differences usually emerge in the quantity and quality of thinking-aloud records. This article reports an experimental sudy of such individual differences. Subjects took Cattell’s 16-PF personality test, a self-relevation scale, and a test of verbal fluency. The 35 subjects then attempted three 8-puzzle tasks under thinking-aloud instructions. The resulting thinking-aloud records (protocols) were scored in terms of length, number of words per puzzle move, number of goal references, and number of goal references per move. The different protocol measures intercorrelated highly in each problem. Furthermore, each of the protocol measures correlated over different puzzles; that is, someone who produced a long protocol on one problem tended to produce a long protocol on other problems. However, none of the protocol measures correlated with any of the personality scores or with the verbal fluency measure. It is concluded that there is consistency within individuals in protocol quantity and completeness, and that this tendency merits further investigation.     

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.     

Incomplete Information, Inferences, and Individual Differences: The Case of Environmental Judgments

A model for inference of missing information is explicated and tested in two studies (Ns = 74, 76) of judgments about two environmental issues (endangered species reintroduction and the siting of a waste processing facility). Participants made judgments of scenarios in which information relevant to the judgment was varied orthogonally and, in some cases, relevant information was missing. The results showed individual differences-as well as intraindividual differences-in the assumptions participants made about missing information and in the tendency to infer missing cues. Reported assumptions about missing information predicted some aspects of the judgments. The data for only a small minority (15%) of the participants were consistent with the inferred values model. Participants may use different methods for dealing with missing information at different times or may not generally follow either an inference or averaging model in such contexts. Less favorable judgments were given for scenarios with incomplete information (the "penalty" effect), and this effect showed individual and intraindividual variation that was related to reported assumptions about missing information. We discuss the implications of these results for societal conflicts over controversial issues and for understanding the sources of individual differences in judgments. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Integrating multiple cues to depth order at object boundaries

We examined the interaction between motion and stereo cues to depth order along object boundaries. Relative depth was conveyed by a change in the speed of image motion across a boundary (motion parallax), the disappearance of features on a surface moving behind an occluding object (motion occlusion), or a difference in the stereo disparity of adjacent surfaces. We compared the perceived depth orders for different combinations of cues, incorporating conditions with conflicting depth orders and conditions with varying reliability of the individual cues. We observed large differences in performance between subjects, ranging from those whose depth order judgments were driven largely by the stereo disparity cues to those whose judgments were dominated by motion occlusion. The relative strength of these cues influenced individual subjects' behavior in conditions of cue conflict and reduced reliability.     

Anticipation skill and susceptibility to deceptive movement

The ability to detect deceptive movement was examined in skilled and novice rugby players. Participants (14 per group) attempted to predict direction change from video of expert and recreational rugby players changing direction with and without deceptive movement. Confidence associated with judgments was recorded on each trial to seek evidence regarding use of inferential (heuristic-based) and direct-perceptual (invariant-based) judgments. Novices were found to be susceptible to deceptive movement whereas skilled participants were not; however, both skilled and novice participants were more confident on trials containing deceptive movement. The data suggest that the skill-level difference in sensitivity to advance visual information extends to deceptive information. The implications of this finding, and the importance of considering the underlying process of anticipation skill, are discussed.     

Judging trustworthiness from faces: Emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments in young children

By adulthood, people judge trustworthiness from appearances rapidly and reliably. However, we know little about these judgments in children. This novel study investigates the developmental trajectory of explicit trust judgments from faces, and the contribution made by emotion cues across age groups. Five‐, 7‐, 10‐year‐olds, and adults rated the trustworthiness of trustworthy and untrustworthy faces with neutral expressions. The same participants also rated faces displaying overt happy and angry expressions, allowing us to investigate whether emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments similarly in children and adults. Results revealed that the ability to evaluate the trustworthiness of faces emerges in childhood, but may not be adult like until 10 years of age. Moreover, we show that emotion cues modulate trust judgments in young children, as well as adults. Anger cues diminished the appearance of trustworthiness for participants from 5 years of age and happy cues increased it, although this effect did not consistently emerge until later in childhood, that is, 10 years of age. These associations also extended to more subtle emotion cues present in neutral faces. Our results indicate that young children are sensitive to facial trustworthiness, and suggest that similar expression cues modulate these judgments in children and adults.     

Gender recognition depends on type of movement and motor skill. Analyzing and perceiving biological motion in musical and nonmusical tasks

Gender recognition in point-light displays was investigated with regard to body morphology cues and motion cues of human motion performed with different levels of technical skill. Gestures of male and female orchestral conductors were recorded with a motion capture system while they conducted excerpts from a Mendelssohn string symphony to musicians. Point-light displays of conductors were presented to observers under the following conditions: visual-only, auditory-only, audiovisual, and two non-conducting conditions (walking and static images). Observers distinguished between male and female conductors in gait and static images, but not in visual-only and auditory-only conducting conditions. Across all conductors, gender recognition for audiovisual stimuli was better than chance, yet significantly less reliable than for gait. Separate analyses for two groups of conductors indicated an expertise effect in that novice conductors' gender was perceived above chance level for visual-only and audiovisual conducting, while skilled conducting gestures of experts did not afford gender-specific cues. In these conditions, participants may have ignored the body morphology cues that led to correct judgments for static images. Results point to a response bias such that conductors were more often judged to be male. Thus judgment accuracy depended both on the conductors' level of expertise as well as on the observers' concepts, suggesting that perceivable differences between men and women may diminish for highly trained movements of experienced individuals.     

A Brunswik lens model of consumer health judgments of packaged foods

Consumer health judgments of packaged food were compared with an objective healthfulness criterion using a Brunswik lens model. Consumer judgments were obtained from a representative consumer sample (N = 1329) who evaluated the healthfulness of 198 packaged food products. The objective healthfulness criterion was calculated for each product according to its specific nutrition values using a validated nutrition profile. The lens model included explicit cues such as nutrition values, nutrition and health claims, food category, and brand and implicit cues such a packaging design and category representativeness. The study revealed that the objective healthfulness criterion is highly predictable on the basis of cues such as the food category, brand, carbohydrate content, and whether the food is a typical “light” product. However, consumer judgments of food healthfulness are based almost entirely on the food category and to a lesser extent on the brand and consumer familiarity with the product. The results are in conflict with consumers' self‐reported use of nutrition information but are in accordance with findings from studies using implicit methods. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fooled by first impressions? Reexamining the diagnostic value of appearance-based inferences

We often form opinions about the characteristics of others from single, static samples of their appearance - the very first thing we see when, or even before, we meet them. These inferences occur spontaneously, rapidly, and can impact decisions in a variety of important domains. A crucial question, then, is whether appearance-based inferences are accurate. Using a naturalistic data set of more than 1 million appearance-based judgments obtained from a popular website (Study 1) and data from an online experiment involving over a thousand participants (Study 2), we evaluate the ability of human judges to infer the characteristics of others from their appearances. We find that judges are generally less accurate at predicting characteristics than they would be if they ignored appearance cues and instead only relied on their knowledge of characteristic base-rate frequencies. The findings suggest that appearances are overweighed in judgments and can have detrimental effects on accuracy. We conclude that future research should (i) identify the specific visual cues that people use when they draw inferences from appearances, (ii) determine which of these cues promote or hinder accurate social judgments, and (iii) examine how inference goals and contexts moderate the use and diagnostic validity of these cues.     

The control of visual attention using multiple target features

An experiment was conducted to determine how visual attention is allocated in response to pairwise combinations of location, color, and size cues. Subjects viewed displays of eight letters arranged into an 'X' pattern emanating from a central fixation point. The letters varied on the dimensions of location (foveal or parafoveal positions), size (large or small), and color (red or blue). Seven of the letters were 'X's and the remaining, critical letter was either an 'R' or an 'L'. Subjects were given advance cues about characteristics of the critical letter on two of the three dimensions (location size, and color). The cues varied in their validity such that on any trial either both dimensions were validly cued, one dimension was validly cued while the other was invalidly cued, or both cues were invalid. Subjects were instructed to try to use the cues to find the critical letter, and response times to identify it as an 'R' or an 'L' served as the main dependent measure. Two models were evaluated against the data; in one, location cues are viewed as having distinct effects on an early stage of attention whereas color and size cues operate only in a later, selection stage. In the other model, all cues are used in a similar way to select display items for serial, focal attention. In general, the serial processing model provides a more complete account of the data.     

Predicting others’ knowledge: Knowledge estimation as cue utilization

Predicting what others know is vital to countless social and educational interactions. For example, the ability of teachers to accurately estimate what knowledge students have has been identified as a crucial component of effective teaching. I propose the knowledge estimation as cue-utilization framework, in which judges use a variety of available and salient metacognitive cues to estimate what others know. In three experiments, I tested three hypotheses of this framework: namely, that participants do not automatically ground estimates of others’ knowledge in their own knowledge, that judgment conditions shift how participants weight different cues, and that participants differentially weight cues based upon their diagnosticity. Predictions of others’ knowledge were dynamically generated by judges who weighed a variety of available and salient cues. Just as the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring of one’s own learning depends upon the conditions under which judgments of self are elicited, the bases and accuracy of metacognitive judgments for others depends upon the conditions under which they are elicited.