I think,therefore I am? Examining conceptions of the self,soul, and mind

In order to delineate among conceptions of the self, soul, and mind, participants reported where they believe these entities are located in the body and provided definitions of each entity. Results indicated that most people consider the self, soul, and mind localized in specific regions in the body. In contrast to previous research, however, some participants reported that the self is not centralized in one location. Participants tended to locate the self and mind in the head and the soul in the chest. The self and mind were commonly defined in mental terms and the soul as one’s essence. These results suggest that people tend to distinguish the soul from the mind, both in how they define each entity and where they locate them in the body. Although some people locate the soul in the same region as the self, most people more closely align the mind with the self.     

We talk,therefore we think? A cultural analysis of the effect of talking on thinking

The Western assumption that talking is connected to thinking is not shared in the East. The research examines how the actual psychology of individuals reflects these different cultural assumptions. In Study 1, Asian Americans and European Americans thought aloud while solving reasoning problems. Talking impaired Asian Americans' performance but not that of European Americans. Study 2 showed that participants' beliefs about talking and thinking are correlated with how talking affects performance, and suggested that cultural difference in modes of thinking can explain the difference in the effect of talking. Study 3 showed that talking impaired Asian Americans' performance because they tend to use internal speech less than European Americans. Results illuminate the importance of cultural understanding of psychology for a multicultural society.     

Leonid Stolovich,Filosofija – Estetika – Smekh

Studies in East European Thought -     

THE MANAGEMENT OF DEPRESSION – ANALYTIC,ANTIDEPRESSANTS OR BOTH?

Patients with depression cover the spectrum, in terms of severity of psychopathology, between those receptive to analytic psychotherapy and those that require treatment with medication. In this paper, the author demonstrates how an analytic framework of understanding has a place in the latter group, and can aid general psychiatrists in relation to their depressed patients. It will be demonstrated, with clinical illustrations, how analytic thinking can help to make sense of many of the symptoms of depression, including early-morning wakening, diurnal mood variation, agoraphobia and hypochondriasis. It is also important to help the supportive relative with their countertransference experiences, when their partner is undergoing a depressive episode. Finally, the notion of a pathological ego-destructive superego taking over the driving-seat in depression is explored. The need to unseat it and replace it with a more mature superego provides an overall framework of approach to the treatment of depression.     

Training attentional control and working memory – Is younger,better?

Authors have argued that various forms of interventions may be more effective in younger children. Is cognitive training also more effective, the earlier the training is applied? We review evidence suggesting that functional neural networks, including those subserving attentional control, may be more unspecialised and undifferentiated earlier in development. We also discuss evidence suggesting that certain skills such as attentional control may be important as ‘hub’ cognitive domains, gating the subsequent acquisition of skills in other areas. Both of these factors suggest that attentional training administered to younger individuals ought to be relatively more effective in improving cognitive functioning across domains. We evaluate studies that have administered forms of cognitive training targeting various subcomponents of attention and the closely related domain of working memory, and we contrast their reported transfer to distal cognitive domains as a function of the age of the participants. Although negative findings continue to be common in this literature we find that cognitive training applied to younger individuals tends to lead to significantly more widespread transfer of training effects. We conclude that future work in this area should concentrate on understanding early intensive training, and discuss a number of practical steps that might help to achieve this aim.     

Causal Compatibilism – What Chance?

Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation.     

Der informierte Trinker – wozu?

Das Schlagwort vom mündigen Patienten macht derzeit die Runde in allen gesundheitspolitischen Diskussionen. Dabei ist nicht ganz klar, ob es sich um ein Einfordern von Patientenrechten auf Information und Mitgestaltung des therapeutischen Prozesses – sowohl auf der individuellen als auch auf der gesellschaftlichen Ebene (Mitspracherecht von Patientenvertretern bei der Planung von gesundheitspolitischen Ma?nahmen, Finanzierung von Therapieprogrammen etc.) – oder eher um das Abschieben von therapeutischer Verantwortung mit dem Hintergedanken, dass sich der Patient ja aussuchen k?nne, für welche Behandlungsmethode er sich entschlie?e, wie intensiv er mitarbeite und wie eigenverantwortlich er therapeutische Empfehlungen umsetze, handelt.     

Perversion – structure or organization?

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss perversion, its implications in the clinical setting, and some of the key concepts around it. First, the etymology of the words “perversion”, “structure”, and “organization” is analyzed. Next follows a discussion on the sexual organization of instincts – from the Unconscious to the Oedipus complex in Freud and Lacan – setting the ground for a disavowal-based theory of perversion. An instructive approach has been chosen so as better to organize the various points presented.

Laender NR et al. Perversion – Struktur oder Organisation?

Der Aufsatz diskutiert die Perversion, ihre Auswirkungen im klinischen Setting und einige Schlüsselkonzepte. Zuerst wird die Herkunft der Wörter Perversion, Struktur und Organisation analysiert. Dann folgt eine Diskussion über die Organisation der Sexualität bzw. der Instinkte – vom Unbewussten bis zum Ödipuskomplex bei Freud und Lacan – wodurch eine Theorie der Perversion auf der Basis von Ablehnung begründet wird. Ein instruktiver Zugang, bei dem die verschiedenen Punkte von Interesse gut strukturiert sind, wurde gewählt.

Laender NR et al . Perversion – organización o estructura?

Este trabajo intenta discutir la perversión, sus implicaciones en la clínica y algunos de los conceptos clave alrededor de la perversión.

Primero, es analizada la etimología de las palabras Perversión, Estructura y Organización. Despúes sigue una discusión sobre la organización sexual de los instintos- desde lo Inconsciente hasta el complejo de Edipo en Freud y Lacan- planteando las bases para una teoría de la negación-desaprobación de la perversión.

Para organizar mejor los varios aspectos presentados se escogió una aproximación instructiva.     

Flat intentions – crazy dispositions?

Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions with strong internal conditions are capable of rationality. This paper explores in how far a broadly dispositional view of intention supports their claims. Its first point will come as a surprise: Intentions indeed involve dispositions toward follies in plenty. Natural objections against this bizarre-sounding claim are shown to fail, and standard counterfactual analyses of disposition locutions are shown to underpin it further. However, since the dispositions at issue are pro tanto dispositions, the consequences are not as odd as might be expected: When hedged by reasonable habits to reconsider one’s intentions, dispositions toward follies do not entail any actual crazy behavior. On balance, unconditional intention is therefore found rational after all. Dispositions toward crazy actions need not be crazy dispositions.     

Higher education, democracy and citizenship – the democratic potential of the university?

From a historical point of view, theuniversity as an institution has had the roleof educating an elite, rather than any obvioustask of enforcing democracy. But what kind ofexpectations regarding citizenship anddemocracy can we justifiably have when it comesto the role of higher education and ouruniversities today when higher education isundergoing a process of massification. Couldthe university eventually become a place fordeliberative communication, developingdeliberative qualities among its many students?According to the contributions presented here –stemming from a conference on the theme``Higher education, democracy and citizenship'',held at Örebro university, Sweden 2000 –the answer is yes, to some extent, if there isroom for pluralism in different dimensions,opportunities to challenge one's own tradition,and tolerance and respect for the concreteother.     

Wilhelm Reich – Ein blinder Seher?

The authors examine the extent to which the development of Wilhelm Reich’s ideas that led from Freud’s understanding of libido through marxism to sex-economy, from character-analysis to vegeto-therapy, from the orgasm reflex to the cosmic life energy “orgone”, might possibly be supported by a logic other than the one that Reich understood as "scientific". In so doing the authors differentiate the latent content from its manifest version and argue that if one focuses on the manifest content of Reich’s ideas, it is obvious that Reich ideologically falls back on the position of the “true socialists”, that his orgone theory ultimately re-vitalised the “new, true religion” Feuerbach’s (Engels 1888, p. 34) and that even Reich’s fetishization of genital love as a natural binding agent of human society finds its counterpart in Feuerbach. However, if one adds the latent content of Reich’s considerations, the unfolding of Reich’s ideas also presents the increasing reification of the human subject in its natural disguise as it emerged – in the light of historical materialism – under the social circumstances within which Reich developed his ideas. The authors develop the thesis that Reich’s misunderstanding of social processes as natural laws was not by coincidence but was due to the natural veil those processes were deceptively encircled. For as long as people keep the inner structure of their society beyond their social consciousness, they do not know what they are doing, so that the results of their social activity take on the appearance of being brought about by practical constraints caused by natural laws.     

Dialectic – a universal for consciousness?

Dialectic is a word of many meanings but used here in the classical sense of the apposition of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis. The first, counterfactual phase is expressible symbolically by the symmetric difference $, “one or the other, but not both”. The second, synthesis phase is taken here to correspond to the complement ∼$, consisting of commonality and context within the universe of discourse. After a brief discussion of parallels between “events” in quantum theory and the dialectical pair ($, ∼$), it is argued that the latter is more fundamental for brain and mind. Consciousness is “carved at the joints” as comprising basic awareness (=not-unconscious), self-awareness, perception and cognition factored by attention, and emotion. The dialectical pair ($, ∼$) is then referred to Working Memory and Long-Term Memory, categories both mathematical and psychological, knowledge and learning, negotiation and dialogue, problem solving, affect and emotion, and brain structure and function. Coupling previous work by the author for the ($, ∼$) model with the present analysis, it is concluded that the dialectical pair provides a universal for consciousness parallel to its known universal property for the most general sorts of equivalences in mathematics.     

Global news – global identity? The relationship between media consumption,perception of identity,and ethnocentrism

In line with the common ingroup identity model, the present research investigated whether factors beyond contact conditions are associated with the emergence of a shared identity perception and outgroup attitudes. Concretely, we reasoned that higher consumption of global news would be positively related to a stronger global identity, which in turn would be negatively correlated with ethnocentrism. In contrast, consumption of local news should be associated with a local identity, which would then be positively related to ethnocentrism. To test these ideas, one cross-sectional (N = 576) and one longitudinal study (N = 410) were carried out at an Austrian university. As hypothesized, global news consumption was associated with a stronger global identity, which then accounted for reduced ethnocentrism. However, only in the cross-sectional study, we found empirical evidence that local news interest is positively correlated with ethnocentrism mediated by local identity.     

No unchallengeable epistemic authority,of any sort,regarding our own conscious experience – Contra Dennett?

Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say that even though we may be mistaken about what our conscious experience is, our reports about “what it’s like to be us” must be correct. That view unfortunately requires a nonstandard and unremarked distinction between facts about consciousness and facts about “what it’s like.” Third, Dennett says that reports about experience may be “incorrigible.” However, that claim stands in tension with evidence, highlighted by Dennett himself, that seems to suggest that people can be demonstrably mistaken about their own experience. Dennett needlessly muddies his case against infallibilism with these unsatisfactory compromises.     

Relevance differently affects the truth,acceptability, and probability evaluations of “and”, “but”, “therefore”, and “if–then”

In this study, we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and “and”/“but”/“therefore” sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege–Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across the two experiments, a strong dissociation was found. The reason-relation reading of all four sentences strongly affected their probability and acceptability evaluations, but hardly affected their respective truth evaluations. Implications of this result for recent work on indicative conditionals are discussed.