Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem

Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blackburn's ' quasi -realist project', i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I show, however, that simple negated contexts provide a fundamental difficulty, since accepting the negation of a sentence is easily confused with merely refusing to accept that sentence. I argue that Blackburn's model-set semantics for his 'Hooray!' and 'Boo!' operators requires logical apparatus to which he is not entitled. I consider various modifications, but show that they do not succeed.
email : n.unwin@bolton.ac.uk     

A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-following

A modest solution to the problem(s) of rule-following is defended against Kripkensteinian scepticism about meaning. Even though parts of it generalise to other concepts, the theory as a whole applies to response-dependent concepts only. It is argued that the finiteness problem is not nearly as pressing for such concepts as it may be for some other kinds of concepts. Furthermore, the modest theory uses a notion of justification as sensitivity to countervailing conditions in order to solve the justification problem. Finally, in order to solve the normativity problem, it relies on substantial specifications of normal conditions such as those that have been proposed by Crispin Wright and Mark Johnston, rather than on Philip Pettit's functionalist specification. This theory is modest in that it does not meet the demands of Kripke's sceptic in full. Arguments are provided as to why this is not needed.     

Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism

The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non‐normative cases, and this problem is solved once the hidden quantificational structure involved in such cases is uncovered; 2) the terms ‘required’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’ can also be analyzed in terms of hidden quantificational structure, and the Negation Problem disappears once this hidden structure is uncovered; 3) the Negation Problem does not arise for normative language that has no hidden quantificational structure. We conclude that the Negation Problem is not really a problem about expressivism at all but is rather a feature of the quantificational structure of the required, permitted, and forbidden.     

Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic

All expressivist theories, including Gibbard's norm-expressivism, require a solution to the 'Frege–Geach problem', or 'embedding problem'. This is the problem of accounting for the fact that normative predicates can enter into indefinitely many complex contexts without changing their meanings. I argue that Gibbard's well known solution fails. The chief difficulty is with negated contexts, specifically the distinction between refusing to accept a normative judgement and accepting its negation. Gibbard overlooks this distinction, and, more generally, overlooks the fact that norm-expressivists cannot explain what is meant by ruling out the content of a normative state, as opposed to ruling out its possession. I show this to have fundamental repercussions, and I cast serious doubt on the viability of expressivist theories of this type.     

A Paraconsistent Solution to the Problem of Moral Dilemmas

Abstract

Moral dilemmas - situations in which an agent has a moral requirement to do each of two acts but cannot do both - seem to suggest some kind of inconsistency. I argue that the inconsistency felt intuitively is actually a logical inconsistency, and then go on to show that we can neither deny the existence of moral dilemmas nor give up the deontic principles involved in the deduction of a contradiction, as both our moral judgements and the deontic principles depend on intuitions that form the basis of our morality. Rather than rejecting our intuitions and thus undermining morality, I suggest regarding moral dilemmas as situations in which a contradiction is not only false, but at the same time true. Finally, the view that moral dilemmas are an example of true contradictions - so-called dialetheias - leads to the application of paraconsistent logic to moral judgements.     

A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience

Journal of Philosophical Logic - The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of...     

A Holist Deontological Solution to the All or Nothing Problem

Philosophia - The All or Nothing Problem is a paradox developed in recent debates about effective altruism. One argues that the paradox can be resolved by rejecting some of its claims in favor of...     

A State-of-Affairs-Semantic Solution to the Problem of Extensionality in Free Logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic - If one takes seriously the idea that a scientific language must be extensional, and accepts Quine’s notion of truth-value-related extensionality, and also...     

Defining Background Information: A Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This paper discusses an aspect of the problem of old evidence which I call here the general problem of old evidence. The probability of old...     

Reasons for Randomness: A Solution to the Axiological Problem for Theists

Abstract

In this paper we bring to light several ways randomness—i.e., undetermined and unintended events—may contribute to our understanding of God's providence and personality. We begin by making clearer a certain problem that randomness has been thought to pose to theism. We then discuss recent criticisms of certain contemporary solutions to this problem that emphasize the value of an autonomous creation. From there, we propose a fresh way of understanding the value of a semi-autonomous creation that does not succumb to these recent critiques. Our end goal is to explore new reasons God might have to value randomness. In particular, we highlight two plausible, interrelated candidate values: (1) There are certain aesthetic properties that a partially random, self-forming creation enjoys; and (2) Such a creation grants God and creatures certain pleasures, such as wonder, anticipation, curiosity, surprise, and appreciation. In articulating our version of the autonomy defense, we position it within two opposing accounts of divine providence, specifically open theism and simple foreknowledge.     

Another Solution to the Problem of Theoretical Terms

In this paper, a solution to the problem of theoretical terms is developed that is based on Carnap’s doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine will be given a semantic, model-theoretic explanation that is not given by Carnap himself as he remains content with a syntactic explanation. From that semantic explanation, rules for the truth-value assignment to postulates, i.e. sentences that determine the meaning of theoretical terms, are derived. The logical status of postulates will be clarified thereby in such a way that the problem of theoretical terms disappears.

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Self‐Esteem: A Human Solution to the Problem of Death

Terror management theory (TMT) posits that the need for self‐esteem develops out of the socialization process in which children learn to abide by parental and, eventually, societal standards of ‘goodness’ to feel securely embedded in a cultural belief system. According to TMT, feeling safely immersed in a meaningful conception of reality (i.e., the cultural worldview) ultimately functions to protect people from anxiety due to the uniquely human capacity to be cognizant of their eventual death. After presenting the basic tenets of this perspective, we review several lines of research supporting it and then address some common questions and criticisms of the theory such as how is a TMT view of anxiety consistent with evolutionary principles, why do people commit suicide, and how is self‐esteem pursued in non‐Western, self‐effacing cultures? Finally, we discuss some implications of TMT for understanding social problems and for pursuing meaning and self‐esteem in healthier, more socially productive ways.     

Negation: A rejoinder to Wales and Grieve

Wales and Grieve (1969) report an experiment in which they show that a factor of “confusability” affects the comprehension of affirmative and negative sentences, and then claim that this is a relevant factor in explaining the difficulty of negatives. The present paper submits arguments and experimental evidence to dispute this claim.     

Consciousness and Hegel's Solution to the Problem of the Criterion

Traditional epistemological interpretations have portrayed Hegel as offering a coherentist solution to the problem of the criterion in the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit. In this paper, I criticize the coherentist interpretation and present an alternative reading that emphasizes the central role of conscious experience in Hegel's argument. In the first part of the paper, I show how the passages commonly used to support the coherentist interpretation ultimately fail to do so and argue that coherence by itself cannot be the lynchpin for an adequate solution to the problem of the criterion. In the second part, I then develop a novel interpretation of Hegel's argument by drawing attention to the fact that Hegel formulates both the problem of the criterion and his solution to it in terms of consciousness.