I Think,Therefore I Persist

Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2?+?2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2?+?2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal and the screen in front of you is blank. Then at some point an image of a peach is flashed on the screen. The image isn't up there for long. In fact, it's only on the screen for what seems like an instant—just long enough for you to see it. These two scenarios are a bit mundane. But, as I will show, reflection on them can yield significant results concerning the nature of persons and their persistence through time. First I will show that thought and perception have temporal constraints whereby your thinking or perceiving in the above scenarios implies that you exist through a temporally extended interval. Then I will argue that this allows us to rule out several prominent theories of personal identity.     

I OUGHT,THEREFORE I CAN

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.     

I Am Who I Am and Who I Am Needs no Excuses

The journey to becoming a counselor may be long or difficult. For others, the journey is simply moving from one career to another. This is a summary of author's journey to become a counselor, including his experiences as a member of the clergy.     

The good I will,I do not

For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do-Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. (Romans 7:19–20)A sermon delivered on November 16, 1958, in James Memorial Chapel. Reprinted by permission from Union Seminary Quarterly Review.     

I Ought to Reply,So I Can

Philosophia - I have elsewhere given three arguments for the claim that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action only if this person can perform this action. Henne, Semler, Chituc,...     

I Belong

ABSTRACT

This essay focuses on the experience of an immigrant returning for a visit to her home country after forty years. She describes her surprise at finding herself “at home,” her changed relationship to her family, and her desire to be buried in her ancestors' crypt. She alludes to the immigrant's fate of not belonging to either country.     

I think I can, I think I can: Examining the within-person coupling of control beliefs and cognition in older adults

We examined short-term intraindividual variability in control beliefs (competence and locus of control) and cognitive performance and the extent to which the constructs travel together over time. Thirty-six older adults (M = 74 years, SD = 5.51) completed questionnaires and cognitive tests twice each day for 60 consecutive days. Results indicated that control beliefs fluctuate within people across time. Multilevel models revealed that control and competence are coupled with concurrent and subsequent performance, but the benefit of occasion-level increases in control depends on individuals' average control. These findings underscore the importance of examining constructs using a within-person approach to identify dynamic processes in cognitive aging. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).