试析道教劝善书中的生态伦理思想

道教劝善书作为一种伦理道德教化书 ,其中所述的伦理道德规范不仅用以调节人与人之间、人与社会之间的相互关系 ,而且还进一步推广到调节人与动植物、人与自然的关系 ;它主张自然界生命的平等性 ,倡导“贵生”的生命情怀 ,提出“是道则进 ,非道则退”的生态伦理行为准则 ,从而形成了具有神学特征的以生命为中心的生态伦理观。     

道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

Agency,human nature and character in Kantian theory

Conclusion In order for the duty of friendship to be practically possible, and for gratitude and beneficence to be unencumbered virtues, Kant need not have held that human beings are basically good. He need only have understood that they are social beings, with desires for both independence and connection, autonomy and affiliation, and purposes that are not always merely their own. I have argued that because he did not, his moral theory is flawed in three important respects.In Kant's theory, morality is only possible because humans are rational, and necessary because (absent morality) they are self-interested individuals, egoistically motivated, distrustful and isolated. When this view is applied to particular questions of friendship and the virtues, it becomes a distorting medium. It is my contention that a more adequate theory of character would result from the application of Kantian moral principles to a sounder, more social conception of human nature.In conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I am not arguing that human beings are basically good, only that they are essentially social. In his political writings Kant has emphasized the social dimension of reason itself, and I believe he would agree with Thomas Nagel's recent claim about human nature and morality: To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain conceptions and ways of thinking have achieved dominance, a dominance which is precarious in any case.

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Religious factors in moral decision-making: Towards an integrated,socio-cultural,developmental, model

Abstract

For far too long, developmental approaches in the psychology of religion have paid insufficient attention to the richness and variety of social and cultural factors in human development and their relationship to religious belief, practice, belonging, identity, and world views, and often, related framing of spiritual questions, concerns, and disciplines. If scholars in the psychology of human development and psychology of religion have offered critical appraisals of the shortcomings of the neo-Piagetian, cognitive-developmental models that have dominated the scientific literature, and offered promising contributions and needed correctives to the omissions of cognitive-developmental approaches, the field is still in need of an integrated, socio-cultural developmental approach to human development and religious functioning. In this article we propose one way of moving toward a more integrated approach in these fields, with special attention to the advantages of such an effort in the study of religious elements in moral decision-making and moral development.     

Evolutionary Ethics and the Status of Non-Human Animals

ABSTRACT If we accept that the behaviour of humans and other animals is very substantially channelled by evolutionary constraints, it might appear that there can be no place for animals within the protection of a human system of morality.
However, the nature of plausible evolutionary constraints on the cognition of social animals, including humans, suggests that this is not so. It is likely that the most important element in our morality is the capacity to imagine the feelings of other individuals, and this capacity is so important for our ability to understand and predict their behaviour that it would be likely to be preserved by evolution even if moral behaviour had no survival value in its own right. We also use this kind of imaginative sympathy to understand and predict the behaviour of other animals, and it is this which provides the main reason for the inclusion of such animals within a human moral system. The primitive elements of morality have a survival value that is probably common to many other social species of animals. Since one of our reasons for putting a special value on human life is the human capacity for moral behaviour, we ought also to view members of these species as being of special significance.     

科技时代的替代经验与道德的个人亲证问题

人对自己生活于其中的科技时代的批判,是与人的自我意识一同发生的。当今世界,科技已越来越被当作自主的、异在于人的并沿着非人性化的惯性而展开的过程。如何对这一过程重新进行人化?如何使现代人具有科技进步时代的人的内容的清醒意识?这是每一个人文学者必须给予严肃关注的问题。从道德本性的角度视之,科技社会所制造的大量的替代经验对道德实践基础的蚕食和颠覆,具有根本的决定性的作用。因此,在科技社会中如何确立实践智慧、个人亲证在道德领域里的独立性,对于避免当代人的“道德孤儿”的命运,便具有头等重要的意义。     

Embodied and Embedded Morality: Divinity, Identity, and Disgust

Our understanding of human morality would benefit from an integrated interdisciplinary approach, built on the assumption that human beings are multidimensional unities with real, irreducible, and mutually interdependent spiritual, relational, emotional, rational, and physiological aspects. We could integrate relevant information from neurobiological, psychosocial, and theological perspectives, avoiding unnecessary reductionism and naturalism. This approach is modeled by addressing the particular limited role of disgust in morality. Psychosocial research reveals disgust as a universal emotion that enables evaluation and regulation of certain moral behaviors and is involved in cultural identity. Theologically, many religious traditions, including the Judeo‐Christian, use disgust in conjunction with moral codes designed to preserve purity and communal identity as the people of God. The concept of natural moral law suggests that morality is embodied in human nature. Neurobiology is beginning to trace the neural circuitry involved in disgust and in moral evaluation, suggesting that emotions are a necessary basis for moral judgment and revealing intriguing relationships between disgust, morality, and other aspects of the psyche. Several problems that arise within these disciplines and at their intersections are identified. Extension of the model to other aspects of human morality would further illuminate our understanding of morality without sacrificing its complexity and richness.     

Harmony and Justice

The reason why justice and harmony are the most-prized values and the highest aims of human beings is that these qualities are the foundation which makes possible the realization of all other positive goals. Interpersonal conflicts and conflicts between individuals and the society lead to social, cultural, and moral crises. Confucian culture argues that moral reason is only possessed by human beings, and that this is what can make human existence harmonious and rational. Harmony creates power, and power can defeat impediments. As a result, physical qualities are humanized, and moral qualities increase. Goodness promotes the establishment of mutually beneficial systems and procedural justice in a society. Therefore, Chinese traditional culture provides a method for resolving contemporary social conflicts and crises, including accumulating goodness to increase virtue, constructing social integrity and harmonious righteousness, and the building up of a just society.     

Coordinating with others: Outlining a pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood

In contrast to individualistic, cognitive-biological, and reductive psychologies, a pragmatic psychology of personhood takes the worldly activity of persons as its core subject matter. The pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood outlined herein offers theoretical frameworks for understanding the development and evolution of persons through their embodied coordination with objects and others in a world that is simultaneously biophysical and sociocultural. In both phylogenesis and ontogenesis, it is their active participation within coordinated, multi-perspectival sequences of interactive practices that constitutes human beings as psychological selves and communal agents who constantly transform the world and themselves. The constitution, emergence, and transformation of persons are accompanied and enabled by a holistic neurophysiological functioning that interacts constantly with, and owes much to, our history of interactivity within the world, especially our social participation with others and their actions and perspectives. A viable pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood demands the close study of our coordinated interactivity within sociocultural practices central to the life of communities and the communal agents who populate them.     

The Balance Between Providing Support,Prolonging Suffering,and Promoting Death: Ethical Issues Surrounding Psychological Treatment of a Terminally Ill Client

The concept of moral identity based on virtue ethics has become an issue of considerable import in explaining moral behavior. This attempt to offer adequate explanations of the full range of morally relevant human behavior inevitably provokes boundary issues between ethics and moral psychology. In terms of the relationship between the two disciplines, some argue for “naturalized (or psychologized) morality,” whereas, on the other hand, others insist on “moralized psychology.” This article investigates the relationship between virtue ethics and moral identity based on previous research on the relationship between ethics and moral psychology. This article especially attempts to show that meaningful links between the two concepts possible by using theoretical frameworks constructed by the most influential philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos.     

Prosociality and morality through the lens of personality psychology

Prosociality and morality are critical to the functioning and flourishing of society. There is, however, great variation in the degree to which individuals help or hinder one another, or adhere to ethical standards of “rightness.” One way to understand this variation is by drawing on theories and models within personality psychology, which may illuminate the basic individual characteristics that drive a wide range of other-regarding tendencies. In this review, we provide a snapshot of three research strands addressing these themes. The first concerns how personality traits map onto prosocial preferences for fairness and cooperation, as studied using classic social decision-making tasks called economic games. The second concerns the robust associations between personality traits and indicators of inter-group prejudice (e.g., authoritarian ideology). The third concerns the emerging concept of moral exceptionality, and the personality traits that may characterise individuals at the forefront of moral progress. These examples demonstrate the core role that personality psychology is playing in the study of prosocial and moral behaviour, as well as the critical mass emerging in the Australian context around these themes.     

Polish students’ attitudes towards sexuality

The following article contains an analysis of medicine and pedagogy students’ attitudes towards sexuality. These attitudes were studied with the use of a scale of author’s own construction. The scale was used to determine: (1) the nature of respondents’ attitudes towards individual aspects of sexuality including several criteria: quality of life, health, acceptability, and morality; and (2) respondents’ preferences of normative regulations of sexual behaviours. It was found that the respondents accept love as relatively the most important aspect for the quality of life, and sex education (seen as a moral aspect). Students also give positive scores to physical aspects of sexuality, yet the scores are lower. Natural contraception in all its aspects is evaluated positively, whereas artificial contraception is evaluated ambiguously, similarly to masturbation and homosexuality. The fundamental norm in regulating sexual behaviour is the welfare of other human beings, the least important are the teachings of the Church.     

Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame

In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we also tend to commit a kind of fundamental attribution error with respect to moral responsibility and blame. Do we also tend to ignore situational factors and overconfidently assume that people are morally responsible and blameworthy for their distinctive patterns of wrongful behaviour? Very few scholars have addressed this issue, and none has ever given a comprehensive account of moral responsibility and blame from a situationist perspective. In this paper, I argue that situationist social psychology impugns subjective theories of responsibility and blame which focus on the agent’s inner states and supports an objective theory—namely, the standard of the reasonable person. I defend this standard as a tool for moral appraisal, and then I refute the common misperception that this approach lets most perpetrators off the hook and poses a threat to society.     

Agency, Nature, Transcendence, and Moralism: A Review of Recent Work in Moral Psychology

Recent work in moral and philosophical psychology provides valuable resources for religious ethicists, and this review examines contributions by Julia Annas, Annette Baier, John Bowlin, John McDowell, and William Wainwright. This literature raises important questions about the character of human moral beingas naturalistic, about whether an explicitly supernatural morality can be other than inevitably "moralistic," and about how that might be so. Nonetheless, religious ethicists should appropriate it only with care, particularly in its emphasis on naturalism, and the partiality of its appropriation of ancient thinkers.     

Preschoolers' social dominance, moral cognition, and moral behavior: an evolutionary perspective

Various aspects of moral functioning, aggression, and positive peer regard were assessed in 153 preschool children. Our hypotheses were inspired by an evolutionary approach to morality that construes moral norms as tools of the social elite. Accordingly, children were also rated for social dominance and strategies for its attainment. We predicted that aspects of moral functioning would be only loosely related to each other and that moral cognitions about rules (unlike emotion attributions and moral internalization) would demonstrate patterns suggestive of instrumentality. Results showed that cognitions about moral rules and internalized conscience were unrelated and that sociomoral behavior was more strongly related to the latter than to the former. In addition, promoting group norms (Selective Moral Engagement) positively predicted social dominance, whereas internalized conscience negatively predicted social dominance. Children who controlled resources via both prosocial and coercive means (i.e., bistrategic) showed enhanced moral cognitions about rules (despite high levels of aggression) but had deficits in emotional aspects of moral functioning in the eyes of teachers. Patterns of Selective Moral Engagement invite comparisons to tattling and impression management. The findings are contrasted with alternative hypotheses that are advanced from traditional yet prevailing approaches.     

The Values of Confucian Benevolence and the Universality of the Confucian Way of Extending Love

The spirit of Confucianism, which holds benevolence as its core value, has positive significance in the dialogue between civilizations and in the construction of global ethics. The values represented in Confucian benevolence are similar to the values in Christian Charity. Confucian values such as the doctrine of magnanimity, the idea of putting oneself in the place of another, and the Confucian way of extending love and favors, are crucial resources to hold in close connection with the relationship between human beings and nature, individuals and society, self and others, and one and oneself. The Confucian idea of “differentiated love” is a concrete and practical idea, which can be extended to be “universal love.” Furthermore, the Confucian way of extending love can also be interpreted as eco-ethical: On the one hand, Confucianism affirms the intrinsic value of the universe and calls for a universal moral concern for the ecological world; on the other hand, it recognizes a distinction between human beings and the nature, revealing an eco-ethical awareness of distinction and a consciousness of the differentiation between different ethical spheres. In extracting the instrumental value of ecological resources, Confucians never disregard the intrinsic value of animals and plants. Confucianism puts emphasis on subjectivity, especially the subjectivity of morality. Relationships between man and himself, between self and others, however, are inter-subjective. For Confucians, the universe exists and grows in the process of perfecting oneself, others, and the world. Such an understanding is of modern significance for the exchange and dialogue between civilizations, and the growth of personality and the mental regulation of gentleman today.     

The Art of Becoming Human: Morality in Kant and Confucius

Kant and Confucius maintain that the art of becoming human is synonymous with the unending process of becoming moral. According to Kant, I must imagine a world in which the universality of my maxims were possible, while realizing that if such a world existed, then morality would disappear. Morality is an impossible possibility because it always meets resistance in our encounter with nature. According to Confucius, human beings become moral by integrating themselves into the already meaningful natural order that is tian 天. Like Kant, he upholds the dignity of human beings. For Kant this dignity rests on the autonomy of each human being’s reason, while for Confucius it is dependent upon our interconnection with each other, demanding ongoing self-extension. Despite these differences, the two thinkers would concur that our efforts at humanization are unceasing and that we may never fully live up to our human potential.     

先秦礼文化凸显的道德生活

先秦礼文化是中国传统文化的重要组成部分,它以制度化的形式存在于先秦社会的方方面面,包括先秦礼俗、礼制、礼学和礼教等主要内容。先秦礼文化的核心是伦理道德,它通过一定的仪式来确立协调天(神)人关系、家庭关系、政治关系以及社会交往等伦理关系的道德规范,以此维护现存社会的稳定和秩序。具体而言,包括以敬神为核心的宗教伦理、以人与自然和谐为主要内容的环境伦理、以孝亲为核心的家庭伦理、以忠君为核心的政治伦理、以尚德尚齿为核心的社会伦理等内容。     

Moral Progress and Human Agency

The idea of moral progress is a necessary presupposition of action for beings like us. We must believe that moral progress is possible and that it might have been realized in human experience, if we are to be confident that continued human action can have any morally constructive point. I discuss the implications of this truth for moral psychology. I also show that once we understand the complex nature and the complicated social sources of moral progress, we will appreciate why we cannot construct a plausible comprehensive action-guiding theory of moral progress. Yet while the nature and sources of moral progress consistently thwart many theoretical hopes, the idea of moral progress is a plausible, critically important and morally constructive principle of historical interpretation.