Evolutionary Psychology： How Psychological Mechanisms Shaped by Natural Selection for Ancestral Environments Produce Current Behaviours

The central purpose of this paper is to explain how Darwin′s theory of evolution by natural selection can be used in understanding current human behaviour. First, Darwin′s logic is briefly described. Development is an important issue when applying evolutionary theory to human behaviour. The notion of innate developmental organization of psychological mechanisms is introduced. The possible social and political outcomes produced when different levels of innate developmental organization are paired with differ...     

Gene–environment interdependence

The modern understanding of genetic influences, of environmental effects, of mental disorder, and of heritabilities is noted. The practical utility of finding susceptibility genes with a very small effect is questioned. The empirical findings and implications of developmental perturbations, epigenetics, gene–environment correlations and interactions are then discussed. It is noted that the genes involved in gene–environment interactions may be concerned with susceptibility to all environments and not just adverse ones.     

Three Laws of Behavior Genetics and What They Mean

Behavior genetics has demonstrated that genetic variance is an important component of variation for all behavioral outcomes, but variation among families is not. These results have led some critics of behavior genetics to conclude that heritability is so ubiquitous as to have few consequences for scientific understanding of development, while some behavior genetic partisans have concluded that family environment is not an important cause of developmental outcomes. Both views are incorrect. Genotype is in fact a more systematic source of variability than environment, but for reasons that are methodological rather than substantive. Development is fundamentally nonlinear, interactive, and difficult to control experimentally. Twin studies offer a useful methodological shortcut, but do not show that genes are more fundamental than environments.     

Applying cognitive training to target executive functions during early development

Developmental psychopathology is increasingly recognizing the importance of distinguishing causal processes (i.e., the mechanisms that cause a disease) from developmental outcomes (i.e., the symptoms of the disorder as it is eventually diagnosed). Targeting causal processes early in disordered development may be more effective than waiting until outcomes are established and then trying to reverse the pathogenic process. In this review, I evaluate evidence suggesting that neural and behavioral plasticity may be greatest at very early stages of development. I also describe correlational evidence suggesting that, across a number of conditions, early emerging individual differences in attentional control and working memory may play a role in mediating later-developing differences in academic and other forms of learning. I review the currently small number of studies that applied direct and indirect cognitive training targeted at young individuals and discuss methodological challenges associated with targeting this age group. I also discuss a number of ways in which early, targeted cognitive training may be used to help us understand the developmental mechanisms subserving typical and atypical cognitive development.     

Hedonic possibilities and heritability statistics

Several influential psychologists have attempted to estimate to what extent human happiness levels are directly controlled by genes by comparing the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart. If we discover that the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart tend to be closer than the happiness levels of fraternal twins raised apart, this is taken as evidence that average happiness levels are largely controlled by genes. However, if it turns out that identical twins' happiness levels tend to be substantially different, as different as fraternal twins raised apart, it has been argued that this implies that the environment largely determines happiness levels. I contend that this interpretation of the data rests on a set of questionable, closely related assumptions: a) that pairs of identical twins raised apart are raised in substantially different environments; b) that genetically identical twins aren't identical in other pertinent ways; and c) that average levels of affect that are correlated with certain sets of genes in the environments the twin studies were conducted in will be correlated with those genes in other relevant environments because those genes govern average affect levels. In this paper, I will show that these assumptions are false and explain how to properly go about investigating the contingent causal links between genes and happiness. In the end, I argue that there is no good evidence that our genes delimit our hedonic potential and that the fact that this misinterpretation of the data has been widely disseminated is potentially harmful to human well-being.     

The second law of thermodynamics is the first law of psychology: evolutionary developmental psychology and the theory of tandem, coordinated inheritances: comment on Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003)

Organisms inherit a set of environmental regularities as well as genes, and these two inheritances repeatedly encounter each other across generations. This repetition drives natural selection to coordinate the interplay of stably replicated genes with stably persisting environmental regularities, so that this web of interactions produces the reliable development of a functionally organized design. Selection is the only known counterweight to the tendency of physical systems to lose rather than grow functional organization. This means that the individually unique and unpredictable factors in the web of developmental interactions are a disordering threat to normal development. Selection built anti-entropic mechanisms into organisms to orchestrate transactions with environments so that they have some chance of being organization-building and reproduction-enhancing rather than disordering.     

Trouble Ahead: Predicting Antisocial Trajectories with Dynamic Systems Concepts and Methods

This paper reviews and evaluates a set of studies that utilize dynamic systems (DS) principles, and in two cases dynamic systems methods, for predicting antisocial development and other behavioral outcomes. I suggest that the emphasis of DS approaches on process and nonlinear causation is very different from the emphasis in developmental psychopathology on prediction, yet the marriage of these approaches is necessary to capture the complex interactions that give rise to problematic trajectories. The studies reviewed do indeed uncover predictive relations that would have been difficult to conceptualize or impossible to find using more traditional strategies. In discussing these studies. I suggest DS interpretations of emerging individual differences, phase-specific change, sleeper effects, mediating variables, and behavioral rigidity versus malleability, in the context of developmental prediction. I also discuss the advantages of moving from DS concepts to DS methods in clinical-developmental research.     

Gene Concepts and Genethics: Beyond Exceptionalism

The discursive explosion that was provoked by the new genetics could support the impression that the ethical and social problems posed by the new genetics are somehow exceptional in their very nature. According to this view we are faced with special ethical and social problems that create a challenge so fundamental that the special label of genethics is needless to justify. The historical account regarding the evolution of the gene concepts could serve us to highlight the limits of what we know about genes and what we can do with genes. The widespread notion about the exceptionality of genetic knowledge and its applicative possibilities is hardly justifiable and leads to misunderstandings regarding the conceptualization of the ethical and social problems we might face. Following a more realistic interpretation of the role of genes in human life we might avoid a whole set of fictive dilemmas and counterproductive regulatory efforts in bioethics. Bioethical discourse should move from the gene-centered scientific discourse toward the more sophisticated and complex discourses where human development represented as a matter of complex interactions between genomes and environments, between genes, educational factors, nutritional regimes, and other different developmental resources. If a gene is seen as one among the different developmental resources that are shaping a given human trait then both genethics and genetic exceptionalism could hardly be represented as a justified approach in discussing the ethical and social problems of genetics.     

Dopamine and serotonin systems modify environmental effects on human behavior: A review

The relative influences of genetic and environmental factors in the development of human behavior have been a long‐term topic for an intense debate. Recent behavioral genetic studies suggest focusing on the joint effect of genes and environment, and especially on the life‐course developmental interplay between nature and nurture. Vulnerability to environmental adversities and sensitivity to its benefits may be conditional on genetic background, and regarding psychological outcomes, these kinds of gene × environment interactions may be of higher importance than direct gene–trait associations. In our recent series of studies, we have shown that different variants of serotonergic and dopaminergic genes may moderate the influence of environmental conditions on a range of psychological outcomes, i.e. temperament, depression, hostility, and educational attainment. These studies suggest that depending on their genotype, people may be differentially sensitive to the environmental conditions they encounter. In the light of these results it seems highly plausible that the effects of genes may become evident only when studied in the context of environmental factors.     

Deviations in the emergence of representations: a neuroconstructivist framework for analysing developmental disorders

A common way of studying developmental disorders is to adopt a static neuropsychological deficit approach, in which the brain is characterized in terms of a normal brain with some parts or ‘modules’ impaired. In this paper we outline a neuroconstructivist approach in which developmental disorders are viewed as alternative developmental trajectories in the emergence of representations within neural networks. As a concrete instantiation of the assumptions underlying this general approach, we present a number of simulations in an artificial neural network model. The representations that emerge under different architectural, input and developmental timing conditions are then analysed within a multi‐dimensional state space. We explore alternative developmental trajectories in these simulations, demonstrating how initial differences in the same parameter can lead to very different outcomes, and conversely how different starting states can sometimes result in similar end states (phenotypes). We conclude that the assumptions of the neuroconstructivist approach are likely to be more appropriate for analysing developmental deviations in complex dynamic neural networks, such as the human brain.     

Optimizing Expression of the Common Human Genome for Child Development

Molecular biology has moved the gene-environment issue in behavior genetics to how and when expression of the human genome is triggered and maintained. How does environment influence gene expression? How many genes are expressed in producing a given behavior? The genome is a data bank and does not automatically create a working brain. The body and brain grow well when (a) endocrine hormones initiate and promote the expression of genes, (b) nutrition is sufficient to sustain the production of proteins, and (c) stress does not suppress gene expression. The growth of brain synapses also requires appropriate neural stimulation. To study gene expression, it is essential to view the complex biology of the cell from a system context that includes the entire genome plus the biological and psychological environments. Optimizing geneexpression for child growth can be achieved by a balance of medicine, nutrition, and appropriate physical, educational, and psychological environments.     

What Is the Word on Self-Motives and Social Perception: Introduction to the Special Issue

Although social, personality, and developmental psychologists have focused on the determinants, processes, and outcomes of social perception on the one hand and self-perception on the other, they have only occasionally explored the relations between the two. In this introduction, I explain how this special issue is designed to explore the links between self- and social perception. In particular, I suggest that perceptions of self and the social world are intrinsically linked because each are influenced by the exact same self-motives, such as the desire to achieve beneficial outcomes for the self, or to maintain the psychic benefits of a positive self-image. Each in its own way, the articles that comprise this special issue illustrate this basic link between the self- and social perception.     

The growth of developmental thought: Implications for a new evolutionary psychology

Evolution has come to be increasingly discussed in terms of changes in developmental processes rather than simply in terms of changes in gene frequencies. This shift is based in large part on the recognition that since all phenotypic traits arise during ontogeny as products of individual development, a primary basis for evolutionary change must be variations in the patterns and processes of development. Further, the products of development are epigenetic, not just genetic, and this is the case even when considering the evolutionary process. These insights have led investigators to reconsider the established notion of genes as the primary cause of development, opening the door to research programs focused on identifying how genetic and non-genetic factors coact to guide and constrain the process of development and its outcomes. I explore this growth of developmental thought and its implications for the achievement of a unified theory of heredity, development, and evolution and consider its implications for the realization of a new, developmentally based evolutionary psychology.     

Is level of prematurity a risk/plasticity factor at three years of age?

Children born preterm have poorer outcomes than children born full-term, but the caregiving environment can ameliorate some of these differences. Recent research has proposed that preterm birth may be a plasticity factor, leading to better outcomes for preterm than full-term infants in higher quality environments. This analysis uses data from two waves of an Irish study of children (at 9 months and 3 years of age, n = 11,134 children) and their caregivers (n = 11,132 mothers, n = 9998 fathers) to investigate differences in how caregiving affects social, cognitive, and motor skills between full-term, late preterm, and very preterm children. Results indicate that parental emotional distress and quality of attachment are important for child outcomes. Both being born very preterm and late preterm continue to be risk factors for poorer outcomes at 3 years of age. Only fathers’ emotional distress significantly moderated the effect of prematurity on infants’ cognitive and social outcomes—no other interactions between prematurity and environment were significant. These interactions were somewhat in line with diathesis stress, but the effect sizes were too small to provide strong support for this model. There is no evidence that preterm birth is a plasticity factor.     

Rethinking the explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science

In this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues.     

Executive function and developmental disorders: the flip side of the coin

Several common developmental disorders emerge during early to middle childhood (e.g. autism, attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder) and are associated with impairments in executive function (EF). Contrary to the prevailing view, I suggest that, within populations at-risk, the association with EF is found because individuals with strong EF skills are better able to compensate for atypicalities in other brain systems early in life, and are therefore less likely to receive a diagnosis later in life. I discuss evidence consistent with this view from considerations of individual variability, neuroimaging, and genetics. To the extent that this view is correct, it offers hope for remediation of some later emerging symptoms, as evidence from typical groups indicates that training programs for EF in preschoolers may be effective in improving skills.     

Development and the epigenome: the ‘synapse’ of gene–environment interplay

This paper argues that there is a revolution afoot in the developmental science of gene–environment interplay. We summarize, for an audience of developmental researchers and clinicians, how epigenetic processes – chromatin structural modifications that regulate gene expression without changing DNA sequences – may offer a strong, parsimonious account for the convergence of genetic and contextual variation in the genesis of adaptive and maladaptive development. Epigenetic processes may play a plausible explanatory role in understanding: divergent trajectories and sexual dimorphisms in brain development; statistical interactions between genes and environments; the biological embedding of early psychosocial adversities; the linkages of such adversities to disorders of mental health; the striking individual variation in the strength of those linkages; the molecular origins of critical and sensitive periods; and the transgenerational inheritance of risk and protection. Taken together, these arguments converge in a claim that epigenetic processes constitute a promising and illuminating point of connection – a ‘synapse’ – between genes and environments.     

Developmental psychology in the real world: A paradigm of parent education

Twenty years ago, William Kessen, Greta Fein and I developed and tested a model of parent education, a model which involved variation in curricular content, didactic approaches, and child outcomes–experimentally contrasted. Our experience yielded some valuable lessons about the extent to which researchers can influence parents' behaviour, and parents their children's development. In the present article I suggest that these lessons might be useful for researchers now as they were for us then. I present some observations about the research that developmental psychologists have done in the intervening two decades and suggest that we could learn much by using such a model of parent education to answer questions about the effets of parents' behaviour on children's development. Carefully done, parent education studies can yield valuable information about many of the questions raised in recent correlational research. Parent training research can suggest hypotheses that can be tested with data collected non-interventively and analysed in causal model analyses–and vice versa. What is more, because one reason for studying parent effects is so that we can offer guidance to parents about rearing their children, this design has a particular advantage; it is both the medium and the message.     

发展性协调障碍的神经机制

发展性协调障碍是一种特殊的发育障碍, 它的一个显著特征是动作协调困难, 这种障碍影响着5%~8%学龄儿童的学业成绩和日常生活。发展性协调障碍常常与其他类型的学习困难并存。发展性协调障碍的病因非常复杂, 这种障碍与一定程度的视觉空间认知能力受损有关, 早期精细运动技能发育与脑神经发育进程可能存在时间的重合。近年来, 研究者们试图探索影响发展性协调障碍的神经基础, 并先后提出不同的神经关联假说。这些理论假说主要涉及到小脑、顶叶、胼胝体、基底神经节和大脑白质等脑区。本文全面回顾了该领域研究的最新进展, 并提出未来研究应该关注的方向与问题。     

Is atypical development necessarily a window on the normal mind/brain?: The case of Williams syndrome

In this paper I challenge the accepted view that atypical development necessarily serves as a window on the normal mind/brain. Such a stance ignores the dynamics of development. Rather I submit that the development of many atypical groups cannot be thought of in terms of a normal brain with whole cortical circuits intact or impaired, as in the adult neuropsychological model, because the brains of genetically impaired children develop differently at multiple levels – brain anatomy, brain chemistry, temporal patterns of brain activity – throughout embryogenesis and postnatal development. This is briefly illustrated with reference to studies of Williams syndrome. It is argued that very subtle differences in developmental timing, neuronal density, neuronal efficiency, firing thresholds, transmitter types, synaptogenesis and pruning, may have crucial but very indirect effects on the resulting phenotypes, affecting certain systems more than others. Subtle differences at a much lower level than cognitive modules are likely to explain the range of phenotypical outcomes that humans can display.