Psychology between science and common sense: William James and the problems of psychological language in the Principles

The suspicion that language can become an obstacle to human knowledge is not new in the Western intellectual tradition. Following the empiricist legacy, many authors have suggested the perils and pitfalls of common sense language for science. Applied to psychology, this leads to the issue of the reliability of psychological language for scientific psychology. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, was one of the first psychologists to address this problem explicitly. The goal of this paper is to situate his position and contrast it with contemporary debates over the status of folk psychology. The results indicate that James conceived of common sense psychology in a very complex manner, and pointed to a kind of illusion that remains ignored in the current literature, with negative consequences for psychology. I conclude by suggesting the relevance of James for contemporary debates in theoretical and philosophical psychology.     

论威廉詹姆斯的心理学科学观

威廉?詹姆斯（William James, 1842-1910）被誉为“美国心理学之父”,他强烈反对当时学院派实验心理学家的小心理学观,在心理学史上第一次对他以前的心理学思想进行了整合,建构了一种整合的心理学科学观。他认为心理学既具有自然科学的性质,又具有人文科学的性质,这种科学观坚持心理学的人学性质,是一种“大心理学观”。詹姆斯的心理学科学观是解决当前心理学问题不可或缺的思想资源,对当前心理学研究工作具有重要的借鉴意义。     

On the Significance of William James to a Contemporary Doctrine of Evolutionary Psychology

Academic popularizers of the new field of evolutionary psychology make notable appeals to William James to bolster their doctrine. In particular, they cite James’ remark that humans have all the “impulses” animals do and many more besides to shore up their claim that people’s “instincts” account for their flexibility. This essay argues that these scholars misinterpret James on the instincts. Consciousness (which they find inscrutable) explains cognitive flexibility for James. The evolutionary psychologists’ appeal to James is, therefore, unwarranted and, given the conditions relevant to the public and professional audiences they address, also ineffective as a rhetorical tool for enlisting new recruits.

詹姆斯心理学的现象学转向及其理论意蕴

本文在阐明詹姆斯心理学的出发点、并考察其心理学思想的探索和突破的基础上指出,詹姆斯关于心理学的思想历程无疑经历了一个根本的转向;又结合与胡塞尔现象学的比较认为,转向之后的詹姆斯的心理学思想的潜在意义,只有借用胡塞尔现象学的思想框架和概念工具,才能得到有效的表达和进一步的发展。文章最后还暗示了詹姆斯心理学思想的现象学转向对于理解并构建心理学的学科同一性的潜在意义。     

威廉·詹姆斯与具身认知心理学

威廉·詹姆斯是美国心理学的创始人,被世人称为"美国心理学之父"。他创造了一整套的心理学理论,包括在具身认知兴起的过程中,他也发挥了重要的、不可替代的作用。而具身认知主要指在人们的认知过程中身体发挥着重要的关键作用,亦即认知是人们通过身体的具体体验及其活动方式而产生的。文章主要通过具身认知的兴起来了解在詹姆斯的一整套心理学理论中所包含的具身认知思想以及探究詹姆斯在其中发挥的重大作用。     

Toward a cumulative science of emotion: a functional-cognitive framework for emotion research

ABSTRACT

Definitions of emotion and emotional phenomena are often infused with intuitions and theoretical ideas about what is “truly” emotional. Although these intuitions and ideas motivate people to study emotion, their prominence at the conceptual level can hamper progress in emotion research. In this paper, we argue that there is merit in defining emotional phenomena as much as possible in terms of behavioural principles that have been developed outside of emotion research. We clarify that such a functional approach is compatible with, and can even strengthen, cognitive approaches to emotion research. This functional-cognitive perspective reveals ways to increase the cumulative nature of emotion research and to surpass initial intuitions and theoretical ideas.     

Learning from the existence of models: On psychic machines,tortoises, and computer simulations

Using four examples of models and computer simulations from the history of psychology, I discuss some of the methodological aspects involved in their construction and use, and I illustrate how the existence of a model can demonstrate the viability of a hypothesis that had previously been deemed impossible on a priori grounds. This shows a new way in which scientists can learn from models that extends the analysis of Morgan (1999), who has identified the construction and manipulation of models as those phases in which learning from models takes place.     

More than a feeling: Wittgenstein and William James on love and other emotions

One of the most significant features of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (written after he had completed most of the Philosophical Investigations) is his reflections on emotions. Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic was developed in direct response to his reading of William James’s chapter on emotions in his 1890 masterpiece, The Principles of Psychology. This paper examines the competing views of emotions that emerge in these works, both of which attempt to overcome the Cartesian dualist conception in different ways. The main point of disagreement concerns the relation between emotions and their bodily expression (e.g. the relation between grief and weeping). My interpretation focuses on Wittgenstein's remarks on the emotion of love because, I argue, it is a particularly problematic case. To elucidate his largely unexplored view of love, I draw on his remarks on understanding and criteria in the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that by examining the examples of complex emotions like love, we can arrive at a more accurate characterization of Wittgenstein's general view of mental concepts and mental phenomena.     

William James, Mind-Cure, and the Religion of Healthy-Mindedness

At the turn of the twentieth century, the mind-cure movement emphasized the healing power of positive emotions and beliefs. William James defended mind-cure during the Massachusetts legislature's debates on licensing physicians in 1894 and 1898. In The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) he used the movement's therapeutic claims to illustrate the typically American, practical turn of the religion of healthy-mindedness. Varieties sympathetically surveys mind-cure literature, but also criticizes healthy-minded religion for its limited range and refusal to confront tragedy and radical evil. Many of today's mind/body therapies continue the mind-cure tradition and retain the limitations that James noted.     

Harry Harlow: From the Other Side of the Desk

On the basis of her personal reminiscences the author provides a picture of Harry Harlow’s personality. Harlow emerges as an unassuming and witty person. Dr. Frank C.P. van der Horst (fhorst@fsw.leidenuniv.nl) of Leiden University stands as the person to address correspondence to.

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Ontological Epistemology: William James and the Chinese Traditional Philosophy of Experience

William James’s understanding of the concept of experience has much in common with ideas in Chinese traditional philosophy. This connection, however, has remained unexplored. Here we introduce the idea of ontological epistemology as a way to bring these important commonalities into view. By highlighting two features of the concept of experience in Chinese philosophy, we suggest that the perspectives of holism and relationism are common to both James and the Chinese tradition. With regard to the personal and impersonal characteristics of radical experience and its commensurability with Chinese philosophy, we will pay attention to the self-dissolving aspect of both. However, there are still some theoretical complexities that remain unresolved, which clearly show the possibility of further research in the comparative study of contemporary pragmatism and Chinese philosophy.     

William King’s Influence on Locke’s Second Edition Change of Mind about Human Action and Freedom

ABSTRACT

Locke’s influential discussion of agency in the chapter ‘Of Power’ in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding underwent important changes between the first and second edition. He reconsidered many of his central claims about the mind’s deliberation about actions. Locke’s position in the two editions is not only different but, as he himself points out, sometimes incompatible. This has suggested to some commentators that his change of mind was at least partly due to an external influence. Locke himself gestures towards this conclusion in the new ‘Epistle’ in the second edition Essay. One view is that William Molyneux was a notable influence, while another position is that Ralph Cudworth’s work on free will, either directly or indirectly through the influence of his daughter Damaris Masham, was an important influence. The position I develop in this paper is that the strongest candidate for an important external influence on Locke’s second edition revision is Molyneux’s close associate and friend, Irish philosopher and Archbishop of Dublin, William King. I argue that King’s criticism is a plausible influence on Locke’s reconceptualization of will and desire. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, King’s criticism appears to have been instrumental in Locke’s new emphasis on the agent’s capacity to determine what to value.     

The Monkey as a Psychological Subject

Many species in long-term captivity have tried to kill time by playing friendly games with their warders. In the end, only rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) could tolerate the tedious hide-and-seek games that their human jailers prefer to play. In this article, written many years before the Stockholm syndrome was first described, the author relates how it was eventually discovered which species is most willing to contribute to the development of a genuinely scientific human psychology. Harry F. Harlow died in 1981 and Dr. Frank C.P. van der Horst (fhorst@fsw.leidenuniv.nl) of Leiden University stands as the person to addess correspondence to.

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Psychology in the Czech lands: Bohemia,Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic

The article provides a comprehensive review of Czech psychology—its history and its current state. It enumerates significant psychologists who were Czech, born in Bohemia or who were instrumental for the development of psychology in the region. The article also enumerates Czech psychological associations along with their main representatives, journals, and academic facilities involved in education and research in psychology. It is pointed out that the origins of psychology as a science are in the Central Europe—the first laboratory of W. Wundt was in Leipzig, Germany; S. Freud was born in Bohemia, in the Moravian city of Příbor and he practiced in Vienna, Austria. The Czech capital Prague will also become the capital of the psychological science in 2020 when it will be hosting the 32nd International Congress of Psychology (ICP 2020).     

The science and meaning of the self

Scientists and practitioners alike invest in theorizing the self in psychology, but prioritize differently theoretical and practical objectives. Theorizing the self differs also when mapped onto the 'science versus art' debate, viewed historically and with reference to the philosophy of science. Jung's model of the psyche is compared and contrasted with social cognitive models of self-concept. Finally, some implications of social constructionism are considered.     

Epistemic cultural constraints on the uses of psychology

This paper describes some epistemic cultural considerations which shape the uses of psychology. I argue the study of mind is bound by the metaphysical background of the given locale and era in which it is practiced. The epistemic setting in which psychology takes place will shape what is worth observing, how it is to be studied, how the data is to be interpreted, and the nature of the ultimate explanatory units. To demonstrate conceptual epistemic constraints, I discuss metaphor use in psychology. In addition, epistemic constraints shape the praxes that arise from structural study of the mind. In order to illustrate this cultural constraint, I discuss Soviet Psychology and provide a contrast between practical uses of psychoanalysis in India, Egypt, and rural Ghana. In response to these conceptual and practical epistemic limitations, psychology could adapt methods drawn from history and anthropology.     

‘Doctrina Deo vivendi’: William Ames,the Nature and Sources of His Voluntarism

ABSTRACT

To establish his vision of theology as the doctrine of ‘living to God,’ William Ames, the English puritan theologian exiled in The Netherlands, strongly emphasized the will as the seat of faith. This prominence has often been interpreted as an extreme version of voluntarism eliminating the intellective elements altogether and regarded as something outside mainstream, Reformed orthodoxy. However, when analysed through the distinction between habit and action, it will be clear that Ames’s emphatic statements on the will reflect his concern for the singularity of virtue, and that he did assign some roles to the intellect in terms of the action of faith. Therefore, the difference over the question of the seat of faith is highly technical in nature and should not be exaggerated. Ames argued for the priority of the will over the intellect by drawing from Scotist sources, which was compatible with the Thomistic idea of premotion.     

"I WALK WEEPING IN PANGS OF A MOTHERS TORMENT FOR HER CHILDREN": Women's Laments in the Poetry and Prophecies of William Blake

Cross-cultural scholarship in ritual studies on women's laments provides us with a fresh vantage point from which to consider the function of women and women's complaining voices in the epic poems of William Blake. In this essay, I interpret Thel, Oothoon, and Enitharmon as strong voices of experience that unleash some of Blake's most profound meditations on social, sexual, individual, and institutional forms of violence and injustice, offering what might aptly be called an ethics of witness. Tracing the performative function of Enion, Jerusalem, Vala, and Erin in Blake's later epics, The Four Zoas and Jerusalem , I argue for the close connection between the female laments and the possibility of redemption, though in Blake such "redemption" comes at the cost of the very voices of witness themselves.     

Towards a literary account of mental health from James' Principles of Psychology

The field of mental health tends to treat its literary metaphors as literal realities with the concomitant loss of vague “feelings of tendency” in “unusual experiences”. I develop this argument through the prism of William James’ (1890) “The Principles of Psychology”. In the first part of the paper, I reflect upon the relevance of James' “The Psychologist's Fallacy” to a literary account of mental health. In the second part of the paper, I develop the argument that “connotations” and “feelings of tendency” are central to resolving some of the more difficult challenges of this fallacy. I proceed to do this in James' spirit of generating imaginative metaphors to understand experience. Curiously, however, mental health presents a strange paradox in William James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology. He constructs an elaborate conception of the “empirical self” and “stream of thought” but chooses not to use these to understand unusual experiences – largely relying instead on the concept of a “secondary self.” In this article, I attempt to make more use of James' central division between the “stream of thought” and the “empirical self” to understand unusual experiences. I suggest that they can be usefully understood using the loose metaphor of a “binary star” where the “secondary self” can be seen as an “accretion disk” around one of the stars. Understood as literary rather the literal, this metaphor is quite different to more unitary models of self-breakdown in mental health, particularly in its separation of “self” from “the stream of thought” and I suggest it has the potential to start a re-imagination of the academic discourse around mental health.