The Role of Probability and Intentionality in Preschoolers' Causal Generalizations

Three experiments examined whether preschoolers recognize that the causal properties of objects generalize to new members of the same set given either deterministic or probabilistic data. Experiment 1 found that 3- and 4-year-olds were able to make such a generalization given deterministic data but were at chance when they observed probabilistic information. Five-year-olds reliably generalized in both situations. Experiment 2 found that 4-year-olds could make some probabilistic inferences, particularly when comparing sets that had no efficacy with sets in which some members had efficacy. Children had some difficulty discriminating between completely effective sets and stochastic ones. Experiment 3 examined whether 3- and 4-year-olds could reason about probabilistic data when provided with information about the experimenter's beliefs about causal outcomes. Children who were more successful on standard false-belief measures were more likely to respond as if the data were deterministic. These data suggest that children's probabilistic inferences develop into early elementary school, but preschoolers might have some understanding of probability when reasoning about causal generalization.     

Children's knowledge of the relation between intentional action and pretending

Two experiments investigated preschoolers’ understanding of the relation between pretending and intentional action. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year olds recognized that characters whose actions were intended as pretense were pretending. However, children also judged that characters whose actions gave them the appearance of an entity unintentionally were pretending to be that entity. In Experiment 2, 3-year olds reliably chose a character whose pretense actions were intentional as pretending over a character whose actions were guided by another intention. These data suggest that preschoolers have some understanding of the role of intentional action in pretense.     

Children and television advertising: when do they understand persuasive intent?

Children's response to television advertising is investigated in this paper. Children aged between six and ten years were tested for their recall, recognition and understanding of novel television advertisements. Children were able to recognise scenes from the advertisements after one exposure but recall of the brand names was poor for the younger children, even after three exposures. Recall for the advertising content increased by age and number of exposures. None of the six‐year‐olds and only a quarter of the eight‐year‐olds and a third of the ten‐year‐olds discussed advertising in terms of persuasion. Therefore, although children remember television advertisements, their purpose is not fully understood, even by many ten‐year‐olds. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications.     

Enculturation to musical pitch structure in young children: evidence from behavioral and electrophysiological methods

Children learn the structure of the music of their culture similarly to how they learn the language to which they are exposed in their daily environment. Furthermore, as with language, children acquire this musical knowledge without formal instruction. Two critical aspects of musical pitch structure in Western tonal music are key membership (understanding which notes belong in a key and which do not) and harmony (understanding which notes combine to form chords and which notes and chords tend to follow others). The early developmental trajectory of the acquisition of this knowledge remains unclear, in part because of the difficulty of testing young children. In two experiments, we investigated 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds' enculturation to Western musical pitch using a novel age‐appropriate and engaging behavioral task (Experiment 1) and electroencephalography (EEG; Experiment 2). In Experiment 1 we found behavioral evidence that 5‐year‐olds were sensitive to key membership but not to harmony, and no evidence that 4‐year‐olds were sensitive to either. However, in Experiment 2 we found neurophysiological evidence that 4‐year‐olds were sensitive to both key membership and harmony. Our results suggest that musical enculturation has a long developmental trajectory, and that children may have some knowledge of key membership and harmony before that knowledge can be expressed through explicit behavioral judgments.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

Young children's spontaneous use of geometry in maps

Two experiments tested whether 4-year-old children extract and use geometric information in simple maps without task instruction or feedback. Children saw maps depicting an arrangement of three containers and were asked to place an object into a container designated on the map. In Experiment 1, one of the three locations on the map and the array was distinct and therefore served as a landmark; in Experiment 2, only angle, distance and sense information specified the target container. Children in both experiments used information for distance and angle, but not sense, showing signature error patterns found in adults. Children thus show early, spontaneously developing abilities to detect geometric correspondences between three-dimensional layouts and two-dimensional maps, and they use these correspondences to guide navigation. These findings begin to chart the nature and limits of the use of core geometry in a uniquely human, symbolic task.     

Children infer affiliative and status relations from watching others imitate

We investigated whether young children are able to infer affiliative relations and relative status from observing others' imitative interactions. Children watched videos showing one individual imitating another and were asked about the relationship between those individuals. Experiment 1 showed that 5‐year‐olds assume that individuals imitate people they like. Experiment 2 showed that children of the same age assume that an individual who imitates is relatively lower in status. Thus, although there are many advantages to imitating others, there may also be reputational costs. Younger children, 4‐year‐olds, did not reliably make either inference. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that imitation conveys valuable information about third party relationships and that, at least by the age of 5, children are able to use this information in order to infer who is allied with whom and who is dominant over whom. In doing so, they add a new dimension to our understanding of the role of imitation in human social life.     

Eyewitness memory for a simulated misdemeanor crime: the role of age and temperament in suggestibility

The timing of misleading questions within an interview (immediate, 7‐week delay) and temperament characteristics as correlates of suggestibility were examined in two experiments. In Experiment 1, 6/7‐year‐olds, 9/10‐year‐olds, and adults were given general‐to‐specific questions at both intervals or misleading questions initially and general‐to‐specific questions at delay. In Experiment 2, 4/5‐year‐olds, 9/10‐year‐olds, and adults were given general‐to‐specific questions at both intervals or general‐to‐specific questions initially and misleading questions at delay. Introducing misleading questions in the initial interview increased suggestibility for peripheral features, whereas suggestibility for central features was found when misleading questions were asked in the delayed interview. Age changes in recall and elaboration for categorical information were found. Some temperament characteristics were associated with age‐related changes in compliance and suggestibility. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's developing understanding of differences between their own intentional action and passive movement

Four studies examined 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds' ability to judge accurately whether they acted intentionally. Children self‐initiated action to attain an outcome, or their arm was moved by the experimenter to create an outcome. In Experiment 3, children in both age groups accurately claimed they were agents of self‐guided action but not of passive movement. In contrast, in Experiments 1, 2 and 4, children in both age groups found it difficult to deny they intended to bring about the outcome, even though their movement was passive and, in some cases, the outcome was unexpected. They were consistently successful only when exclusively involved in creating one of two outcomes and asked which one they intended (Experiment 4). In sum, 3‐and 4‐year‐olds can distinguish when their movements are self‐directed and when they are passive. They are limited, however, in applying this distinction to self‐judgments concerning whether they acted intentionally. These findings are discussed with respect to linguistic and cognitive limitations that may influence the role first‐person knowledge plays in theory‐of‐mind development.     

Training Young Children to Acknowledge Mixed Emotions

Abstract

The failure of children to acknowledge mixed, contradictory emotions is equally of developmental and clinical interest. Developmentally, children do not ordinarily acknowledge the existence of mixed emotions until late in middle childhood. Clinically, the failure to recognise mixed feelings toward others or self is a common presenting problem. The question addressed here is, how readily can such limitations be corrected in children of different ages. Two studies are reported showing that children as young as 6 and 7 years, who initially revealed little understanding of mixed feelings, showed more insight after a short training session. In Experiment 1. two groups of children were equated for their inability to diagnose the mixed feelings of a story character. Subsequently, both groups were presented with a second story containing a similar conflictual event, but only one group was prompted to consider the character's emotional reaction to each component of the conflict. Children in the prompted group were more accurate in diagnosing the character's emotional reaction at the end of the story than the control group, and they maintained their superiority on a post-test story where no prompts were given. Experiment 2 included a similar training procedure. but with a more stringent measure of post-test generalisation: Children were asked to describe or invent their own examples of emotionally charged conflictual situations. Four- and five-year-olds showed little benefit from the training session, but six- and seven-year-olds again showed considerable benefit. Taken together, the two experiments suggest that young school age children often fail to acknowledge mixed feelings because they engage in a cursory appraisal of the elements of an emotionally charged situation; highlighting the elements is sufficient to improve performance. Preschool children, however, appear to suffer from more basic limitations in their ability to integrate the relevant information.     

How fantasy benefits young children's understanding of pretense

Sobel and Lillard (2001) demonstrated that 4-year-olds' understanding of the role that the mind plays in pretending improved when children were asked questions in a fantasy context. The present study investigated whether this fantasy effect was motivated by children recognizing that fantasy contains violations of real-world causal structure. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were shown a fantasy character engaged in ordinary actions or actions that violated causal knowledge. Children were more likely to say that a troll doll who was acting like but ignorant of the character was not pretending to be that character when read the violation story. Experiment 2 suggested that this difference was not caused by a greater interest in the violation story. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar difference for characters engaged in social and functional violations that were possible in the real world. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers use actions and appearance more than mental states to make judgments about pretense, but that those judgments can be influenced by the context in which the questions are presented.     

Developmental changes in attention: the effects of endogenous cueing and of distractors

We used two reaction time tasks to examine age differences in the ability to use an endogenous cue to shift attention covertly and to ignore distractors. In Experiment 1, 8‐year‐olds, 10‐year‐olds and adults (n = 24 per age) were asked to push a button as soon as they detected a target that was presented in a cued, miscued or non‐cued peripheral location at 100, 400 or 800 ms after the appearance of a central cue. In Experiment 2, 10‐year‐olds and adults (n = 24 per age) were asked to indicate which of two shapes appeared in the periphery 400 ms after a central cue, with those shapes surrounded by compatible or incompatible distractors. Unlike previous studies, the data were corrected for a reaction time bias that can inflate the apparent effect of cueing. Children were slower and more variable than adults overall. However, there were no age differences in the effects of the cues in either experiment: at all ages, the speed of responding was increased similarly by correct cueing and slowed similarly by incorrect cueing. Thus, under these conditions, the ability to use endogenous cues to orient covertly to the periphery is already adult‐like by 8–10 years of age, although there may be subsequent changes in the consistency of responding. In Experiment 2, 10‐year‐olds were slowed more than adults by incompatible distractors. Thus, the ability to ignore distracting information is not adult‐like even by 10 years of age. The findings suggest different rates of development for the ability to shift attention following an endogenous cue and for the ability to filter out irrelevant information.     

Children's understandings of the attributes of life

Previous investigations of children's understandings of the life concept have focused on their classifications of the life status of familiar objects. In this study, we attempted to examine more directly the processes by which children infer life status by examining their reasoning about unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were asked to name attributes of living things to establish which attributes they associated most closely with life. Children age 7 and younger most often named attributes true only of animals but not of plants; older children more often named attributes true of both animals and plants. However, movement was the single attribute cited most frequently by children of all ages tested. In Experiment 2, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were presented information about attributes of imaginary objects on a distant planet and were asked to infer if those objects were alive. Again, young children relied relatively heavily on qualities true only of animals but not of plants, whereas older children relied more on attributes true of both plants and animals. Also as before, movement was viewed as indicative of life at all ages tested. In Experiment 3, we examined the hypothesis that children discriminate among different types of motion and that the types of motion they associate with life are in fact typical of living things. Children ranging from age 5 through 11 were found to discriminate among different types of motion and to infer that objects were alive only when they showed the types of motion typical of living beings. The results of Experiment 3 allowed interpretation of seemingly conflicting results that have arisen in previous studies, as well as in Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study.     

Children's Representation of Child and Adult Knowledge

Do children think that adult knowledge subsumes or only partially overlaps child knowledge? Sixty-four 4- and 6-year-old children were asked either whether a child and an adult know the answers to questions tapping adult- and child-specific knowledge (Experiment 1) or to whom each question should be addressed (Experiment 2). Children were also asked directly about the existence of child-specific knowledge. The experiments provided converging evidence that beliefs about child-specific knowledge are relatively limited among 4-year-olds but become well articulated by age 6. The findings contribute to understanding the development of children's beliefs about the relation between knowledge and age.     

Causal learning from probabilistic events in 24‐month‐olds: an action measure

How do young children learn about causal structure in an uncertain and variable world? We tested whether they can use observed probabilistic information to solve causal learning problems. In two experiments, 24‐month‐olds observed an adult produce a probabilistic pattern of causal evidence. The toddlers then were given an opportunity to design their own intervention. In Experiment 1, toddlers saw one object bring about an effect with a higher probability than a second object. In Experiment 2, the frequency of the effect was held constant, though its probability differed. After observing the probabilistic evidence, toddlers in both experiments chose to act on the object that was more likely to produce the effect. The results demonstrate that toddlers can learn about cause and effect without trial‐and‐error or linguistic instruction on the task, simply by observing the probabilistic patterns of evidence resulting from the imperfect actions of other social agents. Such observational causal learning from probabilistic displays supports human children's rapid cultural learning.     

Young children infer causal strength from probabilities and interventions

We examine the interaction of two cues that children use to make judgments about cause-effect relations: probabilities and interventions. Children were shown a "detector" that lit up and played music when a block was placed on its surface. We varied the probabilistic effectiveness of the block, as well as whether the experimenter or the child was performing the interventions. In Experiment 1, we found that children can use probabilistic evidence to make inferences about causal strength. However, when the results of their own interventions are in conflict with the overall frequencies, preschoolers favor the results of their own interventions. In Experiment 2, children used probabilistic evidence to infer a hidden causal mechanism. Though they again gave preference to their own interventions, they did not do so when their interventions were explicitly confounded by an alternative cause.     

From synonyms to homonyms: exploring the role of metarepresentation in language understanding

Doherty and Perner (Metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind: just two words for the same thing? Cognitive Development, 13 (1998), 279–305) report that children’s understanding of synonyms and false belief is dependent on an understanding of the representational mind. Experiment 1 extends this finding by examining children’s understanding of homonyms. Children aged 3 and 4 years were asked to judge whether a puppet correctly selected the second member of a homonym pair. Performance on this task was strongly associated with performance on the false belief task even after chronological and verbal mental age had been accounted for. Experiment 2 incorporated two new tasks: a synonyms task and an adjectives task. Understanding of synonyms and homonyms significantly predicted performance on the false belief task. However, once chronological age was accounted for, only performance on the homonyms task did so. The difficulty experienced on the homonyms task was not due to a reluctance to acknowledge that the puppet can point to a different picture when the the same word label is used twice. Children had no difficulty on the adjectives task when the puppet had to point to a different picture described using the same adjective. The suggestion that the understanding of synonyms, homonyms and false belief are related by a common insight into the representational mind is therefore not supported.     

Children's understanding of embarrassment: Integrating mental time travel and mental state information

The current study investigated 4‐ to 8‐year‐olds’ (N = 81) understanding of embarrassment and their ability to integrate temporal and mental state information to predict and explain emotions. Participants heard stories describing characters commit trivial social transgressions, and then the next day, characters found themselves in the same situation that led to the previous transgression. For some story endings, participants were asked to predict and explain how the character felt, and for others, participants were told the character started to feel embarrassed and they were asked to explain why. Participants’ responses were coded and analysed using nonparametric statistical tests. Kruskal–Wallis analyses revealed significant developments occur between 6 and 8 years in children's understanding of embarrassment and their ability to explain individual's emotion as caused by anticipating the reoccurrence of a previous embarrassing event. Younger children demonstrated a basic knowledge of embarrassment but failed to demonstrate more advanced understanding of the emotion. Findings from the current study indicate children reach a more mature understanding of embarrassment and the implications of committing social transgressions between 7 and 8 years. Finally, the current study contributes to the literature on children's ability to infer mental states and temporally connect experiences.     

The development of spatial category representations from 4 to 7 years

Representation of spatial categories was assessed in 4‐ to 7‐year‐olds. Across nine spatial categories (In, On, Under, In Front, Behind, Above, Below, Left, and Right), children were asked to pick the odd‐one‐out from four images, three of which displayed the same spatial relationship between two objects, and one which showed a different spatial relationship. Results support our proposed model of spatial category representation. Children progressed through three levels of understanding: from rigid (level 1), to abstract (level 2) to broad (including non‐prototypical category exemplars) (level 3) understanding of spatial category membership. This developmental pattern was common to all spatial categories, and the ages at which children reached each level varied across categories, in line with the order in which category representations emerge in infancy.