Foundational belief change

This paper is concerned with the construction of a base contraction (revision) operation such that the theory contraction (revision) operation generated by it will be fully AGM-rational. It is shown that the theory contraction operation generated by Fuhrmann'sminimal base contraction operation, even under quite strong restrictions, fails to satisfy the supplementary postulates of belief contraction. Finally Fuhrmann's construction is appropriately modified so as to yield the desired properties. The new construction may be described as involving a modification of safe (base) contraction so as to make it maxichoice.     

Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment

In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, and can be seen as the Jeffrization of a proposal considered by Rott.I am indebted John G. Bennett and Henry E. Kyburg. jr. for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I thank the referees forErkenntnis who, apart from giving extended comments and suggestions, provided me with some hard-to-find relevant material. I also thank Prashanta Bandyopadhyay, Norman Foo, Maurice Pagnucco, Hans Rott and Mary-Anne Williams for their suggestions. The errors that remain are, of course, mine.     

天后信仰在天津之变化及衰落原因再分析

兴盛于东南沿海尤其闽台地区的天后信仰,六百年前因封建国家经济行为的需要传播天津.然而随着历史发展,天津天后信仰于内容及性质上出现明显变异,又在近代社会环境动荡冲击下,显现出与闽台信仰的生命力差距,文章旨在对这些现象及原因进行深入探讨.     

Rational belief change,popper functions and counterfactuals

This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.     

Iffy beliefs: Conditional thinking and belief change

The ability to entertain possibilities and draw inferences about them is essential to human intelligence. We examine the hypothesis that conditional if-then statements trigger a mental simulation process in which people suppose the antecedent (if statement) to be true and evaluate the consequent (then statement) in that context. On the assumption that supposing an event to be true increases belief that the event has occurred or will occur, this hypothesis is consistent with the claim that evaluating a conditional will heighten belief in its antecedent more than in its consequent. Two experiments, employing conditionals of the form If animal A has property X, then animal B will have property X, in which X was a property that people could not readily relate to the animals, supported this claim. The effect was stronger following the evaluation of conditionals with dissimilar animal categories.     

Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories

In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify suitable conditions concerning the (partial) correctness of acquired data, under which revising our theories by data leads us closer to “the nomic truth”, construed as the target of scientific inquiry. We conclude by indicating some further developments, generalizations, and open issues arising from our results.     

Shifting foundations: religious belief change and adjustment in college students

In a sample of 154 college students, prevalence of religious belief change and its relationship to religiosity and coping variables were examined twice over the course of one month. Students who reported belief change (62%) scored higher than those who did not on measures of religiosity and fared worse on adjustment measures. Significant differences in coping strategies were noted, with the change group using more religious coping and alcohol and drugs to cope. Within the change group, a higher degree of change was related to higher levels of religiousness and religious coping, and poorer adjustment at baseline and follow-up.     

Local warming: daily temperature change influences belief in global warming

Although people are quite aware of global warming, their beliefs about it may be malleable; specifically, their beliefs may be constructed in response to questions about global warming. Beliefs may reflect irrelevant but salient information, such as the current day's temperature. This replacement of a more complex, less easily accessed judgment with a simple, more accessible one is known as attribute substitution. In three studies, we asked residents of the United States and Australia to report their opinions about global warming and whether the temperature on the day of the study was warmer or cooler than usual. Respondents who thought that day was warmer than usual believed more in and had greater concern about global warming than did respondents who thought that day was colder than usual. They also donated more money to a global-warming charity if they thought that day seemed warmer than usual. We used instrumental variable regression to rule out some alternative explanations.     

The dynamics of belief: Contractions and revisions of probability functions

Conclusion Using probability functions defined over a simple language as models of states of belief, my goal in this article has been to analyse contractions and revisions of beliefs. My first strategy was to formulate postulates for these processes. Close parallels between the postulates for contractions and the postulates for revisions have been established - the results in Section 5 show that contractions and revisions are interchangeable.As a second strategy, some suggestions for more or less explicit constructive definitions of the revision process (and indirectly also of the contraction process) were then presented. However, the results in Section 6 are less conclusive than in the earlier ones. This problem area still awaits further development.     

Rule transition on the balance scale task: a case study in belief change

For various domains in proportional reasoning cognitive development is characterized as a progression through a series of increasingly complex rules. A multiplicative relationship between two task features, such as weight and distance information of blocks placed at both sides of the fulcrum of a balance scale, appears difficult to discover. During development, children change their beliefs about the balance scale several times: from a focus on the weight dimension (Rule I) to occasionally considering the distance dimension (Rule II), guessing (Rule III), and applying multiplication (Rule IV; Siegler, 1981). Because of the detailed empirical findings the balance scale task has become a benchmark task for computational models of proportional reasoning. In this article, we present a large empirical study (N = 420) of which the findings provide a challenge for computational models. The effect of feedback and the effect of individually adapted training items on rule transition were tested for children using Rule I or Rule II. Presenting adapted training items initiates belief revision for Rule I but not for Rule II. The experience of making mistakes (by providing feedback) induces a change for both Rule I and Rule II. However, a delayed posttest shows that these changes are preserved after 2 weeks only for children using Rule I. We conclude that the transition from Rule I to Rule II differs from the transition from Rule II to a more complex rule. Concerning these empirical findings, we will review performance of computational models and the implications for a future belief revision model.

It is one Thing, to show a Man that he is in an Error, and another, to put him in possession of Truth. John Locke

     

Children's comprehension of presupposed information: Logical and pragmatic inferences to speaker belief

This study explored the ability of young children (5 and 8 years old) to make presuppositional inferences to a speaker's belief in uttering a sentence. Presuppositional information is the information a speaker believes to be common between himself and the hearer. The information is cued by a speaker either logically, by the use of specific lexical items, or pragmatically, by the use of an utterance in violation of conventional rules of conversation. Comprehension of the information may require a reading of the context of utterance. Kindergarten and thirdgrade children and adults were read paragraphs containing both logical and pragmatic presuppositional information, as well as a sentence that could be treated in a logical or a pragmatic manner depending on the context of utterance. The results showed that both groups of children and the adults could make presuppositional inferences to a speaker's belief, and that the responses of the children and adults were context sensitive.     

从女神崇拜到观音信仰--广州世居满族文化重建过程中的信仰变迁

广州世居满族是乾隆二十一年(1756)驻防广州的满族八旗兵的后代,在移民广州后的248年间,他们的民俗生活世界发生了巨大改变.本文对其信仰世界的流变、现状与特征进行了描述和分析,认为强化观音信仰是这个城市中的异质族群适应新的生活环境的手段之一,是他们强化族群认同,在移入地广州构建新的民俗生活世界的重要举措.     

An evaluation of self-esteem and impression management theories of anticipatory belief change

The predictions of self-esteem and impression management theories of anticipatory belief change were examined as a function of whether or not subjects were reminded that their preexperimental attitudes has been assessed, the source of the expected persuasive communication (expert vs. peer), and whether or not explicit instructions were given regarding the experimenter's concern with opinion change. Anticipatory shifts changed as a function of an interaction of all three variables. In the Reminder conditions, subjects changed their attitudes toward a peer's position when the experimenter explicitly referred to opinion change. In the No Reminder conditions, subjects shifted toward an expert when the instructions were explicit and toward a peer when the instructions were implicit. The results were discussed as qualifying previous research in this area and as problematic for both self-esteem and impression management approaches to anticipatory shifts.     

Qualitative and quantitative change in the dynamics of motor learning

The experiments examined qualitative and quantitative changes in the dynamics of learning a novel motor skill (roller ball task) as a function of the manipulation of a control parameter (initial ball speed). The focus was on the relation between the rates of change in performance over practice time and the changing time scales of the evolving attractor dynamic. Results showed 3 different learning patterns to the changes in the dynamics as a function of practice that were mediated by the initial ball speed. Only participants who learned the task showed a bifurcation in coordination mode that was preceded by enhanced performance variability. The observed multiple time scales to motor learning are interpreted as the products of the dynamical stability and instability realized from (a) the continually evolving landscape dynamics due to bifurcations between attractor organization and (b) the transient phenomena associated with moving toward and away from fixed-point dynamics.     

Logical dynamics of some speech acts that affect obligations and preferences

In this paper, illocutionary acts of commanding will be differentiated from perlocutionary acts that affect preferences of addressees in a new dynamic logic which combines the preference upgrade introduced in DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) by van Benthem and Liu with the deontic update introduced in ECL II (eliminative command logic II) by Yamada. The resulting logic will incorporate J. L. Austin’s distinction between illocutionary acts as acts having mere conventional effects and perlocutionary acts as acts having real effects upon attitudes and actions of agents, and help us understand why saying so can make it so in explicit performative utterances. We will also discuss how acts of commanding give rise to so-called “deontic dilemmas” and how we can accommodate most deontic dilemmas without triggering so-called “deontic explosion”.     

The dimensions of change in therapeutic community treatment instrument

In this article, the authors describe the refinement and preliminary evaluation of the Dimensions of Change in Therapeutic Community Treatment Instrument (DCI), a measure of treatment process. In Study 1, a 99-item DCI, administered to a cross-sectional sample of substance abuse clients (N = 990), was shortened to 54 items on the basis of results from confirmatory factor analyses and item response theory invariance tests. In Study 2, confirmatory factor analyses of the 54-item DCI, completed by a longitudinal cohort of 993 clients, established and validated an 8-factor solution across 2 subpopulations (adults and adolescents) and 2 time points (treatment entry and 30-days postentry). The results of the 2 studies are encouraging and support use of the 54-item DCI as a tool to measure treatment process.