Escalation of commitment with transparent future outcomes

A frequent case of irrational decision making is the tendency to escalate commitment to a chosen course of action after unsuccessful prior investments of money, effort, or time (sunk costs). In previous research it is argued that escalation does not occur when future outcomes and alternative investments are transparent. Inconsistent with this argument, in an experiment in which undergraduates were presented fictitious investment problems with sunk costs, escalation was demonstrated when full information was given about investment alternatives and estimates of future returns. Thus, it is indicated that people may escalate despite knowing that it will not make them economically better off. A more comprehensive understanding of escalation requires disentangling people's noneconomic reasons for escalation.     

The Effects of Goal Distance and Value in Escalation of Commitment

Escalation of commitment describes individuals’ tendencies to spend resources beyond the point of rationality in order to persist in a chosen course of action, and most believe that sunk cost is the primary cause. However, it has been noted that sunk costs are confounded with progress made toward a goal, and that sunk costs do not affect individuals’ tendencies to escalate as all economic information is ignored in pursuit of the goal. Thus, the apparent escalation tendency may be a consequence of goal proximity instead of sunk costs. In Experiment 1, I show that individuals’ tendencies to escalate reflect the goal-gradient effect after controlling for the sunk costs. Experiment 2 provides a psychological process model to explain why goal-gradient influences individuals’ tendencies to escalate commitment by demonstrating that as individuals progress toward their goal, they exaggerate the value difference between the object that they are pursuing and the object that they are not pursuing. This perceived value difference, in turn, influences individuals’ tendencies to commit escalation of commitment. Results suggest a new interpretation for escalation of commitment and new approaches to guiding people to avoid it.     

Weighing the past and the future in decision making

Prior irreversible investments of money, time, or effort referred to as sunk costs frequently lead to decisions to continue a chosen course of action despite that this is irrational. With the aim of demonstrating that such escalation of commitment is a special case of a more general phenomenon, two experiments were carried out employing undergraduates as participants. Experiment 1 showed for fictitious personal and business investment scenarios that both prior losses and gains (sunk outcomes) affected choices to continue or discontinue the investment. In Experiment 2 the effect of sunk outcomes was reduced although not eliminated by a monetary bonus that in one condition depended on the future outcomes of the second gamble in two-stage gambles, in another condition on the future returns in personal investment scenarios. In support of a more inclusive theory subsuming escalation of commitment, the decisions were affected by both past and future outcomes and both gains and losses.     

The mental accounting of sunk time costs: why time is not like money

The sunk‐cost effect, an irrational attention to non‐recoverable past costs while making current decisions, has been documented widely in the domain of monetary costs. In this paper, I study the effect of past time investments on current decisions. In three experiments using choice situations, I demonstrate that the sunk‐cost effect is not observed for past investments of time, but the effect reappears when the investments are expressed as monetary quantities. I further propose that this ‘pseudo‐rationality’ is due to the fact that individuals lack the ability to account for time in the same way as they account for money. In two additional experiments, I facilitate the accounting of time and show that the irrational sunk‐cost effect reappears. In a final experiment, I test my propositions in a setting where subjects make real investments of time and subsequently make real choices. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A conceptualisation of task dimensions affecting escalation of commitment

People frequently continue an investment despite a negative outcome or sunk cost. Such irrational persistence in a losing course of action has been termed escalation of commitment. Although several explanations of escalation of commitment have been proposed, none of them accounts for all determinants that have been empirically demonstrated. Based on a review of previous research, a conceptualisation is introduced of how escalation of commitment is affected by 4 task dimensions: type and nontransparency of decision goal, nontransparency of sunk costs, time course of sunk costs, and accountability. A more inclusive theory that subsumes escalation of commitment is offered as an alternative that may be developed to account for the effects of the task dimensions.     

Optimism as modifier of escalation of commitment

To study whether optimism-pessimism modifies escalation of commitment, 52 undergraduates were told that they had made an unsuccessful investment, then they chose to continue or discontinue this investment. Optimism about future returns was induced in one group by varying the probability of a successful outcome from an initial low to medium, pessimism was induced in another group by varying this probability from an initial high to medium. Supporting the assumption of the manipulation, the results showed that optimistic participants preferred to continue investments whereas pessimistic participants preferred not to. As predicted, when the sunk cost increased, optimism led to escalation of commitment, whereas pessimism led to de-escalation of commitment. These effects were strengthened when probability of a successful outcome was ambiguous.     

Impact of decision goal on escalation

This research investigates the sunk-cost effect or escalation defined as the irrational tendency to choose to continue to invest money, time, or effort following unsuccessful investments. Building on previous research demonstrating a loss-sensitivity principle in sequential decision making, the hypothesis was proposed that a loss-minimization goal would lead to stronger effects of sunk outcomes (prior gains and losses) than would a gain-maximizing goal. The hypothesis was investigated in three experiments with undergraduates responding to investment decision scenarios. Although the tendency to continue investments was always larger for gain-maximizing than for loss-minimizing goal instructions, the sunk-outcome effect was stronger in the former case. However, when the decisions were personal and concerned lower stakes rather than business investments involving large amounts of money, the expected stronger effect of sunk outcomes was found for loss-minimizing goal instructions. Another finding was that the expected value was never ignored, thus suggesting that future research should focus on the joint effects of the expected value and sunk outcomes.     

Looking forward and looking back: integrating completion and sunk-cost effects within an escalation-of-commitment progress decision

Currently, there are 2 conflicting frameworks with which to understand why decision makers might escalate their commitment to a previously chosen course of action: sunk costs and project completion. The author proposes that sunk costs and need to complete exert simultaneous pressures, both independent and interactive, on a decision maker's level of commitment. The responses of 340 participants were analyzed and supported a complementary relationship between the 2 predictors. In addition, sunk costs demonstrated a curvilinear influence on commitment and an interaction with level of completion that supported a Level of Completion x Sunk Cost moderation model. (A marginal utility model was not supported.) Results are discussed in terms of their relevance toward offering a complementary view of 2 potential antecedents to a decision maker's propensity to escalate his or her commitment to a previously chosen course of action.     

Let It Go: Positive Affect Attenuates Sunk Cost Bias by Enhancing Cognitive Flexibility

Sunk cost bias is a pervasive problem in consumer decision making. It occurs when people continue to invest resources toward unsuccessful outcomes merely because they previously invested in them. This tendency exists because people devote too much attention to prior investments without considering how other factors may impact their decision outcome. While many suggested interventions to attenuate sunk cost bias involve altering cognitive processes, we examine an alternate affective route. Specifically, we propose that inducing positive affect attenuates sunk cost bias by naturally facilitating flexible thought processes. Across four studies, using hypothetical and real decision tasks, we find that positive affect induced in three different ways consistently attenuates sunk cost bias involving money, time, and effort investments. Further, we demonstrate that this occurs because people experiencing positive affect have enhanced cognitive flexibility. They consider more relevant decision factors and perceive sunk cost as having less of an influence on their decision outcomes. Then, in a fifth study, we show that a thought intervention promoting flexibility can attenuate consumers’ suboptimal commitment tendency in a field setting.     

Sunk Cost and Commitment to Medical Treatment

The influence of prior, irretrievable, investment (sunk cost) on commitment to medical treatment was investigated. Three studies were run investigating the influence of sunk cost in the form of money, time, and effort. A total of 637 participants (314 male) with a mean age of 19.58 years were recruited from an undergraduate population. A computer program simulated the process of arranging a course of physiotherapy. Participants invested one of three amounts of sunk cost (under budget, on budget, or over budget) into arranging sessions with a chiropractor. Participants then decided how much time they wished to commit to these chiropractor sessions or to an alternative treatment with a better chance of success. Results revealed a significant effect of invested money, a significant effect of invested effort, but no effect of invested time. Invested money produced a sunk cost effect, while invested effort appeared to exert influence via cognitive dissonance. The implications for healthcare decision-making are discussed.     

A sequential learning analysis of decisions in organizations to escalate investments despite continuing costs or losses

Reinforcement process may underlie decisions frequently found in organizations to escalate investments of time, money and other resources in strategies (e.g., product development, capital investment, plant expansion) that do not result in immediate reinforces. Whereas cognitive biases have been proffered in previous explanations, the present analysis suggested that this persistence is a form of resistance to extinction arising from experiences with past investments that were variably reinforced. This explanation was examined in two experiments by varying the pattern of returns and losses subjects experienced for investment decisions prior to experiencing a series losses. Consistent with the proposed explanation, two conditions resulted in higher levels of recommitment during continuous losses: (a) training using a variable schedule of partial reinforcement, and (b) no training on the task. Results indicate that behavior analysis can be used to understand and control situations in organizations that are prone to escalation, such as investments in the research and development of new product lines and extensions of further loans to customers.     

No Time to Waste: Restricting Life‐Span Temporal Horizons Decreases the Sunk‐Cost Fallacy

In three studies, we examined the influence of restricted and expansive temporal horizons on the sunk‐cost fallacy. The sunk‐cost fallacy occurs when prior investments instead of future returns influence decisions about future investments. When making decisions about future investments, rational decision makers base decisions on future consequences, not already‐invested costs that are “sunk” and cannot be recovered. In Study 1, we restricted young adult college students' temporal horizons by instructing them to imagine that they did not have much longer to live; this manipulation decreased the sunk‐cost fallacy. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 and also found that the consequences of manipulating temporal horizons were most pronounced for prior investments of time and that prior investments of time and money had different implications for the sunk‐cost fallacy, depending on the social or nonsocial decision domain. In Study 3, we manipulated temporal horizons by instructing students to imagine their time as a college student was coming to an end. Results were mostly similar to Study 2 but also suggested that focusing on one's mortality may have unique consequences. Implications of the three studies for understanding age differences in sunk‐cost decisions, interventions to improve sunk‐cost decisions, and the situations in which interventions might be most needed are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of mortality salience on escalation of commitment

Based on propositions derived from terror management theory (TMT), the current study proposes that people who are reminded of their mortality exhibit a higher degree of self-justification behavior to maintain their self-esteem. For this reason, they could be expected to stick with their previous decisions and invest an increasing amount of resources in those decisions, despite the fact that negative feedback has clearly indicated that they might be on a course toward failure (i.e., "escalation of commitment"). Our experiment showed that people who were reminded of their mortality were more likely to escalate their level of commitment by maintaining their current course of action. Two imaginary scenarios were tested. One of the scenarios involved deciding whether to send additional troops into the battlefield when previous attempts had failed; the other involved deciding whether to continue developing an anti-radar fighter plane when the enemy had already developed a device to detect it. The results supported our hypothesis that mortality salience increases the tendency to escalate one's level of commitment.     

Equivocality and Escalation: A Replication and Preliminary Examination of Frustration1

An equivocality theory account of escalation of commitment was investigated using a computer simulated marketing scenario in a replication and extension of Hantula and DeNicolis Bragger (1999). Participants acted as marketing executives and invested money to promote sales of a new sneaker, and received high or low equivocality feedback from their investments for one phase and then received failure feedback in a second phase. Participants were videotaped throughout the experiment. Replicating previous research, participants receiving highly equivocal feedback invested a greater relative amount of money during failure than did those who received feedback low in equivocality. Furthermore, analyses of the videotapes for behaviors indicative of frustration showed that participants in both feedback groups displayed a greater degree of frustration while receiving failure feedback than during the first phase of the study. These data replicate and extend previous equivocality findings, but do not resolve the role of frustration in escalation unambiguously.     

Behavioral Causality Orientations and Investment Decisions Following Negative Feedback

Individual differences in the locus of causality for behavior are seldom considered in tests of regulatory events (e. g., feedback and coercion). This study examined the relationship between Deci and Ryan's (1985a) causality orientation constructs and decision makers' behavioral intention responses to negative feedback following an initial decision. A laboratory experiment involved 98 Singaporean business students in a commitment escalation context in which sunk costs for an initial investment failure could be recovered by reinvesting in that prospect in preference to selecting an alternative that had previously performed better. Consistent with various theories of the escalation effect, in which subjects responsible for prior negative outcomes tend to reinvest in the initially chosen project, control orientation was positively associated with reinvestment and impersonal orientation was negatively related to reinvestment. The influence of personality on reinvestment/withdrawal behavior was moderated by the experimental condition of responsibility for the initial sunk cost. We discuss the implications of these findings for the construct validity of the causality orientations, the role of personality in commitment escalation, and the important role that individual differences in perceptions of regulatory events may play in determining behavior.     

De‐escalation after repeated negative feedback: emergent expectations of failure

Research on willingness to make marginal investments (e.g., the escalation and sunk cost literatures) has often focused on project completion decisions, such as the “radar‐blank plane.” This paper discusses a fundamentally different type of marginal investment decision, that of couples deciding whether to continue infertility treatment in the face of repeated failures. Two experiments based on this context show that when people face multiple independent chances to achieve a valued goal but are unsure about chances of success, premature quitting or “de‐escalation” is the norm. Repeated negative feedback appears to induce individuals to see each successive failure as more and more diagnostic. As a result, even a short series of failed attempts evokes beliefs that future attempts will also fail. These emergent expectations of failure, generated by causal attribution processes, associative learning, and/or discounting of ambiguous information, appear very compelling and induce people to forgo profitable marginal investments. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Feedback Equivocality on Escalation of Commitment: An Empirical Investigation of Decision Dilemma Theory1

The effects of feedback equivocality on escalation of commitment were examined in a laboratory study. Subjects had multiple opportunities to allocate money to market a software product. During the initial phase, subjects received feedback that was of either low or high equivocality. Half of the subjects in each equivocality level were given a standard by which to judge the feedback. In the second phase, all subjects received negative feedback. Consistent with Bowen's (1987) decision dilemma theory, subjects who received low equivocality feedback did not escalate allocations, and subjects who received high equivocal feedback escalated allocations. The presence of a standard or goal attenuated escalation. These results are consonant with a dynamic, temporally based account of escalation and are discussed in a synthesis of the literatures in behavior analysis, economics, forecasting, and psychology.     

Escalation behavior in domains related and unrelated to decision makers' academic background

Based on Staw and Ross's (1987) analysis of escalation behavior it was hypothesized that (a) those who are involved with projects related to their academic background will tend to persist in a losing course of action and to judge the situation as reversible more than those who have to make decisions in areas unrelated to their specialty; (b) providing information that the loss is irreversible will decrease the tendency to invest additional resources. A secondary goal of the study was to examine whether there would be any difference in sunk cost decisions when the resource invested is financial as compared to time. Using a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design, a total of 296 students were given eight different scenarios in which relatedness of decision subject-matter to academic background, reversibility of the situation, and type of resources (time or money) were the independent variables, and commitment to a course of action was the dependent variable. The results confirmed the hypotheses. No significant main effect for type of resources (time vs. money) was found. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.The authors thank Dr. Michael Hoffman for his valuable contribution in preparing this paper.