The Effects of Decision Outcome Dispersion Upon Organizational Decision Making

The effects of varying decision outcome dispersion on organizational decision making were investigated under individual and group decision making conditions. Thirty-six female and pg]36 male subjects made decisions for organizational decision scenarios in which outcomes affected primarily the decision maker, people other than the decision maker, or a group of which the decision maker was a member. Subjects rated their levels of perceived risk and confidence in their decisions and made decisions within a simulated context of either a small or a large organization. Results indicated that subjects perceived significantly less risk and more confidence in their decisions when outcomes affected primarily themselves rather than others regardless of whether the decisions were made individually or by a group. Males perceived their decisions as significantly more risky than females. Induced organizational size did not significantly influence decision making.

     

Decision difficulty and illusion of transparency in Japanese university students

People tend to believe that their inner thoughts are readily apparent to others. This study was conducted to examine effects, related to the difficulty of making decisions of personal preference, on the illusion of transparency, that is, the tendency people have to regard their own preference as more apparent to others when they have made their decision easily as opposed to situations in which they felt their decision to be difficult. In three studies in which the customary "transparency" experimental paradigm was used, university students were asked to rank choices of wedding dresses (Studies 1 and 3) or Korean movie stars (Study 2). Analysis suggested that the less difficulty participants felt in making their judgments (the first and last preference vs mid-ranking preference), the more they expected judgments to be transparent, especially when they had the clear intent to convey their thoughts to others. However, observers discerned first preferences no better than mid-ranking preferences. How inner subjective information contributes to the illusion of transparency is also discussed.     

Decision Making under Strict Uncertainty: An Experimental Test of Competitive Criteria

In decisions under strict uncertainty individual decision makers have to choose one of a finite number of alternatives with complete information about their outcomes but in the absence of any information about the probabilities of the various states of nature. We report two experiments with multiple decision tasks in which subjects were instructed to rank the alternatives (Experiment 1), or choose the best one (Experiment 2). We test the major decision rules (criteria) which have been proposed for this case in the normative literature with special attention on Hurwicz′s "optimism-pessimism" criterion which is the only one that can accommodate individual differences. Although none of the criteria can account for the results of the majority of the subjects, choices made by a sizable minority of the subjects′ are consistent with Hurwicz′s model. There is no evidence for a systematic relationship between the model′s single "optimism-pessimism" parameter (inferred form choices) and, independently derived, individual measures of optimism (obtained from responses to personality scales). We conclude with a discussion of the difficulty of experimentally implementing strict uncertainty.     

决策信心在信息化从众中的作用

研究采用JAS范式,通过操纵群体信息的性质（支持和反对）以及一致性程度,考察了决策信心在信息化从众过程中的作用。结果表明：（1）个体仅在接收到反对信息时会发生决策的偏转,表现出从众;（2）群体参照信息能够显著影响个体的信心：支持性的群体信息使个体的信心显著增高,而反对性的群体信息使信心显著降低,且表现出一种“负性偏向”（即个体对来自群体的负性信息更加敏感）;（3）在反对条件下,个体信心降低的程度能够很好地预测其决策偏转的概率,即信息化从众行为。这说明,决策信心可能在信息化从众中起着核心的中介作用——反对性的群体信息使得决策信心下降,而决策信心的下降导致了决策的偏转,从而表现出从众行为。     

A Model of Financial Incentive Effects in Decision Making

This paper proposes a model of the mediating processes whereby performance-contingent financial incentives influence decision quality and provides empirical evidence relevant to assessing the model. We hypothesize that performance-contingent incentives impact both cognitions and emotions, and that these cognitive and affective changes mediate the relationship between incentives and decision quality. To test these hypotheses, 84 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to conditions in which financial incentives were either performance contingent or randomly distributed. Participants used software that collected data on their information processing behavior to make choices from multiattribute choice information displays. After completing their choices, participants′ level of negative affect was assessed. Consistent with the predictions of the model, participants offered performance-contingent incentives took longer to choose, examined more information, had higher levels of negative affect, and used decision strategies that led to more accurate choices than participants offered randomly distributed incentives. Path analyses using structural equations modeling indicated that the changes in information processing behavior induced by financial incentives increased decision quality, while the increased levels of negative affect associated with incentives decreased decision quality. The paper concludes that identifying and measuring mediating variables is an important component of a research agenda designed to generate predictive theory of the relationship between financial incentives and decision quality.     

Decision making and confidence given uncertain advice

We study human decision making in a simple forced-choice task that manipulates the frequency and accuracy of available information. Empirically, we find that people make decisions consistent with the advice provided, but that their subjective confidence in their decisions shows 2 interesting properties. First, people's confidence does not depend solely on the accuracy of the advice. Rather, confidence seems to be influenced by both the frequency and accuracy of the advice. Second, people are less confident in their guessed decisions when they have to make relatively more of them. Theoretically, we develop and evaluate a type of sequential sampling process model—known as a self-regulating accumulator—that accounts for both decision making and confidence. The model captures the regularities in people's behavior with interpretable parameter values, and we show its ability to fit the data is not due to excessive model complexity. Using the model, we draw conclusions about some properties of human reasoning under uncertainty.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

Collecting information: Optimizing outcomes, screening options, or facilitating discrimination?

Collection of information prior to a decision may be integrated into a compensatory choice process; if it is, the information packet that is collected should be the one that produces the highest net gain. Alternatively,information may be collected in order to screen out options that fail to meet minimum standards; if this is the case, people should not choose options on which they have not collected available information. We tested these and other predictions from the two approaches in four experiments. Participants were given specific information about three attributes of each choice option but only probabilistic information about a fourth one. They rated attractiveness of options, decidedwhether to collect specific information about the fourth attribute of each one, rated options again, and then selected one of them. Data were consistent with neither of the above approaches. Instead they suggested that people collect information in order to facilitate their ability to discriminate between the attractiveness of options.     

Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action

The options that people face are rarely ideal: they are good in some ways and poor in others. People have problems choosing among such options because they don’t know which ends to favor. Multiple objectives pose a problem not only for decision makers, but also for our account of decision making. People act to achieve their ends given their beliefs. In order to handle decisions with multiple objectives, however, this story must be supplemented by an account of which ends are implicated in which decisions (e.g., do individual goals guide particular choices? do different ends jointly pick out courses of action?). Unfortunately, such an account is lacking. As a result, there is a gap (at least) in our most basic account of human behavior. In this paper I explore that gap and examine some proposals for closing it.     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

Do the right thing: The assumption of optimality in lay decision theory and causal judgment

Human decision-making is often characterized as irrational and suboptimal. Here we ask whether people nonetheless assume optimal choices from other decision-makers: Are people intuitive classical economists? In seven experiments, we show that an agent’s perceived optimality in choice affects attributions of responsibility and causation for the outcomes of their actions. We use this paradigm to examine several issues in lay decision theory, including how responsibility judgments depend on the efficacy of the agent’s actual and counterfactual choices (Experiments 1–3), individual differences in responsibility assignment strategies (Experiment 4), and how people conceptualize decisions involving trade-offs among multiple goals (Experiments 5–6). We also find similar results using everyday decision problems (Experiment 7). Taken together, these experiments show that attributions of responsibility depend not only on what decision-makers do, but also on the quality of the options they choose not to take.     

The Influence of Decision Aids on Choice Strategies: An Experimental Analysis of the Role of Cognitive Effort

This paper examines the role of computer-based decision aids in reducing cognitive effort and therefore influencing strategy selection. It extends and complements the works reported in the behavioral decision theory literature on the role of effort and accuracy in choice tasks. The central proposition of this paper is that specific features can be incorporated within a set of decision aids that will alter the effort required to implement a particular choice strategy relative to other strategies, and that this will influence strategy selection by the decision maker. In a laboratory experiment, using a repeated measures design, 48 subjects performed a preferential choice task using different decision aids. Subjects were given different levels of support to reduce the cognitive effort associated with different preferential choice strategies. In particular, the decision aids provided varying levels of support for the processing associated with either elimination by aspects or additive difference strategies. The study examined how information processing strategies were influenced by the decision aids. The results show that decision aids which reduce the effort associated with the elimination by aspects strategy induce behaviors associated with elimination by aspects. More importantly, there was an interaction effect caused by the distinct behavior of the group which was provided support for additive difference but not for elimination by aspects. This group processed the information about available choices in a way that is consistent with an additive difference strategy. These findings indicate that a decision aid can induce additive processing by altering the relative effort requirements of different choice strategies.     

Self–other decision making and loss aversion

In eight studies, we tested the prediction that making choices for others involves less loss aversion than making choices for the self. We found that loss aversion is significantly lessened among people choosing for others in scenarios describing riskless choice (Study 1), gambling (Studies 2 and 3), and social aspects of life, such as likeably and status (Studies 4a–e). Moreover, we found this pattern in relatively realistic conditions where people are rewarded for making desirable (i.e., profitable) choices for others (Study 2), when the other for whom a choice is made is physically present (Study 3), and when real money is at stake (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we found loss aversion is moderated when factors associated with self–other differences in decision making are taken into account, such as decision makers’ construal level (Study 4a), regulatory focus (Study 4b), degree of information seeking (Study 4c), omission bias (Study 4d), and power (Study 4e).     

Single-process versus multiple-strategy models of decision making: Evidence from an information intrusion paradigm

When decision makers are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as assumed by single-process models (SPMs) or do they choose adaptively from a set of available decision strategies as multiple-strategy models (MSMs) imply? Both frameworks of decision making have gathered a lot of support, but only rarely have they been contrasted with each other. Employing an information intrusion paradigm for multi-attribute decisions from givens, SPM and MSM predictions on information search, decision outcomes, attention, and confidence judgments were derived and tested against each other in two experiments. The results consistently support the SPM view: Participants seemingly using a “take-the-best” (TTB) strategy do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information as MSMs would predict, but adapt the amount of information searched, choose alternative choice options, and show varying confidence judgments contingent on the quality of the “irrelevant” information. The uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information intrusion paradigm and comprehensively promotes the notion of a uniform decision making mechanism as assumed by single-process models.     

Cognitive Factors Affecting the Use of Social Decision Heuristics in Resource-Sharing Tasks

Two experiments investigated the use of equal division as a social decision heuristic in a group resource-sharing task. We proposed that group members use equality as a decision heuristic to the extent that environmental cues making the rule salient are present and to the extent that competing cues are absent. In Study 1, subjects were provided with justification for being the first group member to withdraw resources from a common pool. The results showed that subjects for whom the justification was prototypical of resource-sharing situations were more likely to violate equality than were subjects with nonprototypical justifications. Study 2 investigated the extent to which arbitrary role assignments within a group affect choice behavior. As predicted, subjects assigned the role of "supervisor" made resource requests that exceeded an equal share, whereas subjects assigned the roles of either "leader" or "guide" made choices that corresponded almost precisely with equal division. Our results underscore the importance of examining implicit knowledge structures about resource-sharing situations and their implications for choice.     

Ambiguity Aversion,Comparative Ignorance,and Decision Context

People typically find bets less attractive when the probability of receiving a prize is more vague or ambiguous (Ellsberg, 1961). According to Fox and Tversky's (1995) comparative ignorance hypothesis, ambiguity aversion is driven by the comparison with more familiar events or more knowledgeable individuals, and diminishes or disappears in the absence of such a comparison. In this paper we emphasize that “comparative ignorance” refers to the state of mind of the decision maker. We extend the comparative ignorance hypothesis by documenting four new ways in which decision context can affect willingness to act under uncertainty that do not rely on the comparative-noncomparative evaluation paradigm used in previous studies. First, people find uncertain bets more attractive when preceded by questions about less familiar items than when preceded by questions about more familiar items. Second, the preference to bet on more familiar domains is less pronounced for the first domain evaluated on a survey than for later domains. Third, people find bets less attractive when they are provided with diagnostic information that they do not know how to use, compared to when they are provided with no such information. Finally, people are sensitive to the relative competence of their counterpart when playing a simple competitive (matching pennies) game, but not when playing a noncompetitive (coordination) game that has the same mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.     

Effects of self-other decision making on regulatory focus and choice overload

A growing stream of research is investigating how choices people make for themselves are different from choices people make for others. In this paper, I propose that these choices vary according to regulatory focus, such that people who make choices for themselves are prevention focused, whereas people who make choices for others are promotion focused. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, in particular work on errors of omission and commission, I hypothesize that people who make choices for others experience a reversal of the choice overload effect. In 6 studies, including a field study, I found that people who make choices for themselves are less satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options, yet, people who make choices for others are more satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options. Implications and suggestions for other differences in self-other decision making are discussed.     

Distinction bias: misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation

This research identifies a new source of failure to make accurate affective predictions or to make experientially optimal choices. When people make predictions or choices, they are often in the joint evaluation (JE) mode; when people actually experience an event, they are often in the single evaluation (SE) mode. The "utility function" of an attribute can vary systematically between SE and JE. When people in JE make predictions or choices for events to be experienced in SE, they often resort to their JE preferences rather than their SE preferences and overpredict the difference that different values of an attribute (e.g., different salaries) will make to their happiness in SE. This overprediction is referred to as the distinction bias. The present research also specifies when the distinction bias occurs and when it does not. This research contributes to literatures on experienced utility, affective forecasting, and happiness.     

Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and Confidence in Choice

Many of us believe that, after writing about a subject, we understand it more deeply. Studies in education indicate that writing does indeed enhance comprehension. Three experiments examined whether similar “exposition effects” exist for decision making. In these experiments, subjects were confronted with standard framing problems. Positive exposition effects would require that the influence of alternative frames on subjects' choices be diminished by exposition demands. Control subjects made choices under customary, non-exposition instructions. Others chose after writing rationales for their selections (exposition), after explicitly planning to write such rationales, or merely in anticipation of writing the rationales. Exposition reduced framing effects in each of the experiments. The magnitudes of the effects were greatest for subjects who wrote before choosing. Also, exposition markedly increased subjects' confidence that their choices were appropriate. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

心理账户的认知标签与情绪标签对消费决策行为的影响

Mental accounting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities. Mental accounting proposes that people utilize a set of cognitive labels to evaluate their financial activities, each of which is associated with different preferences to consume (Levav & McGraw, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Thaler 1985, 1990). Mental accounting researchers have shown that windfall gains are spent more readily and frivolously than ordinary income. Consumers prefer to spend their windfall gains on hedonic consumptions but spend their ordinary incomes on utilitarian consumptions. Levav and McGraw (2009) suggested that emotional accounting, including people’s feelings about money, also influences consumer choices. When people have negative feelings toward windfall, they opt to make utilitarian expenditures. However, the process of how cognitive (windfall or ordinary income) and affective (positive or negative emotion) tags interact in consumer behavior was not explored. This study proposes that both cognitive tag and affective tags in mental accounting affect consumer decision making. The objective of this study is to explore the interactive effect of cognitive and affective tags in mental accounting on consumer decision through four studies. In studies 1a and 1b, the effect of cognitive and affective tags in mental accounting on consumer decision making behavior was measured. Study 1a showed that the positive tag of windfall income is preferred for hedonic consumption, whereas the negative tag of windfall income is preferred for utilitarian consumption. Both positive and negative tags of ordinary income are preferred for utilitarian consumption. Study1b utilized a field study to examine actual consumption behavior. The results showed that when people received 15 Yuan RMB as ordinary income, they prefer to spend it on utilitarian consumption regardless of the positive or negative emotion they feel. However, they receive 15 Yuan RMB as windfall income, they prefer to use it for hedonic consumption in the positive emotion and for utilitarian consumption in the negative emotion. Studies 2a and 2b attempted to explore the reason of negative emotion can make windfall income turn from hedonic to utilitarian consumption. Study2a found that when people expect to feel guilty about spending windfall income on hedonic consumption, they would avoid hedonic consumption. Study2b found that when people felt guilty about windfall income, they tend to avoid hedonic consumption. Compared with the low guilt level group, the high guilt level group prefers to use windfall income for utilitarian consumption. These results suggest that cognitive and affective tags influence consumer behavior. The influence of cognitive tag on consumer decision presents the “cognition match effect”, whereas the influence of affective tag on consumer decision presents the “affect match effect”. Both tags also have an interaction effect on consumer decision. Guilt may be a mechanism that results in the negative tag of windfall being preferred for utilitarian consumption.