Acquisition of basic object categories

Two implications of best-example theory for category acquisition were considered. The first is that categories which people acquire based on initial exposure to good exemplars should be learned more easily and (at first) more accurately than categories based on initial exposure to poor exemplars. The second is that people should generally learn that the best exemplars are category members, before learning that the poor exemplars are category members. These implications are based on the premise that people generalize based on similarity, and that the best example has maximal within-category similarity and minimal extra-category similarity, while the poor examples have minimal within-category similarity and relatively high extra-category similarity. Both implications were strongly supported by the present research. It was also found that when pressure to communicate was removed, comprehension and production of category names were virtually identical. The predictions of best-example theory concerning the conceptual structures underlying the words used by children who are just beginning to talk were discussed briefly. This research also allowed the replication of several important categorization results which had previously been found with real-world categories, with a set of artificial concrete object categories.     

Ontological categories guide young children's inductions of word meaning: object terms and substance terms

Three experiments assessed the possibility, suggested by Quine (1960, 1969) among others, that the ontology underlying natural language is induced in the course of language learning, rather than constraining learning from the beginning. Specifically, we assessed whether the ontological distinction between objects and non-solid substances conditions projection of word meanings prior to the child's mastery of count/mass syntax. Experiments 1 and 2 contrasted unfamiliar objects with unfamiliar substances in a word-learning task. Two-year-old subjects' projection of the novel word to new objects respected the shape and number of the original referent. In contrast, their projection of new words for non-solid substances ignored shape and number. There were no effects of the child's knowledge of count/mass syntax, nor of the syntactic context in which the new word was presented. Experiment 3 revealed that children's natural biases in the absence of naming do not lead to the same pattern of results. We argue that these data militate against Quine's conjecture.     

Consistent (but not variable) names as invitations to form object categories: new evidence from 12-month-old infants

Recent research documents that for infants just beginning to produce words on their own, novel words highlight commonalities among named objects and, in this way, serve as invitations to form categories. The current experiment identifies more precisely the source of this invitation. We asked whether applying a consistent name to a set of distinct objects is crucial to categorization, or whether variable names might serve the same conceptual function. The evidence suggests that for 12-month-old infants, consistency in naming is critical. Infants hearing a single consistent novel noun for a set of distinct objects successfully formed object categories. Infants hearing different novel nouns for the same set of objects did not. These results lend strength and greater precision to the argument that naming has powerful and rather nuanced conceptual consequences for infants as well as for mature speakers.     

Object names and object functions serve as cues to categories for infants

Can object names and functions act as cues to categories for infants? In Study 1, 14- and 18-month-old infants were shown novel category exemplars along with a function, a name, or no cues. Infants were then asked to "find another one," choosing between 2 novel objects (1 from the familiar category and the other not). Infants at both ages were more likely to select the category match in the function than in the no-cue condition. However, only at 18 months did naming the objects enhance categorization. Study 2 shows that names can facilitate categorization for 14-month-olds as well when a hint regarding the core meaning of the objects (the function of a single familiarization object) is provided.     

Scepticism: Epistemic and Ontological

It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.     

Learning new names for new objects: cortical effects as measured by magnetoencephalography

We tracked the evolvement of naming-related cortical dynamics with magnetoencephalography when five normal adults successfully learned names and/or meanings of unfamiliar objects. In all subjects, the learning of new names was associated with pronounced cortical effects. The learning effect was of long latency and emerged as a change of activation in the same cortical network that was active during naming of familiar items. In four out of five subjects, the cortical learning effect occurred in the inferior parietal lobe. In three of these subjects, the cortical effect was left-sided. These results suggest that the inferior parietal lobe plays an important role in the acquisition of novel words, presumably as a part of working memory systems.     

Preschoolers trust particular informants when learning new names and new morphological forms

Across three studies, we investigated whether 4‐year‐olds would trust a previously reliable informant when learning novel morphological forms. In Experiment 1, children (N= 16) were presented with two informants: one who correctly named familiar objects and another who named them incorrectly. Children were invited to turn to these informants when learning novel labels and morphological forms. The majority of children chose the previously correct labeller when learning novel label and morphology. In Experiment 2, children (N= 16) were presented with an informant who used familiar plurals correctly and one who used them incorrectly. Children chose the previously correct morphologist when learning novel labels and past tense forms. Thus, children track both semantic and morphological accuracy. In Experiment 3, some children (N= 16) were presented with two informants who differed in naming accuracy, whereas others (N= 16) were presented with two informants who differed in morphological accuracy. To forestall any risk of experimenter cuing, one experimenter blind to the training children had received, tested children with novel labels and morphology. The results replicated those of Experiments 1 and 2. Implications for how children's trust in an informant might play a role in their acquisition of morphological forms are discussed.     

Selective attention and the acquisition of new phonetic categories

A class of selective attention models often applied to speech perception is used to study effects of training on the perception of an unfamiliar phonetic contrast. Attention-to-dimension (A2D) models of perceptual learning assume that the dimensions that structure listeners' perceptual space are constant and that learning involves only the reweighting of existing dimensions to emphasize or de-emphasize different sensory dimensions. Multidimensional scaling is used to identify the acoustic-phonetic dimensions listeners use before and after training to recognize the 3 classes of Korean stop consonants. Results suggest that A2D models can account for some observed restructuring of listeners' perceptual space, but listeners also show evidence of directing attention to a previously unattended dimension of phonetic contrast.     

Cognitive categories and memory span: I. Shifting between categories

Broadbent and Gregory's hypothesis that shifting selection between cognitive classes is at least inefficient is tested by varying the number of transitions from consonants to digits and back in a mixed list memory span situation. No orderly decrease is found as a function of the number of transitions, which renders the attention hypothesis unlikely. An alternative position in terms of interference theory could explain the data qualitatively. Tests of further predictions of this theory need first an estimate of the degree of difference between cognitive classes.     

Acquisition of subordinate categories by 3-year-olds: The roles of attribute salience,linguistic input,and child characteristics

This study was concerned with factors that may affect young 3-year-olds' acquisition of subordinate categories. Three factors were considered: (a) salience of the attribute or attributes which differentiate a subordinate category from other subordinates subsumed under the same basic level category, (b) presence or absence of linguistic input identifying the relevant attribute, and (c) characteristics intrinsic to the child. Three child characteristics were measured: (a) size of general comprehension vocabulary, (b) size of subordinate category name vocabulary, and (c) cognitive style. Results indicated that subordinate categories were easier to learn if their differentiating attribute was highly salient and/or linguistic input identifying the relevant attribute was provided. Correlational analyses pointed to a series of relations between the child characteristics measured and the number of subordinate categories acquired during the experiment, particularly for low salience categories. Implications of the three factors for the acquisition of expertise on object domains are considered.     

Case-like categories in children: The actor and some related categories

Case categories were investigated using a method in which pictures are presented accompanied by a sentence describing the scene: Preschool children learn to put tokens on the objects in the pictures according to the role each object plays in the scene as described. Generalization trials explore what the children include within the various roles. Children rapidly learn to associate tokens with case-like categories during the training phase, and readily transfer to new stimuli in generalization trials. The experiments demonstrate that children have a broad Actor category. The Actor “does” the action, and Actors are not necessarily animate. However, animacy is a class property of stimuli to which the children were very sensitive. There was evidence that User and Instrument are subcategories of Actor that are differentiated only when a sentence contains both. The data also suggest a Locative category, and Patient as a category of the grammatical object. Finally, the children appeared to treat subjects of predicate adjectives as a separate category, here called the Subject of Attribution, distinct from Actor, and functionally independent of objects of transitive verbs.     

Color categories are not universal: replications and new evidence from a stone-age culture

The authors sought to replicate and extend the work of E. Rosch Heider (1972) on the Dani with a comparable group from Papua, New Guinea, who speak Berinmo, which has 5 basic color terms. Naming and memory for highly saturated focal, non-focal, and low-saturation stimuli from around the color space were investigated. Recognition of desaturated colors was affected by color vocabulary. When response bias was controlled, there was no recognition advantage for focal stimuli. Paired-associate learning also failed to show an advantage for focal stimuli. Categorical Perception effects for both English and Berinmo were found, but only at the boundaries of existing linguistic categories. It is concluded that possession of linguistic categories facilitates recognition and influences perceptual judgments.     

Remembering kinds: new evidence that categories are privileged in children's thinking

What are the representations and learning mechanisms that underlie conceptual development? The present research provides evidence in favor of the claim that this process is guided by an early-emerging predisposition to think and learn about abstract kinds. Specifically, three studies (N = 192) demonstrated that 4- to 7-year-old children have better recall for novel information about kinds (e.g., that dogs catch a bug called “fep”) than for similar information about individuals (e.g., that a particular dog catches a bug called “fep”). By showing that children are particularly likely to retain information about kinds, this work not only provides a first empirical demonstration of a phenomenon that may be key to conceptual development but also makes it apparent that young children’s thinking is suffused with abstractions rather than being perceptually-based and concrete.     

Physicalism and Ontological Holism

The claim of this paper is that we should envisage physicalism as an ontological holism. Our current basic physics, quantum theory, suggests that, ontologically speaking, we have to assume one global quantum state of the world; many of the properties that are often taken to be intrinsic properties of physical systems are in fact relations, which are determined by that global quantum state. The paper elaborates on this conception of physicalism as an ontological holism and considers issues such as supervenience, realization of higher-order properties by basic physical properties, and reduction.     

A Moderate Eclecticism: Ontological and Epistemological Issues

The principle of eclecticism is discussed with the point of departure in a definition of psychology and its subject areas. It is argued that eclecticism constitutes one of the key developmental conditions for science. The argument begins with an analysis of the distinction between real and recognized object and concludes that a scientific object always has an infinite number of aspects and that this fact is not reducible to a question of complexity. Next a differentiation between theoretical levels based on ontological arguments are introduced and it is concluded that it is necessary to accept positive eclectic processes in theories, and that development of theories is due to an eclectic relationship with other theories. A series of examples are given for different versions of the eclectic development of psychological disciplines and concepts, namely phenomenology, psychoanalysis, stress, and cognition.