"Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior

In negotiation, information about the other party may be a source of strength or weakness, depending on the context, the type of information, its availability and quality, and how a negotiator uses it. An empirical study examines the way negotiators use "inside" information specifically designed to increase bargaining strength. The scoop-privileged information about the other party′s deadline-does not inform negotiators about possible deals; rather, it suggests a process of negotiating agreement. Misuse of the scoop, therefore, poses potential costs that may diminish its possible advantages. In a two-party negotiation exercise, access to inside information affected negotiators′ thoughts and behaviors. It enhanced their feelings of success and shifted the criterion for success away from final price toward a relative, interpersonal standard. Furthermore, informed negotiators used the scoop appropriately to manage the negotiation process and enhance both joint and individual profits.     

Unfixing the fixed pie: a motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation

Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant. Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information. Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs. which is consistent with a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

Time pressure and closing of the mind in negotiation

Research on time pressure (TP) in negotiation has considered strategic choice (demands and concession making) but largely ignored information processing. Based on Lay Epistemic Theory ([Kruglanski, 1989]) it is hypothesized that TP reduces motivation to process information systematically, and the time needed to negotiate an agreement, and that it produces greater reliance on cognitive heuristics when placing demands, and less integrative agreements. Two studies revealed that effects of time constraint on information processing in negotiation were due to higher need for cognitive closure under high TP. Study 1 also showed that negotiators use stereotypes about the opponent as a heuristic cue more under high rather than low TP. Study 2 revealed that negotiators under high TP were less likely to revise their unfounded fixed-pie perceptions during negotiation and, therefore, reached less integrative agreements. Implications for motivated information processing in negotiation are discussed.     

From self-prediction to self-defeat: behavioral forecasting, self-fulfilling prophecies, and the effect of competitive expectations

Four studies explored behavioral forecasting and the effect of competitive expectations in the context of negotiations. Study 1 examined negotiators' forecasts of how they would behave when faced with a very competitive versus a less competitive opponent and found that negotiators believed they would become more competitive. Studies 2 and 3 examined actual behaviors during a negotiation and found that negotiators who expected a very competitive opponent actually became less competitive, as evidenced by setting lower, less aggressive reservation prices, making less demanding counteroffers, and ultimately agreeing to lower negotiated outcomes. Finally, Study 4 provided a direct test of the disconnection between negotiators' forecasts for their behavior and their actual behaviors within the same sample and found systematic errors in behavioral forecasting as well as evidence for the self-fulfilling effects of possessing a competitive expectation.     

Mere physical distance and integrative agreements: When more space improves negotiation outcomes

We examined the effects of negotiating non-face-to-face with someone that is physically nearby versus faraway on integrative (mutually beneficial) agreements. Across Studies 1 and 2, we found that individuals who negotiated with another person that they believed was physically faraway (several thousand feet away) rather than nearby (a few feet away) attained more integrative agreements (higher joint outcome, more Pareto efficient agreements). In Study 3, we found that the effect of different magnitudes of physical distance between negotiators on integrative agreements depended on negotiators' construal level: individuals who negotiated with another person who was purportedly farther away achieved more integrative agreements when their level of construal was not constrained, but had no effect when they adopted a high-level of construal. The implications for non-face-to-face communication are discussed.     

The Impact of Alcohol on Negotiator Behavior: Experimental Evidence1

Business‐related drinking is an important organizational and managerial activity with particular relevance to the negotiation process. This paper investigates the influence of a moderate amount of alcohol on negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes. We conducted 2 negotiation studies involving inebriated and sober participants, and found that inebriated negotiators used more aggressive tactics, made more mistakes, and reached less integrative agreements than did sober negotiators. Across both studies, we found that inebriated negotiators were unaware that alcohol had affected their negotiations.     

The Negotiated Allocation of Benefits and Burdens: The Impact of Outcome Valence, Contribution, and Relationship

This laboratory study investigates negotiated allocations of benefits and burdens. We compare both the distributive and integrative aspects of negotiation to determine whether benefits and burdens are allocated according to the same norms of distributive justice and how well negotiators integrate their interests. We hypothesize that the distribution of resources depends on the valence of the resources and negotiators′ relative contributions to those resources. We also expect that the efficiency of agreements depends on the valence of resources, the negotiators′ contributions, and the time horizon of their relationships. Results support the hypotheses. Equity is more commonly used to allocate burdens than benefits; agreements for allocating burdens are less integrative than those for benefits; and agreements are more efficient when relationships are long term and subjects contribute unequally to the resources being allocated than when they contribute equally or relationships are short term. We discuss these results in terms of Taylor′s (1991) hypothesis about the asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events.     

买卖交易中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的机制

现实生活中的谈判通常发生在特定的社会情境中, 谈判者也总在扮演着某种角色。本研究探索了买卖交易谈判中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制。研究提出了一个关于谈判者角色诱发框架效应的理论模型, 然后通过两个模拟谈判实验对这一模型进行验证。实验1表明, 买家知觉到的馅饼大于卖家知觉到的馅饼, 且谈判者知觉到的馅饼在谈判者角色与谈判者绩效间起部分中介作用。实验2发现, 即使保留买家与卖家的角色标签, 如果剥离了金钱作为交易介质这一重要特征, 两个谈判角色知觉到的馅饼也没有差异。研究揭示了谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制, 对谈判者如何利用情境因素取得更好的谈判结果具有实践意义。     

Stereotype reactance at the bargaining table: the effect of stereotype activation and power on claiming and creating value

Two experiments explored the hypothesis that the impact of activating gender stereotypes on negotiated agreements in mixed-gender negotiations depends on the manner in which the stereo-type is activated (explicitly vs. implicitly) and the content of the stereotype (linking negotiation performance to stereotypically male vs. stereotypically female traits). Specifically, two experiments investigated the generality and limits of stereotype reactance. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that negotiated outcomes become more one-sided in favor of the high power negotiator when masculine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator effectiveness. In contrast, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that negotiated outcomes are more integrative (win-win) when feminine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator effectiveness. In total, performance in mixed-gender negotiations is strongly affected by the cognitions and motivations that negotiators bring to the bargaining table.     

The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement in Dyadic Negotiation

This study examines how differential power among negotiators (in the form of alternatives available to the individuals if the parties fail to reach a negotiated settlement) influences the parameters (e.g., the aspiration levels and reservation prices), the process, and the outcome of the negotiation. The results suggest that (a) the possession of an alternative increases one′s own outcome as well as joint outcome; (b) the more attractive or valuable the alternative, the greater the benefits regarding own and joint outcome; and (c) the better one′s own alternative relative to the other parties′ alternative, the larger one′s piece of the resource pie (i.e., one′s benefit increases).     

Myopic prediction, self-destructive secrecy, and the unexpected benefits of revealing final deadlines in negotiation

Three studies explored the psychology of social prediction by examining negotiators’ predictions of the effects of time pressure and comparing those predictions with actual outcomes. The results show that revealing final deadlines in negotiation can lead to better outcomes for the negotiator with the deadline because revelation speeds concessions by the other side. However, both naïve and experienced negotiators consistently predicted the opposite. As a result, when given the choice of revealing their final deadlines to their negotiating opponents, negotiators chose not to. The reasons for these erroneous expectations can be explained by myopic processes of prediction in which people anticipate the effects of constraints like deadlines more on their own behavior than on the behavior of others.     

谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响：角色的调节作用

谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义     

The Impact of Power on Information Processing Depends on Cultural Orientation

Two studies show that different culturally based concepts of interpersonal power have distinct implications for information processing. People with a vertical individualist (VI) cultural orientation view power in personalized terms (power is for gaining status over and recognition by others), whereas people with a horizontal collectivist (HC) cultural orientation view power in socialized terms (power is for benefitting and helping others). The distinct goals associated with these power concepts are served by different mindsets, such as stereotyping others versus learning the individuating needs of others. Therefore, for high-VI individuals, making personalized power salient increases stereotyping in processing product information. That is, they recognize better information that is congruent with their prior product expectations, relative to their recognition of incongruent information. In contrast, for high-HC people, making socialized power salient increases individuating processes, characterized by better memory for incongruent information.     

Initial perceptions in negotiations: evaluation and response to ‘logrolling’ offers

In negotiations, where several issues are under consideration and parties have different priorities among these issues, integrative agreements can be reached through ‘logrolling’: concessions on low priority issues in exchange for gains on higher priority issues. The present research focuses on the potential role of initial offers in the development of integrative agreements. We show first, that in a simulated competitive market the specific composition of initial offers influences the final agreements, beyond the effect predicted by their overall value. In order to obtain some insight into the judgmental processes that might play a role, we explore the way in which inexperienced negotiators presented with a hypothetical negotiation context evaluate and respond to logrolling versus distributive initial offers. Three hypotheses were tested: logrolling offers convey an implicit message of cooperation, logrolling offers promote understanding of the mutual interest structure of the task, and, finally, logrolling offers establish within‐issue anchors. Results do not support the first two hypotheses: logrolling offers were not necessarily judged more attractive than distributive ones, and they did not seem to affect the deeply rooted fixed‐pie assumption. However, initial offers did establish within‐issue anchors: counter‐offers were affected by the specific composition of the initial offers beyond the effect of their overall value. This anchoring process resulted in logrolling offers yielding a higher profit for their initiator, as well as higher combined profits for both parties. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Distributive spirals: negotiation impasses and the moderating role of disputant self-efficacy

Negotiations do not always end in agreements. Yet, we know little about impasses and how they affect negotiators. In three studies, we compare how negotiators experience impasses and agreements, paying particular attention to the moderating role of disputant self-efficacy. Specifically, we propose and find that negotiators who impasse find themselves caught in a distributive spiral-they interpret their performance as unsuccessful, experience negative emotions, and develop negative perceptions of their counterpart and the process. In terms of their future behavioral intentions, they are less willing to work together in the future, plan to share less information, plan to behave less cooperatively, and they lose faith in negotiation as an effective means of managing conflicts. As predicted, negotiators with relatively high levels of self-efficacy were insulated from some of these negative outcomes.     

Online bargaining and interpersonal trust

The presented study explores the effect of interacting over the Internet on interpersonal trust when bargaining online. Relative to face-to-face negotiations, online negotiations were characterized by (a) lower levels of pre-negotiation trust and (b) lower levels of post-negotiation trust. The reduced levels of pre-negotiation trust in online negotiations (i.e., before any interaction took place) demonstrate that negotiators bring different expectations to the electronic bargaining table than to face-to-face negotiations. These negative perceptions of trust were found to mediate another aspect of the relationship, namely, desired future interaction. Those who negotiated online reported less desire for future interactions with the other party. Online negotiators also were less satisfied with their outcome and less confident in the quality of their performance, despite the absence of observable differences in economic outcome quality.     

Long and Short Routes to Success in Electronically Mediated Negotiations: Group Affiliations and Good Vibrations

To understand why e-mail negotiations break down, we investigated two distinct elements of negotiators' relationships with each other: shared membership in a social group and mutual self-disclosure. In an experiment, some participants negotiated with a member of an outgroup (a student at a competitor university), whereas others negotiated with a member of an ingroup (a student at the same university). In addition, some negotiators exchanged personal information with their counterparts, whereas others did not. When neither common ingroup status nor a personalized relationship existed between negotiators, negotiations were more likely to end in impasse. These results are attributable to the positive influence of mutual self-disclosure and common group membership on negotiation processes and rapport between negotiators.     

Sex differences in the effects of visual contact and eye contact in negotiations

Previous research has proposed that the ability to see others would benefit negotiations. We argue that this view is too narrow and that the impact of visual contact on negotiated agreements depends on the meaning individuals ascribe to either its presence or absence. Based on previous research showing that females are more likely to understand others in the presence of visual contact while males understand others better in the absence of visual contact, we explore how visual contact, eye contact, and sex affect the quality of negotiated agreements in a meta-analysis (Study 1) and a laboratory experiment (Study 2). The two studies combined show that because direct communication via the face facilitates a shared understanding for two unacquainted females, their agreements are of higher quality when they have visual contact compared to when they do not (Study 1), and if they have visual contact, their agreements are better when they have eye contact than when they do not (Study 2). Because communication via the face increases discomfort between two unacquainted males, their agreements are of higher quality when they do not have visual contact (Study 1), and if they do have visual contact, their agreements are better when they have no eye contact than when they do (Study 2).     

Joint Effects of Assigned Goals and Training on Negotiator Performance

This study examined the joint effects of assigned goals and training on negotiator performance. Undergraduate business students participated in two sessions of a competitive market simulation and were assigned to one of three levels of goals: do-your-best, specific/emy, or specific/difficult. In the training condition, an introductory lecture on bargaining strategies was presented between the two market sessions; subjects in the control conditions did not attend the lecture. In the first market session, specificldifficult goals improved mean profit per agreement but at the expense of number of agreements negotiated and total profit. In the market session after training, negotiators who were assigned specific goals (whether difficult or easy) negotiated agreements of higher joint value, thereby enhancing both mean personal profit per agreement and total profit. There were no differences between the two market sessions in the control group. The implications of these findings and future research directions are discussed.