THINKING ABOUT FEELINGS: WORKING WITH THE STAFF OF AN EATING DISORDERS UNIT

I would like to share with colleagues some thoughts about the fascinating and disturbing states of mind and body that I found when working in an Eating Disorders Unit, and try both to describe and to think further about how these impact on the work of the staff and upon my task.

Some recurrent themes are: splitting and projection, showing up in many areas as either/or states of mind, which can affect the whole team at times; the refusal to let anything in, which seems linked to disastrous unconscious muddles between food and love, love and hate, etc; a great unconscious terror that, given the slightest acknowledgment, need will emerge as greed; horror of fatness, and body dysmorphic confusions; enactment in place of feeling/thinking; antagonism to change and growth.

Despite common themes and ways of behaving that can make these patients seem superficially very alike, it is their differences that are so striking; it seems clear that there is unlikely to be a single identifiable precursor. We have to keep reminding ourselves that the search for meanings is not always the same as seeking after causes, and that neither is the same as blame, often a difficult balance to hold where splitting is so prevalent a defence.     

The group-member mind trade-off: attributing mind to groups versus group members

People attribute minds to other individuals and make inferences about those individuals' mental states to explain and predict their behavior. Little is known, however, about whether people also attribute minds to groups and believe that collectives, companies, and corporations can think, have intentions, and make plans. Even less is known about the consequences of these attributions for both groups and group members. We investigated the attribution of mind and responsibility to groups and group members, and we demonstrated that people make a trade-off: The more a group is attributed a group mind, the less members of that group are attributed individual minds. Groups that are judged to have more group mind are also judged to be more cohesive and responsible for their collective actions. These findings have important implications for how people perceive the minds of groups and group members, and for how attributions of mind influence attributions of responsibility to groups and group members.     

Reading other people's mind: Insights from neuropsychology

When trying to make sense of other people's behaviour we usually invoke their mental states, such as their intentions, beliefs or emotions. This mind reading ability has been traditionally investigated in developmental psychology and comparative psychology but is now receiving increasing attention from the cognitive neurosciences. I will show the important role that neuropsychology plays in unravelling the cognitive and neural basis of our mind reading abilities. I will illustrate this by showing how cases of adults with acquired brain lesions can help us tease apart the different mechanisms that underlie mind reading abilities and can help us understand the nature of these mechanisms, especially their relation to language and executive function.     

The nature of epistemic feelings

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called “epistemic feelings.” This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account.     

Solving the (Real) Other Minds Problem

People care about others’ thoughts, feelings, and intentions but can have considerable difficulty reading others’ minds accurately. Recent advances in understanding how people make such inferences provide significant insight into when people are likely to be reasonably accurate mind readers and when they are not. People tend to reason about others’ mental states by starting with their own and only subsequently adjusting that egocentric default to accommodate differences between themselves and others. Such adjustments tend to be insufficient, rendering final estimates egocentrically biased. When more information about others is available, people tend to rely on existing stereotypes or other expectations to intuit others’ mental states. Systematic errors resulting either from excessive egocentrism or inaccurate expectations can lead to miscommunication, misunderstanding, and social conflict, but these biases also suggest useful strategies for improving mind reading in everyday life.     

Machiavellianism and Spontaneous Mentalization: One Step Ahead of Others

In spite of the Machiavellians' successful strategies in exploitation of others, they show cognitive deficiencies, especially reduced mind‐reading skill. Theory of mind is usually regarded as an ability to make inferences about the mental states of others and thus to predict their behaviour. In our study, we have instead emphasized a motivation‐based approach, using the concept of spontaneous mentalization. This concept is construed solely in a motivational context and not in relation to the automaticity of mind‐reading ability. It entails that people in their social relations make efforts to explore the thoughts and intentions of others and are motivated to make hypotheses about the mental state of the other person. We assumed that what is peculiar to Machiavellianism is spontaneous mentalization as a kind of motivation rather than mind‐reading as an ability. To measure spontaneous mentalization, we created a set of image stimuli and asked our participants to describe their impressions of the pictures. The results show that individual differences in spontaneous mentalization correlate positively with the scores of Machiavellianism. These results suggest that those who have a stronger motivation for putting themselves into the mind of others can be more successful in misleading and exploiting them. Further research should be carried out to clarify how spontaneous mentalization and mind‐reading ability relate to each other. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Parental Practices and Theory of Mind Development

In the past three decades, psychologists have become increasingly interested in the study of theory of mind. This ability involves an understanding of different components of the mind (e.g., emotions, thoughts, beliefs) and of how they are related to human behavior. Several parents’ characteristics (e.g., attachment, mental-state talk) have been associated to children’s theory-of-mind development, but the variables and methods adopted are diverse and at times lead to inconsistent findings. The goal of the present paper, therefore, is to provide a literature review that can point both to possible ways in which discrepancies might be overcome and to promising research directions. Our review covers 78 research reports published in English between 1980 and 2011. Only empirical studies, using children as participants, were included in the review. Three main suggestions are offered for researchers, parents and practitioners on how to nurture young children’s understanding of mind: (a) to treat children as intentional agents, acting in a sensitive and responsive fashion to their mental states; (b) to speak to children about mental states in an elaborate and connected way, pointing out their causes and consequences, and explaining that these may be different for different people; and (c) to expose children to a wide range of emotions while being careful to not express over-frequent and inconsistent negative affect. One limitation of the present review, however, is that we do not look into how parental practices interact with certain individual characteristics of the child (e.g., personality, IQ and language skills). Future research should explore the multifaceted nature of these relationships and interactions.     

Attachment states of mind and the quality of young adults' sibling relationships

This report examines young adults' states of mind regarding their early attachment experiences in relation to the observed and perceived quality of their sibling relationships. Sixty sibling pairs (18-25 years of age) were (a) administered the Adult Attachment Interview (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985), (b) videotaped during a conflict resolution task, and (c) asked to describe the quality of their relationship using the Adult Sibling Relationship Questionnaire (Stocker, Lanthier, & Furman, 1997). As hypothesized, dismissing states of mind were associated with lower levels of positive and negative affect while participants attempted to resolve an area of conflict with a sibling as well as with relatively low levels of reported warmth in the relationship. In contrast-but also in line with predictions-preoccupied states of mind were associated with heightened expression of negative affect toward a brother or sister, and the siblings of highly preoccupied individuals reported more conflict in their relationships. Findings provide further support for the importance of young adults' representations of childhood attachment experiences with respect to the quality of their adult relationships. In addition, this study extends previous findings regarding the significance of dismissing versus preoccupied states of mind by demonstrating that these dimensions are differentially associated with behavioral and self-reported aspects of sibling relationship quality in early adulthood.     

Psychic reality and the nature of consciousness

In this paper we make the case for a psychoanalytically informed reconsideration of the phenomena of consciousness. Classically, following Freud, who viewed consciousness as merely a reflection or perception of unconscious mental activity, psychoanalysts have tended to regard a focus on conscious experience as potentially reductionistic and at risk of overlooking the mind's deeper structures. We describe the case of Mr K, a patient who experienced disturbances of consciousness that forced us to consider the possibility that the capacity to experience ourselves as conscious, intentional agents in a coherent world of objects is not merely a modality of perception but rather a maturational and developmental achievement that to some degree depends on adequate experiences of caregiving and is vital in ensuring the possibility of human communication. As such, it is a capacity that is vulnerable to experiences of neglect and maltreatment. We suggest that as well as compromising the capacity to think about one's own and other people's feelings, such experiences may have the further adverse consequence of leading the individual to experience and risk becoming conscious of certain dangerously maladaptive, destructive states of mind which in normal development remain inaccessible to conscious experience. Phenomenologically, such states of mind are experienced as fragmentation and disturbances of consciousness. We discuss the clinical implications of these reflections and the limitations they place on psychoanalytic work in the context of their impact on the work with Mr K.     

Unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) as clinical concept

A clinical phenomenology of the concept ‘unconscious fantasy’ attempts to describe it from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective, that is, from the immediate experience of the analyst working in session. Articles of psychoanalytic authors from different persuasions are reviewed, which taken as a whole would shed some light on how the concept of unconscious fantasy takes shape in the analyst's mind during the session with the patient. A clinical phenomenology in three steps is described. Each step is illustrated by clinical material. Current controversies around the concept of unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) are still trapped in the discussion about if and how they are really unconscious. The strategy to describe from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective the process of how the analyst's mind embraces the idea that an emerging phenomenon in the relationship with the patient can be defined as ‘unconscious fantasy’, allows us to elude the question as to whether or not we believe that unconscious fantasies exist at all, since we are neither required to assert or deny such a prior existence in order to describe the process of elaboration which, in the end, does formulate a fantasy as fantasy.     

Toward a model of self pathology underlying personality disorders: narratives, metacognition, interpersonal cycles and decision-making processes

If we want to explain the links between the various and heterogeneous elements--symptoms, dysfunctional forms of behavior and poor social functioning--making up personality disorders, we need model a self pathology that portrays dysfunctions, the links among them, and how their interactions maintain disorders over time. In our view, the most likely elements of self pathology are: a. problematic contents (thoughts and emotions)--experienced subjectively as states of mind and organized in the form of narratives; b. shortfalls in the ability, termed meta-cognition, to reflect on mental states, both of oneself and of others; c. pathogenic interpersonal schemas; and d. maladaptive decision-making processes. These elements get altered in the various personality disorders and interact to form typical pathological organizations. This article seeks to describe a model of self pathology in personality disorders and discuss its current scientific status based on a literature review that spans several disciplines. The model is illustrated with an example of how the pathogenic elements can interact to form personality disorder. Lastly, the limitations and advantages of the model are discussed.     

Thought contents and cognitive functioning in motivational versus volitional states of mind

Do people who are about to make a decision differ from people who are about to enact a decision just made with respect to (1) the contents of their spontaneous stream of thought, and (2) aspects of cognitive functioning reflective of short-term memory? Subjects either made a choice between, or were assigned to, two available test materials allegedly designed to measure creativity and differentially suited to promote an individual's full creative potential. Subjects were, however, interrupted prior to or shortly after making this choice: In Study 1, they were asked to report on the thoughts they experienced during the time period just before the interruption; in Study 2, subjects were interrupted either before or after making a choice and were asked to recall lists of words designed to test memory span. The results of Study 1 confirmed our assumption that predecisional versus postdecisional streams of spontaneous thought reflectmotivational versusvolitional states of mind. That is, predecisional thought was preoccupied with incentive values of goal options, expectancy of performance outcomes, and metamotivational directives, whereas postdecisional thought was concerned with questions of how to implement the pursued goal. In Study 2, subjects in a motivational state of mind exhibited a greater memory span than subjects in a volitional state of mind. Since, in a further study, performance on arithmetic tasks did not improve for subjects in a motivational as opposed to a volitional state of mind, the results of Study 2 are understood as a state-dependent increase in receptivity with respect to incoming information. In interpreting the present findings, the characteristic features of motivational and volitional states are explicated. Furthermore, it is suggested that the dominating research tradition focusing on motivational problems (i.e., expectancy-value models) and the abandoned research tradition concerned with volitional problems (i.e., formation and implementation of an intent) should be integrated into a functional unit.     

A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?

Either 1. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as relevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters, or 2. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as irrelevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters. The first state of mind is morally objectionable, for one should not change one’s normative beliefs to pander to the patterns of some non-natural realm. The second state of mind is irrational, for if you think you are aiming to represent non-natural properties correctly, you should (rationally) be interested to know which actions share a non-natural property and which do not, and you should (rationally) be prepared to change your mind accordingly.

     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

Telic and Mechanistic Explanations of Mind and Meaningfulness: An Empirical Illustration

ABSTRACT Two traditions of personality theorizing, teleology and mechanism, are contrasted on their views of mind and the pivotal cognitive phenomenon of meaningfulness A major, albeit less well known, distinction between these traditions involves the assumption of time The fact that contemporary cognitive models rely on time (e g, temporal sequences or past events) places them firmly in the mechanistic tradition of personality theorizing Telic implications for cognition have been relatively overlooked, and are herein explored theoretically and empirically Cognition without temporality is described and distinguished from modern cognitive models that employ telic terminology An original study is provided to illustrate how these distinctions can be operationalized and addressed empirically     

Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

Reductionism in the comments and autobiographical accounts of prominent psychologists

Many of the researchers in the field of psychological science use strategies and methods in which human actions and experiences are reduced to behavioral contingencies, statistical regularities, neurophysiological states and processes, and computational functions and models. However, many psychologists talk readily and easily about how their research might assist human agents to solve problems, cope, make decisions, self-regulate, and more generally "make a difference" and "take control." The authors considered informally selected comments by several eminent psychologists, and more formally, 73 autobiographical accounts of prominent psychologists to see what could be learned about the attitudes of these psychologists toward reductionism in their own work and in the field of psychology in general. In interpreting these comments and accounts, the authors posit a gap between many psychologists' contemplation of their work and their actual research practices. The authors also suggest that such a gap may be related to psychologists' educational experiences and their scholarly and professional socialization, as well as to their subdisciplinary attachments and contexts.     

Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments,Desires and Motivation

According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper I argue that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg’s arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausible.