Empirical analysis of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction of judgments of learning (JOLs): effects of relatedness and serial position on JOLs

A. Koriat's (1997) cue-utilization framework provided a significant advance in understanding how people make judgments of learning (JOLs). A major distinction is made between intrinsic and extrinsic cues. JOLs are predicted to be sensitive to intrinsic cues (e.g., item relatedness) and less sensitive to extrinsic cues (e.g., serial position) because JOLs are comparative across items in a list. The authors evaluated predictions by having people make JOLs after studying either related (poker-flush) or unrelated (dog-spoon) items. Although some outcomes confirmed these predictions, others could not be readily explained by the framework. Namely, relatedness influenced JOLs even when manipulated between participants, primacy effects were evident on JOLs, and the order in which blocks of items were presented (either all related items first or all unrelated items first) influenced JOLs. The authors discuss the framework in relation to these and other outcomes.     

Reversed better-than-average effect in direct comparisons of nonsocial stimuli depends on the set size

Studies on direct comparative judgments typically show that, for items that are positively evaluated, a single item randomly drawn from a larger set of similar items tends to be judged as better than average (the BTA effect). However, Windschitl, Conybeare, and Krizan (2008) demonstrated that, under timing conditions that do not favor focusing attention on the single item, the reversal of the BTA effect occurs. We report two experiments showing that the magnitude of the reversed BTA effect increases as a function of the size of a multiitem referent with which a single item target is compared. Specifically, in direct comparative judgments of the attractiveness of positively evaluated objects (nice-looking cloth buttons, attractive buildings, or cupcakes), underestimation of the attractiveness of singletons, as compared with a multiitem set (reversed BTA effect), increased with the increased set size. Analysis of absolute judgments obtained for singletons and for small and large multiitem sets suggests that, for attractive stimuli, both the reversed BTA effect in comparative judgments and its sensitivity to set size occur as a result of a positive relationship between set size and perceived attractiveness in absolute judgments.     

Biases in social comparative judgments: the role of nonmotivated factors in above-average and comparative-optimism effects

Biases in social comparative judgments, such as those illustrated by above-average and comparative-optimism effects, are often regarded as products of motivated reasoning (e.g., self-enhancement). These effects, however, can also be produced by information-processing limitations or aspects of judgment processes that are not necessarily biased by motivational factors. In this article, the authors briefly review motivational accounts of biased comparative judgments, introduce a 3-stage model for understanding how people make comparative judgments, and then describe how various nonmotivational factors can influence the 3 stages of the comparative judgment process. Finally, the authors discuss several unresolved issues highlighted by their analysis, such as the interrelation between motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias and the influence of nonmotivated sources of bias on behavior.     

Recognition memory for source and occurrence: The importance of recollection

Previous recognition memory studies indicate that when both recollection and familiarity are expected to contribute to recognition performance (e.g., discriminating studied items from nonstudied items) the dual-process and the unequal-variance signal detection models provide comparable accounts of performance. When familiarity is not expected to be useful (e.g., when items from two equally familiar sources are discriminated between), the dual-process model provides a significantly better account of performance. In the present study, source recognition was tested under conditions in which familiarity could have been used to perform a list-discrimination task; participants were required to discriminate between strong studied items, weak studied items, and new items. The dual-process model provided a better account of performance than did the unequal-variance model. Moreover, the results indicated that the unequal-variance assumption in a single-process signal detection model was not a valid substitution for recollection and that recollection was used to make recognition judgments even when assessments of familiarity were useful.     

Position effects in chunked linear orders

Summary When someone is asked which of two items from a linearly ordered set of items comes first in that order, reaction time decreases with increasing distance between the two items in the given order. This is known as thedistance effect, a very robust finding in studies on linear orders. Surprisingly, investigations onchunked linear orders show unexpected diverse results. For example, reaction times todifferent probes (i. e., probes with items from different chunks) are sometimes longer than those tosame probes (i. e., probes with items from the same chunk). But if subjects' latency depends on the discriminability of chunk labels vs. exact position information within a chunk,different probes should always yield faster order judgments thansame probes. Two experiments investigated whether position effects, including both end-of-list and end-ofchunk effects, can account for the unexpected finding that between-chunk probes are sometimes answered more slowly than within-chunk probes. Moreover, the linea-rorder paradigm was extended to complex action sequences with more than two chunks, using original cooking recipes as materials. The results showed thatchunk-position effects play a crucial role in comparative judgments. Probes from the first and the last chunk were answered faster than those from a middle chunk.Border items (i. e., items next to a chunk boundary) did not produce a significant effect. However, chunking affected subjects' reaction time, as was indicated by the absence of a distance effect fordifferent probes. Besides, action sequences that are ordered in time, as well as concept lists used previously, can be considered linear orders, thus supporting the view that linear orders reflect a basic representation schema of human memory.     

Don’t Shoot the Messnger: Memory for Misspellings in Context

Misspellings in sentences are usually easy to understand by readers due to top-down influences. Although top-down processing allows for fluent reading of misspelled items, the nature of their representations in memory is not known. If representations of misspellings are distinct from representations of correctly spelled words, their influence should be seen in later recognition decisions. In this set of experiments, participants read words and misspellings embedded in sentences and were later given a recognition test. The sentences contained semantically biased or neutral contexts. In Experiment 1, misspellings were created by removing a single letter (e.g., drveway). In Experiment 2, the recognition items probes were presented in uppercase letters (e.g., DRVEWAY) to reduce the visual similarity between study and test items. In Experiment 3, the misspellings were created by substituting visually similar letters (e.g., driweway). In contrast to the previous experiments, in Experiment 4, participants were explicitly told about the memory test to see how response strategies affect performance. Overall, the results indicate that people retain surface feature information about misspellings which seem to inform their memory judgments, and that the processing of this information cannot be strategically controlled.     

On the relative speed account of number-size interference in comparative judgments of numerals

Humans show systematic congruency effects due to irrelevant variations of the numerical value or the physical size of digits in judgments about either of these 2 attributes alone. According to influential models (e.g., J. Tzelgov, J. Meyer, & A. Henik, 1992), these effects are characterized by genuine asymmetries of size and number processing not accounted for by simple relative speed considerations, whereas some recent work (e.g., A. Pansky & D. Algom, 1999) partly challenges this view. This article presents 2 qualitative gradient-based predictions made by relative speed models and a diffusion-based implementation of the relative speed view to quantitatively account for response times and error rates in comparative judgments of digits. The results of 2 experiments using a completely task-symmetric design are in accord with these detailed predictions; they are also consistent with the view that both number and size are converted into magnitude representations of similar structure.     

Finding similarity in a model of relational reasoning

Similarity plays a central role in the study of perception and cognition. Previous attempts to model similarity have captured effects of either featural or structural similarity, but typically not both. We simulated both by fitting similarity data with the LISA model of relational reasoning [Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (1997). Distributed representations of structure: A theory of analogical access and mapping. Psychological Review, 104, 427–466, Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2003a). A symbolic-connectionist theory of relational inference and generalization. Psychological Review, 110, 220–264]. The same mechanisms LISA uses to simulate analogy also provide a natural account of feature-based similarity effects (e.g., violations of symmetry), structural effects (e.g., the advantage of alignable over non-alignable differences), and the combined effects of featural and structured information (i.e., MIPs and MOPs; “Matches In/Out of Place”) on similarity judgments. Our approach differs from most models of similarity in that LISA was not originally designed to simulate similarity judgments, but rather analogical reasoning. LISA’s incidental ability to simulate diverse similarity effects speaks to the plausibility of the model’s account of human knowledge representation.     

Can inhibition resolve retrieval competition through the control of spreading activation?

Two experiments are reported in which the mechanisms underlying retrieval-induced forgetting for complex prose materials were investigated, using the independent probe technique pioneered by Anderson and Spellman (1995). These experiments provide additional empirical evidence in support of an inhibitory account of memory. Specifically, evidence emerged not only for the inhibition of nonpracticed items from practiced sets (i.e., first-order effects), but also for the inhibition of items from nonpracticed sets that were semantically related to practiced items in practiced sets (i.e., cross-category effects) and for items from nonpracticed sets that were semantically related to nonpracticed items in practiced sets (ie., second-order effects). These findings are considered in terms of Anderson and Spellman's model of inhibitory processing. We also outline an alternative inhibitory interpretation. Specifically, we consider how inhibition may function as a way of controlling the spread of activation and what implications this may have for the flexibility and adaptiveness of memory.     

The time course of orthographic and phonological code activation

The present study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine the time course of orthographic and phonological priming in the masked priming paradigm. Participants monitored visual target words for occasional animal names, and ERPs to nonanimal critical items were recorded. These critical items were preceded by different types of primes: Orthographic priming was examined using transposed-letter (TL) primes (e.g., barin-BRAIN) and their controls (e.g., bosin-BRAIN); phonological priming was examined using pseudohomophone primes (e.g., brane-BRAIN) and their controls (e.g., brant-BRAIN). Both manipulations modulated the N250 ERP component, which is hypothesized to reflect sublexical processing during visual word recognition. Orthographic (TL) priming and phonological (pseudohomophone) priming were found to have distinct topographical distributions and different timing, with orthographic effects arising earlier than phonological effects.     

The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.     

The Influence of Language Form and Conventional Wording on Judgments of Illness

Prior research indicates that category labels influence category judgments, but little is known regarding the effects for familiar categories with significant social consequences. The present studies address this issue by examining the effect of linguistic form on judgments of illnesses. Both mental and physical illnesses were presented in each of three linguistic forms: noun, adjective, and possessive phrase. In Study 1, participants were asked to judge the permanence of a set of novel illnesses that differed in wording (e.g., “He is a baxtermic”; “He is baxtermic”; “He has baxtermia”). In Studies 2 and 3, participants were asked to judge which forms of wording were most familiar for actual mental illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia) and physical illnesses (e.g., diabetes). In Study 4, participants were asked to judge the permanence of a set of familiar illnesses that differed in wording. The results indicated that for novel illnesses, nouns (“is a”) imply greatest permanence and possessive nouns (“has”) imply least permanence. However, for familiar illnesses, permanence judgments are also influenced by how frequently each form appears in ordinary language use. Mental illnesses are more often expressed with relatively permanent forms (“is” and “is a”) , whereas physical illnesses are more often expressed with relatively transient forms (“has”). The results demonstrate the importance of both linguistic form and conventional wording patterns on how categories are interpreted.     

Increasing confidence in remote autobiographical memory and general knowledge: extensions of the revelation effect

In recognition tests, items presented in unusual ways (e.g., degraded, revealed in stages, or presented as anagrams) are often judged to be old more than are intact items. This revelation effect has been observed only in episodic judgments about the occurrence or frequency of relatively recent events. The present work extends the boundary conditions of this effect. In three experiments, subjects unscrambled anagrams in the context of answering questions about their childhood (e.g., broke a dwniwo playing ball) or while answering questions pertaining to world knowledge (e.g.,fastest animal-elpraod). In each case, a revelation effect was observed: Solving an anagram increased confidence in remote autobiographical memories and in memory for world facts. These results contradict claims that the effect is an episodic memory phenomenon and challenge existing explanations of the revelation effect.     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.     

Modeling the conscious correlates of recognition memory: Reflections on the remember-know paradigm

Understanding how memory processes contribute to the conscious experience of memory is central to contemporary cognitive psychology. Recently, many investigators (e.g., Gardiner, 1988) have examined theremember-know paradigm to understand the conscious correlates of recognition memory. A variety of studies have demonstrated that variables have different effects on remember and know responses, and these findings have been interpreted in the context of dual-process models of recognition memory. This paper presents a single-process model of the remember-know paradigm, emphasizing the dependence of remember and know judgments on a set of common underlying processes (e.g., criterion setting). We use this model to demonstrate how a single-process model can give rise to the functional dissociations presented in the remember-know literature. We close by detailing procedures for testing our model and describing how those tests may facilitate the development of dual-process models.     

Order information and retrieval distinctiveness: recall of common versus bizarre material

The order-encoding hypothesis (E. L. DeLosh & M. A. McDaniel, 1996) assumes that serial-order information contributes to the retrieval of list items and that serial-order encoding is better for common items than bizarre items. In line with this account, Experiment 1 revealed better free recall and serial-order memory for common than for bizarre items in pure lists, and Experiment 2 showed that recall for bizarre items increased and the recall advantage of common items was eliminated when serial-order encoding for bizarre items was increased to the level of common items. However, inconsistent with a second assumption that bizarre-item advantages in mixed lists reflect better individual-item encoding for bizarre items, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the bizarreness effect in mixed lists is eliminated when alternative retrieval strategies are encouraged. This set of findings is better explained by the differential-retrieval-process framework, which proposes that contextual factors (e.g., list composition) influence the extent to which various types of information are used at retrieval, with the bizarreness advantage in mixed lists dependent on a distinctiveness-based retrieval process.     

A Meta-Meta-Analysis: Empirical Review of Statistical Power,Type I Error Rates,Effect Sizes,and Model Selection of Meta-Analyses Published in Psychology

A general social desirability factor emerged at the second-order level when a set of individual social desirability scale values were correlated between subjects (i.e., across items) and factor analysed. However, no such general factor emerged at the second-order level when the individual judgments were correlated between items (i.e., across subjects).     

Effect of the difficulty of prior items on the magnitude of judgments of learning for subsequent items

Research on metacognition often uses various kinds of paired-associate items (e.g., foreign language translation equivalents) to investigate judgments of learning (JOLs) under the assumption that the JOLs are made independently of each other. We tested this assumption by exploring the effect of manipulating the difficulty of prior Swahili-English translation equivalents to determine whether there is a contrasting change in the magnitude of the JOLs assigned to subsequent Swahili-English translation equivalents (e.g., intermediate-difficulty items might receive lower JOLs when following easy items than when following difficult items). The magnitude of JOLs for the subsequent items did not vary as a function of the difficulty of the prior items, even when there were 10 prior items of homogeneous difficulty that differed from the difficulty of the subsequent to-be-judged items.     

False recognition across meaning,language, and stimulus format: Conceptual relatedness and the feeling of familiarity

Four experiments examined contributions of conceptual relatedness and feelings of familiarity to false recognition. Participants first studied lists of unrelated items (e.g., table, lock) followed by a recognition test with three types of items: (1) studied items (e.g., table), (2) semantically related lures (e.g., key), and (3) unrelated lures (e.g., cup). Participants falsely recognized more related than unrelated lures when the stimuli were words (Experiment 1A) and pictures (Experiment 1B), when the studied items and related lures differed in language (Experiment 2), and when they differed in perceptual format (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, an attribution manipulation, designed to make feelings of familiarity nondiagnostic for memory judgments, eliminated the false-recognition effect obtained in Experiment 3. Overall, the study suggests that conceptual relatedness produces false recognition even in the absence of shared perceptual surface features between study and test items, and it does so by generating feelings of familiarity.