The Matter of Religion and Science: Response to Huston Smith

Huston Smith's Why Religion Matters is the culminating reflections of one of the most respected religion scholars of our day. In this work, Smith sees modern society to be in the midst of a spiritual crisis. According to Smith, this crisis has been brought about by the advance of science and the inroads into what Smith calls the traditional worldview. While Smith's work is of some importance, I believe that several of its fundamental claims are mistaken. Smith often does not accurately portray the content of science and frequently conflates the actual practice of science with philosophical scientism. Smith wrongly blames science alone for the decline of religion among Western elites. His claim that all religions can be equivocally described in terms of the traditional worldview is also problematic. Despite this, Smith does have a clear conception of what the issues are in the relation between science and religion. It is my hope that these issues will continue to be taken seriously.     

A Setback to the Dialogue: Response to Huston Smith

Huston Smith's book, Why Religion Matters , offers an eloquent evocation of mystical sensibility. Unfortunately, along the way, he offers a strongly negative and often inaccurate account of the scientific worldview, the claim being that the science is laying siege to the spiritual.     

Science and Scientism in Huston Smith's Why Religion Matters

Huston Smith is justifiably critical of scientism, the belief that science is the only reliable path to truth. He holds that scientism and the materialism that accompanies it have led to a widespread denial of the transcendence expressed in traditional religious world-views. He argues that evolutionary theory should be seen as a product of scientism rather than of scientific evidence, citing authors who claim that the fossil record does not support the idea of continuous descent with modification from earlier life forms. I suggest that he has underestimated the cumulative weight of evidence from many independent fields of science supporting neo-Darwinism. I argue that methodological (but not philosophical) naturalism is a basic assumption of scientific inquiry. Proponents of intelligent design assume a fixed plan or blueprint, which is compatible with Smith's understanding of God's timeless vision. By contrast, almost all biologists and many theologians today envisage a dynamic and open-ended process rather than the realization of the unchanging forms in a preexisting plan.     

Smith on Indexicals

In this paper, I advance a new view of the semantics of indexicals, using a paper by Quentin Smith as my starting point. I make use of Smith’s examples, refined and expanded upon by myself to argue, as Smith does, that the standard view, that indexicals refer to some prominent features of the context according to an invariant rule called the character, does not agree with a wide range of phenomena. I depart from Smith, however, in denying that we need more complex rules, which he does not give, called metacharacters to account for all the deviations, and instead argue for a view of indexicals as just being special cases of demonstratives. I show how demonstratives can be substituted for indexicals to support this view, and I adduce recent work in the semantics of demonstratives to explain how it can work.     

Huston Smith Replies to Barbour, Goodenough, and Peterson

Responses and clarifications are given to the three respondents to my recent book, Why Religion Matters , in which I discuss what I see as the drawbacks and inconsistencies of Darwinism. While certain of their criticisms are understandable, others are based on a misreading of my work. Finally, my critics fail to show that my book is mistaken in its central claim that the modern loss of faith in transcendence, basic to the traditional/religious worldview, is unwarranted, because science has not been able to disprove the metaphysical claim that transcendence exists.     

Adam Smith and dependency

The focus of this paper is the works and life of Adam Smith, who is widely recognized as the father and founder of contemporary economics. Latent content analysis is applied to his seminal text in economics, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). The results reveal that Smith considers dependence on others a problem and sees the solution to this problem in impersonalized interdependence. In addition, his views on social dependency and personal dependency, reflected in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (1963) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), are analyzed. This analysis suggests a central tension between dependence and independence in Smith's writings. The personal dependency patterns he exhibited in his life, which also suggest a tension between dependence and independence, are identified through a reading of his biographies. Based on insights from psychoanalytic literature, this paper proposes that developing the ideas in the Wealth of Nations was part of Smith's creative solution to this tension. In particular, his solution to one individual's dependence on another was through a system of impersonalized interdependence. In other words, Smith defended against his personal dependence through his economic theorizing.     

Adam Smith,Ethicist

This essay argues that Adam Smith's political economy is premised upon a moral anthropology, and that greater attention to Smith from religious ethicists may both improve Smith scholarship and deepen dialogue on economic themes within the field of religious ethics. It does so first by surveying common readings of Smith and noting that engagement of his work within religious ethics and theology tends to rely on misconceptions prevalent in these readings. It then outlines the moral psychology that links Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations and explains the importance of this moral psychology for Smith's ambivalent analysis of commercial society. Reflecting on the case of Smith's work, it concludes by arguing that attention from religious ethicists may also improve contemporary political economic debates, given that they are often premised upon latent assumptions about moral anthropology.     

Smith On Times And Tokens

In this essay I respond to Quentin Smith's chargethat `the date-analysis version ofthe tenseless theory of time cannot give adequateaccounts of the truth conditions ofthe statements made by tensed sentence-tokens'(Smith 1999, 236). His argument isbased on an analysis of certain counterfactualsituations that is at odds with thedate-analysis account of language and hence succeedsonly in begging the questionagainst that theory. To anticipate: his argumentfails if one allows that temporalindexicals such as `now' rigidly designate theirtime of utterance, something thedate-analyst can happily admit whether she adheresto an absolute or relationalmetaphysics of time.     

Frontier Kantianism: Autonomy and Authority in Ralph Waldo Emerson and Joseph Smith

Ralph Waldo Emerson is often seen as the early American prophet of autonomy. This essay suggests a perhaps surprising fellow traveler in this prophetic call: Joseph Smith. Smith opposed religious creeds for the same reason that Emerson denounced them, namely that creeds represent a threat to the autonomy of a person's beliefs. Smith and Emerson also forward similar defenses of individual autonomy in action. Furthermore, they encounter a shared problem: how can autonomy be possible in a society where other individuals hold some kind of authority? I propose that each thinker resolves this tension through an insight with a Kantian echo. A suitably qualified version of authority can sometimes count as an expression of, rather than hindrance to, autonomy. I describe the overlap in Emerson and Smith as a “frontier” version of Kantianism. They favor determining one's own beliefs and actions in a way that looks forward to an open future of possibility.     

Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action

Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational permissibility that Smith wants to capture. Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf.     

Adam Smith and the Stoic principle of suicide

A substantial portion of Adam Smith's discussion of Stoicism in TMS VII is dedicated to the Stoic “principle of suicide,” according to which suicide is sometimes morally required. While scholars agree that Stoicism exercised considerable influence over Smith, no recent work has explored his views on suicide, despite the central role it plays in his treatment of Stoicism. I argue that Smith opposes the principle of suicide on both epistemic and moral grounds, providing an important critique of Stoicism. I also show how Smith departs from other early modern accounts of suicide by offering a notably humane analysis of this tragic act. I conclude by considering what Smith's discussion of Stoicism and suicide tells us about how his moral theory, and I forward a reading of Smith as a skeptic.     

“亚当·斯密问题”的逻辑张力

“亚当·斯密问题”是指斯密的《国富论》与《道德情操论》之间存在着对立或不一致的问题,最初由十九世纪中叶的德国历史学派所提出。此后,随着现实与理论的发展,出现了不同的看法。学者们普遍认为,斯密的两大著作之间、经济学与伦理学之间存在着对立或者不存在对立,而是相互一致的。这些看法都具有各自的积极合理的内容,但缺乏辩证的观点,而没有看到“斯密问题”自身的逻辑张力,也就是说,“斯密问题”所指涉的是现实的经济与伦理之间及作为其理论表现的经济学与伦理学之间的关系。“斯密问题”所含的这些关系呈现出了一个动态的、由肯定到否定再到否定之否定的辩证过程。     

Making sense of Smith on sympathy and approbation: other-oriented sympathy as a psychological and normative achievement

ABSTRACT

Two problems seem to plague Adam Smith’s account of sympathy and approbation in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). First, Smith’s account of sympathy at the beginning of TMS appears to be inconsistent with the account of sympathy at the end of TMS. In particular, it seems that Smith did not appreciate the distinction between ‘self-oriented sympathy’ and ‘other-oriented sympathy’, that is, between imagining being oneself in the actor’s situation and imagining being the actor in the actor’s situation. Second, Smith’s account of approbation, according to which a sentiment of approval arises when there is recognition of concordance between the spectator’s sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion, seems to face the following problem: since the spectator attains both his own sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion by sympathizing with the actor, the sympathetic passion of the spectator and the original passion of the actor will necessarily be identical. Therefore, Smith’s account of approbation requires that the spectator utilize both self-oriented and other-oriented sympathy (‘the double-sympathy model of approbation’). I offer a novel developmental account of sympathy in TMS that renders Smith’s account of sympathy consistent and allows for the utilization of the double-sympathy model of approbation.     

Realism and Realism: Rejoinder to Gare and Smith

This is a response to comments by Gare and Smith (1984) on my critique of humanistic psychology (McMullen, 1982).     

DOES GOD PLAY DICE? INSIGHTS FROM THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE

Abstract Albert Einstein and Huston Smith reflect the old metaphor that chaos and randomness are bad. Scientists recently have discovered that many phenomena, from the fluctuations of the stock market to variations in our weather, have the same underlying order. Natural beauty from plants to snowflakes is described by fractal geometry; tree branching from trunks to twigs has the same fractal scaling as our lungs, from trachea to bronchi. Algorithms for drawing fractals have both randomness and global determinism. Fractal statistics is like picking a card from a stacked deck rather than from one that is shuffled to be truly random. The polarity of randomness (or freedom) and law characterizes the self‐creating natural world. Polarity is in consonance with Taoism and contemporary theologians such as Paul Tillich, Alfred North Whitehead, Gordon Kaufman, Philip Hefner, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Joseph Ford's new metaphor is replacing the old: “God plays dice with the universe, but they're loaded dice.”     

Competition and Justice in Adam Smith

This article analyzes the relationship between competition and justice in Adam Smith in order to determine to what extent competition can promote and undermine justice. I examine how competition features in two basic motivations for human action, “the propensity to truck barter and exchange,” and “the desire of bettering our condition.” Both can be traced back to the desire for recognition, but they operate in very different ways. The former manifests itself in social cooperation, chiefly commercial exchange and the division of labor, and while it can take a competitive form, competitive success produces benefits for everyone. In contrast, the latter may manifest itself in win-lose social competition. Commercial society harnesses both motivations, and both have negative as well as positive effects. However, while Smith explicitly addresses the negative effects of excessive specialization in the division of labor, it is less clear how he thinks the negative effects of social competition can be addressed. I argue that competition can undermine justice when (i) it pits people against each other and (ii) leads to psychological corruption. I conclude with some reflections on what a focus on competition adds to our understanding of Smith's work.     

Dissociable learning processes,associative theory,and testimonial reviews: A comment on Smith and Church (2018)

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Smith and Church (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25, 1565–1584 2018) present a “testimonial” review of dissociable learning processes...     

Theodate Smith and Amy Tanner: Child Savers of Clark University

This study is an examination of the contributions of Theodate Smith and Amy Tanner to the Children's Institute of Clark University. The institute, established in 1909 by Clark's president, G. Stanley Hall, failed to thrive as a liaison between child study and child welfare concerns for a number of reasons, including Hall's eventual disenchantment with the child welfare movement, financial difficulties, and the loss by the institute of Smith and Tanner. Both Smith and Tanner, unlike Hall, were sympathetic to child welfare concerns. Thus, Smith's death in 1914 and Tanner's departure from Clark in 1918 severed the links between the institute and child welfare interests.     

Theodate Smith and Amy Tanner: child savers of Clark University.

This study is an examination of the contributions of Theodate Smith and Amy Tanner to the Children's Institute of Clark University. The institute, established in 1909 by Clark's president, G. Stanley Hall, failed to thrive as a liaison between child study and child welfare concerns for a number of reasons, including Hall's eventual disenchantment with the child welfare movement, financial difficulties, and the loss by the institute of Smith and Tanner. Both Smith and Tanner, unlike Hall, were sympathetic to child welfare concerns. Thus, Smith's death in 1914 and Tanner's departure from Clark in 1918 severed the links between the institute and child welfare interests.