论网络伦理的困境

在"数字化生存"的时代,人类关注的中心从本体论意义上的最小物质单位"原子"和灭绝性武器"原子弹",转变成以"0101"二进位制编码的数字威胁,这一从Atom(原子)向Bite(字节),即A→B转变所带来的不同的指称和评价对象,不可避免地要产生一些新的问题.     

天主教共融教会论:定义、历史及卢巴克的观点

在上世纪80年代,"共融"(communion)一词逐渐取代"天主子民"(People of God)成为天主教神学家解释梵蒂冈第二届大公会议教会论的核心概念,随之而来的是"共融教会论"(communion ecclesiology)在天主教教会论中占据主导地位。本文首先将诠释新约以及神学史中的"共融"概念;其次将考察"共融教会论"的定义和特征,并从东正教及天主教传统出发梳理共融教会论在近代出现以及在天主教会内部确立的历史;最后将阐明此教会论的代表——天主教神学家卢巴克(Henri de Lubac)的共融教会论思想。     

再论道德理论的层次结构：以义促利 ——与陈晓平教授、罗伟玲博士商榷

陈晓平教授、罗伟玲博士在《试论道德理论的层次结构——兼论儒家伦理与西方伦理之比较》一文中关于儒家伦理的表述前后有矛盾,以情感主义道义论概括儒家伦理和以情感主义功利论概括休谟、斯密也有失偏颇,因此,该文通过"四大道德学派"之间的相互比较说明的道德理论的层次结构以及通过"中西伦理再比较"(以儒家伦理代表中国伦理)得出的中西方伦理之间呈现"互补格局"的结论,也有失误。事实上,道德理论的总原则是以义致利或以义促利,道德理论层次结构应为情感主义以义致利论→理性主义道义论→功利论。该文概括的"道德哲学的四大分野即理性主义、情感主义、功利论、道义论",应该被浓缩为儒家、休谟、斯密代表的情感主义以义致利论,康德代表的理性主义道义论和边沁、密尔代表的最大幸福派功利论。     

佛教逻辑学的论辩解释与认知解释——陈那、法称与因明

佛教逻辑有别于西方形式逻辑的一项重要特征,在于对论证前提为真的强调,并在此基础上提出了著名的"因三相"理论。论证前提的真,在陈那著作中又被理解为辩论主体将该前提确定为真。这种"确定"体现为文献中对"极成"(prasiddha)、"成"(siddha)、"决定"(ni?cita)、"见"(d???a)、"已知"(vidita)的强调。这些表达辩论者认知状态的词汇,皆可概括为佛教逻辑中的"认知算子"(epistemic operator)。本文通过研究东亚因明与法称两个传统对陈那《正理门论》中"决定同许"的理论设定的不同解释,说明因明传统在陈那奠定的方向上,进一步采取了"论辩解释"(dialectic interpretation),将"确定为真"解释为在辩论的情境中为辩论的双方承认为真(共许、同许)。法称《释量论自注》对陈那"决定同许"的解释,则表明由他开启的传统在陈那的基础上,进一步采取了"认知解释"(epistemic interpretation),将"确定为真"解释为在认识论的意义上得到确定(ni?cita/ni?caya,决定),即为有效认知的手段(量)所证成。这是因明传统与法称传统的一项根本差异。因明传统对辩论术的关注,极有可能反映了法称以前印度学界对陈那思想的诠释路径。     

另一种集合论悖论WSP——《逻辑哲学论》之世界-语言悖论

世界和语言究竟孰大孰小?在维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》中其实藏匿着另一种新的可能的集合论悖论:A.世界和语言基数相等;B.世界和语言基数不等(世界之势大于语言之势)。笔者将此矛盾命名为世界一语言悖论(WSP)。WSP能否完满解决,关乎该书语言图像论之成败。本文采用康托尔素朴集合论和ZFC等技术资源,在描述WSP之后,比较了两种有效的WSP化解方案:A.借助"无穷"的数学方案;B.借助"事实即命题"的哲学方案。     

论黑格尔的“Handlung”与马克思的“Praxis”——“在我的物象-世界中行动”与“在物象-世界中我的行动”

黑格尔的行动构想"在世界中行动"可以更准确地概括为"在(我的)世界中行动"。通过行动的结果,黑格尔的主体走向超个体的"物象"(Sache),即"在世界中行动"中的"世界",但通过行动(Handlung)本身,"物象-世界"又内化于主体。马克思的旨趣在解释"在世界中我的行动"的现实根据。在《博士论文》时期,马克思吸纳了黑格尔《逻辑学》的行动思想,但他更关心行动的"条件"(Bedingung)。从《德意志意识形态》开始,马克思从"实践"(Praxis)的"条件"出发,解释了"物象世界"本身的形成。在《资本论》中,通过分析"价值形式论"与"交换过程论"的关系,马克思解释了"物象世界"中"我的行动"何以是拜物教性的"起初是行动"(Im Anfang war die That)。     

荀子“天人并立”思想诠说

"究天人之际"系中国古代思想史的永恒母题。荀子的思想大厦亦以其天人论为根基。荀子认为:"天道有常",不以人的意志为转移,但人可"制天命而用之",实现人的自我长养,进而通过践行礼义而成为圣贤,在德性人格上达到"与天地参"的境界。荀子的天人论是"天人之分"与天人相系的辩证统一,既反对畏天、慕天、"错人而思天",又反对"天人二分",人定胜天,让天与人的价值皆得以彰显,避免了天与人的"互役",形成友好型伙伴关系,可谓之"天人并立"。荀子在《天论》篇中完成了"天人并立"思想的逻辑证成,并将其贯穿于"性恶论"(自然维度)和"礼论"(文化维度)之中,成为荀子天人论的思想内核。本文通过分析天论、性恶论和礼论中的人学意蕴,让"天人并立"这一伟大思想显豁起来,从而让我们对荀子思想有一个更加深刻系统的把握。     

论康德的两个伦理学概念

康德哲学有两个伦理学概念,第一个同"物理学"(探究"自然的因果性")相区别,把"自由的因果性"或"自由法则"(Freiheitsgesetze)置于思想的中心,第二个同"法权学"(源自罗马法的ius)相区别,"不为行动立法(那是ius的事),而只为行动的准则立法",因而是"德性论"的伦理学(ethica)。后人往往遗忘康德第一个伦理学概念,而仅仅依据与法权学相对的第二个伦理学概念言说康德,因而产生了许多误解。本文指出,这个误解源于黑格尔,已经延续了二百多年,但黑格尔对康德的指控自相矛盾,无视康德文本。许多英美的现代阐释者延续这一误解,试图把"法权论"从康德伦理学中分离出去,本文对这些观念进行了批驳,阐释了这两个伦理学概念如何是统一的、一致的,必须把康德伦理学作为一个体系、一个整体,才能准确地理解和把握。     

海德格尔与技术命运论

海德格尔的技术之思在他的哲学中占有重要的地位,其相关迷思可能是20世纪最艰深的一种。本文试图从几个方面探讨海德格尔的技术哲学:第一,海德格尔前期的世界和时间学说及其技术哲学含义;第二,围绕"实验"(experientia)概念探讨海德格尔关于现代技术之起源的观点,落实于形式科学与实验的关系问题;第三,围绕"集置"(Gestell)概念讨论海德格尔关于现代技术之本质的基本看法;第四,围绕"泰然任之"(Gelassenheit)概念讨论在海德格尔那里启示出来的关于现代技术的思想姿态。本文的主要意图还不在于讨论海德格尔的技术哲学本身,而毋宁说在于,从海德格尔的存在历史观和技术之思出发,反驳技术乐观主义和技术悲观主义,阐发一种所谓的"技术命运论"。     

汉语转折复句的命题表征项目互换效应研究

采用句子一图画验证任务(sentence-picture verification task)探讨了汉语转折复句的命题表征项目互换效应。结果表明,汉语倒装转折复句的项目表达顺序为“(但是)B→虽然A”,命题表征中项目存在着互换的倾向,所形成的命题表征为“虽然A→但是B”。本研究结果初步表明,读者理解汉语转折复句可能是一个按照“虽然A(事实让步)→但是B(转折)”固定方向进行系列认知加工的过程。     

Kant and the determinacy of intuition

A central issue in debates about Kant and nonconceptualism concerns the nature of intuition. There is sharp disagreement among Kant scholars about both whether, prior to conceptualization, mere intuition can be considered conscious and, if so, how determinate this consciousness is. In this article, I argue that Kant regards pre-synthesized intuition as conscious but indeterminate. To make this case, I contextualize Kant's position through the work of H.S. Reimarus, a predecessor of Kant who influenced his views on animals, infants, and the role of attention. I use Reimarus to clarify Kant's otherwise ambiguous commitments on the determinacy of intuition in animals and newborns, and the role attention, concepts, and judgment play in making intuited contents determinate. This contextualization helps to shed light on Kant's discussion of pre-synthesized intuition in the threefold synthesis of the A-Deduction by demonstrating that Kant's theory of mind in the deduction offers transcendental grounding for empirical accounts of infant development like Kant and Reimarus's. The upshot is a Kant at odds with many recent interpretations of his theory of mind: pre-synthesized intuition is conscious but indeterminate.     

试论康德心理学思想及其对当代的影响

康德著作中蕴含着丰富的心理学思想,其在继承沃尔夫理性心理学与经验心理学二分的基础上,通过批评理性心理学,消解了我思的主体地位,为解决二元论问题做出了重要努力;通过批评经验心理学,指明了心理学在成长为一门科学过程中必须面对的诸多问题。新康德主义在继承并改造康德思想的过程中,发展出一系列影响深远的心理学理论;认知心理学的重要代表人物皮亚杰基于对康德思想独具特色的把握,提出了发生认识论;而当代认知科学的图式理论,则完全是建基于对康德经验图式理论框架的全面继承上。     

On the Division Between Reason and Unreason in Kant

This article examines Kant’s discussion of the division between reason and unreason in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. On the one hand, Kant says that there is a normative, clear, and definite division between reason and unreason. On the other hand, Kant offers three arguments showing that we cannot draw such a division. First, we cannot explain the normative grounds for the division. Second, both reason and unreason are present in everyone to varying degrees in different ways. Third, Kant invalidates the division as such by characterizing what should be more incomprehensible than an extreme case of unreason as also being a rational way of life.

Kant and the problem of existential judgment: critical comments on Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment

The paper assesses Martin’s recent logico-phenomenological account of judgment that is cast in the form of an eclectic history of judging, from Hume and Kant through the 19th century to Frege and Heidegger as well as current neuroscience. After a preliminary discussion of the complex unity and temporal modalities of judgment that draws on a reading of Titian’s “Allegory of Prudence” (National Gallery, London), the remainder of the paper focuses on Martin’s views on Kant’s logic in general and his theory of singular existential judgment in particular. The paper argues against Martin’s key claims of the primacy of formal logic over transcendental logic and of the synthetic nature of judgment in Kant. It also takes issue with each of the four interpretations of singular existential judgment in Kant offered by Martin: existence as logical predicate, as copula, as thesis and as logical subject.     

Practical judgment as reflective judgment: On moral salience and Kantian particularist universalism

Moral particularists and generalists alike have struggled over how to incorporate the role of moral salience in ethical reasoning. In this paper, I point to neglected resources in Kant to account for the role of moral salience in maxim formation: Kant's theory of reflective judgment. Kant tasks reflective judgment with picking out salient empirical particulars for formation into maxims, associating it with purposiveness, or intentional activity (action on ends). The unexpected resources in Kantian reflective judgment suggest the possibility of a particularist universalism, where recalcitrant particulars directly inform, and in some cases revise, moral principles. Such an account improves on particularist accounts of moral salience and moral perception: rather than deriving moral sensitivity solely from an agent's upbringing or cultural resources, the reflective dimension is situated alongside the universalist dimension of moral principles typically identified with Kantian ethics, allowing for a critical approach both to moral universals and to the reception of moral particulars.     

康德关于纯粹实践理性方法论的思想

文章立足于分析康德对“客观的德性法则如何在主观上也成为实践的”这一问题的回答,梳理了康德的纯粹实践理性的方法论思想,提出了两个步骤的理论：判断力的练习与自由的意识;并分析了方法论与实践理性批判的分析论在方法上的统一。康德认为这一方法论思想对道德生活与道德培育具有重要的意义,尤其是自由的意识以及对自己的敬重是道德教育的立足点,因为它们也是人在内心防止心灵的腐败与堕落的惟一守卫者。     

Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, But Not Hume versus Kant

Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing example exhibiting this marriage of force and freedom, as well as showing how our judgment can come to be properly attuned to the features that constitute value. This image of attunement carries over into their respective accounts of moral judgment. The seemingly radical difference between their moral theories may be traceable not to a different conception of normativity, but to a difference in their empirical psychological theories – a difference we can readily spot in their accounts of aesthetics.     

Making history philosophical: Kant,Maimon, and the evolution of the historiography of philosophy in the critical period

ABSTRACT

In this article I explore Maimon’s role in the evolution of Kant’s understanding of the function of the history of philosophy in philosophical enquiry. Kant is often viewed as holding an ambivalent relation to the history of philosophy. On the one hand, he dismisses past philosophers as victims of transcendental illusion and downplays the value of the historiography of philosophy. On the other hand, by framing his project as a synthesis of several philosophical traditions, Kant embeds the critical philosophy into a sweeping historical narrative in a manner that highlights the importance of the past for present philosophical aims. In this article, I argue that for most of his career Kant held a position reflective of the former view, but that the publication of Maimon’s response to a prize question announced by the Royal Academy led Kant to develop an understanding of the history of philosophy more in line with the latter view. The result is a distinctively post-Kantian model for a ‘philosophical history of philosophy’ that is both methodologically nuanced and potentially relevant to contemporary debates.     

After the slippery slope: Dutch experiences on regulating active euthanasia

"When a country legalizes active euthanasia, it puts itself on a slippery slope from where it may well go further downward." If true, this is a forceful argument in the battle of those who try to prevent euthanasia from becoming legal. The force of any slippery slope argument, however, is by definition limited by its reference to future developments which cannot empirically be sustained. Experience in the Netherlands--where a law regulating active euthanasia was accepted in April 2001--may shed light on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the slippery slope argument in the context of the euthanasia debate. This paper consists of three parts. First, it clarifies the Dutch legislation on euthanasia and explains the cultural context in which it originated. Second, it looks at the argument of the slippery slope. A logical and an empirical version are distinguished, and the latter, though philosophically less interesting, proves to be most relevant in the discussion on euthanasia. Thirdly, it addresses the question whether Dutch experiences in the process of legalizing euthanasia justify the fear of the slippery slope. The conclusion is that Dutch experiences justify some caution.