Reply to Loewy: Anencephalics and Slippery Slopes

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -     

马克思论权利与正义：答胡萨米

伍德重申他先前论文的观点--"对马克思来说,经济交易或社会制度中的正义与否依赖于其与既定的生产方式的关系",认为胡萨米将"正义不仅受生产方式所决定且受阶级立场所决定"的观点归于马克思是一种误解,认为马克思是从一种资本主义之后的正义标准去批判资本主义社会,更是对马克思文本的误读.在他看来,马克思对资本主义的批判是基于对社会生产分析的总体批判,其批判是基于自由、共同体和自我实现等非道德的善的批判,而不是基于权利或正义的道德的善的批判.     

The Fallacy of the Slippery Slope Argument on Abortion

ABSTRACT This paper attempts to show that the acorn–oak tree argument against the slippery slope on the personhood of the fetus is valid and William Cooney's attack on this argument fails. I also argue that the slippery slope argument leads to on undesirable conclusion and should not be used as a valid tool in the debate on the personhood of the fetus.     

非人的"人":从"组织图"到科层制--论M.韦伯科层制模式对人性的背离

几乎所有行政组织的理论与实践工作者都不会否认作为一种既定行政学模式的科层制的实用性价值.问题是,当我们在身处其中体会这种实用价值的时候,往往对它的负面作用缺乏应有的了解.本文从科层制的渊源关系出发,对马克斯·韦伯科层制的实质进行了学理性分析,着重指出它背离人性的特征,目的在于使人们懂得尽管直到现在我们仍然没有找到合适的行政学新模式,但我们在使用科层制模式的时候,辨证的、科学的眼光依然是必不可少的.     

Pornography's Many Meanings: A Reply to C.M. Concepcion

C.M. Conception's review of “Pornography: An Uncivil Liberty ¹ 1 See Steinem (1986, 250); discussed in Carse (1995, 175-76, n. 15).
” ( Carse 1995 ) fundamentally misconstrues the position defended in that article. This paper examines possible sources of this misconstrual, focusing critical attention on the narrowly crafted, morally loaded notion of “pornography” that figures centrally in the original argument under review. Pornography is not a category of speech that can be charaC' terized as having one crucial meaning or message, nor is the message of pornography easily identifiable in instances of pornographic speech. This raises the problem of interpretive privilege, which haunts many of the antipomography arguments being offered in the contemporary debate, including the author's own earlier argument.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

Refocusing on the Data: A Reply to Hardman

Hardman in press claims that the results of Green and Larking 1995 favour a mental rules theory account of performance in the selection task over a mental model theory account. This reply rebuts his claim.