THE BLANK FACE OF LOVE: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOODNESS IN THE LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF IRIS MURDOCH1

This article explores the value of Iris Murdoch's metaphysical ethics for the theologian. Although, in many ways, Murdoch does appeal to the theologian, a subtle form of nihilism underlies her thought insofar as human goodness—in the form of loving attention—is only possible once the individual has overcome his/her ego by staring into the void and accepting the ultimate meaninglessness of reality. As this article demonstrates, Murdoch's replacement of transcendence with void rules out any form of real love or human goodness: only a dualistic exchange of gazes remains possible. Real, selfless love is only possible when the ego understands itself in the context of theological transcendence.     

EUTHYPHRO AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD INCARNATE

A familiar problem is here viewed from an unfamiliar angle. The familiar problem is the Euthyphro dilemma: if God wills something because it is good, then goodness is independent of God, so God becomes, morally speaking, de trop. On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then, given the absence of constraint on what God may will, moral truths are – counterintuitively – contingent. An examination of the kinds of necessity and possibility at work in this conundrum leads us to the most promising solution: there is a metaphysical connection between God and goodness. What he wills is an expression of his nature. But (and this is the unfamiliar angle), that solution now poses an acute problem for an understanding of the Incarnation. For if God is constitutive of goodness, and Christ is God incarnate, then Christ is constitutive of goodness. But Christ, as a human, is subject to external moral evaluation and obligation, which entails that he is not constitutive of goodness. This metaethical difficulty is not easily met by the usual strategies by which Christ is understood to have two natures. Reflection on our moral relations to our past selves, however, suggests a way forward.     

SCHOLARSHIP AND THE CRITIQUE OF TRADITION

This review essay of Wolfson’s recent Heidegger and Kabbalah both praises Wolfson for departing from the historicism of his earliest writings on the kabbalistic tradition, and also critiques him for being unable to ground adequately his critique of the kabbalistic tradition’s ethnocentrism. Resolving the tension in this authorial position, stretched between commitment to a particular tradition and the liberalism of much of contemporary academia, entails acknowledging the limitations of scholarship in religious ethics.     

THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

This essay examines the function of the concept of human dignity (both as an inherent feature of human existence and as an ideal achievement) in the United Nations's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It explains why the key framers of the document affirmed an inherent human dignity in order to provide an explanatory basis for the validity of universal human rights while eschewing any religious or metaphysical justification for this affirmation. It argues that the key framers, while aware of the Christian anthropology informing the modern Western concept of the dignity of the person, grasped (1) that the Declaration, to be ratifiable, would need to be free of religious reference, and also (2) that the notion of inherency suffices to suggest heuristically not only a universal human nature but also, crucially, a transcendent reality in which all persons participate.     

THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE REALISTIC UTOPIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Abstract: Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral‐legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating role of the concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those “dignities” that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, “human dignity” still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status—in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody.     

THE NEUTRALITY OF RIGHTNESS AND THE INDEXICALITY OF GOODNESS: BEYOND OBJECTIVITY AND BACK AGAIN

My purpose in the present paper is two‐fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is the following. The ‘objectively right’ course of action must be right, ‘neutrally’ speaking, that is right for each of the participants in a given situation: if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A. But the latter is precisely how things work with virtuous action: for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so. I maintain, on this basis, that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision‐making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken. I then offer an account of objectivity's constraining power.     

SELF‐SACRIFICE TO SAVE THE LIFE OF ANOTHER IN JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN TRADITIONS1

Although both the Jewish and Christian traditions permit and even valorize self‐sacrificial death for the sake of God (martyrdom), and for other people, they diverge on the issue of self‐sacrificial death for the sake of a single individual. The Jewish tradition prohibits such self‐sacrifice on the basis of the principles that (1) God owns the body and that (2) one cannot exchange one's life for another's. Christian ethics, in contrast, permits sacrificing one's life to save a single person based on the model of Christ's self‐sacrificial love. This ethical disagreement exposes a fundamental theological disagreement between the two traditions concerning what constitutes the imago Dei.