Does easily learned mean easily remembered?: it depends on your beliefs about intelligence

Because numerous studies have shown that feelings of encoding fluency are positively correlated with judgments of learning, a single dominant heuristic, easily learned = easily remembered (ELER), has been posited to explain how people interpret encoding fluency when assessing their own memory. However, the inferences people draw from feelings of encoding fluency may vary with their beliefs about why information is easy or effortful to encode. We conducted two experiments in which participants studied word lists and then predicted their future recall of those items. Results revealed that subjects who viewed intelligence as fixed, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating that they had reached the limits of their ability, used the ELER heuristic to make judgments of learning. However, subjects who viewed intelligence as malleable, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating greater engagement in learning, did not use the ELER heuristic and at times predicted greater memory for items that they found more effortful to learn.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

Estimating self, parental, and partner multiple intelligences: a replication in Malaysia

Participants were 230 adult Malaysians who estimated their own, their parents', and their partners' overall IQs and 10 multiple intelligences. In accordance with both the previous literature and the authors' hypotheses, men rated themselves higher than did women on overall, verbal, logical-mathematical, and spatial intelligences. There were fewer gender differences in ratings of parents and in those of partners. Participants believed that they were more intelligent than both parents (but not their partners) and that their fathers were more intelligent than their mothers. Regressions indicated that participants believed that verbal intelligence and--to a lesser extent--logical-mathematical intelligence were the main predictors of overall intelligence. The authors discussed results in terms of the extant cross-cultural literature in the field.     

Seeing approach motivation in the avoidance behavior of others: implications for an understanding of pluralistic ignorance

Four studies tested the hypothesis that observers tend to interpret others' actions as approach motivated even when they recognize that their own identical choices were motivated by avoidance. Study 1 found that voters in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election who chose a candidate primarily because of their aversion to the alternative thought that others who voted for the same candidate liked him more than they themselves did. In Studies 2, 3, and 4 participants who learned that others made the same choice as themselves between 2 unappealing flavors of soda orjelly beans estimated that the others would pay more than they would for their common choice. The relevance of these findings for an understanding of pluralistic ignorance is discussed.     

The effects of discussion on group and individual choices among bets

The effects of discussion on subsequent group and individual choices are studied in a situation where subjects choose between a sure gain of varying amount and five probability levels associated with larger gains of expected value equal to that of the sure gain. At the end of the experiment, a single bet, chosen at random, is played for money. Before discussion, subjects have to guess the percentage of similar, more risky and more cautious choices made by their peers for each of the six bets. As predicted by a majority-rule decision-making model significant risky shifts were observed for relatively low values of sure gain. For higher values, however, groups tended to be more cautious than individuals. The final private choices of individuals were significantly more risky than their initial decisions. Most individuals apparently thought they were at least as risky as most others. This finding was due, however, primarily to the responses of subjects who chose the highest risk-level (the ceiling effect) and, secondly, to the consistent tendency of most individuals to guess that others make the same choices as they themselves. It is concluded that majority influence seems a satisfactory explanation of group risky shifts observed in the present study, but it cannot account for modifications of group and individual choices in all risk-taking situations.     

Plans or Outcomes: How Do We Attribute Intelligence to Others?

Humans routinely make inferences about both the contents and the workings of other minds based on observed actions. People consider what others want or know, but also how intelligent, rational, or attentive they might be. Here, we introduce a new methodology for quantitatively studying the mechanisms people use to attribute intelligence to others based on their behavior. We focus on two key judgments previously proposed in the literature: judgments based on observed outcomes (you're smart if you won the game) and judgments based on evaluating the quality of an agent's planning that led to their outcomes (you're smart if you made the right choice, even if you didn't succeed). We present a novel task, the maze search task (MST), in which participants rate the intelligence of agents searching a maze for a hidden goal. We model outcome-based attributions based on the observed utility of the agent upon achieving a goal, with higher utilities indicating higher intelligence, and model planning-based attributions by measuring the proximity of the observed actions to an ideal planner, such that agents who produce closer approximations of optimal plans are seen as more intelligent. We examine human attributions of intelligence in three experiments that use MST and find that participants used both outcome and planning as indicators of intelligence. However, observing the outcome was not necessary, and participants still made planning-based attributions of intelligence when the outcome was not observed. We also found that the weights individuals placed on plans and on outcome correlated with an individual's ability to engage in cognitive reflection. Our results suggest that people attribute intelligence based on plans given sufficient context and cognitive resources and rely on the outcome when computational resources or context are limited.     

The effects of feedback about self and others on the recall and judgments of feedback-relevant information

After people have received feedback about the outcome of their behavior, their responses to information bearing on the validity of this feedback may be influenced by their desire to maintain a favorable self-image. This experiment investigated the cognitive mediators of these responses. Subjects who received negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence test disparaged intelligence tests in general and judged a report they had read to be unfavorable to intelligence tests. Nevertheless, they recalled more arguments in the report that were favorable to intelligence tests than did positive feedback recipients. These results contradicted the hypothesis that subjects selectively attend to information that helps them to maintain a positive self-concept in light of negative information about themselves. Rather, they may attempt to refute arguments that support the validity of the negative feedback they receive, and this relatively greater processing may facilitate the recall of these arguments later on. In contrast, there was no evidence that subjects try to refute information that calls the validity of positive feedback into question. Results had implications for two additional issues: first, whether the effect of performance feedback depends on whether it is received before or after information bearing on its validity; second, whether feedback has similar effects on recall and judgments by persons to whom it does not directly pertain.     

Zulu mothers' beliefs about their own and their children's intelligence

Zulu women (N = 133) were given a structural interview concerning their own and their children's multiple intelligences. The best predictor of their own self-estimated overall intelligence rating was mathematical and spatial intelligence. Mothers showed few significant differences in their estimates of their sons and daughters' overall or multiple intelligences. However, they rated their daughters' interpersonal intelligence higher than those of their sons, and their sons' bodily-kinesthetic intelligence higher than those of their daughters. The mothers believed that overall their children were about 6 IQ points more intelligent than themselves. Although mothers estimated their own spatial, inter-, and intrapersonal intelligence to be higher than those of their children, they also believed that their children had higher mathematical intelligence.     

Self-deprecation and estimates of body size in women.

The subject of body image in women has received considerable attention particularly with concern about its relationship to behaviours such as dieting. This study investigated the reported tendency of women to see thinness as desirable and to perceive themselves as fatter than others do. This tendency is inconsistent with the general findings on self-enhancement that show that people (including women) generally overestimate the extent to which they possess desirable characteristics. Thus, the purpose of this study was to investigate whether the tendency for women to report themselves as fatter than others perceive them is part of a general tendency to deprecate themselves on socially desirable qualities or whether this deprecation is restricted to body size. To investigate this, 29 female undergraduates in psychology participated in a study comparing own and others' perceptions of body size, attractiveness, sexiness, intelligence, and friendliness. Compared with the ratings of them given by others, women tended to make self-enhancing judgements of their attractiveness, sexiness, intelligence, and friendliness. This was not found for body size, however, for which self-ratings tended to be the same as those made by others. The failure to find self-enhancing judgements of body size is discussed in terms of the relatively unvarying standards presented to women concerning ideal body size compared to the more subjective standards used to evaluate other qualities.     

Peering into the bias blind spot: people's assessments of bias in themselves and others

People tend to believe that their own judgments are less prone to bias than those of others, in part because they tend to rely on introspection for evidence of bias in themselves but on their lay theories in assessing bias in others. Two empirical consequences of this asymmetry are explored. Studies 1 and 2 document that people are more inclined to think they are guilty of bias in the abstract than in any specific instance. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that people tend to believe that their own personal connection to a given issue is a source of accuracy and enlightenment but that such personal connections in the case of others who hold different views are a source of bias. The implications of this asymmetry in assessing objectivity and bias in the self versus others are discussed.     

Personal and parents’ life stories in patients with borderline personality disorder

Patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) display disturbances in understanding self and others. We examined whether these disturbances extended to how patients described their personal and parents’ life stories and to measures of identity, alexithymia, empathy, and emotional intelligence. Thirty BPD patients and 30 matched control participants described personal and parents’ life stories and completed measures of identity disturbance, alexithymia, empathy, and emotional intelligence. Compared to the controls, patients with BPD described their personal and their parents’ life stories more negatively and with fewer themes of agency and communion fulfillment. Patients and controls showed equally complex reasoning about their personal life stories, but patients displayed less complexity and more self‐other confusion, when reasoning about their parents’ stories. Patients also differed from controls on identity disturbance, alexithymia, and empathy. The results suggest that patients’ storied understanding of themselves and others are disturbed and should be taken into account to better understand BPD.     

Social Comparison of Health Risks: Locus of Control,the Person-Positivity Bias,and Unrealistic Optimism1

People typically attribute lower health risks to themselves than to others, a phenomenon referred to as unrealistic optimism. The present study tested the person positivity bias as a previously unexamined explanation of the phenomenon and analyzed the relationship between unrealistic optimism and expectations of control. High-school students estimated their own and one of three other persons’(the average student's, a randomly chosen student's, or their best same-sex friend's) chances of getting health problems. They also filled out questionnaires measuring locus of control and health-protective behavior. In contrast with the person positivity explanation, unrealistic optimism was not restricted to the “average other” condition. However, unrealistic optimism was stronger in subjects with a more internal locus of control than in subjects with a rather external locus of control. An unpredicted effect of estimation order was observed: Unrealistic optimism was stronger in subjects who estimated the comparison person's risks first than in subjects who started with own risks. This effect can be understood in terms of Codol's observation that people perceive others as more similar to themselves than they themselves are to others.     

Zulu Mothers' Beliefs About Their Own and Their Children's Intelligence

Abstract

Zulu women (N = 133) were given a structural interview concerning their own and their children's multiple intelligences. The best predictor of their own self-estimated overall intelligence rating was mathematical and spatial intelligence. Mothers showed few significant differences in their estimates of their sons and daughters' overall or multiple intelligences. However, they rated their daughters' interpersonal intelligence higher than those of their sons, and their sons' bodily-kinesthetic intelligence higher than those of their daughters. The mothers believed that overall their children were about 6 IQ points more intelligent than themselves. Although mothers estimated their own spatial, inter-, and intrapersonal intelligence to be higher than those of their children, they also believed that their children had higher mathematical intelligence.     

Similarity and uniqueness: the effects of attribute type, relevance, and individual differences in self-esteem and depression

On the basis of a self-validation perspective, it was predicted that distortions in consensus estimates would vary as a function of attribute type (opinions versus abilities), relevance of the attribute, and individual differences in self-esteem and depression. Students rated themselves on seven opinion and ability dimensions using 5-point Likert scales. Then they estimated the percentage of the other students who held each opinion/ability position, and rank ordered the opinions/abilities for personal relevance. Absolute and directional accuracy scores were computed (comparing estimated percentages with actual percentages in the sample), as well as false consensus (FCE) scores (comparing estimates of subjects holding and not holding a particular position). Subjects overestimated consensus for their opinions and low abilities, but underestimated consensus for their high abilities. Although subjects exhibited a larger FCE on opinions than abilities, there was a reliable FCE for both attributes. Relevance affected the magnitude of these biases. Higher opinion relevance was associated with increased accuracy, lower FCE scores, and smaller overestimates. Higher ability relevance was associated with decreased accuracy, greater overestimation on low abilities, and greater underestimation on high abilities. Finally, low self-esteem and depressed subjects overestimated consensus on opinions and underestimated consensus on abilities less than high self-esteem and nondepressed subjects.     

The Gender Heuristic and the Database: Factors Affecting the Perception of Gender-Related Differences in the Experience and Display of Emotions

Two studies investigated the conditions under which people use gender stereotypes about emotion to make judgments about the emotions of self and others. Participants in Study 1 either played or watched a competitive word game (actual game conditions), or imagined themselves playing or watching the same game (hypothetical condition). Participants actually involved in the game made emotion judgments either immediately after the game (online condition) or after a time delay (delayed condition). Both in terms of self-reports of emotional experience and perceptions of the emotional displays of others, gender-related stereotypes had a significant influence on judgments of participants in the hypothetical condition but had no significant influence on online judgments. Furthermore, participants rating their own emotional experiences (after a 1-week delay) exhibited responses consistent with gender stereotypes, whereas participants rating the emotional displays of others (after a 1-day delay) did not show a gender-stereotypic response pattern. Study 2 found that participants rating hypothetical others were more likely to employ gender-related stereotypes of emotion than participants rating themselves were. The results of both studies suggest that people tend to use an emotion-related gender heuristic when they lack a database of concrete situational experiences on which to base their judgments.     

Communication,Influence, and Informational Asymmetries among Voters

The costs of political information vary dramatically across individuals, and these costs help explain why some individuals become politically expert while others demonstrate low levels of political knowledge and awareness. An attractive alternative, particularly for those with high information costs, is to rely on information and advice taken from others who are politically expert. This paper focuses on the complications that arise when the informant and the recipient do not share preferences. A series of small group experiments show that subjects tend to weight expertise more heavily than shared preferences in selecting informants, thereby exposing themselves to diverse views and biased information. Experimental subjects employ several heuristic devices in evaluating the reliability of this information, but depending on their own levels of information, these heuristics often lead subjects either to dismiss advice that conflicts with their own prior judgments or to dismiss advice that comes from an informant with divergent preferences. Hence these heuristics produce important consequences for patterns of political influence, as well as reducing the potential for political change.     

Anticipated compatibility as a function of attitude or status similarity1

Two experiments explored the effects of self-other discrepancies in attitude or status on judgments of another's desirability as a companion It was found that increasing discrepancy in status or attitudes led to lower judgments of compatibility and liking In one experiment, similarity of attitudes of another was found to correlate with liking him, desire to befriend him, do favors for him, and possibly conform to him. The contribution of some personality measures to the relationship between similarity and anticipated compatibility was a major focus of the study The inhibitory effect of a target's status discrepancy was more pronounced for subjects who were more sensitive to rejection Also, between targets of equally discrepant status, there was a general preference to affiliate with the one whose status was higher than the one whose status was lower–an effect which was even more pronounced for subjects who were sensitive to rejection More anxious subjects judged themselves as generally less acceptable to others, particularly to others of higher status. When predicting attitudes on the basis of limited information, females showed a greater tendency than males to see others as similar to themselves Finally, persons holding different attitudes from one's own were judged as more harmful socially, a bias which was more pronounced in females than in males.     

Creative Justice? The Relationship between Prospective Teachers' Prior Schooling Experiences and Perceived Importance of Promoting Student Creativity

Prospective teachers (N = 117) enrolled in an introductory educational psychology course completed questions measuring their perceptions of past schooling experiences, current views regarding the importance of promoting student creativity, and their perceived ability to promote creativity. Statistically significant differences were found between the low importance and high importance groups. Prospective teachers who viewed promoting creativity of students as highly important were significantly less likely to indicate that they enjoyed school. In addition, prospective teachers in the high importance group indicated significantly lower levels of experiencing belongingness (relatedness) and significantly lower self‐judgments of their past ability to be successful in school (competence). Judgments regarding the choices afforded in school (autonomy) were mixed, but favored prospective teachers who placed less importance on promoting student creativity. Finally, prospective teachers who viewed promoting student creativity as highly important were significantly more likely to indicate that they had the ability to promote student creativity. A creative‐justice hypothesis was derived from these results. This hypothesis posits that individuals committed to promoting creativity are driven by their own past experiences with creativity diminishing environments. These individuals then seek out opportunities to transform the experiences of new inhabitants in similar environments.     

True intercorrelation among job components, time delay in rating, and rater intelligence as determinants of accuracy in performance ratings

Ninety subjects viewed one of three sets of videotapes which presented simulated work performances by five ratees. Subjects viewed videotapes where the true intercorrelation among the three job components was either high, moderate, or low. Half of the subjects completed ratings immediately after viewing all five ratees and again, 24 h later. The remaining subjects completed ratings only once, 24 h after viewing the videotapes. Rater intelligence was assessed via the Wesman Personnel Classification Test. Performance ratings for each ratee on each of the three job components were completed using a magnitude estimation scale. Subjects' ratings were compared to ratee true scores (based on objective worker output) to obtain four components of rater accuracy: elevation, differential elevation, stereotype accuracy, and differential accuracy as well as a measure of overall accuracy. Results indicated that subjects' ratings were more accurate with respect to overall accuracy and differential accuracy when the true intercorrelation among job components was high rather than low. Rater intelligence was significantly correlated with stereotype accuracy. In addition, rater intelligence was significantly related to overall accuracy, differential elevation, and elevation, but only when the true intercorrelation among job components was moderate or high. Also, there was a curvilinear component to the relationship between intelligence and both differential accuracy and stereotype accuracy such that the most intelligent raters tended to be less accurate than more moderately intelligent raters who were, in turn, more accurate than the least intelligent raters. Finally, subjects' immediate ratings were not more accurate than ratings provided by subjects who completed only delayed ratings. However, repeated measures analyses found that for subjects who completed both immediate and delayed ratings, delayed ratings were less accurate than immediate ratings with respect to overall accuracy, differential accuracy, and differential elevation.