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1.
The contingency of composition 总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0
Ross P. Cameron 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):99-121
There is widespread disagreement as to what the facts are concerning just when a collection of objects composes some further
object; but there is widespread agreement that, whatever those facts are, they are necessary. I am unhappy to simply assume
this, and in this paper I ask whether there is reason to think that the facts concerning when composition occurs hold necessarily.
I consider various reasons to think so, but find fault with each of them. I examine the theory of composition as identity,
but argue that the version of this doctrine that entails universalism is unwarranted. I consider the claim that the a priority
of such facts leads to their necessity, but give a defence of substantial contingent a priori truths. I ask whether the contingency
of such facts would lead to unwelcome possibilities, but argue that it does not. Next, I argue against the thought that the
Lewis–Sider argument against restricted composition might give us reason to accept the necessity of universalism. Lastly,
I respond to two objections from the 2006 BSPC. I conclude in favour of the contingency of the facts concerning when some
things compose some thing.
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Ross P. CameronEmail: |
2.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
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Michael MartinEmail: |
3.
Berit Brogaard 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):21-42
There are two doctrines for which Quine is particularly well known: the doctrine of ontological commitment and the inscrutability
thesis—the thesis that reference and quantification are inscrutable. At first glance, the two doctrines are squarely at odds.
If there is no fact of the matter as to what our expressions refer to, then it would appear that no determinate commitments
can be read off of our best theories. We argue here that the appearance of a clash between the two doctrines is illusory.
The reason that there is no real conflict is not simply that in determining our theories’ ontological commitments we naturally
rely on our home language but also (and more importantly) that ontological commitment is not intimately tied to objectual
quantification and a reference-first approach to language. Or so we will argue. We conclude with a new inscrutability argument
which rests on the observation that the notion of objectual quantification, when properly cashed out, deflates.
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Berit BrogaardEmail: Email: |
4.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):361-372
The paper provides an account of necessary truths in Berkeley based upon his divine language model. If the thesis of the paper
is correct, not all Berkeleian necessary truths can be known a priori.
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Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
5.
Daniel Giberman 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):297-311
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity
are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose
facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these
objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies.
The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
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Daniel GibermanEmail: |
6.
Anand Vaidya 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):191-212
Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary possibility. Modal monism
is the thesis that the space of logically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds.
In this paper I explore the relation between the two theses. My aim is to show that the former thesis implies the latter thesis,
and that problems with the latter make the former implausible as a complete picture of the epistemology of modality. My argument
explores the relation between logical modality and metaphysical modality.
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Anand VaidyaEmail: |
7.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
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Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
8.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
9.
Mikkel Gerken 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):87-96
There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or
anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However,
Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge
and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility
is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are
promising responses available to the compatibilists.
相似文献
Mikkel GerkenEmail: |
10.
John Lemos 《Philosophia》2006,34(1):85-93
In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR (morality) and PPR (self-interest).
相似文献
John LemosEmail: |
11.
Roberto Poli 《Axiomathes》2007,17(1):1-18
The thesis is defended that the theories of causation, time and space, and levels of reality are mutually interrelated in
such a way that the difficulties internal to theories of causation and to theories of space and time can be understood better,
and perhaps dealt with, in the categorial context furnished by the theory of the levels of reality. The structural condition
for this development to be possible is that the first two theories be opportunely generalized.
相似文献
Roberto PoliEmail: |
12.
Steven A. Jauss 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):285-298
According to what Robert Stecker dubs the “ethical-aesthetic interaction” thesis, the ethical defects of a literary work can
diminish its aesthetic value. Both the thesis and the only prominent argumentative strategy employed to support it the affective
response argument have been hotly debated; however, Stecker has recently argued that the failure of the ARA does not undermine
the thesis, since the argument “fails to indentify the main reason [the thesis] holds, when it in fact does.” I critically
examine Stecker’s objection to the familiar versions of the affective response argument and the line of support for ethical-aesthetic
interaction he proposes to install in their place. I conclude that neither is compelling; however, an important insight can
be salvaged from his positive proposal, and I argue that the insight does, in fact, point toward a novel defense of the thesis.
相似文献
Steven A. JaussEmail: |
13.
Cécile Fabre 《Res Publica》2008,14(2):137-140
In his review of my book Whose Body is It Anyway, Wilkinson criticises the view (which I defend) that confiscating live body parts for the sake of the needy is (under some
circumstances) a requirement of justice. Wilkinson makes the following three points: (a) the confiscation thesis is problematic
on its own terms; (b) there is a way to justify coercive resource transfers without being committed to it; (c) the thesis
rests on a highly questionable approach to the status of the body. Wilkinson’s paper is challenging, and some of his points
are well taken. On the whole, however, it does not constitute an insurmountable challenge for my thesis.
相似文献
Cécile FabreEmail: |
14.
Christian Basil Miller 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):233-255
Cases involving amoralists who no longer care about the institution of morality, together with cases of depression, listlessness,
and exhaustion, have posed trouble in recent years for standard formulations of motivational internalism. In response, though,
internalists have been willing to adopt narrower versions of the thesis which restrict it just to the motivational lives of
those agents who are said to be in some way normal, practically rational, or virtuous. My goal in this paper is to offer a
new set of counterexamples to motivational internalism, examples which are effective both against traditional formulations
of the thesis as well as against many of these more recent restricted proposals.
相似文献
Christian Basil MillerEmail: |
15.
Michael Jacovides 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):437-439
The author defends attributing to Berkeley the thesis that we can't conceive of extension in a mind-independent body against
criticism from Smalligan Marusic. The author also specifies the resemblance requirements that Berkeley places on conceivability,
concedes that the principle that ideas can only be like other ideas is not, strictly speaking, a premise in the Master Argument,
and clarifies his views on the relation between possibility and conceivability.
相似文献
Michael JacovidesEmail: |
16.
It is generally agreed upon that Grice’s causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does
not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all
causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality
(as done by David Lewis). Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match
the way the world is (Frank Jackson and Michael Tye). Finally, one can also try to provide sufficient conditions by elaborating
on the content of perceptual experiences (Alva N?e). These different strategies are considered in this paper, with the conclusion
that none of them is successful. However, a careful examination of their problems points towards the general solution that
we outline at the end.
相似文献
Valtteri Arstila (Corresponding author)Email: |
Kalle PihlainenEmail: |
17.
Manfred Kupffer 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):225-238
Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem
about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem
Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with
regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.
相似文献
Manfred KupfferEmail: |
18.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
相似文献
David PhillipsEmail: |
19.
The article deals with phenomenology in Lithuania. The main thesis of the article is this: phenomenology is a living tradition
in need of both development and interpretation. The minor thesis follows from the main one: the Western phenomenological tradition
and Lithuanian philosophy interact and develop in tandem with one another. According to the authors, the contact between poetics
and philosophy is the dominant form of phenomenology in Lithuania. The phenomenological tradition is treated as creative and
living philosophical thought.
相似文献
Tomas KačerauskasEmail: |
20.
Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected
by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds
in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency
of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the
actual world, Cartesian worlds are impossible.
相似文献
Kelly TrogdonEmail: |