Belief as emotion

It is commonly held that (i) beliefs are revisable in the face of counter-evidence and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions in reliable and predictable ways. Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn't result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counter examples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way that is expected. I offer a view of belief that does not force us to exclude states as real beliefs that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs, and that does not require us to “outsource” the work belief seems to do to other mental states. I propose that we view belief as a type of emotion where emotions are understood a irreducibly blended states, containing representational, motivational and phenomenological elements.     

Disbelief as the Dual of Belief

The duality of truth and falsity in a Boolean algebra of propositions is used to generate a duality of belief and disbelief. To each additive probability measure that represents belief there corresponds a dual additive measure that represents disbelief. The dual measure has its own peculiar calculus, in which, for example, measures are added when propositions are combined under conjunction. A Venn diagram of the measure has the contradiction as its total space. While additive measures are not self‐dual, the epistemic state of complete ignorance is represented by the unique, monotonic, non‐additive measure that is self‐dual in its contingent propositions. Convex sets of additive measures fail to represent complete ignorance since they are not self‐dual.     

Belief Change as Propositional Update

This study examines the problem of belief revision, defined as deciding which of several initially accepted sentences to disbelieve, when new information presents a logical inconsistency with the initial set. In the first three experiments, the initial sentence set included a conditional sentence, a non-conditional (ground) sentence, and an inferred conclusion drawn from the first two. The new information contradicted the inferred conclusion. Results indicated that conditional sentences were more readily abandoned than ground sentences, even when either choice would lead to a consistent belief state, and that this preference was more pronounced when problems used natural language cover stories rather than symbols. The pattern of belief revision choices differed depending on whether the contradicted conclusion from the initial belief set had been a modus ponens or modus tollens inference. Two additional experiments examined alternative model-theoretic definitions of minimal change to a belief state, using problems that contained multiple models of the initial belief state and of the new information that provided the contradiction. The results indicated that people did not follow any of four formal definitions of minimal change on these problems. The new information and the contradiction it offered was not, for example, used to select a particular model of the initial belief state as a way of reconciling the contradiction. The preferred revision was to retain only those initial sentences that had the same, unambiguous truth value within and across both the initial and new information sets. The study and results are presented in the context of certain logic-based formalizations of belief revision, syntactic and model-theoretic representations of belief states, and performance models of human deduction. Principles by which some types of sentences might be more “entrenched” than others in the face of contradiction are also discussed from the perspective of induction and theory revision.     

Introduction: Belief as Cultural Performance

Abstract

Although the concept of belief has become a focus of critical discussion in other disciplines, sociologists of religion have tended to assume that belief is a universal phenomenon, structured around cognitive propositions which can be made explicit in the context of research surveys and interviews The articles in this special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Religion explore belief in the lives of young people in different religious, cultural, and national contexts to suggest more complex ways in which belief might be conceptualised and researched. While the ‘authenticity’ of belief is a significant value for young people across these cases, the authors show how belief can, in different contexts, be a marker of identity, an expression of socially significant relationships or an organising centre for the lives of individuals and groups. Belief can also be understood as the performance of embodied practices shaped by one’s spatial and cultural environment. In this wider context, training young people in propositional forms of belief is shown to be a particular kind of religious project, which can be unstable and have unintended consequences.     

The Ability to Judge the Romantic Interest of Others

ABSTRACT— The ability to judge another individual's romantic interest level—both toward oneself and toward others—is an adaptively important skill when choosing a suitable mate to pursue. We tested this ability using videos of individuals on speed dates as stimuli. Male and female observers were equally good at predicting interest levels, but they were more accurate when predicting male interest: Predictions of female interest were just above chance. Observers predicted interest successfully using stimuli as short as 10 s, and they performed best when watching clips of the middle or end of the speed date. There was considerable variability between daters, with some being very easy to read and others apparently masking their true intentions. Variability between observers was also found. The results suggest that the ability to read nonverbal behavior quickly in mate choice is present not only for individuals in the interaction, but also for third-party observers.     

Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment

In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.The authors are thankful to John G. Bennett, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., Norman Foo, Pavlos Pepas, Maurizio Pagnucco, Bob Hadley, members of the Knowledge Systems Group at the University of Sydney and participants of the AI'93 workshop on Belief Revision: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice at Melbourne where a version of this paper was presented, for their suggestions. The authors also express their gratitude to the two anonymous referees for Synthese for their excellent comments and suggestions. Of course it is only the authors that are responsible for the errors that remain.     

Cognitive Pathways to Belief in Karma and Belief in God

Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross-culturally recurrent cognitive processes. Specifically, past research has focused on humans' intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God—an agentic, morally concerned supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma—another culturally widespread but ostensibly non-agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across reincarnations. In two studies and four high-powered samples, including mostly Christian Canadians and mostly Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2,006) and mostly Christian Americans and Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1,752), we provide the first systematic empirical investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma. We used path analyses to (a) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in God, (b) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (c) examine the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs. We found that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma—including morally laden, non-agentic, and agentic conceptualizations—above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning about karma across cultures. These results provide further evidence for an independent role for both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural contexts.     

Longuenesse on Kant and the Priority of the Capacity to Judge

'Hobbes and the Imitation of God' ( Inquiry , 44, 223-6) is Eric Brandon's criticism of my article, 'Thomas Hobbes and the Constraints that Enable the Imitation of God' ( Inquiry , 42, 149-76). Brandon's criticisms are rooted in a misunderstanding of what is argued. Observations made concerning Hobbes's claims about prudence - a form of thinking Hobbes distinguishes from philosophic practice - are erroneously described by Brandon as a part of arguments concerning Hobbes's claims about philosophy. Brandon's own account reaffirms a conventional interpretation by claiming that Hobbes envisioned philosophers discovering order, an interpretation challenged in the original argument. Hobbes privileged the creation of order over attempts to discover the order of the world, and this is reflected in his affinity for geometry over physics.     

Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

Justified Belief from Unjustified Belief

Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification (JFJ): a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ.     

信念的组合性与信念的形而上学

20世纪以来,关于信念的形而上学研究,主要有表征主义和倾向论两条基本路径。基于对信念的组合性特征的阐明,一方面,组合性是信念的构成性条件;另一方面,组合性不是信念的构成性条件,因为典型的物理倾向和心理倾向都不具有组合性,而且,一个组合性的倾向谓词不必然谓述一个组合的倾向。因此,在形而上学上,信念不是倾向。进而,考虑到表征主义能够为信念的组合性提供最佳解释,论文主张,信念的组合性特征是支持信念表征主义的有力理由。     

地域社会变迁与民间信仰区域化的分异形态——以近800年来福建民间信仰为中心

民间信仰的地域性与佛道教发展息息相关却又独具特性,民间信仰的区域化既是民间信仰地域性研究的核心问题,更是宗教社会学和宗教地理学的重要主题。本文以我国民间信仰最为发达的地区之一——福建为中心展开研究。福建沿海与内陆地区民间神明信仰具有明显的地域差别。南宋时期,福建沿海地区佛道教信仰式微,民间信仰取而代之,并在民间神明的敕封总量与信仰取向上与内陆趋向分异。沿海神明信仰的区域化进程相应展开,明清时期尤为显著,进一步形成与内陆分散化态势明显不同的体系化格局,而这一体系化又是在"高层—低层"之间形成地域层级的转换中逐步实现的。这不仅是地域社会变迁的深层反映,更隐含着地域社会与民间信仰的内在关联中经常被忽视却又是关键性的特征。     

Three Approaches to Iterated Belief Contraction

In this paper we investigate three approaches to iterated contraction, namely: the Moderate (or Priority) contraction, the Natural (or Conservative) contraction, and the Lexicographic contraction. We characterise these three contraction functions using certain, arguably plausible, properties of an iterated contraction function. While we provide the characterisation of the first two contraction operations using rationality postulates of the standard variety for iterated contraction, we found doing the same for the Lexicographic contraction more challenging. We provide its characterisation using a variation of Epistemic ranking function instead.     

A Topological Approach to Full Belief

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Stalnaker (Philosophical Studies, 128(1), 169–199 2006) introduced a combined epistemic-doxastic logic that can formally express a strong concept of belief, a...     

Practising the Space Between: Embodying Belief as an Evangelical Anglican Student

Abstract

This article explores the formation of British evangelical university students as believers. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted with a conservative evangelical Anglican congregation in London, I describe how students in this church come to embody a highly cognitive, word-based mode of belief through particular material practices. As they learn to identify themselves as believers, practices of reflexivity and accountability enable them to develop a sense of narrative coherence in their lives that allows them to negotiate tensions that arise from their participation in church and from broader social structures. I demonstrate that propositional belief—in contexts where it becomes an identity marker—is bound up with relational practices of belief, so that distinctions between ‘belief in’ and ‘belief that’ are necessarily blurred in the lives of young evangelicals.