《周易》与元明戏曲略考

元明戏曲的创作是受到<易>之义理及<易>之卜筮文化影响的.在元明戏曲中,有不少对于<周易>及<易>卦的描写.从内容上说,它是社会生活中沉淀了<周易>文化因素而在戏曲创作中的必然反映;从艺术上看,戏剧家们採拮<易>卦<易>事进入戏曲描写,也并非闲笔,它有人物塑造、情节安排、心理映带等多种作用.     

Spare the rod and spoil the icon

Short-term visual storage was investigated with a successive field paradigm, so that correct performance depended upon combining visual information from two targets that were never on simultaneously. In the first two experiments, the stimuli consisted of two slides, each containing a 10' red dot on a gray surround, and separated by an interstimulus interval (ISI) from 20 to 400 msec. Subjects had to determine if the dots were vertically or horizontally aligned. In Experiment 1, the stimuli had either no contrast for the rods or no luminance contrast for the cones or high contrast. At short ISIs the cone contrast determined performance, whereas at long ISIs the rod contrast determined performance. In fact, when the dots were invisible to the rods, the task was impossible for long ISIs. In Experiment 2, performance was compared for zero log rod contrast and for small departures from zero. Even a small departure from zero log rod contrast resulted in above-chance performance. In Experiment 3, the stimuli were luminous rectangles and the task was to decide whether or not a 4' spatial gap was present between the two successively presented rectangles. Wavelength, luminance, and ISI were varied under both photopic and scotopic adapting conditions. The result was that the rods performed the task for ISIs of 150 msec or longer under scotopic conditions and under the photopic conditions that we were able to test. The results of the experiments taken together are consistent with the hypothesis that the cone icon is short, whereas the rod icon is robust and long lasting.     

Mood and the generation effect

Three experiments address the assumptions, derived from a dual-force model, that positive mood supports assimilative (knowledge-driven) processes whereas negative mood supports accommodative (stimulus-driven) functions, and that mood-selective recall (mood congruency) is mainly a matter of assimilation. The generation-effect paradigm was borrowed from memory research to test these assumptions. In Experiment 1, the theoretical variable, degree of assimilation, was operationalised by the ease with which stimulus meaning could be generated from word fragments. In Experiment 2, self-generated stimuli (assimilation) were compared to experimenter-provided stimuli (accommodation). As predicted, positive mood supported assimilation which in turn enhanced mood-congruent recall. In Experiment 3, retrieval mood rather than encoding mood was manipulated. In this situation, positive mood facilitated the recall of all self-generated information, whether congruent or not. The empirical results are generally consistent with the predictions derived from the dual-force framework.     

The client,the therapist and the paranormal: a response to the special edition on psychotherapy and the paranormal

Abstract

In this paper, I provide a published paper response to the papers in this special edition on the paranormal and psychotherapy articulated largely from my career as a parapsychologist. In the introduction I note the definitional differences between advocates and counter-advocates in terms of what might be ‘paranormal’, although I argue ultimately that definitional differences aside, the therapist’s relationship with the client’s unusual experiences is critical, taking a phenomenological stance which is echoed by at least two of the papers in the special edition. In broad review, the papers make a variety of welcome contributions; historical individually and small sample phenomenological and also more metaphorically in terms of articulations of the haunting nature of collective and intergenerational trauma in the social and cultural sphere. I review the papers from a parapsychological perspective, considering the evidence drawn from parapsychological studies where it supports or adds to the topics of each paper. In concluding this response, it seems clear that therapists often work from first principles when relating to clients’ anomalous experiences, and that the papers of the special edition each offer practising therapists some important evidential and practical insights into working with client presentations of ostensibly paranormal and anomalous experiences.     

Minimalism, the Generalization Problem and the Liar

In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflictwith his response to the liar paradox. Something must give. I consider and reject variousalternatives and emendations to the strategy. In order to resolve the conflict,I propose an alternative approach to the liar, one that supports Horwich's strategywhile leaving minimalism maximally uncompromised.     

Pavlov and the Rockefeller foundation

Despite the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1920’s, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research found ways to assist I. P. Pavlov. In addition to providing scientific literature and financial aid, these institutions and their officers rendered important moral support to the scientific career of Pavlov during his later years. In 1923, as a guest of the Rockefeller Institute, Pavlov visited American scientific laboratories. In 1924, he requested and received a number of books on physiology, and during the 1930’s the Foundation helped him to acquire equipment for his Leningrad laboratory.     

Voluntary attention and the spacing effect

Three experiments were done to test the hypothesis that the spacing effect results from a voluntary decision by the subject to pay little attention to the second presentation (P₂) of an item when it occurs shortly after the first (P¹)- In all three experiments, the spacing of repetitions was varied. In Experiment I, allocation of attention was manipulated by pairing P₂ of some pictures with a signal that indicated high payoff for later retention. In Experiment II, attention was controlled more directly by requiring the subject, in one condition, to recite words aloud. In both experiments, the dependent variable was judged frequency. In neither experiment did the effect of the attention manipulation interact with that of the spacing of repetitions. In Experiment III, the number of eye fixations given a picture was taken to be a measure of attention. The number of fixations dropped from P₁ to P₂ to P₃, but was unaffected by the spacing of repetitions. The experiments provide no support for a voluntary attention explanation of the spacing effect.     

Self-Handicapping,Expected Evaluation,and Performance: Accentuating the Positive and Attenuating the Negative

Three studies investigated the influence of social- and self-evaluative motives on self-handicapping and performance. In each study, efficacy expectancies were manipulated by varying the difficulty of a preliminary task, and social- and self-evaluation were manipulated orthogonally. In Study 1, participants who self-handicapped performed better than those who did not when a positive or negative evaluation was expected, in some conditions. In Study 2, we used a situationally imposed handicap and found that both social- and self-evaluation participants showed improved performance in the presence of the handicap. In Study 3, when a positive or negative evaluation was expected, high self-handicappers performed better after choosing to self-handicap, for both social- and self-evaluative motives. Little evidence of self-handicapping or effects on subsequent performance was found for low self-handicappers. No evidence was found for self-handicapping among participants who could not be evaluated. Discussion centers around motives to self-handicap and implications for subsequent performance.     

Considerations on the precedence of the scenes,the contact barrier and the separation of conscious and unconscious

In this essay the term ‘scene’ which has been developed in the German psychoanalytic discussion, is confronted with the terms ‘total situation’ and ‘psychoanalytic field’, showing common features as well as differences. Thereafter four child observations are presented, through which light is thrown onto the scenic structures which make the foundations of early experience. In the precedence of scenes those structures are omnipresent whereas subjectivity only gradually builds up. It is shown how the development of subjectivity and the differentiation of consciousness and unconscious go along with overcoming the precedence of scenes, by breaking them up and reorganizing them. Thus scenes can become metaphors, which are used for ‘translating’ experience and for building up the contact barrier.     

Culture and the economy

In a sample of 18 industrialized nations, measures of national character did not improve the power of socioeconomic variables in predicting unemployment rates.     

Worldviews and World-Pictures. Avoiding the Myth of the Semantic Given

Topoi - In this paper I focus on the notion of worldview as a conceptual scheme and the role of language in shaping our view of reality. In particular, I engage with Wittgenstein’s notion of...     

Choice behavior and the accessibility of the reinforcer

In Experiment 1, matching of relative response rates to relative rates of reinforcement was obtained in concurrent variable-interval schedules when the absolute values of the two concurrent variable-interval schedules varied from 6 sec and 12 sec to 600 sec and 1200 sec. Increases in the duration of the changeover delay, however, produced decreases in the relative response rates and, consequently, some deviation from matching. In Experiment 2, matching of relative response rates to the relative duration of the reinforcer failed to occur when the equal variable-interval schedules arranging access to the two different reinforcer durations (1.5 and 6 sec) were varied in size from concurrent variable-interval 10-sec schedules to concurrent variable-interval 600-sec schedules.     

Presentism and the Triviality Objection

Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it is obviously false if read as saying that everything that has existed, exits or will exist is present. If eternalism is taken as the negation of presentism, it is also either trivially false or obviously true. In this paper, I try to respond to the triviality objection on behalf of presentism. In second section, I will examine how the argument proceeds. In third section, I will reflect on three possible ways to respond but will argue that none of them succeeds in giving a satisfactory solution. I will then try to clarify the core idea of presentism and to suggest that if we characterise presentism accurately, the problem will disappear. In fourth section, I will offer a plausible definition of presentism and will show how it can avoid the triviality objection and demonstrate why it is advantageous to accept the version of presentism I offer.     

Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes

In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard’s version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard’s. In Section 3, I consider some ways in which Gibbard might attempt to avoid the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue that all of these ways fail to achieve their aim and further contend that the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem cannot be solved in a sufficiently convincing manner by the widely used method of making ad hoc distinctions among kinds of properties, kinds of attitudes, and kinds of reasons. In Section 4, I sketch my own version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness and show that it simply avoids the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem rather than attempting to solve the problem on a piecemeal basis.     

Picture and pattern perception in the sighted and the blind: the advantage of the late blind

Two experiments are reported on the contribution of visual experience to tactile perception. In the first experiment, sighted, congenitally blind, and late blind individuals made tactual matches to tangible embossed shapes. In the second experiment, the same subjects attempted tactile identification of raised-line drawings. The three groups did not differ in the accuracy of shape matching, but both groups of blind subjects were much faster than the sighted. Late blind observers were far better than the sighted or congenitally blind at tactile picture identification. Four of the twelve pictures were correctly identified by most of the late blind subjects. The sighted and congenitally blind performed at comparable levels in picture naming. There was no evidence that visual experience alone aided the sighted in the tactile task under investigation, since they performed no better than did the early blind. The superiority of the late blind suggests that visual exposure to drawings and the rules of pictorial representation may help tactile picture identification when combined with a history of tactual experience.     

Religious Zeal and the Uncertain Self

In two studies, personal uncertainty threats caused compensatory religious zeal. In Study 1 an academic uncertainty manipulation heightened conviction for religious beliefs and support for religious warfare. In Study 2 a relationship uncertainty manipulation caused non-Muslim's to derogate Islam. Together, these findings demonstrate that two aspects of religious zeal—conviction for one's own beliefs and derogation of others'—are caused by personal uncertainty.     

Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom,Transcendental Idealism,and the Third-Person

Kant wants to show that freedom is possible in the face of natural necessity. Transcendental idealism is his solution, which locates freedom outside of nature. I accept that this makes freedom possible, but object that it precludes the recognition of other rational agents. In making this case, I trace some of the history of Kant’s thoughts on freedom. In several of his earlier works, he argues that we are aware of our own activity. He later abandons this approach, as he worries that any awareness of our activity involves access to the noumenal, and thereby conflicts with the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism. In its place, from the second Critique onwards, Kant argues that we are conscious of the moral law, which tells me that I ought to do something, thus revealing that I can. This is the only proof of freedom consistent with transcendental idealism, but I argue that such an exclusively first-personal approach precludes the (third-personal) recognition of other rational agents. I conclude that transcendental idealism thus fails to provide an adequate account of freedom. In its place, I sketch an alternative picture of how freedom is possible, one that locates freedom within, rather than outside of nature.     

The true and the false

A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the twentieth century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with the laws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular, according to which some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and the laws of nature are to be explained in terms of these fundamental dispositions. The supposed ability of fundamental dispositions to ground natural laws is one of the most attractive features of the dispositional essentialist position. In this paper, however, I cast doubt on the ability of dispositional essences to ground the laws of nature. In particular I argue that the dispositional essentialist position is not able to coherently respond—sympathetically or otherwise—to Cartwright's challenge that there are no true general laws of nature.     

Consciousness and Hegel's Solution to the Problem of the Criterion

Traditional epistemological interpretations have portrayed Hegel as offering a coherentist solution to the problem of the criterion in the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit. In this paper, I criticize the coherentist interpretation and present an alternative reading that emphasizes the central role of conscious experience in Hegel's argument. In the first part of the paper, I show how the passages commonly used to support the coherentist interpretation ultimately fail to do so and argue that coherence by itself cannot be the lynchpin for an adequate solution to the problem of the criterion. In the second part, I then develop a novel interpretation of Hegel's argument by drawing attention to the fact that Hegel formulates both the problem of the criterion and his solution to it in terms of consciousness.     

Fate and the Fortune of the Categories: Kant on the Usurpation and Schematization of Concepts

In the early steps of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant briefly addresses the threat posed by usurpatory concepts such as ‘fate’ and ‘fortune’. Commentators have largely passed over these remarks, but in this paper I argue that a careful analysis of the reasons why ‘fate’ and ‘fortune’ are usurpatory reveals an important point about the relation between the Deduction and the Principles chapters of the Critique. In particular, I argue that ‘fate’ and ‘fortune’ are usurpatory because they are unable to discriminate between the particular contents of experience, and that this requires that Kant provide an account of how the categories are able to accomplish this task. And this in turn shows that the justificatory work begun in the Deduction can be completed only in the Schematism and Principles.