Intentionality and Self-Awareness

In this essay I defend both the individual plausibility and conjoint consistency of two theses. One is the Intentionality Thesis: that all mental states are intentional (object‐directed, exhibit ‘aboutness’). The other is the Self‐Awareness Thesis: that if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object. I begin by arguing for the individual prima facie plausibility of both theses. I then go on to consider a regress argument to the effect that the two theses are incompatible. I discuss three responses to that argument, and defend one of them.     

学道之无私 体道之包容

<正>道是中国文化的重要核心理念,在中华文化的丰富发展和衍变过程中,在对外文化交流融合与相互吸取包容过程中,在中国人的精神生活、思维形式和生活方式的构建过程中,都有着巨大而深远的影响。     

Sense and Sensibility Educated: A Note on Experience and (Minimal) Empiricism

Abstract

McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks concerning the importance of experience.     

Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism

In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.     

Situationism,Manipulation, and Objective Self-Awareness

Among those taking the implications of situationism seriously, some have suggested exploiting our tendency to be shaped by our environments toward desirable ends. The key insight here is that if experimental studies produce reliable, probabilistic predictions about the effects of situational variables on behavior—for example, how people react to the presence or absence of various sounds, objects, and their placement—then we should deploy those variables that promote prosocial behavior, while avoiding or limiting those that tend toward antisocial behavior. Put another way, some have suggested that we tweak situations to nudge or influence others toward good behavior. A question arises: Isn’t this manipulative? In this paper, I describe some existing proposals in the literature and consider the manipulation worry. Drawing on classical Confucian ethics, I argue that, when all is considered, it is chimerical to think we can refrain from influencing or manipulating others. We must rather accept that influence (whether intended or not) is part of social existence. Once we accept this, the only remaining question is how to influence others. I suggest that this should make us conceive ourselves in an objective fashion.     

Modes of Self-Awareness: Perception,Dreams, Memory

Husserl Studies - I contend that the well-established phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness needs to be further supplemented with more refined...     

I-ness and Otherness: A review of Dan Zahavi's Self-Awareness and Alterity

Continental Philosophy Review -     

Test Anxiety, Self-Awareness, and Cognitive Interference: A Process Analysis

ABSTRACT Participants performed a cognitive task under evaluative, self-awareness, and neutral conditions, Task performance was determined jointly by trait test anxiety and situational factors. Test anxiety led to poorer performance in both evaluative and self-awareness situations, relative to the neutral situation. We examined the cognitive activity variables that might mediate the effects of test anxiety and situational variables on performance, and identified a significant cognitive mediator of the main effect of test anxiety, but not for the Test Anxiety x Situation interaction effect. Therefore, the current experiment offered some support for Sarason's (1980) cognitive interference theory, as well as integrating test anxiety and self-awareness research.     

Self-Awareness without a Self: Buddhism and the Reflexivity of Awareness

In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch of reflexivist accounts of self-awareness, using the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti as my example. In the next section, I examine reductionism as it relates to accounts of the self. I then, in the third section, argue that a reductionist account of persons can account for the unique features of first-person contents and our deep and multi-layered sense of self.     

White Counselor Self-Awareness: A Prerequisite for Developing Multicultural Competence

This review of the literature examines White counselor self-awareness as an important variable in developing multicultural competence. The self-dimension discussed in this article includes worldview, cultural values, and racial identity. It is suggested that counselor self-awareness is a prerequisite to developing multicultural competence and that an in-depth understanding of these factors may improve the delivery of mental health services to culturally diverse client populations.     

Professional Virtue and Professional Self-Awareness: A Case Study in Engineering Ethics

This paper articulates an Aristotelian theory of professional virtue and provides an application of that theory to the subject of engineering ethics. The leading idea is that Aristotle’s analysis of the definitive function of human beings, and of the virtues humans require to fulfill that function, can serve as a model for an analysis of the definitive function or social role of a profession and thus of the virtues professionals must exhibit to fulfill that role. Special attention is given to a virtue of professional self-awareness, an analogue to Aristotle’s phronesis or practical wisdom. In the course of laying out my account I argue that the virtuous professional is the successful professional, just as the virtuous life is the happy life for Aristotle. I close by suggesting that a virtue ethics approach toward professional ethics can enrich the pedagogy of professional ethics courses and help foster a sense of pride and responsibility in young professionals.     

The Role of Self-Awareness and Self-Monitoring in Charismatic Relationships

In this paper, a hypothesis from a theory of charismatic relationships is examined that incorporates follower's level of self-monitoring and state of self-awareness. It is argued that changes in the state of self-awareness affect the characteristics of the short-term charismatic relationship between leader and follower, but only for high self-monitoring followers. Providing support for the hypothesis was a repeated-measures study. Participants ( N = 78) viewed video vignettes of charismatic leaders presenting different messages, in either a high or low self-awareness condition. When high in self-awareness, participants with a high self-monitoring orientation were more likely than when in a state of low self-awareness to internalize only those messages congruent with their values and beliefs.     

Sartre,Developmental Psychology and Burgeoning Self-Awareness: Ricocheting from Being to Nothingness

While the genesis of self-awareness at approximately 18 months old is a dramatic landmark in human development, there is at this stage no explicit awareness on the toddler's part of his/her truly standing apart from others. Only much later does a distinct sense of self shift into focus, and here Sartre provides us with a compelling theory of a first reflective experience of self-awareness. He explains this phenomenon by emphasizing a violent shift in ontological status, one in which the pre-adolescent child is precipitated from functional unity with a primary caregiver to an individuated state involving self-awareness as privative, i.e. where the child becomes aware of existing only in the form of not-being-the-adult. For Sartre this new experience of self is not therefore positive but rather formal or empty; there has in fact been a psychic transition, from being to nothingness. In addition, Sartre also states that all children first explicitly experience themselves in this fashion. These claims find support in the work of developmental psychologist Margaret Mahler. In fact, in spite of the vast developmental discrepancies between toddler and pre-adolescent child, given the appropriate environmental triggers privative subjectivity will be shown to involve a regression to the much earlier rapprochement stage of development described by Mahler.     

Self-Awareness, Task Failure, and Disinhibition: How Attentional Focus Affects Eating

ABSTRACT Dieting and nondieting subjects were given either failure or neutral performance feedback on a problem-solving task. Failure subjects were then assigned to one of three self-awareness conditions: One group was forced to watch a video clip of themselves failing on the problem-solving task, one group was asked to watch a distracting video clip on bighorn sheep, and the final group was asked to sit quietly for 10 minutes. Subjects were then allowed to eat as much ice cream as they wanted. Only in those conditions which allowed—or promoted—low self-awareness (the failure/distraction and simple failure condition) did dieters show disinhibited eating. In the failure/videotape condition, which enforced high levels of self-awareness, eating in dieters remained inhibited. This supports the proposal that a reduction in self-awareness is necessary for lifting of inhibitions. Eating in nondieters was reduced in the failure/videotape and simple failure conditions, possibly because of the autonomic correlates of distress.     

Public Self-Awareness and Success-Failure Feedback as Disinhibitors of Restrained Eating

This study investigated the role of public self-awareness and distress in disinhibiting eating. Ninety-six women who were classified as restrained or unrestrained eaters completed a computerized social perception test during which public self-awareness (low vs. high) and type of feedback (success vs. failure) were manipulated. Following the test, restrained subjects ate more than did unrestrained subjects. When public self-awareness was low, subjects who received failure feedback consumed more than those who were exposed to success feedback. An opposite pattern occurred in the high-self-awareness condition. A post hoc examination revealed that restrained subjects exhibited more regulated eating behavior when exposed to a combination of disinhibitors, whereas each disinhibitor taken separately was associated with increased consumption. Results were interpreted in terms of the self-awareness reduction model of eating.