Individual Concepts in Modal Predicate Logic

The article deals with the interpretation of propositional attitudes in the framework of modal predicate logic. The first part discusses the classical puzzles arising from the interplay between propositional attitudes, quantifiers and the notion of identity. After comparing different reactions to these puzzles it argues in favor of an analysis in which evaluations of de re attitudes may vary relative to the ways of identifying objects used in the context of use. The second part of the article gives this analysis a precise formalization from a model- and proof-theoretic perspective. This material has grown out of Chapters 2 and 4 of my PhD thesis Quantification under Conceptual Covers.     

Complicity in Thought and Language: Toleration of Wrong

Complicity as “toleration of wrong” is deeply rooted in Western language and narratives. It is based on assumptions about the self, our relationship to the world and personal accountability that differ from the Common Law's and moral theology's standard doctrines. How we blame others for “tolerating wrong” depends upon the moral force of public discourse and upon the meaning of censure as exhortation. Censure as blame is usually retrospective, while censure as exhortation is forward-looking and stresses moral maturity and flourishing.     

Psychological Researches in Schizophrenic Language and Thought

Seventy-two five- to seven-year-old boys were exposed to televised adult models and were then administered tests of resistance to deviation (moral behavior), moral choice, and moral judgment level. Boys exposed to a model who said he would resist deviating from a prohibition and who supported his statement with a morally realistic justification were subsequently more likely to use that model's statements to guide their own moral behavior and moral choice than were boys exposed to a model advocating resistance to deviation with a morally autonomous justification. Realistic models expressing a deviating moral choice led to more deviating moral choices in observers than did autonomous deviating models. The moral judgment levels of the boys were not significantly affected by the models. The boys' moral behavior was predictive of their moral choice while moral judgment level was not significantly related to the other two indices of morality.     

从语言到思想:基于指称问题考察分析哲学的范式转移

本文通过追溯当代内容理论的语言哲学和现象学起源,以指称性概念和意向性概念为核心,简要刻画了指称理论和内容理论的发展线索。在此基础上,本文试图借助语言指称问题和心理指称问题的平行关系,为当代分析哲学的主流从语言哲学到心灵哲学的范式转移的动机和方法勾勒出一个考察纲要。     

Explanation and the Language of Thought

In this paper we argue that the insistence by Fodor et. al. that the Language of Thought hypothesis must be true rests on mistakes about the kinds of explanations that must be provided of cognitive phenomena. After examining the canonical arguments for the LOT, we identify a weak version of the LOT hypothesis which we think accounts for some of the intuitions that there must be a LOT.We then consider what kinds of explanation cognitive phenomena require, and conclude that three main confusions lead to the invalid inference of the truth of a stronger LOT hypothesis from the weak and trivial version. These confusions concern the relationship between syntax and semantics, the nature of higher-level causation in cognitive science, and differing roles of explanations invoking intrinsic structures of minds on the one hand, and aetiological or evolutionary accounts of their properties on the other.We are indebted to Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, Huw Price, and Kim Sterelny for their generous and useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to discussions with Martin Davies on these and related issues.     

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

A main thread of the debate over mathematical realism has come down to whether mathematics does explanatory work of its own in some of our best scientific explanations of empirical facts. Realists argue that it does; anti-realists argue that it doesn't. Part of this debate depends on how mathematics might be able to do explanatory work in an explanation. Everyone agrees that it's not enough that there merely be some mathematics in the explanation. Anti-realists claim there is nothing mathematics can do to make an explanation mathematical; realists think something can be done, but they are not clear about what that something is.

I argue that many of the examples of mathematical explanations of empirical facts in the literature can be accounted for in terms of Jackson and Pettit's [1990] notion of program explanation, and that mathematical realists can use the notion of program explanation to support their realism. This is exactly what has happened in a recent thread of the debate over moral realism (in this journal). I explain how the two debates are analogous and how moves that have been made in the moral realism debate can be made in the mathematical realism debate. However, I conclude that one can be a mathematical realist without having to be a moral realist.     

论语言与思想的反思平衡

弗雷格和达米特从说者视角出发,认为语言是思想的容器和交流的工具,因而思想是静态的。戴维森则从听者视角主张:思想作为一种倾向性的语言,乃是解释者赋予说者的命题态度内容,因而思想是动态的。据此我们进一步论证:思想是解释者在交流过程中与说者所共同建构的东西,而不是说者在说话之前的现成之物;思想不是解释者的意见,也不单是说者的意图,而是话语自身的意义;思想是说者与解释者在话语交流的互动过程中一个逐步完成的过程。说者的话语与解释者赋予说者的思想之间是一种相互依赖、相互调整、相互促进的反思平衡关系。