Diagnostic discrepancy and clinical inference: a social-cognitive analysis

This review posits that clinical inference be studied as an instance of human inference. Normative rules for clinical inference may be derived from those for human inference in general, but clinicians choose not to adhere to them, relying instead on possibly biasing and suboptimal methods. A seven-phase model of clinical inference, with each phase containing particular tasks, is presented. Performance on these tasks depends on the effect of cognitive and environmental influences and the application of cognitive strategies, with erroneous performance leading to impaired clinical inference.     

When can non‐commutative statistical inference be Bayesian?

Based on recalling two characteristic features of Bayesian statistical inference in commutative probability theory, a stability property of the inference is pointed out, and it is argued that that stability of the Bayesian statistical inference is an essential property which must be preserved under generalization of Bayesian inference to the non‐commutative case. Mathematical no‐go theorems are recalled then which show that, in general, the stability can not be preserved in non‐commutative context. Two possible interpretations of the impossibility of generalization of Bayesian statistical inference to the non‐commutative case are offered, none of which seems to be completely satisfying.     

Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference

It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively or ampliatively. The inductive risk may be shouldered by premises or rules, but it cannot be shirked. Demonstrative theories of induction might, nevertheless, better describe scientific practice. And there may be good methodological reasons for constructing our inferences one way rather than the other. By exploring the limits of these possible advantages, I argue that scientific inference is neither of essence deductive nor of essence inductive.     

Argument,Inference, and Persuasion

This paper distinguishes between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. First, borrowing from Pinto (in Argument, inference, and dialectic, Kluwer Academic Pub, Dordrecht, 2001), an arguer's invitation to inference directly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference that the arguer invites. This raises the question of how invited inferences are determined by an invitation to inference. Second, borrowing from Sorenson (J Philos 88:245–266, 1991), an arguer's invitation to inference indirectly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference guided by the argument even though it is uninvited. This raises the question of how an invitation to inference can guide inferences that the arguer does not use the argument to invite. Focusing on belief-inducing inference, the primary aims here are (i) to clarify what is necessary for an addressee's belief-inducing inference to be invited by an argument used as an instrument of persuasion; and (ii) to highlight the capacity of arguments to guide such inferences. The paper moves beyond Pinto's (2001) discussion by using Boghossian's (Philos Stud 169:1–18, 2014) Taking Condition in service of (i) and (ii) in way that illustrates how epistemically bad arguments can rationally persuade addressees of their conclusions.

     

Is awareness necessary for true inference?

In transitive inference, participants learn a set of context-dependent discriminations that can be organized into a hierarchy that supports inference. Several studies show that inference occurs with or without task awareness. However, some studies assert that without awareness, performance is attributable to pseudoinference. By this account, inference-like performance is achieved by differential stimulus weighting according to the stimuli's proximity to the end items of the hierarchy. We implement an inference task that cannot be based on differential stimulus weighting. The design itself rules out pseudoinference strategies. Success on the task without evidence of deliberative strategies would therefore suggest that true inference can be achieved implicitly. We found that accurate performance on the inference task was not dependent on explicit awareness. The finding is consistent with a growing body of evidence that indicates that forms of learning and memory supporting inference and flexibility do not necessarily depend on task awareness.     

利/害条件下归纳推理的心理效应分离

研究设计了两类包含内容的归纳推理任务, 一类是对获得收益的可能性的推理; 另一类是避免伤害的推理。实验显示, 不同内容的归纳推理结果有显著差异。其中, 避免伤害的归纳推理表现出将伤害可能过度推延的特点; 而获得收益的归纳推理则表现出对收益可能推延不足。此外, 不同的自我卷入水平——自我卷入式推理或者非自我卷入式推理——也会对推理产生显著影响。在避害条件下, 自我卷入式推理比非自我卷入式推理表现出更强烈的过度推延的特点; 在获利条件下, 自我卷入式推理比非自我卷入式推理表现出更严重的推延不足。研究经过分析提出, 这种差异可能暗示了归纳推理的领域特殊性特征。     

On the justification of inductive rules of inference

Summary Rules of inference can be interpreted as rules of (purposive) behavior; in such a case the behaptor consists in accepting a certain statement, called conclusion. The justification of a rule of inference with respect to a given end consists in showing that it is the most efficient method of realizing that end; the meaning of the word “efficient”, and the character of the end, should, of course, be made clear. The article is an attempt at reconstructing a part of the theory of mathematical statistics (the so-called parametric inference) along those lines. It is assumed that the end to be realized by following rules of statistical inference is, broadly speaking, a cognitive one.     

基于语境的因果性预期推理的构建的实验研究

实验一探讨对因果性预期推理的支持程度不同的语境对因果性预期推理的即时构建的影响。结果表明,如果文本信息有支持预期结果的语境,读者会即时进行因果性预期推理。实验二探讨当文本描述了两个不能整合的情境模型时因果性预期推理的即时构建情况。结果表明,在这种条件下,因果性预期推理不会即时产生。本研究结果表明,文本的语境对因果性结果的支持程度对因果性预期推理的即时构建有决定性的影响作用。     

以貌取人可行吗？——基于面孔的特质推理及准确性

面孔—特质推理（face - traits inference）是知觉者凭借面孔推断他人特质的心理过程。面孔特征、构型以及表情是特质推理的主要线索。其心理机制可从生理、进化和认知取向等方面进行解释。以往研究发现,面孔-特质推理具有适度准确性。其准确性主要受到知觉对象的面孔吸引力,知觉者的身心特征、知识经验和文化背景的影响;情境也是影响准确性的重要因素。未来研究需在面部线索、准确性指标、准确性的影响因素以及理论框架等方面进行探讨。     

因果模型在类比推理中的作用

通过操纵因果模型的特征维度及推理方向, 探讨因果模型在类比推理中的作用。实验一探讨了当结果特征未知时进行类比推理的情况, 发现在一果多因时, 被试采用因果模型进行类比推理, 而在一因多果时, 被试同时采用因果模型和计算模型进行类比推理。实验二探讨当原因特征未知时进行类比推理的情况, 发现在一果多因和一因多果时, 被试均采用因果模型进行类比推理。结果表明：(1)当结果特征未知时, 人们会建构因果模型进行类比推理。且当因果模型和计算模型处于冲突情境时, 人们会采用因果模型进行类比推理; 但当因果模型和计算模型处于非冲突情境时, 人们会同时采用因果模型和计算模型。(2)当原因特征未知时, 即按照因果模型推理的难度增加时, 人们仍会建构因果模型进行类比推理。     

The effect of negation on deductive inferences

Research shows that negation can suppress the activation of propositions presented explicitly in text, but does negation have a similar effect on propositions that can be inferred? That is, does negation inhibit the inference process? Four experiments investigated whether a deductive inference that produces a negated conclusion (therefore not a) is made as readily as a similar inference form that yields an affirmative conclusion (therefore a). A combination of naming latencies, verification times, and reading times indicate that negation does not affect the deductive inference process itself, although it may inhibit the activation of inferred concepts.     

心理研究中引入贝叶斯统计推断的必要性、应用思路与领域

本文从科学范式演变和概率统计推断特征分析出发,就贝叶斯统计推断引入心理学的必要性、怎么应用、在哪些领域应用集中进行了论述。首先在分析科学范式演进各阶段统计推断任务需要、经典的频率概率统计推断不足基础上,得出科学范式处于危机和革命阶段时需要对相关理论做可信度检验。然后,在介绍贝叶斯定理及其统计推断的基础上,进一步分析了贝叶斯推断能解决理论可信度的多种假设检验情景。最后本文还就贝叶斯统计推断在心理学理论争鸣与建构、心理技术产品开发与评估具体领域应用做了分析。     

Defeasibility and Inferential Particularism

In this paper I argue that defeasible (nonmonotonic) inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim (plus collateral premises) depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference (including typical environmental conditions, and also pragmatic and contextual factors, such as the information available to agents and how high stakes are). More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity arises in inferentialist theories of content that appeal to defeasible inferences.     

The inference to the best explanation

In a situation in which several explanations compete, is the one that is better qua explanation also the one we should regard as the more likely to be true? Realists usually answer in the affirmative. They then go on to argue that since realism provides the best explanation for the success of science, realism can be inferred to. Nonrealists, on the other hand, answer the above question in the negative, thereby renouncing the inference to realism. In this paper I separate the two issues. In the first section it is argued that a rationale can be provided for the inference to the best explanation; in the second, that this rationale cannot justify an inference to realism. The defence of the inference rests on the claim that our standards of explanatory power are subject to critical examination, which, in turn, should be informed by empirical considerations. By means of a comparison of the realist's explanation for the success of science with that of conventionalism and instrumentalism it is then shown that realism does not offer a superior explanation and should not, therefore, be inferred to.     

When Laddering and the Downward Arrow Can Be Used as Adjuncts to Inference Chaining in REBT Assessment

This paper looks at the ways in which laddering in Personal Construct Therapy and the downward arrow in Cognitive Therapy can be used as adjunctive techniques to inference chaining in locating a client's critical A or emotional core. We describe their use through a number of case examples and annotations. We conclude that these two methods require skilled use if they are to be successfully integrated into inference chaining and are offered as part of REBT's interest in theoretically consistent eclecticism. The use of inference chaining in Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), the downward arrow in Cognitive Therapy (CT) and laddering in Personal Construct Therapy (PCT) are techniques which aim to help therapists and clients gain rapid insight into the latters' core beliefs and values about themselves, others and the world. This article will show how each technique reveals underlying beliefs and then, from the REBT viewpoint, in what circumstances laddering or the downward arrow might be used as an adjunct to inference chaining in the assessment stage of therapy.     

Inference using categories

How do people use category membership and similarity for making inductive inferences? The authors addressed this question by examining the impact of category labels and category features on inference and classification tasks that were designed to be comparable. In the inference task, participants predicted the value of a missing feature of an item given its category label and other feature values. In the classification task, participants predicted the category label of an item given its feature values. The results from 4 experiments suggest that category membership influences inference even when similarity information contradicts the category label. This tendency was stronger when the category label conveyed class inclusion information than when the label reflected a feature of the category. These findings suggest that category membership affects inference beyond similarity and that category labels and category features are 2 different things.     

A Test by Any Other Name: P Values,Bayes Factors,and Statistical Inference

Procedures used for statistical inference are receiving increased scrutiny as the scientific community studies the factors associated with insuring reproducible research. This note addresses recent negative attention directed at p values, the relationship of confidence intervals and tests, and the role of Bayesian inference and Bayes factors, with an eye toward better understanding these different strategies for statistical inference. We argue that researchers and data analysts too often resort to binary decisions (e.g., whether to reject or accept the null hypothesis) in settings where this may not be required.     

Ampliative abduction

In Peirce's and Hanson's characterization of abductive inference, the abducted hypothesis (but not others) is present in the premises, so that the inference can hardly be taken as ampliative. Abduction has consequently been treated as part of the process whereby already generated hypotheses are judged in terms of their plausibility, simplicity, etc. I propose an interpretation of abduction which supports an ampliative view. It relies on a distinction between two logical stages in the generation of hypotheses, one “factual” and one “explanatory”. I also indicate how we may reconstruct Peirce's and Hanson's original inference in an ampliative form.     

熟悉主题说明文阅读推理加工的认知神经机制

采用功能磁共振成像(Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, fMRI)技术对熟悉主题说明文阅读过程因果推理加工进行研究, 探讨说明文阅读过程中读者是否能够自发进行因果推理加工, 以及阅读焦点的存在是否会对说明文阅读过程中的因果推理加工产生影响。结果表明, 读者在熟悉主题说明文阅读过程中能够自动进行推理加工, 负责推理加工的主要脑区为额叶(尤其是额下回)、顶叶下部及双侧楔前叶等区域。在熟悉主题说明文阅读过程中, 阅读焦点的存在一定程度上使读者的认知加工资源集中在对与焦点相关的推理关系的加工上。