On three arguments against categorical structuralism

Some mathematicians and philosophers contend that set theory plays a foundational role in mathematics. However, the development of category theory during the second half of the twentieth century has encouraged the view that this theory can provide a structuralist alternative to set-theoretical foundations. Against this tendency, criticisms have been made that category theory depends on set-theoretical notions and, because of this, category theory fails to show that set-theoretical foundations are dispensable. The goal of this paper is to show that these criticisms are misguided by arguing that category theory is entirely autonomous from set theory.     

Unification of models for choice between delayed reinforcers.

Two models for choice between delayed reinforcers, Fantino's delay-reduction theory and Killeen's incentive theory, are reviewed. Incentive theory is amended to incorporate the effects of arousal on alternate types of behavior that might block the reinforcement of the target behavior. This amended version is shown to differ from the delay-reduction theory in a term that is an exponential in incentive theory and a difference in delay-reduction theory. A power series approximation to the exponential generates a model that is formally identical with delay-reduction theory. Correlations between delay-reduction theory and the amended incentive theory show excellent congruence over a range of experimental conditions. Although the assumptions that gave rise to delay-reduction theory and incentive theory remain different and testable, the models deriving from the theories are unlikely to be discriminable by parametric experimental tests. This congruence of the models is recognized by naming the common model the delayed reinforcement model, which is then compared with other models of choice such as Killeen and Fetterman's (1988) behavioral theory of timing, Mazur's (1984) equivalence rule, and Vaughan's (1985) melioration theory.     

Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory?

Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor’s genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones’ own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors’ own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory.     

Problems in contemporary psychoanalytic theory: 1. Controversial issues

In two articles the controversial situation within contemporary psychoanalytic theory is discussed with reference to both the form and content of the theory. In the first article some areas of theoretical conflict between traditional drive theory, on the one hand, and object relations theory, self theory, and ego theory, on the other, are surveyed. It is concluded that inconsistency and ambiguity seem so penetrating that one can hardly speak of a unified theory of psychoanalysis at present. This seems to be a new situation in the history of psychoanalysis. A main issue of disagreement is that between drive theory and object relations theory concerning the nature of human motivation. In order to bridge the theoretical gap between the two positions, it seems necessary for psychoanalysis to disclaim the monolithic status of the drives and to adopt a broad theory of motivation where drives are only one contribution among several types of motivating forces. In the second article some lines of advance in psychoanalytic theory are discussed.     

Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism

Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.     

Why we can still believe the error theory

The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.     

Selecting the wrong processor: a critique of Leslie’s theory of mind mechanism–selection processor theory

The fundamental assumption behind Leslie’s theory of mind mechanism theory is that from 18 months onwards a single device, the theory of mind mechanism, allows children to represent both pretend and belief in terms of propositional attitudes. This is compared with Perner’s argument that early pretence is not understood in terms of propositional attitudes. Recent modifications to Leslie’s theory aim to explain why children younger than 4 years fail the false belief test. Leslie argues that the correct proposition is computed, not by the theory of mind mechanism, but by the selection processor, a later-developing executive device. In this paper I examine the coherence of Leslie’s revised theory and conclude that representing beliefs is now entirely the task of the selection processor; the theory of mind mechanism is no longer involved, thus contravening the fundamental assumption of the theory. The conclusion is that the theory and the assumption should be abandoned.     

What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of emotions

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory of emotions.     

A First Order Theory of Functional Parthood

This paper contains a formal theory of functional parthood. Since the relation of functional parthood is defined here by means of the notion of design, the theory of functional parthood turns out to be a theory of design. The formal theory of design I defend here is a result of introducing a number of constraints that are to express the rational aspects of designing practice. The ontological background for the theory is provided by a conception of states of affairs. The theory is accompanied with a formal model. I prove that the theory is sound and complete with respect to this model.     

Control theory and understanding motivated behavior: A different conclusion

In the preceding article it was argued that control theory is not a useful paradigm for understanding work motivation. In doing so, three primary criticisms were presented: (a) that control theory, as originally formulated, does not adequately describe human behavior, (b) that modifications of control theory to describe human behavior have not been successful, and (c) that the use of logical deductions to develop a control theory model of work motivation is less efficacious than a grounded theory approach. In this reply, it will be shown that (a) the first criticism is not incorrect but is an inappropriate basis for criticism, (b) statements regarding modified control theory models are either inaccurate or premature, and (c) both inductive and deductive reasoning play an important role in theory development. In addressing these issues and in discussing the distinct advantages of current control theory models it will be shown that control theory does provide a viable paradigm for understanding work motivation.Thanks to John R. Hollenbeck for his helpful comments on this paper.     

The tower experiment and the Copernican revolution

During the Copernican revolution the supporters of the Ptolemaic theory argued that the tower experiment refuted the Copernican hypothesis of the (diurnal) motion of the earth, but was in agreement with the Ptolemaic theory. In his defence of the Copernican theory Galileo argued that the experiment was in agreement both with Copernican and Ptolemaic theory. The reason for these different views of the same experiment was not that the two theories were incommensurable, as Paul Feyerabend argues, but that Galileo introduced a new theory of motion which he used as an auxiliary hypothesis in his discussion of the tower experiment, while those defending the Ptolemaic theory used the old Aristotelian theory of motion. Already before the Copernican revolution the Aristotelian theory of motion was criticized by philosophers in Paris, who suggested the impetus theory of motion. The later versions of this theory had the consequence that the tower experiment no longer refuted the hypothesis of the (diurnal) motion of the earth. Thus the impetus theory removed an old and important objection to the heliocentric theory. Galileo's inertial dynamics had the same function in the discussion of the tower experiment.     

FROM FREUD TO FEMINIST PERSONALITY THEORY: GETTING HERE FROM THERE

After a discussion of the impact of psychoanalysis on psychological thinking about personality theory and the changes that have been taking place within psychoanalytic theory about women, eight criteria arising out of feminist therapy theory are stated. These criteria represent suggested minimum conditions that a woman-based theory of female development and personality needs to fulfill. Freudian theory, current psychoanalytic theory, and several feminist theories are then evaluated in light of the stated criteria. The author concludes that feminists have arrived at some degree of general agreement about personality theory, although they have often arrived at their specific approaches via diverse theoretical routes.     

Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative

Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation is a purely qualitative account of confirmation; it allows us to say that the evidence confirms a given theory, but not that it confirms the theory to a certain degree. The present paper extends Glymour’s theory to a quantitative account and investigates the resulting theory in some detail. It also considers the question how bootstrap confirmation relates to justification.     

A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory

I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.

     

Original and cumulative prospect theory: a discussion of empirical differences

This paper discusses differences between prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory. It shows that cumulative prospect theory is not merely a formal correction of some theoretical problems in prospect theory, but it also gives different predictions. Some experiments by Lola Lopes are re-analyzed, and are demonstrated to favor cumulative prospect theory over prospect theory. It turns out that the mathematical form of cumulative prospect theory is well suited for modeling the psychological phenomenon of diminishing sensitivity. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Property Theory of Musical Works

The property theory of musical works says that each musical work is a property that is instantiated by its occurrences, that is, the work's performances and playings. The property theory provides ontological explanations very similar to those given by its popular cousin, the type/token theory of musical works, but it is both simpler and stronger. However, type/token theorists often dismiss the property theory. In this essay, I formulate a version of the property theory that identifies each type (thus, each musical work) with a unique property. I then scrutinize the arguments offered for thinking that types, including musical works, are distinct from properties. I respond that no such argument is forceful and conclude that the property theory of musical works is superior to the type/token theory.     

CONSEQUENTIALISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: LESSONS FROM THE ALLAIS PARADOX

Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected as a principle of rational choice and that there are reasons to doubt its plausibility in the realm of moral theory. Moreover, this is a reason to doubt whether standard expected utility theory is a plausible theory of rational choice.     

Anomalous Evidence,Confidence Change,and Theory Change

A novel experimental paradigm that measured theory change and confidence in participants' theories was used in three experiments to test the effects of anomalous evidence. Experiment 1 varied the amount of anomalous evidence to see if “dose size” made incremental changes in confidence toward theory change. Experiment 2 varied whether anomalous evidence was convergent (of multiple types) or replicating (similar finding repeated). Experiment 3 varied whether participants were provided with an alternative theory that explained the anomalous evidence. All experiments showed that participants' confidence changes were commensurate with the amount of anomalous evidence presented, and that larger decreases in confidence predicted theory changes. Convergent evidence and the presentation of an alternative theory led to larger confidence change. Convergent evidence also caused more theory changes. Even when people do not change theories, factors pertinent to the evidence and alternative theories decrease their confidence in their current theory and move them incrementally closer to theory change.     

Philosophical Arguments Against the A‐Theory

According to the A‐theory of time some instant of time is absolutely present. Many reject the A‐theory on the grounds that it is inconsistent with current spacetime physics, which appears to leave no room for absolute presentness. However, some reject the A‐theory on purely philosophical grounds. In this article I describe three purely philosophical arguments against the A‐theory and show that there are plausible A‐theoretic responses to each of them. I conclude that, whatever else is wrong with the A‐theory, it is not obviously a philosophically suspect theory.