Cogency and the Validation of Induction

I.T. Oakley claims that the cogency of invalid, but cogent, arguments is context independent. Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow claim that the apparent cogency of any cogent, but invalid, argument is to be explained by the existence of a corresponding valid argument. I argue that both claims are incorrect and provide my own account of the cogency of arguments.     

Cogency in Motion: Critical Contextualism and Relevance

If arguments are to generate public knowledge, as in the sciences, then they must travel, finding acceptance across a range of local contexts. But not all good arguments travel, whereas some bad arguments do. Under what conditions may we regard the capacity of an argument to travel as a sign of its cogency or public merits? This question is especially interesting for a contextualist approach that wants to remain critically robust: if standards of cogency are bound to local contexts of evaluation, then how may arguments legitimately travel at all? The key to a contextualist conception of cogent travel, I argue, lies in the way local contexts are linked to broader contexts of evaluation by relations of relevance. The burden of the article is to elaborate the different forms these relations can take in the travel of scientific arguments.     

Cogency,Warrant Transmission‐Increase and non‐Ideal Thinkers

Contemporary debates concerning warrant transmission take for granted this thesis: when warrant transmission fails the argument fails. I challenge this thesis. An argument with conclusion C, addressed to subject S, can be cogent in the sense that recognition that the premises entail (or make highly likely) C can rationally foster in S the belief in C, without the warrant for C necessarily being gained (or reinforced) by such recognition. A key idea is to accept that some arguments should be understood in a way that involves the abandonment of two characteristic idealizations imposed on rational thinkers by Bayesian modelling.     

Truth and Context Change

Some dynamic semantic theories include an attempt to derive truth-conditional meaning from context change potential. This implies defining truth in terms of context change. Focusing on presuppositions and epistemic modals, this paper points out some problems with how this project has been carried out. It then suggests a way of overcoming these problems. This involves appealing to a richer notion of context than the one found in standard dynamic systems.     

Context Sensitivity and Chance

‘Chance’ is arguably a context-sensitive expression, a fact that some have thought bears upon the debate about the compatibility of determinism with objective, non-trivial chances (chances with values other than 0 or 1). In this paper, I argue that this attempted move from context sensitivity to compatibilism is misguided, for a number of reasons. First, it relies on a theory of context sensitivity that we have independent reason to reject. Second, the resulting compatibilist position leaves unanswered precisely the sorts of questions we reasonably expect a metaphysical account of chance to answer.     

In Context

‘In Context’ is aimed at giving contextualization its rightful place in the study of argumentation. First, Frans H. van Eemeren explains the crucial role of context in a reconstructive analysis of argumentative discourse. He distinguishes four levels of contextualization. Second, he situates his approach to context in the field of argumentation studies by comparing it with Walton’s approach. He emphasizes the importance of distinguishing clearly between a normatively motivated theoretical ideal model and empirically-based communicative activity types. Third, van Eemeren concentrates on the ‘macro-level’ of contextualization: contextualization in institutionalized communicative activity types. He makes clear that the macro-context of a communicative activity type can be characterized argumentatively by describing the disctinctive features of the empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion in the activity type concerned. Fourth, he points out what the consequences of the macrocontextualization of argumentative discourse in a certain communicative activity type are for the strategic maneuvering that may takes place and the identification of fallacies as derailments of strategic maneuvering. Fifth, van Eemeren draws some general conclusions regarding the role of contextualization in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse.     

后现代语境与马克思哲学总体性概念的再思考

随着后现代主义的扩散,总体性的哲学观念受到了根本性的否定,马克思哲学的总体性理论,作为现代性谱系的构成要素,也成为后现代批评的焦点。本文从资本逻辑的历史形态学出发,认为马克思哲学的总体性思想是他批判资本主义及其文化的理论基础,强调差异、非总体化的后现代主义,体现了资本在后组织化(弹性生产)资本主义社会的文化理念,这是不同于组织化资本主义社会总体性的另一种总体性,重思马克思哲学的总体性观念,才能更为真实地透视后组织化资本主义及其文化逻辑,这构成了马克思哲学当代理解的一个重要维度。     

Context Sensitivity and Indirect Reports

In this paper, I argue that Contextualist theories of semantics are not undermined by their purported failure to explain the practice of indirect reporting. I adopt Cappelen & Lepore’s test for context sensitivity to show that the scope of context sensitivity is much broader than Semantic Minimalists are willing to accept. The failure of their arguments turns on their insistence that the content of indirect reports is semantically minimal.     

Supervisory Experiences and Their Context

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -