Odd Couplets: CPE, Journaling, and Spiritual Poetry

It is argued that concepts of what is poetryand what is a journalare broader than might be considered and vital to the spirit of I AM in us. It begins with word derivations that shed light on conceptual connections that might otherwise be missed. Through the author's CPE experience, the I AM of what we do, write, and feel manifests: Creation connected to Creator as Co-Creator, explored through a wide variety of word-arts under five (5) themes: I AM, empty/full, birth/death, bridges, and the path of unknowing. Conclusion: We are I AM and I AM is us.     

Re:Views

Adventures in Therapy Part I: Actualizing Therapy: Foundations for a Scientific Ethic. Everett L. Shostrom, Lila Knapp, and Robert Knapp. Adventures in Therapy Part I: Handbook for the Personal Orientation Inventory. Robert Knapp. Adventures in Therapy Part I: Individual Psychology in Counseling and Education, Parts I and II , (Distinguished Contributors to Psychology series). Adventures in Therapy Part I: Psychotherapy: The Hazardous Cure. Dorothy Tennov. Adventures in Therapy Part I: R. D. Laing: The Man and His Ideas. Richard I. Evans. Adventures in Therapy Part I: Four Psychologies Applied to Education: Freudian, Behavioral, Humanistic, Transpersonal. Thomas B. Roberts, Editor. Adventures in Therapy Part I: A Complete Guide to Therapy From Psychoanalysis to Behavior Modification. Joel Kovel. Adventures in Therapy Part I: Evaluation of Psychological Therapies—Psychotherapies, Behavior Therapies, Drug Therapies and Their Interactions. Robert L. Spitzer & Donald F. Klein, Editors. Adventures in Therapy Part I: Primer for the Nonmedical Psychotherapist. Joyce A. Bockar. Adventures in Therapy Part I: Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders. Aaron T. Beck. Adventures in Therapy Part I: Biofeedback Applications in Counseling and Education. David G. Danskin and Timothy J. Lowenstein.     

CAN I KILL MY YOUNGER SELF? TIME TRAVEL AND THE RETROSUICIDE PARADOX

If (backward) time travel is possible, presumably so is my shooting my younger self (YS); then apparently I can kill him – I can commit retrosuicide. But if I were to kill him I would not exist to shoot him, so how can I kill him? The standard solution to this paradox understands ability as compossibility with the relevant facts and points to an equivocation about which facts are relevant: my killing YS is compossible with his proximity but not with his survival, so I can kill him if facts like his survival are irrelevant but I cannot if they are relevant. I identify a lacuna in this solution, namely its reliance without argument on the hidden assumption that my killing YS is possible: if it is impossible, it is not compossible with anything. I argue that this lacuna is important, and I sketch a different solution to the paradox.     

Making sense of the study of spirituality: late modernity on trial

ABSTRACT

In this article I offer a meta-theoretical mapping of spirituality studies and its many controversies. I begin by distinguishing between two projects that together constitute the field: the study for and the study of spirituality. I argue a good deal of the confusion surrounding ‘spirituality’ is the result of scholars failing to make this distinction. Next, I outline the few areas of agreement within the study of spirituality in order to illuminate what I consider the issue that defines the field: the merits and shortcomings of late modernity. By late modernity I mean the current era, whose origins can be traced roughly to the 1960s. I then offer a meta-theoretical analysis of the social-cum-political theoretical frameworks commonly used to study spirituality, delineating them according to their assessments of the contemporary epoch. I contend this is a useful and much-needed means of dispelling some of the fuzziness that characterizes the field.     

Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership

abstract    Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to 'critical life choices'. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein's recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.     

Practical Moore Sentences*

I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don't know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I suggest that this infelicity points to a striking psychological fact, with potentially broad ramifications concerning the structure of norms of speech acts: namely, when giving an order, we must act as if we believe we will be obeyed.     

WHY I BELIEVE IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD

Abstract: I claim in this article that if my experience is such that it seems to me that there is an external object before me, then I have reason to believe that there is an external object before me. The sceptic argues that since my having the experience is compatible both with there being and with there not being an external object before me, I have no reason to believe that the former possibility obtains and not the latter. I respond that the sceptic has ignored a relevant difference between the two possibilities: I can make sense of the former possibility but not of the latter. I examine two broad categories of sceptical possibilities (dreams and hallucinations), explain why I cannot make sense of them, and explain why my inability to make sense of them gives me reason to believe they do not obtain.     

The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive.     

Centered assertion

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities.     

Intentionality and Self-Awareness

In this essay I defend both the individual plausibility and conjoint consistency of two theses. One is the Intentionality Thesis: that all mental states are intentional (object‐directed, exhibit ‘aboutness’). The other is the Self‐Awareness Thesis: that if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object. I begin by arguing for the individual prima facie plausibility of both theses. I then go on to consider a regress argument to the effect that the two theses are incompatible. I discuss three responses to that argument, and defend one of them.     

MUSIC AND METAPHYSICS

Abstract: In this article, I assume that musical works are abstract types, and I raise and address a new question concerning musical ontology that may take the types view at least a step further: When do musical works cease to exist? I then propound my view about musical works as types, which is somewhat like the Aristotelian Realist position concerning universals. Next, I address some objections to that view. Finally, I provide some grounds for rejecting alternative views that see Western classical musical works before 1950 (the sorts of musical works the discussion here is restricted to) either as classes or else as kinds.     

CONCEIVABILITY AND MODAL KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that “it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled” by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real value of the maxim: it does help us, in certain cases, reliably to make up our minds. Along the way I show that Reid, his criticism of the maxim notwithstanding, actually employs it, and I furthermore argue that the principle What is inconceivable, is impossible is spurious.     

Working psychodynamically and psychosocially with women who have been raped

In this paper, I analyse aspects of the experience of some female University students who have been raped drawing on a Kleinian psychoanalytic perspective and Layton’s concept of ‘normative unconscious processes’. I suggest that Klein’s writing provides a theoretical basis for thinking about the projective and introjective processes that may be at play between perpetrator and ‘victim’. Here, I focus upon Kleinian conceptualisations of castration anxiety, fragmentation, envy, greed and guilt. In terms of ‘normative unconscious processes’, I explore how castration anxiety (in a more symbolic sense of powerlessness), fragmentation, envy, greed and guilt may also operate within social discourses around sexual violence. Specifically, I draw upon Freyd’s concept of DARVO and Payne’s Rape Myth Acceptance Scale which both explain ‘victim blaming’ in terms of the social reversal of the positions of perpetrator and ‘victim’. I illustrate this social process with reference to representations of rape within the mainstream media. My hypothesis is that, although the ‘psychic’ and the ‘social’ are two contrasting positions theoretically, it is possible to draw on both of them to make sense of the experience of working with rape clinically.

The clinical context of this paper is my work as a psychodynamic counsellor at a modern London-based University. I draw on composite case studies of women who have been raped, drawing on both ‘psychic’ and ‘social’ perspectives. I seek to explore how the ‘psychic’ and the ‘social’ can be integrated in different ways depending upon the clinical situation. I suggest that they can be mutually enriching ways of working. Through approaching how the ‘psychic’ and the ‘social’ might interrelate from a clinical viewpoint, I conclude that the idea of ‘working psychosocially’ is of most use when approached as a flexible concept that different clinicians may draw on in different ways with different patients.     

Levinasian Reflections on Somaticity and the Ethical Self

In this article, I attempt to bring some conceptual clarity to several key terms and foundational claims that make up Levinas's body‐based conception of ethics. Additionally, I explore ways that Levinas's arguments about the somatic basis of subjectivity and ethical relatedness receive support from recent empirical research. The paper proceeds in this way: First, I clarify Levinas's use of the terms “sensibility”, “subjectivity”, and “proximity” in Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence. Next, I argue for an interpretation of Levinas's thought that I suggest is buttressed by recent experimental work in both developmental psychology and neuroscience. I provide examples of research that I suggest opens up Levinas's phenomenological analysis in new and interesting ways. I also urge the importance of Levinas's phenomenological analysis in contextualizing the ethical significance of these empirical findings.     

Kant's Argument that Existence is not a Determination

In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non‐existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant's target is not merely ontological arguments as such but the larger ‘ontotheist’ metaphysics they presuppose: the view that God necessarily exists in virtue of his essence being contained in, or logically entailed by, his essence. I show that the ontotheist explanation of divine necessity requires the assumption that existence is a determination, and I show that Descartes and Leibniz are implicitly committed to this in their published versions of the ontological argument. I consider the philosophical motivations for the claim that existence is a determination and then I examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason against it.     

The Bureaucratization of Spirituality[1]

This paper examines some of the critical contexts within which spiritual, moral, social and cultural education is to be realized. First, I examine the nature of school as a modernist bureaucratic institution. I argue that schools are bound in a self‐referential reality and barely connect with the late modem world. I then discuss the cultural sources of education policy and particularly the employment of nostalgia as a legitimation for neo‐conservative policy and practice. I then discuss school knowledge and in particular the end of liberalism and its replacement with rationalism. I next turn to spiritual, moral and social education and critically discuss its cultural and political formation. Finally, I argue that school is unable to accommodate the spiritual dimension and that critical to its successful inclusion is the re‐establishment of teachers as knowledgeable professionals with their practice grounded in the contemporary world and the real conditions of pupils' lives.

     

Action‐oriented Perception

Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch‐able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q‐able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q‐able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually.     

Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions

I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’ operation as univocal in a line of reasoning. I will argue that the exercise of this reasoning competence constitutes certain inferential presuppositions. More specifically, I outline a conception of an inferential presupposition as a non-attitudinal but genuinely psychological and rationally committing relation that holds between a reasoner and a proposition. Thus, inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from tacit or standing attitudes that function as premise-beliefs in reasoning. Likewise inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from other kinds of presuppositions. In conclusion, I note some features of inferential presuppositions that bear on the epistemology of inference.     

On Prayer in Anglican Systematic Theology

For an ecclesial tradition that does not have a particularly strong history of systematic theology, it is curious that several of those currently engaged in the production of large‐scale, multi‐volume projects of systematic theology are Anglican theologians. In this article, I investigate three such projects: Sarah Coakley’s God, Sexuality and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’, Graham Ward’s How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I, and Katherine Sonderegger’s Systematic Theology – Vol. 1: The Doctrine of God. In the first section, I examine these examples of systematic theology in light of Stephen Sykes’s analysis of the state of the discipline in Anglican theology. Then, in the second section, I identify a common characteristic shared by Coakley, Ward, and Sonderegger: the grounding of systematic theology in the practice of prayer. I argue that although these contemporary systematicians might not see themselves as enunciating an Anglican systematics, the systematic seriousness they accord to matters of prayer can be interpreted as articulations of the Anglican propensity to grant theological priority to the liturgy. In the final section, I suggest that for all the theological opportunities made available by the systematic reclamation of prayer, these invariably positive embraces of prayer leave little space for what might be called the Schattenseite of prayer. There is a ‘shadow‐side’ to the history and practice of prayer that I argue needs to be appropriately theorized if the category of prayer is to have a future in the discipline of systematic theology.     

Empire,Eschatology and Stolen Land

Abstract : In this article I propose that empire be countered by a revised understanding of eschatology. I first explore the idea of an eschatology of space, wherein the notion of eschatos as limit is advanced. I then revisit a temporal understanding of eschatology illumining the theme of the pause, or rest. This Sabbath theme, in concert with attentiveness to space, is then brought to bear upon the primal North American experience of empire: the expropriation of aboriginal lands.