Taking Merleau-Ponty Literally: Reply to Dermot Moran

For most people, pronouns are just a matter for linguists. In linguistics, pronouns are classified according to the various linguistic functions they perform: for instance, deictic or anaphoric, definite or indefinite, personal or demonstrative, etc. But a closer look at the issue reveals that pronouns have a great deal to do with philosophy as well. This paper presents a brief sketch of some classical philosophical problems to show how dealing with pronouns has played a part in the formulation and advancement of important philosophical issues including spatial orientation, dialectics, cognition, existential experiences, social relationships, the philosophy of rights, and so forth.

For Elmar Holenstein on his Seventieth Birthday     

From Destruktion to Deconstruction: A Response to Moran

Abstract

As a response to Moran’s (1994) recommendation that Heidegger’s Destruktion be extensively elaborated and critiqued, this paper suggests a way in which Heidegger’s thinking can be more clearly understood as a search for how better to ‘say’ the destruction. By briefly tracing how Heidegger’s thinking on the Destruktion repeatedly turns against itself throughout his writings, it is demonstrated that Heidegger does indeed revise the notion by abandoning the term in his later writing; to replace it first with the concept of ‘overcoming’, and subsequently with the notion of Verwindung. This self-critical reworking of the Destruktion is evident in his turning towards these concepts; which is taken up by Derrida’s deconstruction in its simultaneous turning towards and away from Heidegger’s Destruktion.     

On derived embodiment: a response to Collins

In derived embodiment, intangible phenomena become as-if tangible as a result of their almost promiscuous borrowing of corporeality from experiences of real objects.     

Ethics and Selfhood: A Reply to Dermot Moran and John Drummond 1

Situating the Self By Seyla Benhabib Polity Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 266. ISBN 0–7456–1059–5. £11.95 pbk.

A Descartes Dictionary By John Cottingham Basil Blackwell, 1993. Pp. 187. ISBN 0–631–18538–0. £12.99 pbk.

A reply to Baker and Morris By John Cottingham

Truth and Objectivity By Crispin Wright Harvard University Press, 1992. Pp. x + 247. ISBN 0–674–91086–9. £19.95.     

On Judaism and genes: a response to Paul Root Wolpe

The following comments on Paul Root Wolpe's article "If I Am Only My Genes, What Am I? Genetic Essentialism and a Jewish Response" address (1) his presentation of the relationship between science and culture or religion as unimodal; (2) his misconception of the Jewish view of the physical corpus; and (3) his essential question of genetic determinism by examining the traditional Jewish view of the spiritual aspects of the human.     

On Hare's attempt to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap: A response to Forschler's rejoinder

In a paper in this journal (Wall 2016), the author of the present paper critiqued Scott Forschler's attempt (2013) to establish that Jens Timmermann's argument (2005) against R. M. Hare's attempt (1981) to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap is unsuccessful. Forschler's thesis is that Hare's utilitarianism is strictly normative, not metaethical. In Hare's ethical rationalism, which is metaethical but contains no intrinsic ends (Forschler 2013), reason determines the proper ends, and preference satisfaction has no value prior to reason's determinations (Forschler 2013). The present author responded that Hare's moral approach presupposes that preference satisfaction is the ultimate end (Wall 2016) and that an analysis of preference satisfaction in Hare's moral approach cannot be confined to normative ethics. Forschler's rejoinder (2017) suggests that Hare's moral theory was misinterpreted by the author, who now shows that such a judgment results from significant oversights concerning the foundation of Hare's moral theory and utilitarian foundations.     

On objectivity and subjectivity in statistical inference: A response to Mayo

In this paper we respond to the article An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing by D. G. Mayo (1983). We argue that the theory of testing developed by Mayo, NPT*, is neither novel nor objective. We also respond to the claims made by Mayo against Bayesian theory.