共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Carl E. Paternite 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2003,31(1):121-121
Call for Papers
Call for Papers 相似文献2.
Call for Papers
Call for Papers 相似文献3.
Daniel P. Sulmasy 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》1999,20(6):597-597
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Vincent Colapietro Torjus Midtgarden Torill Strand 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2003,22(6):415-415
Call for Papers
Call for papers: Peirce and Education: The Conflicting Processes of Learning and Discovery 相似文献10.
M. Vickers 《Psychometrika》2007,72(4):671-671
Treasurer's Report
REPORT OF THE TREASURER OF THE PSYCHOMETRIC SOCIETY 8/15/2007 相似文献11.
Janice G. Edwards 《Journal of genetic counseling》2004,13(2):177-177
Call for Papers
Announcement 相似文献12.
John H. Krantz 《Memory & cognition》2002,30(1):166-166
Notices and Announcements
SCiP 2002 Call for Papers 相似文献13.
Notices and Announcements
Call for papers electronic archiving: Norms, stimuli, and data a special issue ofBehavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 相似文献14.
Rafael Aleixandre-Benavent Gregorio González-Alcaide Alberto Miguel-Dasit Carolina Navarro-Molina Juan Carlos Valderrama-Zurián 《Cognitive processing》2006,7(1):65-65
Call for Papers
Third International Conference on Spatial Cognition: “Dynamics in Spatial Interactions”. Rome - Perugia, Italy: September 12th–15th 2006. www.icsc2006.org - committee@icsc2006.org 相似文献15.
Ben Bradley 《Philosophical Studies》2002,107(1):23-44
Accoding to G.E. Moore, something's intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something's intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView. 相似文献
16.
Noel Balzer 《The Journal of value inquiry》1990,24(4):253-268
The principles that AN INSTANCE OF A CLASS IS THE CLASS and A CLASS IS AN INSTANCE OF ITSELF allow for the so called LAWS OF THOUGHT
and allow us to adopt a bivalent system. Everything essential for primary logic is provided. 相似文献
1. | IDENTITY - WHAT IS, IS. |
2. | CONTRADICTION - NOTHING BOTH IS and IS NOT. |
3. | EXCLUDED MIDDLE - EVERYTHING IS or IS NOT. |
17.
Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others’ moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due to Alison Hills, uses pessimism about the former to argue for steadfastness about the latter. This paper reveals that this line of thinking, and others like it, are unsuccessful. There is no way to argue from a compelling version of pessimism about moral deference to the conclusion of steadfastness about moral disagreement. The most plausible versions of pessimism about moral deference have only very limited implications for moral disagreement. 相似文献
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Taylor W. Cyr 《Philosophical Studies》2017,174(12):3153-3161
This paper presents a new challenge to the thesis that moral responsibility for an omission requires the ability to do the omitted action, whereas moral responsibility for an action does not require the ability to do otherwise than that action. Call this the asymmetry thesis. The challenge arises from the possibility of cases in which an omission is identical to an action. In certain of such cases, the asymmetry thesis leads to a contradiction. The challenge is then extended to recent variations of the asymmetry thesis defended by John Martin Fischer and Carolina Sartorio. Finally, a possible objection to the challenge is addressed. 相似文献
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Timothy Pawl 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):539-550
Call the thesis that, possibly, there are two times, t1 and t2, such that everything that exists at t2 also exists at t1, but some things that exist at t1 do not exist at t2 Temporal Change. Call the thesis that, possibly, there are two worlds, w and v, such that everything that exists at v also exists at w, but some things that exist at w do not exist at v Modal Difference. I argue that if either Temporal Change or Modal Difference is true, then Orthodox Truthmaker Theory—the theory that every truth requires a necessitating truthmaker—is false. 相似文献
20.
Lenny R. Vartanian Christopher M. WhartonErica B. Green 《Psychology of sport and exercise》2012,13(3):251-256