Imaginative resistance as imagistic resistance

When we are invited to imagine an unacceptable moral proposition to be true in fiction, we feel resistance when we try to imagine it. Despite this, it is nonetheless possible to suppose that the proposition is true. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of imaginative resistance are unable to explain why only attempts to imagine (rather than to suppose) the truth of moral propositions cause resistance. My suggestion is that imagination, unlike supposition, involves mental imagery and imaginative resistance arises when imagery that one has formed does not match unacceptable propositions.     

The Self as Social Construction

The paper begins with the articulation of key assumptions central to contemporary constructionist scholarship. This is followed by an analysis of the issues in the social construction of the self. To this end several major lines of inquiry along with their socio-political implications are brought into focus. Finally, an alternative to traditional conceptions of self, one that emerges distinctly from social constructionist theory is presented.     

Imaginative Transportation

Actors, undercover investigators, and readers of fiction sometimes report ‘losing themselves’ in the characters they imitate or read about. They speak of ‘taking on’ or ‘assuming’ the beliefs, thoughts, and feelings of someone else. I offer an account of this strange but familiar phenomenon—what I call imaginative transportation.     

Imaginative Attitudes

The point of this paper is to reveal a dogma in the ordinary conception of sensory imagination, and to suggest another way forward. The dogma springs from two main sources: a too close comparison of mental imagery to perceptual experience, and a too strong division between mental imagery and the traditional propositional attitudes (such as belief and desire). The result is an unworkable conception of the correctness conditions of sensory imaginings—one lacking any link between the conditions under which an imagining aids human action and inference and the conditions under which it is veridical. The proposed solution is, first, to posit a variety of imaginative attitudes—akin to the traditional propositional attitudes—which have different associated correctness (or satisfaction) conditions. The second part of the solution is to allow for imaginings with “hybrid” contents, in the sense that both mental images and representations with language‐like constituent structure contribute to the content of imaginings.     

Anticipating the Self: Toward a Personal Construct Model of Emotion

Previous accounts of the role of emotion in construct theory place insufficient emphasis on the constructive role of emotion as a “feeling toward.” Emotion is regarded either as an epiphenomenon of acts of construal or as an outcome of prior cognitive processes. It is argued in this paper that emotion performs an anticipatory role in pursuit of the current concerns of the self, a view that follows from a closer analysis of the function of anticipation. A revision of the control systems theory of Carver and Scheier (1981) is proposed, in which emotional anticipation at the level of the self is distinguished from schema-based anticipation at the level of behavior. Given the framework of personal construct theory as a method of analysis, this revised view of emotion enables a range of self-concept processes to be better understood.     

Gender Differences in the Construct Validity of the Silencing the Self Scale

Gender differences in the construct validity of Jack's (1991) Silencing the Self Scale (STSS) were assessed using 187 female and 169 male undergraduates. Results of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses revealed gender differences in the scale's latent structure and at best provided only limited support for the validity of the scale's four subscales for women. Among men, the studies exposed a weakness in the scale's construct validity and provided insights into possible alternative interpretations made by men when responding to the scale's items. Convergent and discriminant validity of the scale were assessed by correlating it with measures of neuroticism and attachment. Whereas the construct validity of the STSS for use with women was supported, evidence was weaker for men. For men, data suggest that the STSS, in part, taps a motive to avoid intimacy and relationship situations that limit one's sense of independence and autonomy, a construct incongruous with Jack's notion of self-silencing.     

Self as the feminine principle

In analytical psychology, ego is associated with consciousness and the masculine principle. Although die feminine principle generally characterizes the unconscious, it was not assigned a psychic structure equivalent to the ego. This paper proposes a model of the psyche where self and ego are the major modes of psychic experience. The self as the 'being' mode represents the feminine principle and functions according to primary process; the ego represents 'doing', the masculine principle and secondary process. Feminine and masculine principles are considered to be of equal significance in both men and women and are not limited to gender.
Jung's concept of the self is related to the Hindu metaphysical concepts of Atman and Brahman, whose source was the older Aryan nature-oriented, pagan religion. The prominence of self in analytical psychology and its predominantly 'feminine' symbolism can be understood as Jung's reaction to the psychoanalytic emphasis on ego and to Freud's 'patriarchal' orientation. In Kabbalah, a similar development took place when the feminine principle of the Shekinah emerged in a central, redemptive role, as a mythic compensation to the overtly patriarchal Judaic religion.
In the proposed model of the psyche neither ego nor self represents the psychic totality. The interplay of both psychic modes/principles constitutes the psyche and the individuation process.     

Quantified Self as Epistemological Anarchism

Philosophia - The phenomenon of the quantified self, which is especially addressed by sociology and medical humanities, is still quite disregarded by philosophy. Yet, the philosophical issues it...     

Characterizing the Imaginative Attitude

Abstract

Three thoughts strongly influence recent work on sensory imagination, often without explicit articulation. The image thought says that all mental states involving a mental image are imaginative. The attitude thought says that, if there is a distinctive imaginative attitude, it is a single, monolithic attitude. The function thought says that the functions of sensory imagination are identical or akin to functions of other mental states such as judgment or belief. Taken together, these thoughts create a theoretical context within which eliminativism appears attractive. Eliminativism is the idea that we need not refer to a distinctive attitude in order to characterize sensory imagination: the attitudes involved in other states provide all the resources we need. Peter Langland-Hassan’s account of sensory imagination provides an example of such eliminativism. Via close examination of this account, I make manifest the three thoughts and their collective tendency to support eliminativism. I argue that all three are dubious, and that we should reject eliminativism; we need a distinctive imaginative attitude if we are to adequately explicate sensory imagination.     

Imaginative Suggestibility and Hypnotizability

More than a half-century of research aimed at identifying the predictors of hypnotic responding has been described as investigations of 'hypnotizability'. Most of that research, however, has disregarded the well-established findings that (a) people respond to suggestion without being hypnotized almost as much as they do following a hypnotic induction, and (b) nonhypnotic and hypnotic suggestibility are highly correlated. More recent studies have provided the first empirical data on predictors of individual differences in response to the induction of hypnosis. These studies indicate that individual differences in hypnotic suggestibility can be accounted for completely by nonhypnotic suggestibility, expectancy, motivation, and reaction time. Because the amount of variance accounted for is as great as the reliability of the hypnotic-suggestibility scale, and because nonhypnotic suggestibility has been controlled, no additional variables are necessary to account for hypnotic suggestibility.     

Imaginative resistance without conflict

I examine a range of popular solutions to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. According to each solution in this range, imaginative resistance occurs only when we are asked to imagine something that conflicts with what we believe. I show that imaginative resistance can occur without this sort of conflict, and so that every solution in the range under consideration fails. I end by suggesting a new explanation for imaginative resistance??the Import Solution??which succeeds where the other solutions considered fail.     

An interview with LA Universal Self

LA Universal Self reports his phenomenology, according to which, as he puts it, ‘I am the universe’. The Interviewer challenges the report in a variety of ways, and LA Universal Self responds to each challenge. A traditional Universal Self mysticism is given a new physicalist interpretation.     

自我记忆的"错误"和"歪曲"

人们关于自我的记忆经常会发生“错误”和“歪曲”,造成这种状况的原因有三：其一是“压抑”,其二是“肯定性的错觉”,其三是“个体历史建构和保持”。它们是人们进行心理防卫的方式,其目的是使自我保持一种积极的、具有一致性和稳定性的状态。     

Self as Cultural Product: An Examination of East Asian and North American Selves

In the past decade a wealth of research has been conducted on the cultural foundation of the self-concept, particularly with respect to East Asian and North American selves. The present paper discusses how the self differs across these two cultural contexts, particularly with respect to an emphasis on consistency versus flexibility, an intraindividual versus an extraindividual focus, the malleability of the self versus world, the relation of self to others, and self-enhancing versus self-critical motivations. These differences reveal the manifold ways that culture shapes the self.