What Was Not Discussed: Reply to Comments

Here I respond to comments and questions raised in commentary papers (Castro and Lafuente, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007; Charles, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007; Woodward and Hetley, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007) and address three issues not discussed on my previous paper: (1) the historiography used in the history of Japanese psychology, (2) the first generation of Japanese women psychologists to flesh out the history of psychology in Japan, and (3) how applied psychology and psychical research existed in the early phase of psychology in Japan. Consequently, this paper, together with the previous one, provides a broader picture of the development of psychology in Japan.

Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis

Philosophia - I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT). In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship...     

On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson

Howson's critique of my essay on Hume's problem of induction levels two main charges. First, Howson claims that I have attributed to him an error that he never made, and in fact which he warned against in the very text that I cite. Secondly, Howson argues that my proposed solution to Hume's problem is flawed on technical and philosophical grounds. In response to the first charge, I explain how Howson's text justifies attributing to him the claim that the principle of induction is shown to be inconsistent by Goodman's riddle. In regards to the second, I show that Howson's objections rest on misunderstandings of formal learning theory and on conflating the problem of induction with the problem of unconceived alternatives.     

Too Naturalist and Not Naturalist Enough: Reply to Horsten

Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC.

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To See or Not to See: Blinded by Guilt: Reply to Commentary

In response to Annabella Bushra's discussion and her focus on what is missing in the clinical material, the author speculates about the repetition of the historical trauma of purifying mixed race in the face of its complexity—trying to neatly package race despite it not so neatly fitting into any one category—and losing the individual by overly focusing on skin color. The author considers the silence, secrecy, and transgression in the treatment and, in this context, a few of Bushra's key points are addressed—sorting out the nature of hate in relation to Susan, passing as transgression, and White guilt. A distinction is made between a malevolent, destructive hate and a loving hate, and White guilt is considered as a defense against recognition of the other.     

On Not Quite Taking Up the Gauntlet: Reply to Adam Phillips

Muriel Dimen replies to Adam Phillips’s interest in her understanding of psychoanalysis. She focuses on psychoanalysis—its method, thought, and practice—as all interminable, as process, as becoming.     

Sorites Is No Threat to Modus Ponens: A Reply to Kochan

A recent article by Jeff Kochan contains a discussion of modus ponens that among other thing alleges that the paradox of the heap is a counterexample to it. In this note I show that it is the conditional major premise of a modus ponens inference, rather than the rule itself, that is impugned. This premise is the contrapositive of the inductive step in the principle of mathematical induction, confirming the widely accepted view that it is the vagueness of natural language predicates, not modus ponens, that is challenged by Sorites.     

Reclaiming Desire: Love Is Not Enough

How may desire be disrupted in a person's life and how may it be reclaimed in treatment? To what degree are the dynamics of therapeutic action predicated on the relational aspects of treatment versus time-honored understandings of the reconfiguration of dynamic forces within the psyche? These questions are considered in the context of a discussion of a detailed clinical case. The paper suggests that although much may be gained in the love and the “new outcome” experienced in treatment, an essential function of interpretation is to enable desire to be reclaimed from entrapment in relational demands and obligations from the past and within the treatment relationship. In this manner, analytic treatment mirrors a developmental a trajectory that begins in complex relational exchanges, but from which emerges—in the best of circumstances—an individual whose possession of his or her own mind and desire has derived from, and yet is independent of, the specific relational foundations in which desire was shaped.     

Knowledge Is Not Enough

Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science.     

Knowing Is Not Enough

I consider the rule of assertion according to which knowledge is sufficient for epistemically proper assertion. I examine a counterexample to this rule recently proposed by Jennifer Lackey. I present three responses to this counterexample. The first two, I argue, highlight some flaws in the counterexample. But the third response fails. The lessons I draw from examining these three responses allow me to propose two counterexamples to the sufficiency rule that are similar to Lackey’s but avoid its problems.     

Critical Psychology: What It Is and What It Is Not

Critical psychology alerts us to the limitations of mainstream research in the discipline, and it promises to put 'social' issues on the agenda in the whole of psychology. A starting point of the stance of critical psychological research is that the claims that psychologists make about human beings often seem to vanish almost as quickly as they are discovered. People, a group or culture do not behave or think like the model would predict, and, more importantly, we find that our awareness, our reflection on a process described by a psychologist changes that process. It is in the nature of human nature to change, to change as different linguistic resources, social practices, and representations of the self become available, and for human nature to change itself as people reflect on who they are and who they may become. That means that any attempt to fix us in place must fail. But it will only fail in such a way that something productive emerges from it if we do something different, and one place to do something different is in psychology. We need to step back and look at the images of the self, mind and behaviour that psychologists have produced, the types of practices they engage in, and the power those practices, those 'technologies of the self' have to set limits on change. When we appreciate this, we can start to look at what psychologists might do instead as part of a genuinely critical approach.     

When Psychotherapy Is Not Working: Ethical Considerations

Evidence-based practice (EBP) models have been developed, in part, to enhance the likelihood that the outcome of health care treatment, including psychotherapy, leads to positive improvement. However, two additional outcomes can occur: no change and poor outcome (e.g., harm, worsening of symptoms). What does the clinician do when psychotherapy is not working? When faced with various treatment decisions, such as this, the EBP model posits that therapists should apply their clinical expertise in considering the “best available research” within the context of various patient characteristics. In part because of various limitations of this approach, I suggest that another important set of principles are important to consider in tandem when faced with this clinical dilemma—that is, ethical concerns. Borrowing from the American Psychological Association’s (2017a) Ethics Code, I discuss how the following issues exist when clinicians wrestle with this question: avoidance of harm, competence, conflicts of interest, and informed consent. I conclude this paper with a list of suggestions that can potentially foster the application of ethical principles when making treatment decisions.