THE PERSONAL IS PHILOSOPHICAL IS POLITICAL: A PHILOSOPHER AND MOTHER OF A COGNITIVELY DISABLED PERSON SENDS NOTES FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

Abstract: Having encountered landmines in offering a critique of philosophy based on my experience as the mother of a cognitively disabled daughter, I ask, "Should I continue?" I defend the idea that pursuing this project is of a piece with the invisible care labor that is done by people with disabilities and their families. The value of attempting to influence philosophical conceptions of cognitive disability by virtue of this experience is justified by an inextricable relationship between the personal, the political, and the philosophical. If one grants that the "special relationship" between mother and child requires moral recognition, then I need first to make vivid the case that this relationship in the case of a child who lacks some "normal capacities" is indistinguishable from any mother-child relationship. If this is so, then I believe I can make a case that has as its conclusion that the moral personhood of even the severely cognitively disabled must be granted. Moreover, such recognition, I argue, necessitates the recognition of others who bear no special relationships to the child.     

DUTIES OF JUSTICE TO CITIZENS WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES

Abstract: Many social practices treat citizens with cognitive disabilities differently from their nondisabled peers. Does John Rawls's theory of justice imply that we have different duties of justice to citizens whenever they are labeled with cognitive disabilities? Some theorists have claimed that the needs of the cognitively disabled do not raise issues of justice for Rawls. I claim that it is premature to reject Rawlsian contractualism. Rawlsians should regard all citizens as moral persons provided they have the potential for developing the two moral powers. I claim that every citizen requires specific Enabling Conditions to develop and exercise the two moral powers. Structuring basic social institutions to deny some citizens the Enabling Conditions is unjust because it blocks their developmental pathways toward becoming fully cooperating members of society. Hence, we have a duty of justice to provide citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities with the Enabling Conditions they require until they become fully cooperating members of society.     

Institutional Review Board Issues Related to Special Populations

The present article begins with an introduction to the role of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in research activities in general and proceeds to issues IRBs face with relation to special populations, including children and terminally ill individuals, as well as developmentally disabled and cognitively impaired persons. A historical overview of research with these special populations is included, and the report concludes with a real-world example of how IRB-related issues with developmentally disabled and cognitively impaired individuals are discussed and resolved.     

When left is "right". Motor fluency shapes abstract concepts

Right- and left-handers implicitly associate positive ideas like "goodness" and "honesty" more strongly with their dominant side of space, the side on which they can act more fluently, and negative ideas more strongly with their nondominant side. Here we show that right-handers' tendency to associate "good" with "right" and "bad" with "left" can be reversed as a result of both long- and short-term changes in motor fluency. Among patients who were right-handed prior to unilateral stroke, those with disabled left hands associated "good" with "right," but those with disabled right hands associated "good" with "left," as natural left-handers do. A similar pattern was found in healthy right-handers whose right or left hand was temporarily handicapped in the laboratory. Even a few minutes of acting more fluently with the left hand can change right-handers' implicit associations between space and emotional valence, causing a reversal of their usual judgments. Motor experience plays a causal role in shaping abstract thought.     

But for the Grace of God: Abortion and Cognitive Disability,Luck and Moral Status

Many theories of moral status that are intended to ground pro-choice views on abortion tie full moral status to advanced cognitive capabilities. Extant accounts of this kind are inconsistent with the intuition that the profoundly cognitively disabled have full moral status. This paper improves upon these extant accounts by combining an anti-luck condition with Steinbock’s stratification of moral status into two levels. On the resulting view, a being has full moral status if and only if (1) she has moral status and (2) (a) has had advanced cognitive capacities, (b) has the potential to develop such capacities, or (c) would have had such capacities were it not for luck. I argue that modal accounts of luck provide a non-speciesist basis for attributing the lack of advanced cognitive capacities in humans to luck without doing the same for non-human animals.     

人际目标认知三视角模型

人际关系对自我管理有着重要的意义。关系对象会影响个体的目标设置和目标追求,个体在日常生活中所追求的目标也会影响其人际关系的进程。Fitzsimons等人提出了人际目标认知三视角模型,强调目标在自我和他人关系中的重要作用。模型主要介绍了目标与重要他人之间的双向复杂关系,并对影响二者关系的调节变量进行了分析。未来研究应该在深入探讨重要他人与目标之间关系的基础上扩大人际关系对象的范围,考察一般他人与目标的关系及其心理机制。     

Integrating justice and care in animal ethics

In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal ethics presents us with a false dilemma. We should take justice's focus on reasoning from principles, and care's use of sympathetic awareness, as two integrated deliberative capacities necessary for the consideration of arguments for extending moral concern to animals. Such an integrated approach rests on a plausible account of the psychology of moral deliberation. I develop my argument as follows. Section I summarizes the nature of the debate between justice and care approaches to animal ethics, focusing on Brian Luke's arguments against justice approaches. Section II provides pro-justice rebuttals to Luke's objections. These rebuttals, while largely successful against Luke's objections, do not account for the intuition that sympathy does play a central epistemological role in animal ethics. Section III explains how sympathy cognitively simulates the perspective of the other, and thus can play an epistemological role in animal ethics. I argue that the abilities to simulate the perspective of the other and to reason from moral principles can complement each other. In section IV, I argue that though it may not be desirable to use both sympathy and reasoning from principles in all moral deliberation, it is a desirable aim when offering, and considering, moral arguments for what I will term the "extensionist project" of extending over moral concern to animals. I make this idea plausible by elucidating the claim that arguments for this project are best thought of as second-order deliberations about our first-order deliberative life.     

Intrinsic Motivation,Organizational Justice,and Creativity

For employees to generate creative ideas that are not only original, but also useful to their company, they must interact with their workplace environment to determine organizational needs. Therefore, it is important to consider aspects of the individual as well as their environment when studying creativity. Intrinsic motivation, a predictor of individual level creativity, is associated with feelings of enjoyment and interest in the task at hand. To the extent that tasks are nested in an environment, intrinsically motivated individuals may perceive their environment more favorably than individuals who are not interested in the task. Specifically, such individuals may view the rewards (i.e., distributive justice), decision-making procedures (i.e., procedural justice), and their interpersonal treatment (i.e., interpersonal justice) in their work environment as more fair, due to the positive affect associated with intrinsic motivation. This study examines the relationships between intrinsic motivation, perceptions of organizational fairness, and creativity. Participants (n = 133) worked on a task in a laboratory setting and completed measures of intrinsic motivation and organizational justice. Findings were supportive that intrinsically motivated participants viewed their environment as fairer than participants that were uninterested in the task. Consequently, distributive and interpersonal justice were shown to significantly mediate the relationship between intrinsic motivation and creativity. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Resilience: A Disability Studies and Community Psychology Approach

This paper contests traditional psychological understandings of resilience through reference to a research project exploring resilience in the lives of disabled people. The paper briefly historically locates individualistic accounts of resilience (which have often been unhelpful in the lives of disabled people) and then moves into more recent social constructionist theories of this phenomenon. This latter perspective necessarily locates resilience in a network of resources including material resources, relationships, identity, bodies and minds, power and control, community participation, community cohesion and social justice. We argue that the recognition of resilience as a relational product is important and in tune with attempts to make psychology less an individualistic encounter and more a community intervention. However, disabled people, their politics and the development of critical disability studies, contest and challenge normative ideas of what it means to live with a resilient network of resources. In this sense disability offers new and exciting ways of addressing resilience.     

Contributive Justice and Meaningful Work

The dominant focus of thinking about economic justice is overwhelmingly distributive, that is, concerned with what people get in terms of resources and opportunities. It views work mainly negatively, as a burden or cost, or else is neutral about it, rather than seeing it as a source of meaning and fulfilment—a good in its own right. However, what we do in life has at least as much, if not more, influence on whom we become, as does what we get. Thus we have good reason also to be concerned with what Paul Gomberg has termed contributive justice, that is, justice as regards what people are expected and able to contribute in terms of work. Complex, interesting work allows workers not only to develop and exercise their capacities, and gain the satisfaction from achieving the internal goods of a practice, but to gain the external goods of recognition and esteem. As Gomberg’s analysis of the concept of contributive justice in relation to equality of opportunity shows, as long as the more satisfying kinds of work are concentrated into a subset of jobs, rather than shared out among all jobs, then many workers will be denied the chance to have meaningful work and the recognition that goes with it. In this paper I examine the contributive justice argument, suggest how it can be further strengthened, arguing, inter alia, that ignoring contributive injustice tends to support legitimations of distributive inequality.

RESPECTING HUMAN DIGNITY: CONTRACT VERSUS CAPABILITIES

Abstract: There appears to be a tension between two commitments in liberalism. The first is that citizens, as rational agents possessing dignity, are owed a justification for principles of justice. The second is that members of society who do not meet the requirements of rational agency are owed justice. These notions conflict because the first commitment is often expressed through the device of the social contract, which seems to confine the scope of justice to rational agents. So, contractarianism seems to ignore the justice claims of the severely cognitively impaired. To solve this problem, Martha Nussbaum proposes the capabilities approach. The justifiability condition, on this approach, is met by the idea of overlapping consensus. This essay argues that overlapping consensus cannot meet liberalism's justifiability condition, nor is it more inclusive of the cognitively impaired. Therefore, we have reason to retain the contract device and look for another way to ensure that liberalism respects the justice claims of all.     

Language as a Global Public Good

Language use is a public good. Those using a common language receive benefits that are non-excludable and non-rival. And as more people speak the same language, the greater these benefits are. Sometimes individuals make a conscious decision to learn a language other than their native language in order to receive these benefits, and thereby incur costs. This paper is an attempt to determine how we should share the costs among all beneficiaries. I argue against Van Parijs’s (Linguistic justice for Europe and for the world, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011a) proposal for this, and instead argue that an approach found in the work of Gauthier (Morals by agreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986) is preferable. A general lesson to be drawn from this paper is that the correct principle for distributing the costs of (global) public goods will depend on whether we think the good in question is required by justice or not. Where Van Parijs went wrong, I claim, was in thinking that a cross-border common language is required by justice.     

Respect for the developmentally disabled and forgoing life-sustaining treatment

A developmentally disabled person should be treated at all times as a unique individual and not as some anonymous "disabled person." The developmentally disabled should not be subjected to invasive medical treatment that is unduly burdensome or nonbeneficial, or be forced to endure a quality of life not meaningful to them as individuals. They have a right to refuse or accept treatment that a surrogate must exercise on behalf of each individual in a responsible and careful manner. Three cases and a preliminary approach to the ethical analysis of decisions to allow developmentally disabled persons to die by forgoing medical treatment are offered. The "best interests" of a developmentally disabled individual, properly understood, can serve as a useful and ethically defensible standard for determining the ethical propriety of surrogate decision making about forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment of the disabled.     

政治的,抑或道德的——对政治自由主义一个关键悖论的解读

政治自由主义试图将其正义观念塑造为纯粹"政治的"观念,而不能是完备性的"道德的"观念。但任何规范性的正义观念似乎都不能不是道德的,这就形成了政治自由主义所面对的一个最根本的悖论。通过分析我们可以看到,政治自由主义要克服这一悖论,必须寻求一种具有自主性的规范性政治概念。此外,政治自由主义把公民的两种道德能力当作理论前提,同时强调道德化的公民美德,这两个因素都加深了这一悖论。通过解释和分析这两种因素所带来的理论难题及其原因,文章认为,"政治的"自由主义之所以难以抹去"道德的"面纱,其根源在于政治在自由主义价值系统中的处境。     

The relevance of Rawls' principle of justice for research on cognitively impaired patients

An ethical conflict arises when we must performresearch in the interest of future patients,but that this may occasionally injure theinterests of today's patients.In the case of cognitively impaired persons, thequestion arises whether it is compatible withhumane healthcare not only to treat, but alsoto use these patients for research purposes.Some bioethicists and theologians haveformulated a general duty of solidarity, alsopertaining to cognitively impaired persons, as ajustification for research on these persons. Ifone examines this thesis from the theory ofjustice according to John Rawls, it is revealedthat such a duty of solidarity cannotnecessarily be extrapolated from Rawls'conception of justice. This is at least true ofRawls' difference principle, because accordingto the difference principle only those measuresare justifiable which serve the interest of therespective least well off. Those measures whichwould engender additional injury for the leastwell off could not be balanced by any utilityaccording to Rawls.However, John Rawls' difference principleis subordinate to the first principle,which is that each person has an equalright to the most extensive basic libertycompatible with the same liberty for others.These primary goods are determined by thefreedom and integrity of the person.This integrity of decisionally impaired personswould be in danger if one would abstain fromresearch and thus forego the increase inknowledge related to their disease. Thus onecould conclude, at least from Rawls' firstprinciple, that society must take on a duty toguarantee the degrees of freedom forcognitively impaired persons and thus alsosupport the efforts for their healing.     

Mathematical symbols as epistemic actions

Recent experimental evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience indicates that humans are equipped with unlearned elementary mathematical skills. However, formal mathematics has properties that cannot be reduced to these elementary cognitive capacities. The question then arises how human beings cognitively deal with more advanced mathematical ideas. This paper draws on the extended mind thesis to suggest that mathematical symbols enable us to delegate some mathematical operations to the external environment. In this view, mathematical symbols are not only used to express mathematical concepts??they are constitutive of the mathematical concepts themselves. Mathematical symbols are epistemic actions, because they enable us to represent concepts that are literally unthinkable with our bare brains. Using case-studies from the history of mathematics and from educational psychology, we argue for an intimate relationship between mathematical symbols and mathematical cognition.     

Justice at the Margins: The Social Contract and the Challenge of Marginal Cases

Attempts to justify the special moral status of human beings over other animals face a well‐known objection: the challenge of marginal cases. If we attempt to ground this special status in the unique rationality of humans, then it becomes difficult to see why nonrational humans (infants, the severely cognitively disabled, and so on) should be treated any differently than other, nonhuman animals. We respond to this challenge by turning to the social contract tradition. In particular, we identify an important role for the concept of recognition in attempts to secure rights through a social contract. Recognition, which involves identifying with or seeing ourselves as others, is the key to establishing the scope of justice, and we argue that this scope extends to all humans—even the so‐called marginal cases—but not to other animals. If this is correct, then we have a principled reason for why all humans have certain rights that other animals lack.     

Life Satisfaction and Job‐Seeking Behavior of the Unemployed: The Effect of Individual Differences in Justice Sensitivity

This study examines the effect of justice sensitivity on the life satisfaction and job‐seeking behavior of unemployed individuals and considers the likelihood of experiencing long‐term unemployment. We focus on two facets of dispositional justice sensitivity that reflect individual differences in perception and reactions to perpetrating injustice against others (perpetrator sensitivity) or suffering from the injustice of others as an innocent victim (victim sensitivity). We hypothesised that the negative effect of unemployment on life satisfaction is stronger among individuals with higher levels of victim sensitivity and perpetrator sensitivity. The former are more likely to perceive themselves as victims of an unjust situation, such as fate or the employer's decisions, whereas the latter are more likely to perceive themselves as perpetrators against the rules of social justice. Using survey data from approximately 400 participants, we found that unemployed individuals were less satisfied with life than employed individuals and that this relationship was stronger for perpetrator‐sensitive individuals. Unemployed perpetrator‐sensitive individuals were more likely to engage in active job‐seeking behavior and faced a lower likelihood of long‐term unemployment. The results are discussed in terms of the importance of justice‐related personality aspects of unemployed individuals for their well‐being and labor market outcomes.     

Self-knowledge: An expanded view

This paper argues for a more extensive study of self-knowledge. From the cognitive perspective, self-knowedge is a critical component of personality. Until quite recently, however, the study of self-knowledge has been narrowly conceived, focusing primarily on how individuals describe their roles and characteristic behaviors. Yet individuals also have knowledge about their preferences and values, their goals and motives, and their rules and strategies for regulating behavior. These dynamic aspects of self-knowledge are significant because they can be importantly revealing of future behavior. The content and organization of self-knowledge is important first because it indicates which domains of behavior are regarded as the most self-relevant. It is in these domains that the strongest links between personality and behavior will be observed. Second, self-knowledge cognitively represents desired and undesired states for the self, as well as specific ideas about how to realize or avoid these states. It thus indicates the likely course of behavior in self-relevant domains. A number of recent research efforts can be intepreted as explorations of self-knowledge. These are briefly reviewed and integrated to provide a general outline for an expanded view of self-knowledge.