Kann Es Ein Argument Für Den Skeptizismus Geben? Das Epistemische Problem Der Irrtumsmöglichkeit

Summary  Is there any argument for scepticism? The epistemic problem of the possibility of error. Arguments for scepticism rest on the assumption that knowledge claims are fallible. For this reason the concept of knowledge appears to be questionable. Since it is necessary to distinguish doubts from possible doubts, the arguments for scepticism appear to be unconvincing. If we take it into account that we know something that is immune to doubt, we should draw the conclusion that, contrary to scepticism, knowledge claims have to be compatible with being fallible. Thus any knowledge claim is capable of being doubted.     

WHY WE CANNOT RELY ON OURSELVES FOR EPISTEMIC IMPROVEMENT

There is something very appealing about the idea that we are epistemic agents. One reason—if not the main reason—is that, while we are undoubtedly fallible creatures, us being epistemic agents that do things means that it might just be within our power to improve and thereby do better. One important way in which we would want to improve is in relation to our well‐established tendency for cognitive bias. Still, the proper role of epistemic agency in us avoiding or correcting for cognitive bias is highly limited. In fact, what we know from empirical psychology—particularly with respect to our tendencies for overconfidence—suggests that we cannot rely on ourselves for epistemic improvement, and have good reason to impose significant constraints on our ability to exercise such agency in ameliorative contexts.     

不同社会情境对儿童奖惩分配公平性的影响

为探讨社会排斥和社会接纳情境下儿童奖惩分配公平性,研究采用个体-偶然排斥范式和第三方奖惩分配范式,对8~9岁儿童奖惩分配公平性行为和奖惩分配公平性判断进行研究,结果发现：（1）社会排斥组被试的奖惩分配公平性行为显著多于社会接纳组,奖惩分配不公平性行为显著少于社会接纳组。9岁组被试的奖惩分配公平性行为显著多于8岁组,奖惩分配不公平性行为显著少于8岁组;（2）社会排斥组被试的奖惩分配公平性判断显著高于社会接纳组,9岁组被试的奖惩分配公平性判断显著高于8岁组,奖惩分配不公平性判断显著低于8岁组。结论：社会情境影响儿童的奖惩分配公平性,在排斥情境下,8~9岁儿童的奖惩分配公平性明显提升;8~9岁儿童的奖惩分配公平性随年龄增长有上升趋势。     

A Brief History of Dissonance Theory

Prior to the construction of the theory of cognitive dissonance, the dominant view in American experimental psychology held that behavior, including verbal attitude statements, was learned and shaped by rewards and/or punishments. Dissonance theory took a surprisingly different view by stating that behaviors and reasons for engaging in them could be strengthened by minimizing the very rewards or threatened punishments that produced the behaviors. Many hundreds of experimental studies later, the main argument of dissonance theory is well supported, although researchers disagree about the necessary and sufficient conditions. The present paper traces the major lines of research, including contributions from around the world, and the major controversies among some of the researchers.     

Embracing Impossible Justice

It is often thought that considerations of practicality speak in favour of accepting the principle that if there is no practical alternative to something then that thing is not unjust. I present an argument which suggests that there are in fact practical costs to accepting such a principle, so that on grounds of practicality we perhaps ought to reject it. That argument does not assume that there are any demands of justice which it is impossible to meet, but only that we are very fallible when it comes to knowing what the possibilities are. I then argue that rejecting that principle and embracing a notion of ‘impossible justice’ has positive practical benefits in respect of putting us in a position to respond appropriately to really necessary injustices if there are any.     

Responsibilities of Criminal Justice Officials

In recent years, political philosophers have hotly debated whether ordinary citizens have a general pro tanto moral obligation to follow the law. Contemporary philosophers have had less to say about the same question when applied to public officials. In this paper, I consider the latter question in the morally complex context of criminal justice. I argue that criminal justice officials have no general pro tanto moral obligation to adhere to the legal dictates and lawful rules of their offices. My claim diverges not only from the commonsense view about such officials, but also from the positions standardly taken in legal theory and political science debates, which presume there is some general obligation that must arise from legal norms and be reconciled with political realities. I defend my claim by highlighting the conceptual gap between the rigid, generalised, codified rules that define a criminal justice office and the special moral responsibilities of the various moral roles that may underpin that office (such as guard, guardian, healer, educator, mediator, counsellor, advocate, and carer). After addressing four objections to my view, I consider specific contexts in which criminal justice officials are obligated not to adhere to the demands of their offices. Amongst other things, the arguments advanced in this paper raise questions about both the distribution of formal discretion in the criminal justice system and the normative validity of some of the offices that presently exist in criminal justice systems.     

A non‐utilitarian approach to punishment

Although the view that punishment is to be justified on utilitarian grounds has obvious appeal, an examination of utilitarianism reveals that, consistently and accurately interpreted, it dictates unjust punishments which are unacceptable to the common moral consciousness. In this rule‐utilitarianism is no more satisfactory than is act‐utilitarianism. Although the production of the greatest good, or the greatest happiness, of the greatest number is obviously a relevant consideration when determining which punishments may properly be inflicted, the question as to which punishment is just is a distinct and more basic question and one which must be answered before we can determine which punishments are morally permissible. That a retributivist theory, which is a particular application of a general principle of justice, can account more satisfactorily for our notion of justice in punishment is a positive reason in its support.     

… And Then Again,He Might Not Be

In reply to Michael Bertrand, I clarify my view that the problem of physical evil is not an a priori problem but an a posteriori one.     

Purposes of reasoning and (a new vindication of) Moore’s proof of an external world

A common view about Moore’s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore’s Proof is—in that sense—dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore’s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my defence is to conceive the Proof as addressed to subjects with a different epistemic condition. To sustain this view I formulate some hypothesis about the common general purpose of arguing and I defend that it can be fulfilled even when the addressee of an argument is not someone who disbelieves or doubts its conclusion.     

Hume and the Problem of Paternalism: When is Humanity Sufficient?

Hume states that if a group of powerless, rational creatures lived amongst human beings, then humans would be required to treat this species with humanity but not with justice. Michael Ridge has argued that this implies humans would be required to engage in a morally dubious form of paternalism toward this imagined species. I argue that a proper understanding of why this imagined species is excluded from the scope of justice shows Hume has a plausible moral reason for requiring paternalism in this instance. The reason the imagined species is excluded is that they are incapable of feeling what I term “the pain of dependence,” or unease arising from complete dependence upon those who are more powerful. Those capable of the pain of dependence will have reason to resent exclusion from the scope of justice (and the accompanying susceptibility to paternalism). However, I contend that Hume did not think that the imagined species was capable of feeling the pain of dependence. This means that the imagined species would not consider themselves wronged when subject to paternalistic treatment, and, consequently, there is good reason to think the sort of paternalism that Hume's theory allows is not morally objectionable.     

Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis

How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas or situations when immediate self-interest and longer term collective interest conflict? What variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives for cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that rewards and punishments should both promote cooperation, and we identify 2 variables—cost of incentives and source of incentives—that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperation.A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes revealed that rewards and punishments exhibited a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d =0.51 and 0.70, respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly to administer, compared to free. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both (a) iterated dilemmas with reassignment to a new group after each trial and (b) one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators, such as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad conclusions, consider implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards and punishment in social dilemmas.     

Aesthetic Judging and The Intentionality of Pleasure

I point out some unclarities in Allison's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory, specifically in his account of the free play of the faculties. I argue that there is a tension between Allison's commitment to the intentionality of the pleasure involved in a judgment of beauty, and his view that the pleasure is distinct from the judgment, and I claim that the tension should be resolved by rejecting the latter view. I conclude by addressing Allison's objection that my own view fails to accommodate judgments of non-beauty or ugliness.     

The difference between punishments and rewards in fostering moral concerns in social decision making

In social decision making, punishing non-cooperation and rewarding cooperation may not only affect cooperation because of instrumental reasons. They may also evoke moral concerns regarding cooperation as they signal that cooperation is socially approved of and non-cooperation socially disapproved of. I argue that punishments do this to a greater extent than rewards as punishments communicate an obligatory rule and rewards communicate a voluntary rule. Indeed, the first experiment shows that, in a social dilemma, the concept of punishment increased cooperation and the concept of a reward did not. The second experiment showed that participants showed more disapproval towards an offender when there was a punishment for non-compliance than when there was a reward for compliance. These findings suggest that punishing non-cooperation more strongly foster moral concerns regarding cooperation than rewarding cooperation. Possible implications for internalizations are discussed.     

A priori judgments and the argument from design

Conclusions At the outset of this discussion, I undertook to present an argument from design which would follow Swinburne's example in making use of a priori judgments, while avoiding some of the objections which have been posed in response to his treatment of these issues. So we need to ask: how does this approach to the question of design compare with Swinburne's?Swinburne argues that a chaotic world is a priori more likely than an ordered world: this consideration provides one central reason, on his account, for giving an explanation of some sort for the world's regularity. The other central argument he advances for this claim is the argument from analogy (in terms of the coins) which we noted earlier. The approach I have taken offers an alternative route to this same conclusion. In particular, it substitutes the simpler a priori judgments recorded in (i) and (ii) for the rather difficult and contentious claim that chaos is a priori more likely than order. In place of this claim, I have offered the judgment that order, or recurrence, is more likely given the activity of a common source or common kind of source than otherwise: this proposal does not commit us to a view either way on the question of whether order is a priori likely per se. Moreover, in place of Swinburne's analogical argument, I have offered an a priori approach, with the advantages I have noted.Given that recurrence is to be explained, we might ask: why offer an explanation in terms of design? On this point, Swinburne argues, for instance, that no other explanation of temporal regularity is even possible a priori. Again, the a priori principles which I have used, in (iv) and (v), may be less ambitious, but at the same time more persuasive. In support of this same idea, Swinburne also cites various ideas to do with the predictive power of the idea of design. I have tried to bring out the role of this sort of consideration in terms of my principle (v). Principle (iv) has no place in Swinburne's account, in view of his reliance on the principle of simplicity as a measure of prior probability.Lastly, we may ask: if we are to cite a designer, are there reasons for attributing to this agent more powers than are needed for the production of the effect to be explained? On this point, Swinburne cites the principle of simplicity. Again, my approach avoids what has proved to be a relatively controversial judgment about the nature of a priori probabilities, offering in place of the principle of simplicity the less ambitious principle recorded in (iii). At this point, I have moreover inverted the logical sequence of Swinburne's argument: it seems to me that, in the ways I have indicated, it is helpful to consider the extent of the powers of the source of recurrence before addressing the question of design.In these various ways, I hope I have made good my undertaking to present an argument which avoids some of the controversy surrounding the particular measures of a priori probability which figure in Swinburne's argument. Moreover, I hope that this approach provides an indication of how a priori judgments may function in a relatively unproblematic way within an argument from design, in so far as (i)–(v) are all rather modest proposals. In sum, the argument I have presented is distinguished by its explicit use of the a priori judgments recorded in (i)–(v), by its attempt to buttress in this fashion analogical forms of argument, and by the logical role it gives to the idea that the source of regularity possesses more powers than are required for the production of this effect.Lastly, we might ask: how persuasive is this argument? Of course, the cogency of the idea of design depends upon the balance of debate in other areas of the philosophy of religion, especially upon our ability to provide some account of the existence of evil. In this paper, I have been concerned to argue simply that recurrence by kind provides evidence for design: I have not addressed the question of whether other features of the world provide good evidence against the idea of (benevolent) design. However, if we confine our attention to this one phenomenon, there is it seems to me good evidence for the idea of design, (i) and (ii) suggest that recurrence surely calls for some explanation; (iii), together with the existence in nature of statistical irregularities, suggests that whatever provides this explanation could have brought about other effects besides; and design seems the only clear explanation of why this effect should have been brought about, if (as I have argued) analogies drawn from vegetable and animal reproduction fail, and if we cannot explain the effect satisfactorily by reference to the conditions of observation. Moreover, I have argued that there are reasons for supposing that the probability a priori of design is relatively high in relation to the probability a priori of any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. In brief, this is because the design hypothesis (unlike the hypothesis of theism) can cite an agent of relatively indeterminate power in order to account for the phenomenon to be explained. In this regard, it is less precisely defined than any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. If all of this is so, then as philosophers from early times have supposed, temporal regularity provides the basis for a powerful argument in favour of design. It remains true, of course, that its import can be judged in full only when we have taken into account the relevance of other phenomena, many of which are apparently less favourable to the idea of design.     

Relationships Between Leader-Contingent and Non-contingent Reward and Punishment Behaviors and Subordinates’ Perceptions of Justice and Satisfaction, and Evaluation of the Moderating Influence of Trust Propensity, Pay Level, and Role Ambiguity

Purpose

This research evaluates how reward and punishment behaviors are related to employee satisfaction, and how perceptions of justice mediate the effects of these behaviors. This study also seeks to examine the connection between some boundary conditions and the efficacy of reward and punishment behaviors.

Design/Methodology/Approach

Data were collected using questionnaires, and hypotheses were tested using a sample of 3,065 managers from 41 business units.

Findings

We found that contingent financial and social rewards were positively related to fairness and satisfaction, whereas punishment behaviors exert a negative influence. Findings reveal that high-trust propensity and low-pay level strengthen the positive influence of rewards on distributive justice, whereas high role ambiguity increases the positive effect of reward behaviors and the negative influence of non-contingent punishment (NCP) on superior satisfaction.

Implications

This study provided evidence that using contingent rewards is more effective in promoting positive attitudes at work than using contingent punishments. Our findings add to the evidence that organizations would benefit from encouraging their managers to use financial and social rewards and reducing the administration of NCP among performing employees.

Originality/Value

This study represents a first attempt to examine an integrated model of the effects of reward and punishment behaviors. It also contributes to this field by empirically evaluating the impact of individual and situational boundary conditions in the efficacy of these leader behaviors.     

Understanding Fallible Warrant and Fallible Knowledge: Three Proposals

One of contemporary epistemology's more important conceptual challenges is that of understanding the nature of fallibility. Part of why this matters is that it would contribute to our understanding the natures of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. This article evaluates two candidates – and describes a shared form of failing. Each is concealedly infallibilist. This failing is all‐too‐representative of the difficulty of doing justice to the notion of fallibility within the notions of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. The article ends with a proposal for an improved (even if schematic) form of conception of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge.     

《管子》论“且怀且威”及其现代启示

《管子》认为,治理国家既要采用怀柔政策,主张为政者"先之以德",通过整饬四维来形成良好的社会风尚;又强调"法不可不审",主张通过严刑峻法来树立君主的权威,赏罚严明,使人们严格遵守各项法令制度,坚持"且怀且威",礼法并重,其思想对现代社会有很好的启迪意义。     

MUSIC AND METAPHYSICS

Abstract: In this article, I assume that musical works are abstract types, and I raise and address a new question concerning musical ontology that may take the types view at least a step further: When do musical works cease to exist? I then propound my view about musical works as types, which is somewhat like the Aristotelian Realist position concerning universals. Next, I address some objections to that view. Finally, I provide some grounds for rejecting alternative views that see Western classical musical works before 1950 (the sorts of musical works the discussion here is restricted to) either as classes or else as kinds.     

THE PUZZLE OF FALLIBLE KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: Although the fallible/infallible distinction in the theory of knowledge has traditionally been upheld by most epistemologists, almost all contemporary theories of knowledge claim to be fallibilist. Fallibilists have, however, been forced to accommodate knowledge of necessary truths. This has proved to be a daunting task, not least because there is as yet no consensus on how the fallible/infallible divide is to be understood. In this article, after examining and rejecting a number of representative accounts of the notion of fallible knowledge, I argue that the main problems with these accounts actually stem from the very coherence of that notion. I then claim that the distinction is best understood in terms of the externalist/internalist conceptions of knowledge. Finally, I seek to garner some independent support for the proposal by highlighting some of its consequences, including its surprising bearing on certain recent and seemingly distant controversies involving issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind.     

Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori, objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide genuine, objective normative‐practical necessities. There are no objective practical necessities in our pursuit of empirical ends and desires. Hence, non‐moral agency is a rationally impoverished form of agency.