The schema provokes a disparity of false recollection between actions and objects in an everyday scene

We explored the effect of the schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects in an everyday scene. At first, participants watched slides of a man cooking in a kitchen. The man performed schema‐consistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects were left. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. We confirmed three main results. First, participants made more false recognitions for schema‐consistent distracters than for schema‐inconsistent distracters with more “remember” judgments accompanied by perceptual, thought, and contextual details, and with more “know” judgments. Second, participants made more false recognitions for schema‐consistent object distracters than for schema‐consistent action distracters. Third, participants more frequently recognized schema‐consistent action targets than schema‐consistent object targets with more “remember” judgments. Both action memory and object memory were reconstructed under the schema, provoking false recognitions for schema‐consistent distracters. However, the memories of schema‐consistent action targets were so recollective that they could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

What is the “front” of a simple geometric form?

A total of 670 undergraduate Ss were tested in three studies conducted in an attempt to define a set of cues that minimally specify perceived “frontness” and “backness” of objects. In Experiment I, Ss were instructed to identify the “front” and “back” of printed squares to which no, one, or two circles were attached. In Experiment II, different Ss made the same kind of judgment to a wider range of geometric forms. In Experiment III, different Ss judged the direction of “imagined” movement of forms from Experiment I. The results indicated that the “front” and “back” are asymmetric opposite sides, with “front” the side most different from the rest and the side toward which the form is imagined to be moving.     

Human exploratory behavior in a “natural” versus a laboratory setting

Two groups of 30 Ss each viewed a series of nonrepresentational patterns varying in three physical parameters. For the “natural-setting” group the patterns were arranged in a loose-leaf binder and S, unaware that his responses were being recorded, viewed them “spontaneously” prior to the “beginning” of the experiment. For the “laboratory-setting” group the patterns were presented by means of slides and S, under instructions similar to those employed in conventional studies of human exploratory behavior, controlled the duration of each exposure by pressing a telegraph-key. A 4-factor analysis of variance of the viewing times showed that both groups spent the same amount of time examining the patterns and that their viewing times were not differentially affected by any of the three pattern parameters. It was tentatively concluded that the “unnaturalness” of conventional laboratory settings may have little effect on human exploratory responses.     

Anchor effects using numerical estimates of simple dot patterns

Shifts due to anchor stimuli using absolute judgments have been ascribed to “semantic” and “scale modulus” changes. To test this explanation, random dot patterns of 10, 12, 14, 16 and 18 dots were exposed for 0.30 sec with anchors of 4, 13 or 32 dots preceding each of the stimuli. In the control only the series of stimuli were judged. It was found that numerical estimates of the number of dots increased with small anchor, decreased with large anchor, and were not significantly changed with anchor in the vicinity of AL. These results exactly parallel those found using methods of absolute and comparative ratings and hence cannot be ascribed to semantic shifts especially in view of the fact that independent groups of Ss served in the four anchor and control conditions. Since the anchor effects were significant but not so large that they can be ascribed to change of scale modulus this theory must also be rejected. The AL model seems to offer the simplest and most unitary explanation of these as well as many other results obtained with different types of stimuli and different methods of judging.     

On the perception of symmetrical and repeated patterns

Four experiments investigated rapid perceptual judgments about tachistoscopically presented patterns that were either symmetrical about or repeated across a vertical axis. The same patterns were presented under two different instructional conditions; some Ss were to judge the two halves of each pattern “same” or “mirror,” others were to judge each pattern as a whole “symmetrical” or “asymmetrical.” With dot patterns, RTs were faster for symmetrical than for repeated patterns when the two halves were close together, but not when they were separated, regardless of instructions. With simpler patterns made up of arrowheads and C-shapes, however, “same” RTs were faster than “mirror,” but “asymmetrical” RTs were marginally slower than “symmetrical,” regardless of spatial separation. The advantage of “same” over “mirror” did not seem to be simply a labeling effect. The results suggest that left-right symmetry is perceptually more salient than left-right repetition when the patterns are perceived holistically. By contrast, distinct patterns can be matched more rapidly when they are the same than when they are left-right mirror images.     

The effects of stimulus structure and familiarity on same-different comparison

It was hypothesized that performance in the same-different comparison task is based on two modes of processing: (1) structural processes that organize the detailed parts of a stimulus into a well-formed whole, and (2)analytic processes that decompose the stimulus into features. This hypothesis was supported, but with the unexpected finding of individual differences in the mode of processing underlying “same” responses. Those Ss in the “same” condition whose reaction times were faster for symmetrical than for asymmetrical patterns supported the hypothesis for structural processes. The remaining Ss in the “same” condition, as well as all the Ss in the “different” condition, were unaffected by symmetry. These Ss supported the hypothesis for analytic processes. Although familiarity effects were obtained for both structural and analytic Ss, the rotation of the familiar patterns into an unfamiliar orientation virtually eliminated familiarity effects for the structural Ss, but left them intact for analytic Ss.     

Stroop interference with response,comparison, and encoding stages in a sentence-picture comparison task

The paper discusses a Stroop variant of the word-picture comparison task analyzed by Chase and Clark (1971). The locatives above or below were printed at the center of a reference square, and Ss reported “Yes” if there was a word or an array of Xs in the location specified and “No” if there was not. Under the control (Xs) conditions, above displays were classified faster than below displays and true displays faster than false displays. These effects were unaltered when the words “yes” or “no” or “right” or “wrong” were printed in place of the Xs, although there was a small overall increase in response latency under these Stroop conditions that was independent of agreement or disagreement between the distractor and the response to be made. When the locatives up and down were printed on the display, a substantial Stroop effect was observed, and the above-below and true-false effects were eliminated. These results are discussed in relation to theories about the nature of Stroop interference and processes involved in sentence-picture comparisons.     

A comparison of semantic. acoustic and visual criteria for matching of word pairs

Ss judged the some pairs of words “same” or “different” under semantic, acoustic and visualcriteria. RTs were compared for each criterion, and the effects of different kinds of confusabittty, such as acoustic similarity in the semantic matching task, or semantic similarity in the acoustic matching task, were also studied.     

Memory for lateral orientation of slides in picture stories

Three picture stories were constructed by taking slides of people involved in three different activities. Two sequences of these slides were presented. Subjects were asked whether or not each slide in the second sequence was in the same lateral orientation as in the first sequence. Experiment 1 presented the slides in correct or random sequence and in correct or random lateral orientation (2 by 2 design). The two groups who received correct orientation excelled in recognition of orientation in the test series. Experiment 2 replicated the random orientation condition, found that pre-warning of the recognition task had no effect on performance, and suggested that these subjects did not make use of the events in determining laterality. Experiment 3 replicated the correct order and orientation condition and further revealed that new but appropriate slides in the test series were accurately judged as to lateral orientation which fit the context of the original stories.     

Auditory pattern recognition by untrained listeners

Earlier work with unpracticed Ss has indicated that identification (naming) of the temporal order of components within repeated sequences consisting of three or four unrelated sounds cannot be accomplished when the item durations are 200 msec or less. In the present experiment, separate groups of 30 unpracticed Ss were required to teil whether alternated sequences, each consisting of reiterated presentations of the same three or four successive items, were in identical or permuted order. Naming of the order within the sequences was not required. Accuracy of same/different judgments was significantly better than chance when all items lasted 200 msec. Changing the duration of each item in one of the two sequences above or below 200 msec made the task more difficult. These results, together with other evidence, suggest that: (1) identification of order and recognition of auditory temporal patterns may represent fundamentally different processes, and (2) recognition may involve matching of “temporal templates.”     

Reaction times and error rates for judging nominal identity of letter strings

Most theories of “same”-“different” judgments predict that “same” responses should be at least as slow as “different” responses. However, the contrary has often been found. To explain this, a two-processor model has been proposed. In this model, a fast processor and a slow processor operate simultaneously. “Same” responses are initiated by whichever processor first indicates that the stimuli are “same,” whereas “different” responses are initiated only by the slow processor. In the experiment reported here, Ss judged whether two successively presented letter strings were nominally “same” or “different.” It was expected that the fast processor would be incapable of making nominal identity judgments. Thus, both “same” and “different” responses would be initiated by the slow processor. Consequently, “same” responses should have been slower than “different” responses. However, this did not occur. This finding casts doubt upon, but does not disprove, the two-processor model.     

Repeated magnitude estimations with a variable standard: Sequential effects and other properties

Twelve Ss made magnitude estimations of the loudness of each one of a sequence of pure tones according to the rule R(N) = R(N - 1) · [S(N)/S(N - 1)], where R(N) is the response on Trial N, R(N - 1) is the response on Trial N - 1, and S(N)/S(N - 1) is the judged ratio of the “loudness” of the pure tone presented on Trial N to that of the pure tone presented on Trial N - 1. It was found that these magnitude estimations were assimilated toward the immediately preceding stimuli as far as five trials back in the sequence of stimuli. In addition, ratio judgments were consistently asymmetric and the data displayed a form of “time order error.” In all cases, there are similar effects displayed in category judgment data. These and other data imply that at least some kinds of magnitude estimations may involve a judgment of the “difference” or “distance” between pairs of stimuli as a first step in the production of the response required by the judgment situation.     

Effects of stimulus-response uncertainty on watchkeeping performance and choice reactions

The present study was conducted to assess the effects of S-R uncertainty on performance in watchkeeping and typical type-b choice-reaction situations. The assessment was based in part on measurements of S-R compatibility effects in the two performance conditions. Four levels of S-R uncertainty (1, 2, 3 and 4 bits/S-R event) were combined factorially with two levels of S-R compatibility (high and low) and the two kinds of tasks (watchkeeping and choice-reaction); 12 Ss were assigned at random to each of the 16 conditions. A matrix of lights was used as stimuli in the choice-reaction condition; Ss monitored the matrix for a I-h duration in the watchkeeping condition. In both tasks, Ss responded by pressing a corresponding key after the presentation of a stimulus or “critical signal.” Reaction time (RT) was found to be an increas ing linear function of S-R uncertainty in both tasks. and the effects of S-R compatibility were essentially identical in the two. However, choice reactions were significantly faster than watchkeeping responses, and the rate of gain of information in watchkeeping was greater than in the comparable choice-reaction situations. The results are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that watchkeeping differs from the simpler choice-reaction task principally in presenting an additional source of (temporal) uncertainty for information processing.     

Mistaking the instance for the rule: A critical analysis of the truth-table evaluation paradigm

Many studies probe for interpretations of < if A then C> by having people evaluate truth-table cases (<A and C>, < A and not-C>, < not-A and C>, < not-A and not-C>) as making the rule true or false, or being irrelevant. We argue that a single case can never prove a general rule to be true, as philosophy of science has taught any researcher. Giving participants the impossible “true” option would therefore bias results away from this response. In Experiment 1 people judged instead whether cases make a rule false, do not make the rule false, or are irrelevant to the rule. The experimental group (N = 44) showed a significant increase in not-false responses compared with true responses of the control group (N = 39). In Experiments 2 and 3 the experimental groups judged whether cases make a rule true, corroborate it (i.e., make the rule more plausible, but neither true nor false), make it false, or are irrelevant. There was a significant reduction of irrelevant responses as compared to the default true/false/irrelevant task for the control groups. Even < A and C> cases were often no longer considered to make an < if A then C> rule true and were correctly judged to corroborate (vs. verify) rules. Results corroborate our conceptual analyses of the unsuitable “true” response option and put into question arguments that hinge on the presumed likelihood by which people consider truth contingencies to make a rule “true”.     

The effects of schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects

We examined how the schema affects recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects. First, participants watched consecutive slides that described a man in the kitchen. In the slides, the man performed schema‐consistent actions and schema‐inconsistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects and schema‐inconsistent objects were left in the kitchen space. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. For objects, the discrimination between targets and distracters was more accurate for schema‐inconsistent items than for schema‐consistent items, owing to perceptual, thought, and emotional recollections for schema‐inconsistent object targets. For actions, schema‐consistent targets were more frequently recognized than schema‐inconsistent targets, with more remember judgments based on perceptual and contextual recollections. While item‐specific information of schema‐inconsistent targets could be elaborated for objects, the perceptual details and the contextual relationship of schema‐consistent targets could be elaborated for actions. We also found less false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters than for schema‐consistent object distracters. The retrieval of the perceptual details of schema‐consistent action targets could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

Novelty,complexity, and hedonic value

Two experiments, in which Ss were exposed to sequences of colored shapes, investigated effects on ratings of “pleasingness” and “interestingness” of variables that had previously been shown to affect ratings of “novelty.” The results indicate, on the whole, that both pleasingness and interestingness increase with novelty. These findings run counter to those of experiments indicating an inverse relation between novelty and verbally expressed preference. Two further experiments examined effects of some variables that might account for this apparent discrepancy. Homogeneous sequences declined in judged “pleasantness” more than sequences in which several stimuli were interspersed, and simple stimuli became less pleasant as they became less novel, while complex stimuli declined less or became more pleasant. The findings are related to hypotheses regarding mechanisms of hedonic value. Two crucial predictions were confirmed in a fifth experiment.     

Rated preference and complexity for natural and urban visual material

In order (1) to study the relationship between complexity and preference for slides of the physical environment and (2) to test the hypothesis that the content of slides (in particular, whether nature or urban) will influence preference, independent of the rated complexity, 88 Ss were asked to rate 56 slides, both for preference and for complexity. Based on dimensional analyses, a nature and an urban dimension were identified. Three major results were obtained: (1) Nature scenes were greatly preferred to urban scenes (p < .001). (2) Complexity predicted preference within the nature domain (r = .69) and within the urban domain (r = .78). (3) Complexity did not account for the preference for nature over urban slides; the greatly preferred nature slides were, in fact, judged on the average less complex than the urban slides. The possibility is raised that the domain-specific character of the preference/complexity relationship found in this study may be general; that is, it may not be a special property of environmentally generated arrays.     

Effects of survival processing and retention interval on true and false recognition in the DRM and category repetition paradigms

ABSTRACT

Two experiments examined the effects of survival processing and delay on true and related false recognition. Experiment 1 used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm and found survival processing to increase true and related false recognition. Extending the delay from 5-mins to 1-day reduced true, but not false memory. Measures of the characteristics of true and false memories showed survival processing increased “remember” and “know” responses for related false memory, “know” responses for true memory and gist processing. Experiment 2 made use of the category repetition procedure and found a broadly similar pattern of results for true memory. However, related false memory was decreased by survival processing. Except for one result, no interactions were found between encoding task and delay. Overall, survival processing produced similar or different effects on true/false memory depending on the nature of the list. The mechanisms that might underpin these are evaluated and considered in relation to future work.