沉没成本效应的产生根源与影响因素

沉没成本效应是指决策者的决策行为因受沉没成本影响而产生的一种非理性决策现象。针对这一决策偏差的产生根源,研究者从认知、动机和神经三个角度提出了解释。沉没成本效应的影响因素包括沉没成本特性、情境因素、个体差异和文化差异等。基于先前研究存在的问题和不足,沉没成本效应的未来研究应着眼于改进研究方法,探究产生根源,关注行为沉没成本和加强应用研究。     

The mental accounting of sunk time costs: why time is not like money

The sunk‐cost effect, an irrational attention to non‐recoverable past costs while making current decisions, has been documented widely in the domain of monetary costs. In this paper, I study the effect of past time investments on current decisions. In three experiments using choice situations, I demonstrate that the sunk‐cost effect is not observed for past investments of time, but the effect reappears when the investments are expressed as monetary quantities. I further propose that this ‘pseudo‐rationality’ is due to the fact that individuals lack the ability to account for time in the same way as they account for money. In two additional experiments, I facilitate the accounting of time and show that the irrational sunk‐cost effect reappears. In a final experiment, I test my propositions in a setting where subjects make real investments of time and subsequently make real choices. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of probability of success estimates in the sunk cost effect

The sunk cost effect is manifested in a tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment has been made. Arkes and Blumer (1985) showed that a sunk cost increases one's estimated probability that the endeavor will succeed [p(s)]. Is this p(s) increase a cause of the sunk cost effect, a consequence of the effect, or both? In Experiment 1 participants read a scenario in which a sunk cost was or was not present. Half of each group read what the precise p(s) of the project would be, thereby discouraging p(s) inflation. Nevertheless these participants manifested the sunk cost effect, suggesting p(s) inflation is not necessary for the effect to occur. In Experiment 2 participants gave p(s) estimates before or after the investment decision. The latter group manifested higher p(s), suggesting that the inflated estimate is a consequence of the decision to invest. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No Time to Waste: Restricting Life‐Span Temporal Horizons Decreases the Sunk‐Cost Fallacy

In three studies, we examined the influence of restricted and expansive temporal horizons on the sunk‐cost fallacy. The sunk‐cost fallacy occurs when prior investments instead of future returns influence decisions about future investments. When making decisions about future investments, rational decision makers base decisions on future consequences, not already‐invested costs that are “sunk” and cannot be recovered. In Study 1, we restricted young adult college students' temporal horizons by instructing them to imagine that they did not have much longer to live; this manipulation decreased the sunk‐cost fallacy. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 and also found that the consequences of manipulating temporal horizons were most pronounced for prior investments of time and that prior investments of time and money had different implications for the sunk‐cost fallacy, depending on the social or nonsocial decision domain. In Study 3, we manipulated temporal horizons by instructing students to imagine their time as a college student was coming to an end. Results were mostly similar to Study 2 but also suggested that focusing on one's mortality may have unique consequences. Implications of the three studies for understanding age differences in sunk‐cost decisions, interventions to improve sunk‐cost decisions, and the situations in which interventions might be most needed are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Common Representations of Abstract Quantities

ABSTRACT— Representations of abstract quantities such as time and number are essential for survival. A number of studies have revealed that both humans and nonhuman animals are able to nonverbally estimate time and number; striking similarities in the behavioral data suggest a common magnitude-representation system shared across species. It is unclear, however, whether these representations provide animals with a true concept of time and number, as posited by Gallistel and Gelman (2000) . In this article, we review the prominent cognitive and neurobiological models of timing and counting and explore the current evidence suggesting that nonhuman animals represent these quantities in a modality-independent (i.e., abstract) and ordered manner. Avenues for future research in the area of temporal and mathematical cognition are also discussed.     

The analysis of human behavior in context

Does the name of the special interest group, “The Experimental Analysis of Human Behavior,” imply that those who analyze the behavior of human animals must organize themselves apart from those who analyze the behavior of nonhuman animals? Is the use of nonhumans in experiments really not relevant to the analysis of the behavior of humans? If so, then something must have changed. Many differences exist, of course, between the behavior of humans and nonhumans—humans, for example, cannot fly under their own power—but have we really isolated differences in principle, differences that require separate organizations for the study of each? I will try to indicate why I believe this is a serious concern, where the concern comes from, and what, perhaps, might be done to maintain what was once a flourishing bidirectional relation between research with humans and nonhumans, in both basic and applied research.     

The sunk‐time effect: An exploration

We explored the potential for a sunk‐cost effect in the realm of time. Questionnaire studies (Experiments 1–4) obtained a sunk‐time effect that was robust to manipulations of prospective value, individual versus group consequences, and the effort or enjoyment inherent in the time. Behavioral experiments (Experiments 5–7) also suggested a sunk‐time effect and found support for a personal responsibility by sunk‐cost interaction on choice behavior. We discuss theoretical implications and a potential connection to animal sunk‐cost phenomena. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The sunk cost effect with pigeons: some determinants of decisions about persistence

The sunk cost effect occurs when an individual persists following an initial investment, even when persisting is costly in the long run. The current study used a laboratory model of the sunk cost effect. Two response alternatives were available: Pigeons could persist by responding on a schedule key with mixed ratio requirements, or escape by responding on a second key. In Experiment 1, mean response requirements for persistence and escape were varied across conditions. Pigeons persisted (committing the sunk cost error) when persisting increased the mean response requirement only slightly but not when persisting was sufficiently nonoptimal. Experiment 2 explored more systematically combinations of ratios and probabilities assigned to the schedule key. Persistence varied with the ratio of the mean global response requirements for persistence and escape. In Experiment 3, transitions between ratios were signaled. This reduced nonoptimal persistence, and produced some instances of a reverse sunk cost error--escaping when persistence was optimal. In Experiment 4, it was optimal to escape after the second-smallest ratio ever presented. Pigeons escaped at approximately the optimal juncture, especially in conditions with added signals. Overall, this series of experiments suggests that the sunk cost error may arise in part because persistence is the default behavioral strategy in situations where the contingencies for escape and persistence are insufficiently disparate and/or it is relatively difficult to discriminate when to escape. The study also demonstrates the utility of animal models of complex decision making situations.     

沉没成本效应中的心理学问题

沉没成本效应是一种常见的非理性行为。本文从心理学角度对其进行了系统地介绍。文章概括了沉没成本及沉没成本效应的定义,沉没成本的种类和发生领域,并用心理学理论对沉没成本效应进行了解释。此外．文章还讨论了沉没成本的逆效应以及影响沉没成本效应的主要因素。     

Personality Dimensions in Nonhuman Animals: A Cross-Species Review

The evolutionary continuity between humans and other animals suggests that some dimensions of personality may be common across a wide range of species. Unfortunately, there is no unified body of research on animal personality; studies are dispersed across multiple disciplines and diverse journals. To review 19 studies of personality factors in 12 nonhuman species, we used the human Five-Factor Model plus Dominance and Activity as a preliminary framework. Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness showed the strongest cross-speciesgenerality, followed by Openness; a separate Conscientiousness dimension appeared only in chimpanzees, humans? closest relatives. Cross-species evidence was modest for a separate Dominance dimension but scant for Activity. The comparative approach taken here offers a fresh perspective on human personality and should facilitate hypothesis-driven research on the social and biological bases of personality.     

Germ-line enhancement of humans and non-humans

The current difference in attitude toward germ-line enhancement in humans and nonhumans is unjustified. Society should be more cautious in modifying the genes of nonhumans and more bold in thinking about modifying our own genome. I identify four classes of arguments pertaining to germ-line enhancement: safety arguments, justice arguments, trust arguments, and naturalness arguments. The first three types are compelling, but do not distinguish between human and nonhuman cases. The final class of argument would justify a distinction between human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement; however, this type of argument fails and, therefore, the discrepancy in attitude toward human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement is unjustified.     

The sunk cost effect in pigeons and humans

The sunk cost effect is the increased tendency to persist in an endeavor once an investment of money, effort, or time has been made. To date, humans are the only animal in which this effect has been observed unambiguously. We developed a behavior-analytic model of the sunk cost effect to explore the potential for this behavior in pigeons as well as in humans. Each trial started out with a short expected ratio, but on some trials assumed a longer expected ratio part way through the trial. Subjects had the (usually preferable) option of "escaping" the trial if the longer expected ratio had come into effect in order to bring on a new trial that again had a short expected ratio. In Experiments 1 through 3, we manipulated two independent variables that we hypothesized would affect the pigeons' ability to discriminate the increase in the expected ratio within a trial: (a) the presence or absence of stimuli that signal an increase in the expected ratio, and (b) the severity of the increase in the expected ratio. We found that the pigeons were most likely to persist nonoptimally through the longer expected ratios when stimulus changes were absent and when the increase in the expected ratio was less severe. Experiment 4 employed a similar procedure with human subjects that manipulated only the severity of the increase in the expected ratio and found a result similar to that of the pigeon experiment. In Experiment 5, we tested the hypothesis that a particular history of reinforcement would induce pigeons to persist through the longer expected ratios; the results suggested instead that the history of reinforcement caused the pigeons to persist less compared to pigeons that did not have that history.     

Escalation and De-escalation of Commitment in Response to Sunk Costs: The Role of Budgeting in Mental Accounting

Research has traditionally assumed that people increase investment (or "escalate commitment") in response to previous investments (sunk costs). This paper presents several demonstrations which show that people will incorrectly de-escalate investment in response to sunk costs. I propose that people set mental budgets to control their resource expenditures: they set a budget for a class of expenses and track their investments against their budget. A lab study with real monetary incentives shows support for de-escalation and supports a specific rule for how people set budgets - based on the breakeven of total costs and total benefits. The budgeting process suggests that people are only likely to escalate commitment when they fail to set a budget or when expenses are difficult to track. The later part of the paper organizes the previous literature on escalation around these processes and provides additional experiments to illustrate each point. For example, I argue that previous demonstrations that have shown errors of escalation exclusively involve "incidental" investments that are difficult to track. A study in the current paper shows that people are more willing to invest time than money to salvage a monetary sunk cost and more willing to invest money than time to salvage a sunk cost of time, even when the time and money investments are of equal value. The paper concludes by discussing the rationality of escalation and de-escalation.     

Let It Go: Positive Affect Attenuates Sunk Cost Bias by Enhancing Cognitive Flexibility

Sunk cost bias is a pervasive problem in consumer decision making. It occurs when people continue to invest resources toward unsuccessful outcomes merely because they previously invested in them. This tendency exists because people devote too much attention to prior investments without considering how other factors may impact their decision outcome. While many suggested interventions to attenuate sunk cost bias involve altering cognitive processes, we examine an alternate affective route. Specifically, we propose that inducing positive affect attenuates sunk cost bias by naturally facilitating flexible thought processes. Across four studies, using hypothetical and real decision tasks, we find that positive affect induced in three different ways consistently attenuates sunk cost bias involving money, time, and effort investments. Further, we demonstrate that this occurs because people experiencing positive affect have enhanced cognitive flexibility. They consider more relevant decision factors and perceive sunk cost as having less of an influence on their decision outcomes. Then, in a fifth study, we show that a thought intervention promoting flexibility can attenuate consumers’ suboptimal commitment tendency in a field setting.     

Impact of decision goal on escalation

This research investigates the sunk-cost effect or escalation defined as the irrational tendency to choose to continue to invest money, time, or effort following unsuccessful investments. Building on previous research demonstrating a loss-sensitivity principle in sequential decision making, the hypothesis was proposed that a loss-minimization goal would lead to stronger effects of sunk outcomes (prior gains and losses) than would a gain-maximizing goal. The hypothesis was investigated in three experiments with undergraduates responding to investment decision scenarios. Although the tendency to continue investments was always larger for gain-maximizing than for loss-minimizing goal instructions, the sunk-outcome effect was stronger in the former case. However, when the decisions were personal and concerned lower stakes rather than business investments involving large amounts of money, the expected stronger effect of sunk outcomes was found for loss-minimizing goal instructions. Another finding was that the expected value was never ignored, thus suggesting that future research should focus on the joint effects of the expected value and sunk outcomes.     

The discounting of ambiguous information in economic decision making

In three experimental studies we investigated how decision makers respond to ambiguous information about costs and benefits. In Experiment 1, we studied the effect of ambiguity about prior costs. Experiments 2 and 3 focused on the effect of ambiguity about future outcomes. The collective results of the three studies suggest that decision makers discount ambiguous information. The findings are related to insights on the disjunction effect, the sunk cost effect, transaction decoupling, and ambiguity aversion. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Visual artificial grammar learning by rhesus macaques (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>): exploring the role of grammar complexity and sequence length

Humans and nonhuman primates can learn about the organization of stimuli in the environment using implicit sequential pattern learning capabilities. However, most previous artificial grammar learning studies with nonhuman primates have involved relatively simple grammars and short input sequences. The goal in the current experiments was to assess the learning capabilities of monkeys on an artificial grammar-learning task that was more complex than most others previously used with nonhumans. Three experiments were conducted using a joystick-based, symmetrical-response serial reaction time task in which two monkeys were exposed to grammar-generated sequences at sequence lengths of four in Experiment 1, six in Experiment 2, and eight in Experiment 3. Over time, the monkeys came to respond faster to the sequences generated from the artificial grammar compared to random versions. In a subsequent generalization phase, subjects generalized their knowledge to novel sequences, responding significantly faster to novel instances of sequences produced using the familiar grammar compared to those constructed using an unfamiliar grammar. These results reveal that rhesus monkeys can learn and generalize the statistical structure inherent in an artificial grammar that is as complex as some used with humans, for sequences up to eight items long. These findings are discussed in relation to whether or not rhesus macaques and other primate species possess implicit sequence learning abilities that are similar to those that humans draw upon to learn natural language grammar.     

A Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task with symmetrical joystick responding for nonhuman primates

The serial reaction time (SRT) task is a simple procedure in which participants produce differentiated responses to each of a series of stimuli presented at varying locations. Learning about stimulus order is revealed through decreased latencies for structured versus randomized sequences. Although widely used with humans and well suited to nonhumans, this paradigm is little used in comparative research. In the present article, we describe an SRT procedure that uses colored circles as stimuli, a circular layout of locations, and symmetrical joystick deflections as responses. In two experiments, we showed that four rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) learned to track sequences up to eight items long, with three animals showing faster responding to repeating sequences than to randomized versions. After extended training, these participants also showed evidence of faster responding at all positions within repeating sequences. This method minimizes response effort, equates effort and travel distance across stimulus locations, and is applicable to any joystick-capable species.     

Sunk Cost Effects: The Influences of Instruction and Future Return Estimates

Normative principles imply that decision makers′ choices should be affected solely by the prospective future consequences of the options. Previous work, however, has demonstrated the occurrence of sunk cost effects, whereby decision makers are reluctant to abandon options in which they have made prior investments. The present research shows that, contrary to earlier findings, there exist conditions under which sunk cost effects are reduced significantly by instruction in pertinent economic principles. Additional findings indicate that sunk cost effects are mitigated by an important factor that is often present in real-world decision situations but omitted in most sunk cost research paradigms-explicit estimates of the future returns the given options might yield. Theoretical and practical implications are developed and discussed, including possibly common ambiguities about what normative sunk costs principles imply and how they should be applied.