Are facial displays social? Situational influences in the attribution of emotion to facial expressions

Observers are remarkably consistent in attributing particular emotions to particular facial expressions, at least in Western societies. Here, we suggest that this consistency is an instance of the fundamental attribution error. We therefore hypothesized that a small variation in the procedure of the recognition study, which emphasizes situational information, would change the participants' attributions. In two studies, participants were asked to judge whether a prototypical "emotional facial expression" was more plausibly associated with a social-communicative situation (one involving communication to another person) or with an equally emotional but nonsocial, situation. Participants were found more likely to associate each facial display with the social than with the nonsocial situation. This result was found across all emotions presented (happiness, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness) and for both Spanish and Canadian participants.     

How do depressed and healthy adults interpret nuanced facial expressions?

This study investigates the discrimination accuracy of emotional stimuli in subjects with major depression compared with healthy controls using photographs of facial expressions of varying emotional intensities. The sample included 88 unmedicated male and female subjects, aged 18-56 years, with major depressive disorder (n = 44) or no psychiatric illness (n = 44), who judged the emotion of 200 facial pictures displaying an expression between 10% (90% neutral) and 80% (nuanced) emotion. Stimuli were presented in 10% increments to generate a range of intensities, each presented for a 500-ms duration. Compared with healthy volunteers, depressed subjects showed very good recognition accuracy for sad faces but impaired recognition accuracy for other emotions (e.g., harsh, surprise, and sad expressions) of subtle emotional intensity. Recognition accuracy improved for both groups as a function of increased intensity on all emotions. Finally, as depressive symptoms increased, recognition accuracy increased for sad faces, but decreased for surprised faces. Moreover, depressed subjects showed an impaired ability to accurately identify subtle facial expressions, indicating that depressive symptoms influence accuracy of emotional recognition.     

Is this happiness I see? Biases in the identification of emotional facial expressions in depression and social phobia

The present study was designed to examine the operation of depression-specific biases in the identification or labeling of facial expression of emotions. Participants diagnosed with major depression and social phobia and control participants were presented with faces that expressed increasing degrees of emotional intensity, slowly changing from a neutral to a full-intensity happy, sad, or angry expression. The authors assessed individual differences in the intensity of facial expression of emotion that was required for the participants to accurately identify the emotion being expressed. The depressed participants required significantly greater intensity of emotion than did the social phobic and the control participants to correctly identify happy expressions and less intensity to identify sad than angry expressions. In contrast, social phobic participants needed less intensity to correctly identify the angry expressions than did the depressed and control participants and less intensity to identify angry than sad expressions. Implications of these results for interpersonal functioning in depression and social phobia are discussed.     

Can an anger face also be scared? Malleability of facial expressions

Do people always interpret a facial expression as communicating a single emotion (e.g., the anger face as only angry) or is that interpretation malleable? The current study investigated preschoolers' (N = 60; 3-4 years) and adults' (N = 20) categorization of facial expressions. On each of five trials, participants selected from an array of 10 facial expressions (an open-mouthed, high arousal expression and a closed-mouthed, low arousal expression each for happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust) all those that displayed the target emotion. Children's interpretation of facial expressions was malleable: 48% of children who selected the fear, anger, sadness, and disgust faces for the "correct" category also selected these same faces for another emotion category; 47% of adults did so for the sadness and disgust faces. The emotion children and adults attribute to facial expressions is influenced by the emotion category for which they are looking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Are event-related potentials to dynamic facial expressions of emotion related to individual differences in the accuracy of processing facial expressions and identity?

Despite a wealth of knowledge about the neural mechanisms behind emotional facial expression processing, little is known about how they relate to individual differences in social cognition abilities. We studied individual differences in the event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by dynamic facial expressions. First, we assessed the latent structure of the ERPs, reflecting structural face processing in the N170, and the allocation of processing resources and reflexive attention to emotionally salient stimuli, in the early posterior negativity (EPN) and the late positive complex (LPC). Then we estimated brain–behavior relationships between the ERP factors and behavioral indicators of facial identity and emotion-processing abilities. Structural models revealed that the participants who formed faster structural representations of neutral faces (i.e., shorter N170 latencies) performed better at face perception (r = –.51) and memory (r = –.42). The N170 amplitude was not related to individual differences in face cognition or emotion processing. The latent EPN factor correlated with emotion perception (r = .47) and memory (r = .32), and also with face perception abilities (r = .41). Interestingly, the latent factor representing the difference in EPN amplitudes between the two neutral control conditions (chewing and blinking movements) also correlated with emotion perception (r = .51), highlighting the importance of tracking facial changes in the perception of emotional facial expressions. The LPC factor for negative expressions correlated with the memory for emotional facial expressions. The links revealed between the latency and strength of activations of brain systems and individual differences in processing socio-emotional information provide new insights into the brain mechanisms involved in social communication.     

Physical education teachers in Australia: Why do they stay?

Studies related to reasons why teachers stay are far less frequent than those reporting reasons to leave. This study assessed the factors that satisfied PE teachers and the motivators to stay in PE teaching. Physical educator stayers (N?=?139) responded to a ‘PE Teachers’ Career Intentions Questionnaire’, ‘Basic Satisfaction Needs at Work Scale’ and an open-ended question to ascertain retention motivators. Basic needs satisfaction for competence, autonomy and relatedness support, along with satisfaction for ‘professional interaction’, ‘participation in decision-making’, ‘organisation of teaching’, and ‘respect’ predicted retention. PE teachers gain work-related motivation from their expertise, the opportunity to implement ideas collaboratively, but also the sense of efficacy to control their pedagogy and student outcomes of focus. Supportive policy and actions; not just the absence of career-thwarting stimuli, appear vital for teacher self-efficacy, leading to career fulfillment. Quality mentoring programs may serve to enhance PE teacher satisfaction and are worthy of further investigation.     

Why do they do it? Differences in high-intensity exercise-affect between those with higher and lower intensity preference and tolerance

Evidence suggests high-intensity exercise results in a more negative affective response when compared to moderate- or low-intensity exercise. However, a large number of individuals continue participating in high-intensity exercise, in spite of these supposed declines in affective state.PurposeDetermine whether trait differences influence variability in exercise-affect for those with higher versus lower exercise intensity preference and/or tolerance, and determine the mediating relationship between traits, exercise behavior, and affective states.MethodsUndergraduates (N = 245, 20.3 ± 1.7 yrs, BMI = 23.7 ± 3.8, 60.8% female, 82% regular exercisers) completed the Preference for and Tolerance of the Intensity of Exercise Questionnaire. They then completed a 15-min high-intensity body-weight circuit (HIC), a walk, and a reading condition, where valence (via Feeling Scale), perceived physiological activation (via Felt Arousal Scale), and ratings of perceived exertion were taken prior to, every 3-min during, and 20-min post (P20) condition, while activity enjoyment was assessed immediately post.ResultsMultivariate ANOVAs revealed significant differences (p_s < 0.05) in valence between those with high versus low intensity preferences during HIC at minutes 3 (d = 0.615), 6 (d = 0.772), 9 (d = 0.659), 12 (d = 0.625), 15 (d = 0.632), and at P20 (d = 0.554), and for enjoyment following HIC (d = 0.545), but not for walking or reading conditions.ConclusionsThese findings suggest the intensity-preference trait influences how an individual feels during high-intensity exercise, but has less influence on affect during moderate/lower intensity activities. These differences may be predictive of whether an individual will continue high-intensity exercise programming.     

What is the ethical in fear and trembling?

James Bogen misinterprets what Kierkegaard (or more accurately, Johannes de Silentio) meant by the ethical in Fear and Trembling (see Inquiry, 5 [1962], pp. 305–17). Kierkegaard did not intend to depict morality as a system of duties where moral duties derive from the particular position(s) one holds in society. Kierkegaard thought that moral duties were based on universal principles that were divine commands. Although Kierkegaard thought that it was necessary for an action to be moral that it be done in accord with such universal principles, he did not think that this was sufficient. In order to be a moral action, the action must be done not only in accord with certain universal principles but in a certain way. Kierkegaard notes the appropriate way by saying the agent must reveal himself in his action. Thus revelation by the agent and acting in accordance with certain principles are jointly sufficient and singly necessary conditions for an action to be moral.     

Why do Qualia and the Mind Seem Nonphysical?

In this article, I discuss several of the factors that jeopardize our understanding of the nature of qualitative experiences and the mind. I incorporate the view from neuroscience to clarify the naïve view from the first person perspective. I suggest that the most misleading factor in the understanding the nature of the mind and conscious processes is the transparency of experiences and the imperceptibility of the neurobiological processes that realize them. Transparency reflects the biological advantages provided to organisms by avoiding the proliferation of superfluous sensing and the regress implied in sensing the sensors and analyzers ad infinitum. The downside of simplicity and the price for biological efficiency is that through introspection, we cannot perceive the inner workings of the brain. Thus, the view from the first person perspective creates the pervasive illusion that the mind is nonphysical. Sensing the environment requires encoding information into neural surrogates, which I conceive as contingent processes that when incorporated into conscious processes become qualitative experiences. They are cognitive shortcuts with a variable degree of isomorphism, which partially falsify reality. Thus, the what-it-is-like is not the what-it-is. The first person perspective seemings should be corrected by the objective approach provided by neuroscience. To compensate for the contingency of experiences, organisms learn to rely on the aboutness of associated phenomenal concepts. Experiences have high biological value, because even in the absence of language, they allow organisms to make intelligent choices. Qualia are also necessary to ground words and language, which are essential to develop higher forms of cognition.     

Why do they exercise less? Barriers to exercise in high-anxiety-sensitive women

Anxiety sensitivity (AS; fear of arousal sensations) is a risk factor for mental and physical health problems, including physical inactivity. Because of the many mental and physical health benefits of exercise, it is important to better understand why high-AS individuals may be less likely to exercise. The present study's aim was to understand the role of barriers to exercise in explaining lower levels of physical exercise in high-AS individuals. Participants were undergraduate women who were selected as high (n = 82) or low (n = 72) AS. High-AS women participated in less physical exercise and perceived themselves as less fit than low-AS women. Mediation analyses revealed that barriers to exercise accounted for the inverse relationships between AS group and physical exercise/fitness levels. Findings suggest that efforts to increase physical exercise in at-risk populations, such as high-AS individuals, should not focus exclusively on benefits to exercise but should also target reasons why these individuals are exercising less.     

Don’t look back in anger: A cross-sectional and dyadic examination of the Dark Triad,anger, and aggression in athletes

ObjectivesThe Dark Triad (psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism) has been linked to anti-social behaviour in sport, and while anti-social behaviour often involves aggression and violence, no research to date has examined the relationship between the Dark Triad and anger and aggression in athletes. The current two-sample study sought to address this gap.DesignMulti-sample cross-sectional design.MethodSample 1 included 224 athletes (M_AGE = 23.85) and Sample 2 included 98 coach-athlete dyads (196 total; athlete M_AGE = 18.15, coaches M_AGE = 34.84). In both samples, facets of the Dark Triad were related to anger and aggression.ResultsIn Sample 1, regression analyses indicated that psychopathy positively predicted both anger and aggression and Machiavellianism positively predicted aggression. In Sample 2, actor-partner interdependence models indicated a combination of dyadic relationships (i.e., both actor [coach and athlete personality predicted their own anger and aggression] and partner effects [coach and athlete personality predicted the other’s anger and aggression]). In this regard, actor effects were found between psychopathy and both anger and aggression and narcissism and aggression. Coach to athlete partner effects were found for narcissism and anger and Machiavellianism and aggression.ConclusionsOverall, the findings provide evidence for personal and interpersonal relationships between the Dark Triad and anger and aggression and highlight the potential for the darker side of both athlete and coach personality to influence athlete emotions.     

Why do I feel this way? Attributional assessment of happiness and unhappiness

ABSTRACT

Much research has shown that how people explain events affects subjective well-being (SWB), in particular when they explain positive events as being due to internal, stable, and global factors, and negative events as being due to external, unstable, and local factors. In the current research, we asked: how do people explain their SWB itself, and how do such attributions in turn relate to SWB? In repeated measures studies 1 (N = 281) and 2 (N = 169) participants viewed happy feelings as more personally controllable, stable, and internally caused compared to unhappy feelings. In Study 3 (N = 142) participants made causal attributions about accurate SWB feedback, or about randomly assigned false (low or high) SWB feedback. Those in the false low-SWB feedback condition attributed their SWB to external and unstable factors controlled by others compared to those in the high-level feedback condition. In all three studies, attributing SWB to stable, personally controllable factors was positively associated with SWB.     

Why do you fear the bogeyman? An embodied predictive coding model of perceptual inference

Why are we scared by nonperceptual entities such as the bogeyman, and why does the bogeyman only visit us during the night? Why does hearing a window squeaking in the night suggest to us the unlikely idea of a thief or a killer? And why is this more likely to happen after watching a horror movie? To answer these and similar questions, we need to put mind and body together again and consider the embodied nature of perceptual and cognitive inference. Predictive coding provides a general framework for perceptual inference; I propose to extend it by including interoceptive and bodily information. The resulting embodied predictive coding inference permits one to compare alternative hypotheses (e.g., is the sound I hear generated by a thief or the wind?) using the same inferential scheme as in predictive coding, but using both sensory and interoceptive information as evidence, rather than just considering sensory events. If you hear a window squeaking in the night after watching a horror movie, you may consider plausible a very unlikely hypothesis (e.g., a thief, or even the bogeyman) because it explains both what you sense (e.g., the window squeaking in the night) and how you feel (e.g., your high heart rate). The good news is that the inference that I propose is fully rational and gives minds and bodies equal dignity. The bad news is that it also gives an embodiment to the bogeyman, and a reason to fear it.     

Why do they hook up? Attachment style and motives of college students

Attachment style may be related to variations in hookup experiences; however, we do not know if attachment style is associated with hookup motives. College students (N = 266) completed questionnaires that assessed attachment style and hookup motives. Avoidant attachment was negatively associated with intimacy motives, while anxious attachment was positively related to intimacy. Insecure attachment styles were positively related to coping motives and self‐affirmation motives, but gender interacted with attachment style. Anxious attachment was positively associated with peer pressure motives in men only. The role of attachment style and hookup motives in understanding young adults' hookup experiences will be discussed.     

Can expressions of anger enhance creativity? A test of the emotions as social information (EASI) model

We investigated whether expressions of anger can enhance creative performance. Building on the emotions as social information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009), we predicted that the interpersonal effects of anger expressions on creativity depend on the target's epistemic motivation (EM)—the desire to develop an accurate understanding of the situation (Kruglanski, 1989). Participants worked on an idea generation task in the role of “generator.” Then they received standardized feedback and tips from an “evaluator” (a trained actor) via a video setup. The feedback was delivered in an angry way or in a neutral way (via facial expressions, vocal intonation, and bodily postures). Participants with high EM exhibited greater fluency, originality, and flexibility after receiving angry rather than neutral feedback, whereas those with low EM were less creative after receiving angry feedback. These effects were mediated by task engagement and motivation, which anger increased (decreased) among high (low) EM participants.     

Who do you look like? Evidence of facial stereotypes for male names

The present research provides evidence that people use facial prototypes when they encounter different names. In Experiment 1, participants created face exemplars for fifteen common male names, subsets of which were endorsed as good examples by a second set of participants. These most typical faces were morphed to create face-name prototypes. In Experiment 2, participants matched one of the names to each of the prototype faces from Experiment 1. Participants’ matching choices showed convergence in naming the prototypes for many of the names. Experiment 3 utilized these same prototypes in a learning task designed to investigate if the face-name associations revealed in Experiment 2 impacted the learnability of the names. Participants learned face-name pairings that had a higher association (based on frequencies from Experiment 2) faster than pairings with a low association. Results suggest a more direct relationship between faces and names than has been previously proposed.     

Summer camp and the AGPA Institute: what do they have in common?

This paper describes similarities between children's experiences when going to summer camp and experiences in the two-day Institute of AGPA. The paper focuses on the dynamics of leadership and membership, addressing tasks involved in joining, including finding the courage and taking the risks required to emotionally fully join a group. Particular resistances arising out of being a therapist-as-member and exposing one's work as a leader to colleagues are discussed.     

Why do People Disagree? Explaining and Endorsing the Possibility of Partiality in Judgments

The current study examines developing changes in children's intuitions about why disagreements about decisions might occur, focusing on what children understand about partiality and how it may vary depending on the context. Eighty children ages 6 to 13 years old and 20 adults were presented with stories in which there was a disagreement with the judge about who the winner of a contest should be. Participants were asked to generate their own explanations for why the disagreement may have occurred and to evaluate the plausibility of different explanations provided by the experimenter. Even 6-year-olds generated and endorsed partiality as a possible explanation for disagreement, although they did so at a lower rate than older children. A richer understanding of how context influences both the reasons for disagreement and the likelihood of partiality seems to develop over childhood.     

Sudden gains in cognitive behavioral treatment for depression: when do they occur and do they matter?

Despite the use of efficacious treatments for depression, individuals differ in both the degree to which they recover and the rate at which recovery occurs. Tang and colleagues found that depressed patients who had sudden improvements in their symptomatology not only maintained these gains, but also enjoyed more improvement and higher rates of recovery than those without sudden gains (J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 67(6) (1999) 894; J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 70(2) (2002) 444). Our study examined the role of sudden gains in a cognitive-behavioral group treatment for depression. Results indicated that 41.9% of patients experienced sudden gains. Furthermore, sudden gains occurring in the first third of treatment appear to have special importance. Participants enjoying early sudden gains had significantly larger changes in depressive symptom scores over the course of treatment than those without sudden gains and were marginally more likely to be treatment responders compared to those without early sudden gains. In contrast to Tang and DeRubeis (J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 67(6) (1999) 894), however, sudden gains were not associated with cognitive changes.