The Expertise Question Revisited: Horizontal and Vertical Expertise

This article deals with the developments taking place in the field of family therapy from the expertise perspective, and as an expert practice. This development is looked at as a dialectical movement between two types of expertise, namely vertical and horizontal expertise. This spatial metaphor is put forward as a complementary alternative to the prevailing modern/postmodern debate. A brief account of the development of the study of science and of expertise is provided. The author suggests that the richness of current family therapeutic thinking owes something to both these different modes of expertise, the division not being as exclusive as some postmodernist authors suggest.     

Transmuted Expertise: How Technical Non-Experts Can Assess Experts and Expertise

To become an expert in a technical domain means acquiring the tacit knowledge pertaining to the relevant domain of expertise, at least, according to the programme known as “Studies of Expertise and Experience” (SEE). We know only one way to acquire tacit knowledge and that is through some form of sustained social contact with the group that has it. Those who do not have such contact cannot acquire the expertise needed to make technical judgments. They can, however, use social expertise to judge between experts or expert claims. Where social expertise is used to make technical judgments we refer to it as “transmuted expertise”. The various kinds of transmuted expertise are described and analysed.     

Expertise and category-based induction

The authors examined inductive reasoning among experts in a domain. Three types of tree experts (landscapers, taxonomists, and parks maintenance personnel) completed 3 reasoning tasks. In Experiment 1, participants inferred which of 2 novel diseases would affect "more other kinds of trees" and provided justifications for their choices. In Experiment 2, the authors used modified instructions and asked which disease would be more likely to affect "all trees." In Experiment 3, the conclusion category was eliminated altogether, and participants were asked to generate a list of other affected trees. Among these populations, typicality and diversity effects were weak to nonexistent. Instead, experts' reasoning was influenced by "local" coverage (extension of the property to members of the same folk family) and causal-ecological factors. The authors concluded that domain knowledge leads to the use of a variety of reasoning strategies not captured by current models of category-based induction.     

Xunzi on Moral Expertise

This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi??s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another??s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?     

Expertise and the explanation effect

The effect of professional experience on the “explanation effect”, i.e., generation of an explanation for an event occurrence increasing the judged likelihood of the event, is investigated in a risk assessment (financial auditing) context. An explanation effect was predicted for inexperienced auditors (auditing students); however, audit judgment experience was predicted to mediate, or eliminate, any explanation effect. Two competing hypotheses for the origin of the effect, the causal construction and recall-availability hypotheses, are tested given the presence of antecedent conditions for, and against, the explanation events. Audit risk judgments were provided by 58 novice and 42 experienced auditors. Written explanation for occurrence of the target event resulted in the explanation effect for novice subjects, both for specifie event and aggregate risk assessments. The pattern of results supported the recallavailability over the causal construction hypothesis. The judgments of the experienced auditors, however, did not indicate any explanation effect.     

Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology

In recent years a new discussion on the nature of philosophical expertise has emerged: whether philosophers possess a special kind of expertise, what such expertise would entail, how to measure it, and related concerns. The aim of the present article is to clarify certain related points across these debates in the hope of paving a clearer path forward, by addressing the following. (1) The expertise defense, which seems central to many discussions on methodology and expertise, has been misconstrued at times. (2) Questions of expertise and methodology could be separated more clearly. (3) The study of expertise may be important in its own right; however, there may be good reasons to give priority to methodological concerns. (4) Finally, when viewed in light of methodological concerns, a new project emerges when engaging with recent contributions to the expertise debate. The present article attempts a brief outline of this project.     

Expertise in tactile pattern recognition

This article explores expertise in tactile object recognition. In one study, participants were trained to differing degrees of accuracy on tactile identification of two-dimensional patterns. Recognition of these patterns, of inverted versions of these patterns, and of subparts of these patterns was then tested. The inversion effect (better recognition of upright than inverted patterns) and the part-whole effect (better recognition of the whole than a part pattern), traditionally considered signatures of visual expertise, were observed for tactile experts but not for novices. In a second study, participants were trained as visual or tactile experts and then tested in the trained and nontrained modalities. Whereas expertise effects were observed in the modality of training, cross-modal transfer was asymmetric; visual experts showed generalization to haptic recognition, but tactile experts did not show generalization to visual recognition. Tactile expertise is not obviously attributable to visual mediation and emerges from domain-general principles that operate independently of modality.     

The Structure of Practical Expertise

Anti-intellectualists in epistemology argue for the thesis that knowing-how is not a species of knowing-that, and most of them tend to avoid any use of the notion “knowing-that” in their explanation of intelligent action on pain of inconsistency. Intellectualists tend to disprove anti-intellectualism by showing that the residues of knowing-that remain in the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. Outside the field of epistemology, some philosophers who try to highlight the nature of their explanation of intelligent action in certain fields, such as ethics, tend to classify themselves as intellectualist simply because they appeal to the notion of knowing-that in their explanation. In a word, the idea of knowing-that is harmful to the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action, whether from an insider or outsider perspective. In this paper, I argue that these tendencies are unjustified because they are based on an unclear conception of anti-intellectualism. I shall use Gilbert Ryle’s anti-intellectualism as a paradigm with which to describe anti-intellectualism and to illustrate why the notion of knowing-that is not harmful to but is, on the contrary, beneficial to the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. If my explication of Ryle’s anti-intellectualism is correct, then most anti-intellectualists in the literature blindly worry about the notion of knowing-that, most intellectualists fire into the wrong flock, and some philosophers outside epistemology mischaracterize their own position.     

各国医疗鉴定制度及对我国的启示

医疗鉴定是处理医疗事故的核心,有效地保证医疗鉴定的公平性,只有完善签定人的相关管理制度才能完善医疗监督制度.通过对两大法系医疗鉴定制度的介绍和比较,对我国的医疗鉴定制度的公平性、鉴定人的管理制度、鉴定结果的追究制度等提出了自己的见解.     

How Philosophy Lost Perceptual Expertise

If we think of perceptual expertise, we might think ofa neurologist interpreting a CAT scan or an astronomerlooking at a star. But perceptual expertise is notlimited to experts. Perceptual expertise is atthe heart of our everyday competence in the world. Wenavigate around obstacles, we take turns inconversations, we make left-turns in face of on-comingtraffic. Each of us is a perceptual expert (thoughonly in certain domains). If we misunderstandperceptual expertise, we risk misunderstanding ourepistemic relationship to the world. I argue that thestandard arguments for the received view of perceptualexpertise are problematic at best. Of course, theissue of whether the received view is actually correctis an empirical issue. But the decision to adopt thereceived view, I argue, was not a scientific decision,but was made by inheriting a philosophical tradition– which many philosophers today would question.     

Character,Common-Sense,and Expertise

Gilbert Harman has argued that the common-sense characterological psychology employed in virtue ethics is rooted not in unbiased observation of close acquaintances, but rather in the ‘fundamental attribution error’. If this is right, then philosophers cannot rely on their intuitions for insight into characterological psychology, and it might even be that there is no such thing as character. This supports the idea, urged by John Doris and Stephen Stich, that we should rely exclusively on experimental psychology for our explanations of behaviour. The purported ‘fundamental attribution error’ cannot play the explanatory role required of it, however, and anyway there is no experimental evidence that we make such an error. It is true that trait-attribution often goes wrong, but this is best explained by a set of difficulties that beset the explanation of other people’s behaviour, difficulties that become less acute the better we know the agent. This explanation allows that we can gain genuine insight into character on the basis of our intuitions, though claims about the actual distribution of particular traits and the correlations between them must be based on more objective data.

Expertise and the evolution of consciousness

This paper argues that expertise can be used as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. The argument is based on the following observations: (1) expertise and skill acquisition require deliberate practice; and (2) the characteristics of deliberate practice such as performance evaluation against a more proficient model, retention of voluntary control over actions, self-monitoring, goal-setting, error-detection and correction, and the construction of hierarchically organized retrieval structures are outside of the currently understood bounds of unconscious processing. Thus, to the extent that evidence of expertise exists in an organism, evidence of conscious experience is also present. Two important implications arise from this conclusion: (1) evidence of expertise can be used as the basis for cross-species comparisons of consciousness; and (2) the evolution of human consciousness can be assessed using fossil evidence of skilled behavior as a measure of consciousness.     

Expertise and attunement to kinematic constraints

Three experiments were undertaken to ascertain the extent to which expertise in natural anticipatory tasks is characterised by superior attunement to the biomechanical (kinematic) constraints of the movement pattern being observed. Twelve world-class and twelve non-expert badminton players were required to predict the depth of an opponent's stroke from either video displays or point-light displays of the opposing player's hitting action. The information available within the displays was manipulated through temporal and/or spatial occlusion. Consistent with predictions that can be derived from the constraint-attunement hypothesis (Vicente and Wang, 1998 Psychological Review 105 33-57), experts showed: (i) an unchanged pattern of information pick-up when the display was reduced from video to point-light and only kinematic information was available; (ii) superior information pick-up from kinematic features that non-experts could use; and (iii) attunement to early kinematic information from the lower body to which non-experts were not sensitive. Consistent with predictions that can be derived from a common-coding perspective (Prinz, 1997 European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 9 129-154), the anticipation of stroke depth was facilitated more for experts than non-experts when the perceptual display provided linked segment information reminiscent of the cross-segmental torque transfers that occur during expert movement production.     

The Beginnings of Expertise for Ballads

To study the beginning stages of expertise, 14 students, who were inexperienced with ballads, heard and recalled a series of 5 ballads over the course of 5 weeks. Compared with their first recall of the first ballad, their first recall of the fifth ballad had one and a half times as many words, two times as many rhyming words, and three times as much line structure evident in the written recall protocols. Compared with novices, the 14 beginning experts more often filled in blank spaces in novel ballads with words of the correct number of syllables and more often chose the original stanza of a novel ballad that was paired with a changed version of the stanza. The beginning experts were also able to compose, in 20 min, ballads about two thirds as long as the 10-stanza ballads they learned. Thirty characteristics were identified in the set of the five learned ballads. The ballads composed by the beginning experts used over half of these. The beginning experts also explicitly stated about one quarter of these 30 characteristics, but there was no statistical relationship between the characteristics used and the characteristics stated. Memory expertise is viewed as a pervasive aspect of cognition in which people make use of a variety of regularities in the material to be learned.     

Expertise and error in diagnostic reasoning

An investigation is presented in which a computer simulation model (DIAGNOSER) is used to develop and test predictions for behavior of subjects in a task of medical diagnosis. The first experiment employed a process-tracing methodology in order to compare hypothesis generation and evaluation behavior of DIAGNOSER with individuals at different levels of expertise (students, trainees, experts). A second experiment performed with only DIAGNOSER identified conditions under which errors in reasoning in the first experiment could be related to interpretation of specific data items. Predictions derived from DIAGNOSER's performance were tested in a third experiment with a new sample of subjects. Data from the three experiments indicated that (1) form of diagnostic reasoning was similar for all subjects trained in medicine and for the simulation model, (2) substance of diagnostic reasoning employed by the simulation model was parable with that of the more expert subjects, and (3) errors in subjects' reasoning were attributable to deficiencies in disease knowledge and the interpretation of specific patient data cues predicted by the simulation model.