Moore’s paradox and the priority of belief thesis

Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such as Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. This assumption gives explanatory priority to belief over assertion. I show that the translation involved is much trickier than might at first appear. It is simplistic to think that Moorean absurdity in assertion is always a subsidiary product of the absurdity in belief, even when the absurdity is conceived as irrationality. Instead we should aim for explanations of Moorean absurdity in assertion and in belief that are independent even if related, while bearing in mind that some forms of irrationality may be forms of absurdity even if not conversely.     

Computationalism,The Church–Turing Thesis,and the Church–Turing Fallacy

The Church–Turing Thesis (CTT) is often employed in arguments for computationalism. I scrutinize the most prominent of such arguments in light of recent work on CTT and argue that they are unsound. Although CTT does nothing to support computationalism, it is not irrelevant to it. By eliminating misunderstandings about the relationship between CTT and computationalism, we deepen our appreciation of computationalism as an empirical hypothesis.     

Erikson’s Schedule of Human Strengths and the Church’s Self-Images

This article focuses on Erik H. Erikson’s schedule of human strengths presented in his essay, “Human Strength and the Cycle of Generations” (Erikson 1964) and suggests that certain images of the church support these human strengths. In supporting these human strengths, they also contribute to our understanding of the importance of the fact that the church is an intergenerational body.     

Meno’s paradox and medicine

The measurement of diagnostic accuracy is an important aspect of the evaluation of diagnostic tests. Sometimes, medical researchers try to discover the set of observations that are most accurate of all by directly inspecting diseased and not-diseased patients. This method is perhaps intuitively appealing, as it seems a straightforward empirical way of discovering how to identify diseased patients, which amounts to trying to correlate the results of diagnostic tests with disease status. I present three examples of researchers who try to produce definitive diagnostic criteria by directly inspecting diseased and not diseased patients. Despite this method’s intuitive appeal, I will argue that it is impossible to carry out. Before researchers can inspect these patients to discover definitive diagnostic criteria, they must be able to distinguish diseased and not-diseased patients; and they do not know how to do this, because this is what they are trying to discover. I suspect the intuitive appeal of directly inspecting patients makes this difficult to appreciate. To counter this difficulty, I present this problem as a manifestation of ‘Meno’s paradox’, which was described in classical antiquity, and of ‘the problem of nomic measurement’, described more recently. Considering these philosophical problems may help researchers address the methodological issues they face when evaluating diagnostic tests.

     

Morinaga’s paradox and figure-ground organization

Morinaga’s paradox of displacement is constructed by setting several copies of the two Mueller-Lyer figures one above the other. The Mueller-Lyer illusion is that the wings pointing out seem farther apart than wings pointing in, and Morinaga’s paradox is that when one looks down a column of wings pointing alternately one way and the other, they appear misaligned but in the opposite direction from the Mueller-Lyer illusion. The hypothesis of this paper is that the subject, under instructions to align the vertical array of wings, sets up a vertical figure-ground organization different from that used in judging the horizontal distance between wings, and that the two illusions are contingent upon the two organizations. The experiment showed that Morinaga’s paradox occurs when only one column of wings is shown, in agreement with the figure-ground hypothesis, and also shows that Morinaga’s paradox disappears when short line segments are introduced which disrupt the vertical figure-ground organization.     

Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis

The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a twofold strategy is used to show how a consideration of sociality can address both sides of the cognitive gap: (1) it is argued from a systemic perspective that inter-agent interactions can extend the behavioral domain of even the simplest agents and (2) it is argued from a phenomenological perspective that the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns. These two complementary considerations of the constitutive role of inter-agent interactions for mind and cognition indicate that sociality is an indispensable element of the life–mind continuity thesis and of cognitive science more generally.     

The Catholic Church’s Mission with the Marginalized

The Catholic Church’s primary mission is to spread the kingdom of God. In the broader sense, the kingdom of God means the reign of righteousness, justice, and peace. However, widespread social, political, and economic inequity tramples the rights of the weak. The church wields tremendous power and influence in the world. However, at times it has failed miserably to protect the weakest. The various scandals within the church call for thorough introspection and repentance. Church authorities need to alter power structures radically to empower the poor and the marginalized. In this paper, I shall refer to Pope Francis’s Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii gaudium to propose concrete steps the church could take to reach out to the marginalized, heal their wounds, and collaborate with them to spread the kingdom of righteousness, justice, and peace in this world. Apart from Evangelii gaudium, I shall also refer to the documents on the social teachings of the Catholic Church and the views of experts in this field.     

Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem’s thesis revisited

This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.     

The Church–Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory

Anti-realist epistemic conceptions of truth imply what is called the knowability principle: All truths are possibly known. The principle can be formalized in a bimodal propositional logic, with an alethic modality ${\diamondsuit}$ and an epistemic modality ${\mathcal{K}}$ , by the axiom scheme ${A \supset \diamondsuit \mathcal{K} A}$ (KP). The use of classical logic and minimal assumptions about the two modalities lead to the paradoxical conclusion that all truths are known, ${A \supset \mathcal{K} A}$ (OP). A Gentzen-style reconstruction of the Church–Fitch paradox is presented following a labelled approach to sequent calculi. First, a cut-free system for classical (resp. intuitionistic) bimodal logic is introduced as the logical basis for the Church–Fitch paradox and the relationships between ${\mathcal {K}}$ and ${\diamondsuit}$ are taken into account. Afterwards, by exploiting the structural properties of the system, in particular cut elimination, the semantic frame conditions that correspond to KP are determined and added in the form of a block of nonlogical inference rules. Within this new system for classical and intuitionistic “knowability logic”, it is possible to give a satisfactory cut-free reconstruction of the Church–Fitch derivation and to confirm that OP is only classically derivable, but neither intuitionistically derivable nor intuitionistically admissible. Finally, it is shown that in classical knowability logic, the Church–Fitch derivation is nothing else but a fallacy and does not represent a real threat for anti-realism.     

Brightnesses,luminances, and Fechner’s paradox

Monocular brightnesses were varied, without varying monocular luminances, both by means of simultaneous contrast and by means of changes in the level of adaptation. Binocular brightness was shown to change in accord with monocular brightness, independent of monocular luminances.     

Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic,Kripke Models and Fitch’s Paradox

The present work is motivated by two questions. (1) What should an intuitionistic epistemic logic look like? (2) How should one interpret the knowledge operator in a Kripke-model for it? In what follows we outline an answer to (2) and give a model-theoretic definition of the operator K. This will shed some light also on (1), since it turns out that K, defined as we do, fulfills the properties of a necessity operator for a normal modal logic. The interest of our construction also lies in a better insight into the intuitionistic solution to Fitch’s paradox, which is discussed in the third section. In particular we examine, in the light of our definition, DeVidi and Solomon’s proposal of formulating the verification thesis as \(\phi \rightarrow \neg \neg K\phi\). We show, as our main result, that this definition excapes the paradox, though it is validated only under restrictive conditions on the models.     

Jean-Yves Lacoste’s thesis on truth

Continental Philosophy Review - This essay offers a commentary of Jean-Yves Lacoste’s most recent book Théses sur le vrai (2018). It does so through a close reading of the book’s...     

The Crimes and Punishments of the ‘Enemies of the Church’ and the Nature of Russia’s Desecularising Regime1

Following a longstanding sociological tradition, this paper looks at reactions to nonconformity in order to understand the nature of social norms. In particular, it explores the patterns and scope of intolerance towards the perceived ‘enemies of the Church’ in order to understand social norms emerging in post-atheist Russia. Utilising the ‘social drama’ approach, the paper offers a comparative case study of increasingly repressive reactions by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and state to two art exhibitions at the Sakharov Museum and anti-clerical publications by a blogger in Karelia, along with an in-depth analysis of the recent (2012) Pussy Riot action at Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow and the resulting trial and punishment of three of the band’s members, as well as of a variety of events that have followed this initial action. We then utilise national and cross-national representative survey data to suggest that these repressive reactions were congruent with an intolerant public sentiment towards opponents of the ROC. Ultimately, we draw on Durkheim’s dialectic of norm and deviance, work on disciplinary modalities of power by Foucault and Agamben, desecularisation analysis and social identity theory to argue that the severe punishment of the perceived ‘enemies of the Church’ and the popular support for it reflect the crystallisation of a new normative system brought about by the desecularising regime in Russia, a regime which is characterised by a symbiosis of the ROC and the state.     

God meets Satan’s Apple: the paradox of creation

It is now the majority view amongst philosophers and theologians that any world could have been better. This places the choice of which world to create into an especially challenging class of decision problems: those that are discontinuous in the limit. I argue that combining some weak, plausible norms governing this type of problem with a creator who has the attributes of the god of classical theism results in a paradox: no world is possible. After exploring some ways out of the paradox, I conclude that the classical theist should accept Marilyn Adams’s view that no norms (of morality or of rationality) apply to gods.     

How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle

In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke??s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in ??A Puzzle About Belief?? poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence ??Londres est jolie??, but not to the English sentence ??London is pretty??, both of which he understands perfectly well. The question to be answered is whether Pierre believes that London is pretty, and Kripke argues, of each answer, that it is unacceptable. On my proposal, either answer to the question is to be rejected, but neither answer is to be denied, using the resource of partially-defined predicates. After demonstrating how this serves as a solution to the puzzle, I illustrate some philosophical motivations??independent of Kripke??s puzzle??for adopting a view on which belief is a partially defined predicate. I conclude that there are decent prospects for the proposed response to Kripke??s puzzle.     

The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox

In Newcomb’s paradox you can choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though, an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to accurately deduce your choice, and uses that deduction to fill the two boxes. The way they do this guarantees that you made the wrong choice. Newcomb’s paradox is that game theory’s expected utility and dominance principles appear to provide conflicting recommendations for what you should choose. Here we show that the conflicting recommendations assume different probabilistic structures relating your choice and the algorithm’s prediction. This resolves the paradox: the reason there appears to be two conflicting recommendations is that the probabilistic structure relating the problem’s random variables is open to two, conflicting interpretations. We then show that the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in Newcomb’s paradox, the focus of much previous work, is irrelevant. We end by showing that Newcomb’s paradox is time-reversal invariant; both the paradox and its resolution are unchanged if the algorithm makes its ‘prediction’ after you make your choice rather than before.