Regulatory mode effects on counterfactual thinking and regret

The present studies examined the influence of two regulatory mode concerns—a locomotion concern with movement from state to state and an assessment concern with making comparisons [see Higgins, E. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Pierro, A. (2003). Regulatory mode: Locomotion and assessment as distinct orientations. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 293-344). New York: Academic Press]—on engaging in counterfactual thinking and experiencing post-decisional regret. When contemplating a decision with a negative outcome, it was predicted that high (vs. low) locomotion would induce less counterfactual thinking and less regret, whereas the opposite would be true for high (vs. low) assessment. Locomotion and assessment orientations were measured as chronic individual differences in Study 1 and 2, and were induced experimentally in Study 3. In Study 1 and 3 a purchase scenario with a negative outcome was used to elicit counterfactuals and regret, while in Study 2 participants were asked to recall one of their own personal purchases that had a negative outcome. The results supported our predictions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the nature of counterfactual thinking and regret from the perspective of their relation to regulatory mode.     

Behavioural consequences of regret and disappointment in social bargaining games

Previous research on the role of negative emotions in social bargaining games has focused primarily on social emotions such as anger and guilt. In this article, we provide a test for behavioural differences between two prototypical decision-related negative emotions-regret and disappointment-in one-shot social dilemma games. Three experiments with two different emotion-induction procedures (autobiographical recall and imagined scenarios) and two different games (the ultimatum game and the 10-coin give-some game) revealed that regret increased prosocial behaviour, whereas disappointment decreased prosocial behaviour. These results extend previous findings concerning differences between regret and disappointment to interdependent (social) situations.     

The differential effect of realistic and unrealistic counterfactual thinking on regret

Research has established that realistic counterfactual thinking can determine the intensity and the content of people's affective reactions to decision outcomes and events. Not much is known, however, about the affective consequences of counterfactual thinking that is unrealistic (i.e., that does not correspond to the main causes of a negative outcome). In three experiments, we investigate the influence of realistic and unrealistic counterfactuals on experienced regret after negative outcomes. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who thought unrealistically about a poor outcome reported less regret than those who thought realistically about it. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we replicated this finding and we showed that the decrease in regret was associated with a shift in the causal attributions of the poor outcome. Participants who thought unrealistically attributed it more to external circumstances and less to their own behaviours than those who thought realistically about it. We discuss the implications of these findings for the role of counterfactuals as self-serving biases and the functionality of regret as a counterfactual emotion.     

Supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation: The interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret

This study examined the social effects of emotions related to supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation. In a computer-simulated negotiation, participants in Experiment 1 were confronted with a disappointed or worried opponent (supplication), with a guilty or regretful opponent (appeasement), or with a nonemotional opponent (control). Compared with controls, participants conceded more when the other experienced supplication emotions and conceded less when the other experienced appeasement emotions (especially guilt). Experiment 2 replicated the effects of disappointment and guilt and showed that they are moderated by the perceiver's dispositional trust: Negotiators high in trust conceded more to a disappointed counterpart than to a happy one, but those with low trust were unaffected. In Experiment 3, trust was manipulated through information about the other's personality (cooperative vs. competitive), and a similar moderation was obtained.     

When the alternative would have been better: counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning--asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got--creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that--when controlling for false positives--regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

Mental contrasting and conciliatory behavior in romantic relationships

When people in a relationship offend each other, it is important for them to behave in a conciliatory manner if they wish to reconcile. We tested in two studies if mental contrasting (versus other modes of thoughts) is an effective strategy for people to self-regulate their conciliatory behavior. In Study 1, we assessed student participants’ spontaneous mode of thought when thinking about an unresolved interpersonal transgression and measured their commitment to reconcile. Eight days later, we assessed their conciliatory behavior. Participants who spontaneously mentally contrasted reported more commitment to reconcile and showed sensible conciliatory behavior (i.e., based on their expectations of solving their interpersonal concern). In Study 2, romantic couples were invited into the lab and asked to identify unresolved incidents in which one partner (the perpetrator) had offended the other (the victim). After perpetrators were induced to mentally contrast or indulge about a successful reconciliation, we videotaped the couples discussing the incident. Only perpetrators who mentally contrasted showed sensible conciliatory behavior and reached effective reconciliation (measured right after the experiment and 2 weeks later). The findings imply that mental contrasting supports perpetrators to show conciliatory behavior when it promises to be successful, but discourages it when it seems futile or adverse, thereby protecting the relationship from further harm.

     

Perceived qualifications,resource abundance,and resentment about deprivation

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that perceptions of being well qualified for a desired object will decrease individuals' resentment about deprivation when opportunities for obtaining the object are good (i.e., when the resource is abundant), but increase resentment when the resource is scarce. In the first experiment, unemployed nurses participated in a survey of the job situation for nurses. The initial questions in the survey were designed to manipulate respondents' perceptions of (a) their qualifications for employment, by affecting their perceived similarity to employed nurses (similar vs different), and (b) the job potential for unemployed nurses (improve vs worsen). In the second experiment, subjects competed over a number of trials with other participants for money that they had previously been promised. Some of the subjects had practiced the task ahead of time (qualified subjects), whereas others had not (unqualified subjects). In addition, the number of payments that were allegedly available was varied (many vs few). In both experiments, the manipulation of good qualifications reduced resentment when the resource was abundant, but did not significantly affect resentment when the resource was scarce. The implications of these results for understanding the determinants of resentment about deprivation are discussed.     

Mental contrasting and the self-regulation of responding to negative feedback

Mentally contrasting a desired future with impeding reality promotes goal pursuit when expectations of success are high and curbs goal pursuit when expectations of success are low. Four studies tested whether mental contrasting affects responses to goal-relevant negative feedback. Mental contrasting promoted the processing of negative feedback (Studies 1 and 2), which in turn helped participants to form plans beneficial for goal pursuit (Study 2). Mental contrasting also protected the self-view of competence against negative feedback (Study 3) and facilitated beneficial attributions for negative feedback (Study 4). All effects occurred in line with expectations of success. These results suggest that mental contrasting regulates effective responses to negative feedback by bringing goal pursuit in line with expectations of success.     

Unconscious fantasies, structural theory, and compromise formation

Although the existence of unconscious fantasies is an empirical assumption, in the clinical situation unconscious fantasies are treated as if they have a concrete existence. Unconscious fantasies form intermediate links in causal chains of which clinical observations constitute one end, and the components of unconscious conflicts, the other. Like all clinical material, fantasies may be affected by actual experiences; they may also be revised, layered, and can function to alter and disguise other fantasies as well as provide gratification. From a technical standpoint, it is most important to analyze their constituents and to adduce their primary purposes in the clinical situation of the moment. The nature of the evidence that identifies the presence of particular unconscious fantasies is discussed. Although a single analytic session is presented by way of illustration, I am convinced that the analyst's entire understanding of the patient inevitably channels his or her interpretive focus on the associational material of each analytic hour.     

Martha Nussbaum: Anger and forgiveness: resentment,generosity, justice

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Mental contrasting of a dieting wish improves self-reported health behaviour

Mentally contrasting a desired future with present reality standing in its way promotes commitment to feasible goals, whereas mentally indulging in a desired future does not. Dieting students (N?=?134) reported their most important dieting wish that they deemed attainable within a 2-week period. Then, they were directed to mentally contrast or indulge in thoughts and images about the named dieting wish. A control condition was given no directions. Two weeks after the experiment, dieters retrospectively rated their behaviour change: in the mental contrasting condition they reported having eaten relatively fewer calories overall, fewer high-calorie food and more low-calorie food compared to those in the indulging and control conditions, and they also reported having been more physically active. This transfer effect from one health domain to another suggests a more generalised effect of mental contrasting versus indulging and control than previously assumed.     

Cultural grounding of regret: regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

Deductive reasoning with factual, possible, and counterfactual conditionals

We compared reasoners' inferences from conditionals based on possibilities in the present or the past (e.g., "If Linda had been in Dublin then Cathy would have been in Galway") with their inferences based on facts in the present or the past (e.g., "If Linda was in Dublin then Cathy was in Galway"). We propose that people construct a richer representation of conditionals that deal with possibilities rather than facts: Their models make explicit not only the suppositional case, in which Linda is in Dublin and Cathy is in Galway, but also the presupposed case, in which Linda is not in Dublin and Cathy is not in Galway. We report the results of four experiments that corroborate this model theory. The experiments show that reasoners make more inferences from conditionals based on possibilities rather than on facts when the inferences depend on the presupposed case. The results also show that reasoners generate different situations to verify and falsify conditionals based on possibilities and facts.     

Further validation of the gratitude, resentment, and appreciation test (GRAT)

The authors conducted this study to further validate the revised short form of the Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Test by investigating the relationship between GRAT-measured gratitude and two other constructs: (a) spiritual transcendence and (b) materialism. As predicted, both the GRAT and its subscales correlated positively with a measure of spiritual transcendence and negatively with a measure of materialism.     

Parenting a damaged child: mourning, regression, and disappointment

This paper is an examination of the long-term parenting experiences of parents who have given birth to CNS damaged infants. In particular, the focus is on the mourning, regression, rage, and depression that frequently attend these parents throughout their lives and can become pathological and pathogenic interferences with the provision of good-enough parenting. Several clinical vignettes were presented, each of which illustrated the usefulness of different psychoanalytic clinical theories about normality and pathology of parenting and parent-child interaction. The now-classical contribution of Solnit and Stark (Mourning and the Birth of a Defective Child, 1962) is reviewed along with Benedek's and others' psychoanalytic theories about normal parenting. The thinking of these writers is within the framework of structural/libidinal theory and seems to be useful in describing certain parenting problems that concern the mourning and regressive aspects of parenting. However, it was proposed that some of the adaptive coping and pathology encompassed by Solnit and Stark's explanations is not comfortably illuminated by the structural clinical theory of conflict and drives. Freud's discussion (1917) compares mourning and melancholia, which he differentiated as related but dynamically distinct clinical phenomena. This work is briefly recalled as an earlier point in theory building where structural theory was not sufficient to explain clinical depression and rage that exceeds normal mourning (as in Freud's melancholia). It is felt that an additional theoretical perspective on parenting provided by self psychology can fill in some of the gaps left by structural theory explanations. The self psychology perspective is particularly helpful with understanding the rage, ambivalence, and chronic depression often experienced by parents of damaged children. According to this perspective, the damaged child is a disappointing selfobject for the parent, and the parent's self organization will give him the resources to cope adaptively or to develop narcissistic pathology. Three types of intrapsychic problems for a parent are described: mourning the lost object, the fantasied perfect child; experiencing and recovering from regression to early identifications with his own parents; withstanding tension and regulating one's self (experiencing chronic depression and rage) when confronted with a great disappointment in a selfobject (represented by the damaged child). It is important when designing intervention strategies in a hospital or pediatric clinic setting to clarify which type of problem is the major focus of the parent's struggle.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)