Ethical theory, “common morality,” and professional obligations

We have two aims in this paper. The first is negative: to demonstrate the problems in Bernard Gert’s account of common morality, in particular as it applies to professional morality. The second is positive: to suggest a more satisfactory explanation of the moral basis of professional role morality, albeit one that is broadly consistent with Gert’s notion of common morality, but corrects and supplements Gert’s theory. The paper is in three sections. In the first, we sketch the main features of Gert’s account of common morality in general. In the second, we outline Gert’s explanation of the source of professional moral rules and demonstrate its inadequacy. In the third section, we provide an account of our own collectivist needs-based view of the source of the role-moral obligations of many professional roles, including those of health care professionals.

Is causal induction based on causal power? Critique of Cheng (1997)

The authors empirically evaluate P. W. Cheng's (1997) power PC theory of causal induction. They reanalyze some published data taken to support the theory and show instead that the data are at variance with it. Then, they report 6 experiments in which participants evaluated the causal relationship between a fictitious chemical and DNA mutations. The power PC theory assumes that participants' estimates are based on the causal power p of a potential cause, where p is the contingency between the cause and the effect normalized by the base rate of the effect. Three of the experiments used a procedure in which causal information was presented trial by trial. For these experiments, the power PC theory was contrasted with the predictions of the probabilistic contrast model and the Rescorla-Wagner theory. For the remaining 3 experiments, a summary presentation format was employed to which only the probabilistic contrast model and the power PC theory are applicable. The power PC theory was unequivocally contradicted by the results obtained in these experiments, whereas the other 2 theories proved to be satisfactory.     

Can being scared cause tummy aches? Naive theories, ambiguous evidence, and preschoolers' causal inferences

Causal learning requires integrating constraints provided by domain-specific theories with domain-general statistical learning. In order to investigate the interaction between these factors, the authors presented preschoolers with stories pitting their existing theories against statistical evidence. Each child heard 2 stories in which 2 candidate causes co-occurred with an effect. Evidence was presented in the form: AB?E; CA?E; AD?E; and so forth. In 1 story, all variables came from the same domain; in the other, the recurring candidate cause, A, came from a different domain (A was a psychological cause of a biological effect). After receiving this statistical evidence, children were asked to identify the cause of the effect on a new trial. Consistent with the predictions of a Bayesian model, all children were more likely to identify A as the cause within domains than across domains. Whereas 3.5-year-olds learned only from the within-domain evidence, 4- and 5-year-olds learned from the cross-domain evidence and were able to transfer their new expectations about psychosomatic causality to a novel task.     

Los procesos de atribución causal

RESUMEN

El interés por los procesos de atribución, por las explicaciones -razones- que las personas dan para su conducta y la de los demás, es una de las características más sobresalientes de los modelos recientes en la Psicología Social. Heider, hace veinticinco años, ya se había fijado en la gran significación de los procesos de atribución causal en las relaciones interpersonales, pero hasta hace bastantes años después no se recogieron los frutos de aquel interés señalado por Heider. En este trabajo se realiza una revisión de diversos modelos de atribución y se señala, desde una posición crítica, algunas de sus inconsistencias.     

Can there be one-way causal conditionship?

I defend my attempt to explain causal priority by means of one-way causal conditionship by answering an argument by J. A. Cover about Charles' law. Then I attempt to say what makes a philosophical analysis a counterfactual analysis, so I can understand Cover's claim that my account is at its base a counterfactual one. Finally I examine Cover's discussion of my contention that necessary for in the circumstances is nontransitive.     

Naïve deontics: a theory of meaning, representation, and reasoning

Deontic assertions concern what one ought to do, may do, and ought not to do. This paper proposes a theory of their meanings and of how these meanings are represented in mental models. The meanings of deontic assertions refer to sets of permissible and impermissible states. An experiment corroborated the ability of individuals to list these states. The most salient were those corresponding to the mental models of the assertions. When individuals reason, they rely on mental models, which do not make all states explicit. The theory predicts the most frequent conclusions drawn from deontic premises. It also predicts the occurrence of illusory inferences from assertions of permission, i.e., inferences that seem highly plausible but that are in fact invalid. Assertions of prohibitions, according to the theory, should reduce the illusions. Further experiments corroborated these predictions.     

Does causal action facilitate causal perception in infants younger than 6 months of age?

Previous research has established that infants are unable to perceive causality until 6¼ months of age. The current experiments examined whether infants’ ability to engage in causal action could facilitate causal perception prior to this age. In Experiment 1, 4½‐month‐olds were randomly assigned to engage in causal action experience via Velcro sticky mittens or not engage in causal action because they wore non‐sticky mittens. Both groups were then tested in the visual habituation paradigm to assess their causal perception. Infants who engaged in causal action – but not those without this causal action experience – perceived the habituation events as causal. Experiment 2 used a similar design to establish that 4½‐month‐olds are unable to generalize their own causal action to causality observed in dissimilar objects. These data are the first to demonstrate that infants under 6 months of age can perceive causality, and have implications for the mechanisms underlying the development of causal perception.     

Information theory,evolutionary computation,and Dembski’s “complex specified information”

Intelligent design advocate William Dembski has introduced a measure of information called “complex specified information”, or CSI. He claims that CSI is a reliable marker of design by intelligent agents. He puts forth a “Law of Conservation of Information” which states that chance and natural laws are incapable of generating CSI. In particular, CSI cannot be generated by evolutionary computation. Dembski asserts that CSI is present in intelligent causes and in the flagellum of Escherichia coli, and concludes that neither have natural explanations. In this paper, we examine Dembski’s claims, point out significant errors in his reasoning, and conclude that there is no reason to accept his assertions.     

“Dependency, subordination, and recognition: On Judith Butler's theory of subjection”

Judith Butler's recent work expands the Foucaultian notion of subjection to encompass an analysis of the ways in which subordinated individuals becomes passionately attached to, and thus come to be psychically invested in, their own subordination. I argue that Butler's psychoanalytically grounded account of subjection offers a compelling diagnosis of how and why an attachment to oppressive norms – of femininity, for example – can persist in the face of rational critique of those norms. However, I also argue that her account of individual and collective resistance to subjection is plagued by familiar problems concerning the normative criteria and motivation for resistance that emerge in her recent work in new and arguably more intractable forms, and by new concerns about her conceptions of dependency, subordination and recognition.     

Ethnotherapeutic empathy (EthE)—Part I: Definition,theory, and process

This paper introduces the concept of ethnotherapeutic empathyin working with ethnoculturally different patients to increase the efficacy of therapy. This form of empathy is used instrumentally to get to know the patient's inner problematic images, anxieties, fears, depressive affect, suffering, hurt, disillusionment, rage, joy, and triumph. Clinical empathy with ethnic patients is instrumental in that it is purposive:it sets out to achieve what might be called patient-comprehending(that is, finding out the nature of the patient's problems) using this as guide to intervening—a form of creativity-in-action. Ethnotherapeutic empathy utilizes active ego processes, in contrast to the passive processes implied in artistic appreciation and surrender. This article presents the definitions of empathy, and associated intrapsychic and social factors, as well as physiological responses in empathie responding. The implications for clinical practice with patients of differing ethnocultural and racial groups are discussed. The article develops a foundation for understanding the therapeutic matrix of applied ethnotherapeutic empathy which is detailed in the second part of this article (Ethnotherapeutic Empathy [EthE]—Part II: Techniques of Vicarious experiencing Across Cultures).     

Wittgenstein's picture‐theory

In a paper published in this journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1962, pp. 46–64, Mr. H. R. G. Schwyzer has argued that ‘the current view (as held by, eg., Wamock, Anscombe and Stemus) of Wittgenstein's theory of language in the Tractatus is mistaken’. The editor of the journal has asked me for a reply. My reply concerns only my own book, and it amounts to the statement that Mr. Schwyzer's attack on the book has very little to do with what is said in it.     

Sensorimotor theory,cognitive access and the ‘absolute’ explanatory gap

Sensorimotor Theory (SMT) is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following three claims. First, that appeals to cognitive access fail to answer the absolute gap question. Second, that SMT can be read in a way that rejects the gap question. Third, that if proponents of SMT are prepared to read SMT in a way that rejects the absolute gap question, then they can also reject the claim that cognitive access is needed to explain experience.     

Familial comorbidity of bipolar disorder and multiple sclerosis: Genetic susceptibility, coexistence or causal relationship?

Our purpose in undertaking the present study was to examine the hypotheses proposed for explaining the frequent comorbidity of bipolar disorder and multiple sclerosis. One hypothesis posits that, when there is comorbidity, MS plays a causal role in psychiatric manifestations. Another suggests that both disorders have a common underlying physiological process that increases the likelihood of their co-occurrence. We examined two adult siblings with comorbidity and their relatives, including three generations of family members with psychiatric morbidity. We found an extensive multigenerational history of bipolar disorder in this family. This history would seem to support the hypothesis of a common underlying brain process (potentially genetically-based) to explain the comorbidity of BD and MS, but cannot clarify whether this comorbidity implies a relationship between the two disorders or merely reflects parallel processes of brain deterioration. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility of a subclinical MS-related process leading to the early manifestation of BD, with MS appearing much later in time, or even a third, undetermined factor, leading to familial comorbidity. Although we have insufficient information to support either hypothesis definitively, we present the familial cases as a springboard for a discussion of dilemmas related to teasing apart MS and BD comorbidity. Further observation of the clinical course of the younger family members, who have not yet shown any neurological signs, over the next few years may elucidate the current picture further.     

Can Beck's theory of depression and the response style theory be integrated?

There are obvious similarities between the cognitive constructs of A. T. Beck's (1976) cognitive theory and the response style theory (S. Nolen-Hoeksema & J. Morrow, 1991). Different propositions of J. A. Ciesla and J. E. Roberts (2007) and S. Lyubomirsky and S. Nolen-Hoeksema (1993, 1995) concerning associations of 2 response styles, brooding and reflection, with constructs of Beck's cognitive theory (schemata, cognitive errors, cognitive triad, automatic thoughts) were tested. Model comparisons were based on a 4-week study in which 397 participants completed self-report instruments at 2 time points. A model allowing schemata to influence brooding and reflection that influence the other cognitive variables of Beck's cognitive theory fits the data better than the other integrated models. However, although schemata were significant predictors of both response styles, neither response style did significantly predict other cognitive variables. A comparison of the integrated model with Beck's original cognitive theory revealed that Beck's original theory fits the data better than the integrated model, whereas both models explain about the same amount of variance. Thus, an integration of Beck's theory and the response style theory are not supported.