An objection to gareth evans' account of self-identity

In chapter seven ‘Self Identification’ of his challenging book The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans attempts to give an account of how it is that one is able to think about oneself self‐consciously. On Evans’ view, when one attempts to think of oneself self‐consciously that person is having what he calls an ‘I’ thought. Since these ‘I’ thoughts are a case of reference, more specifically self‐reference, Evans thinks that these thoughts can be explained by employing the same theoretical framework that he uses to explain other kinds of reference. Evans thinks all thoughts are essentially structured, and this means that they must fall under his ‘generality constraint’. Since ‘I’ thoughts are also ‘thoughts’ they are essentially structured as well, and they too must be subject to the generality constraint. The radical implication of this is that Evans thinks that if ‘I’ thoughts are subject to the generality constraint, then he can show that self‐reference must be reference to a thing which we can locate on a spatio‐temporal map. In this article I hope to accomplish three things. First, I will spell out in detail the argument Evans uses to arrive at his claim that self‐reference must be reference to something located on a spatio‐temporal map. Second, I will raise an objection, which states that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is not a consequence of the generality constraint. Finally I will argue that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is in fact in tension with the generality constraint, rather than being an implication of it.     

Tense and Relativity

Those inclined to positions in the philosophy of time that take tense seriously have typically assumed that not all regions of space‐time are equal: one special region of space‐time corresponds to what is presently happening. When combined with assumptions from modern physics this has the unsettling consequence that the shape of this favored region distinguishes people in certain places or people traveling at certain velocities. In this paper I shall attempt to avoid this result by developing a tensed picture of reality that is nonetheless consistent with ‘hypersurface egalitarianism’—the view that all hypersurfaces are equal.     

Auto-affection and the Curvature of Spacetime: Derrida Reading Heidegger Reading Kant

ABSTRACT

This paper has a twofold objective. First, it engages with the interrelation of time, space, and matter in Kant, Heidegger, and Derrida and questions whether and how this interrelation effects the possibility of self-relation. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger suggests that the very structure of subjectivity is constituted by what he calls the ‘pure self-affection’ of time and thus the possibility of self-relation is intimately bound up with the temporalizing of time. In his 1964–65 seminar, Heidegger: the Question of Being and History, Derrida translates this pure affection of time into the more generic term ‘auto-affection,’ which will remain a pivotal reference point for his deconstruction of the metaphysical privileging of time as presence. Derrida shows how the (im)possibility of auto-affection is bound up not only with time but also with space, or rather with the ‘spacing of time’ that he also refers to as ‘the trace.’ Second, the paper moves across the frontiers of philosophy and physics posing anew the question concerning the interrelations of temporality, spatiality, and materiality. With reference to what in general relativity is called ‘the curvature of spacetime,’ the efficacy of materiality in the movement of auto-affection is called into question.     

The explosion of the present and the encapsulation of time: Transference phenomena in the analysis of a psychotic patient

The paper deals with some basic problems concerning the experience of time and space in the psychoanalytic treatment of psychotic patients. Whereas borderline patients tend to distort the experience of time and space under emotional pressure, the concepts of time and space seem to dissolve in acute psychotic states of mind. Sometimes this manifests itself in an explosion of the present, where the past is ubiquitous and the future is perceived as the end of all times. The case of a 48 year‐old patient with the external diagnosis of ‘paranoid–hallucinatory schizophrenia’ is presented to illustrate that the main task is to recreate a structure to contain the experience of space and time. Such a development may occur if primitive psychotic anxieties can be taken up and metabolized. A near‐psychotic decompensation before the first break and the development of a transference psychosis in the second year of the analysis are depicted in detail. Subsequently some developments became visible which helped the patient to better tolerate catastrophic fears of loss. This included the formation of a structure which the patient called ‘hibernation’ enabling her to psychically survive without falling apart. By retreating into her ‘time capsule’ she managed to overcome breaks and to delay her fears of fragmentation until they could be taken up and worked through in the transference. The creation of a structure like the patient's ‘time capsule’ is considered to be an attempt to construct the experience of time and space. It prevented a collapse of her internal space thereby enabling further steps towards thinking and symbolization. In conclusion, some theoretical and clinical aspects are discussed including the role of the countertransference.     

On Death—Preliminary Communication

I try to show that throughout the analytical process, real issues arise which require analysis; these may relate to time changes, fees, endings of the week or of the term and ultimately the ending of the analysis. The patient's capacity to handle the pain of feeling excluded relates to the patient's internal objects as they are re-experienced in relation to real events in the analysis. These patients ‘experiences of real events, past and current, may be closely bound up with early unconscious phantasies which colour and even dominate the way these events were and are experienced and negotiated. I have particularly emphasised the intersection of real events in the patients’ past and current lives with real events in the analysis and have tried to indicate ways in which they might be addressed in analytic work     

The aimless rationality of science 1

It is usually attempted teleologically to demonstrate the rationality of the so‐called scientific method. Goals or aims are posited (and their specification defended) and it is then argued that conformity with some body of methodological rules is conducive to the realization of these goals or aims. A ‘ deontological’ alternative to this approach is offered, adapting insights of contemporary political philosophers, especially John Rawls and Bruce Ackerman. The ‘circumstances of method’ are defined as those circumstances in which it alone makes sense to seek some method for the resolution of disputed issues. It is then shown that individuals who find themselves in these circumstances have reason to conduct themselves in conformity with certain simple rules of argumentation—have reason, indeed, in the very fact that they do so find themselves and altogether without reference to any goals or aims which it might be hoped to achieve. These rules require non‐interference, responsiveness, relevance, and publicity, and are, arguably, the rules which define the concept (and which therefore provide a framework for various conceptions,) of scientific method.     

Young Children's Reports of When Events Occurred: Do Event Type and Assessment Method Matter?

Studying young children's reporting about when various events occurred informs about the development of episodic memory and metacognition. In two experiments, 55 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two activity sessions, a week apart. During the activity sessions, they learned novel animal facts and body movements, and they coloured animal pictures and posed for body movement photos. Immediately after the second activity session, children were interviewed about when they experienced the various events. Overall, children were as accurate about learning events as physical events, but they were more accurate when asked temporal distance (e.g. ‘Which did you learn a longer time ago, “X” or “Y”?’) than temporal location questions (e.g. ‘Which did you learn before today, “X” or “Y”?’). The results suggest that young children's apparent difficulty recognizing new learning is not due to a rapid ‘remember‐to‐know shift’. Rather, the way we ask young children about when they experienced various events determines their accuracy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aristotle’s Notion of ‘Place’ in the Context of Present-day Physics

The article deals with Aristotle’s conception of ‘place’, which is of cruсial importance for his theory of motion. It is shown that in the physics of Aristotle there is no concept of spасe; instead, there is the notion of ‘place’ of a body (topos). Aristotle considered ‘place’ as the first boundary of a body embracing (containing) the body in question. The author shows the incommensurability between the spatial ideas of the Stagirite and the similar ideas of Newtonian physics. The article states that in order to give an adequate reconstruction of Aristotle’s concept of ‘place’ we need to take into account two different levels of consideration: local and global. Places locally separable (from bodies) cannot be separated on the global level. In Newtonian physics, bodies are separable from places on both levels. The nature of parallelism of ideas between Aristotle’s conception of ‘place’ and the notions of space in present-day physics is analysed.     

Life‐events and post‐traumatic stress in a sample of English adolescents

The aim of the present study was to investigate the lifetime prevalence of negative life‐events and their association with post‐traumatic stress in English adolescents. Of the 427 adolescents surveyed, 360 (84%) endorsed at least one negative event. Respondents were asked to complete the Impact of Event Scale (IES: Horowitz, Wilner and Alvarez, 1979) for each event that they endorsed. For boys, highest levels of post‐traumatic stress were found in those who had experience of a ‘family member with a drink or drugs problem’, followed by ‘parental separation or divorce’, ‘life threat to family member’, and ‘life‐threat to self ’. For girls, highest levels of post‐traumatic stress were found in those who had experienced ‘attack or physical assault to self ’, followed by ‘family member with drink or drugs problem’, ‘parental separation or divorce’, and ‘life threat to family member’. These data suggest that moderate levels of post‐traumatic stress are present in around one fifth of adolescents who have experienced one of these events and that community levels of post‐traumatic stress in adolescents may be higher than previously thought. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Spaces of Knowledge: Bertrand Russell,Logical Construction,and the Classification of the Sciences

What Russell regarded to be the ‘chief outcome’ of his 1914 Lowell Lectures at Harvard can only be fully appreciated, I argue, if one embeds the outcome back into the ‘classificatory problem’ that many at the time were heavily engaged in. The problem focused on the place and relationships between the newly formed or recently professionalized disciplines such as psychology, Erkenntnistheorie, physics, logic and philosophy. The prime metaphor used in discussions about the classificatory problem by British philosophers was a spatial one, with such motifs as ‘standpoints’, ‘place’ and ‘perspectives’ in the space of knowledge. In fact, Russell’s construction of a perspectival space of six-dimensions was meant precisely to be a timely solution to the widely discussed classificatory problem.     

The covering law model of historical explanation

It is often argued (as by Hempel and Nagel) that genuine historical explanations — if these are to be had — must exhibit a connection between events to be explained and universal or probabilistic laws (or ‘hypotheses'). This connection may take either a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ form. The historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained is a logical consequence of statements of reasonably well‐confirmed universal laws and occurrences linked by the laws to the event to be explained. Or the historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained has high inductive probability conferred upon it given statements of reasonably well‐confirmed probabilistic laws and occurrences so linked by the laws to the type of event to be explained that one finds the occurrence of the particular event likely. This essay focuses on ‘strong’ explanations which meet a ‘deducibility’ requirement (for reasons given in the body of the article). It is argued that explanations in history (at least where it is plausible to construe them as ‘non‐rational') may meet a ‘deducibility’ requirement and count as genuine historical explanations although they do not meet a ‘covering law’ requirement (i. e. none of the premises of these explanations state universal or probabilistic hypotheses). It is required, however, that at least one premise in such explanations assert a reasonably well‐confirmed condition (e. g., a co‐variation) which can be taken as a sign or indication of the presence of laws. Rather than appealing to laws, the historian may appeal to the well‐founded possibility of laws.     

Cybernetics and mind‐body problems 1

It is asked to what extent answers to such questions as ‘Can machines think?’, ‘Could robots have feelings?’ might be expected to yield insight into traditional mind‐body questions. It has sometimes been assumed that answering the first set of questions would be the same as answering the second. Against this approach other philosophers have argued that answering the first set of questions would not help us to answer the second. It is argued that both of these assessments are mistaken. It is then claimed, although not argued in detail, that the following three approaches to the first set of questions are mistaken: (1) machines (and robots) obviously cannot think, feel, create, etc., since they do only what they are programmed to do; (2) on the basis of ah analysis of the meaning of the words ‘machine’ ('robot’, ‘think’, ‘feel’, etc.) we can see that in principle it would be impossible for machines (or robots) to think, feel, create, etc.; (3) machines (and robots) obviously can (or could) think, feel, etc., since they do certain things which, if we were to do them, would require thought, feeling, etc. It is argued that, once it is seen why approach (2) is mistaken, it becomes desirable to decline ‘in principle’ approaches to the first set of questions and to favor ‘piecemeal investigations’ where attention is centered upon what is actually taking place in machine technology, the development of new programming techniques, etc. Some suggestions are made concerning the relevance of current computer simulation studies to traditional mind‐body questions. A new set of questions is proposed as a substitute for the first set of questions. It is hoped that attempts to answer these may provide us with new and detailed portraits of the mind‐body relationship.     

Sense‐making in the wake of September 11th: A network analysis of lay understandings

The objective of this research was to document and explore British university students' immediate understanding of the events of September 11th. A network analysis of lay causal perceptions procedure was employed to capture the social perceptions and sense‐making of respondents at a time when they and the world struggled to impose meaning and coherence on the events. The study also examined the possible effects of ‘belief in a just world’ and ‘right‐wing authoritarianism’ on the pattern of perceived causes. The results suggest that most participants perceive cultural and religious differences, the history of conflict in the Middle East, unfairness and prejudice as being the distal causes of the individual agent's emotions and actions. There is also some evidence that right‐wing authoritarianism and belief in a just world have an interactive effect on the strength of the perceived link between some of these causes.     

Remembering when we last remembered our childhood experiences: Effects of age and context on retrospective metamemory judgments

People sometimes exhibit a ‘forgot‐it‐all‐along bias’ in which they claim that they have gone for months or years without thinking about certain childhood experiences despite recently recalling those memories. The present study examines memory for memories of childhood experiences, expanding on prior work by using manipulations that require greater reflection when thinking about remembered experiences and when making retrospective metamemory judgments. Age‐related differences in memory‐for‐memory accuracy were also examined. Young (18–20) and older adults (63–89) recalled various events while focusing on emotional or perceptual details for some, and several weeks later were asked to indicate the last time they had remembered various events. Results showed that young adults were more accurate than older adults overall, though both age groups still exhibited a forgot‐it‐all‐along bias that was reduced but not eliminated when a contextual reminder was provided. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hacking on the Looping Effects of Psychiatric Classifications: What Is an Interactive and Indifferent Kind?

This paper examines Ian Hacking’s analysis of the looping effects of psychiatric classifications, focusing on his recent account of interactive and indifferent kinds. After explicating Hacking’s distinction between ‘interactive kinds’ (human kinds) and ‘indifferent kinds’ (natural kinds), I argue that Hacking cannot claim that there are ‘interactive and indifferent kinds,’ given the way that he introduces the interactive‐indifferent distinction. Hacking is also ambiguous on whether his notion of interactive and indifferent kinds is supposed to offer an account of classifications or objects of classification. I argue that these conceptual difficulties show that Hacking’s account of interactive and indifferent kinds cannot be based on—and should be clearly separated from—his distinction between interactive kinds and indifferent kinds. In clarifying Hacking’s account, I argue that interactive and indifferent kinds should be regarded as objects of classification (i.e., kinds of people) that can be identified with reference to a law‐like biological regularity and are aware of how they are classified. Schizophrenia and depression are discussed as examples. I subsequently offer reasons for resisting Hacking’s claim that the objects of classification in the human sciences—as a result of looping effects—are ‘moving targets’.     

What’s the object of object working memory in infancy? Unraveling ‘what’ and ‘how many’

Infants have a bandwidth-limited object working memory (WM) that can both individuate and identify objects in a scene, (answering ‘how many?’ or ‘what?’, respectively). Studies of infants’ WM for objects have typically looked for limits on either ‘how many’ or ‘what’, yielding different estimates of infant capacity. Infants can keep track of about three individuals (regardless of identity), but appear to be much more limited in the number of specific identities they can recall. Why are the limits on ‘how many’ and ‘what’ different? Are the limits entirely separate, do they interact, or are they simply two different aspects of the same underlying limit?We sought to unravel these limits in a series of experiments which tested 9- and 12-month-olds’ WM for object identities under varying degrees of difficulty. In a violation-of-expectation looking-time task, we hid objects one at a time behind separate screens, and then probed infants’ WM for the shape identity of the penultimate object in the sequence. We manipulated the difficulty of the task by varying both the number of objects in hiding locations and the number of means by which infants could detect a shape change to the probed object. We found that 9-month-olds’ WM for identities was limited by the number of hiding locations: when the probed object was one of two objects hidden (one in each of two locations), 9-month-olds succeeded, and they did so even though they were given only one means to detect the change. However, when the probed object was one of three objects hidden (one in each of three locations), they failed, even when they were given two means to detect the shape change. Twelve-month-olds, by contrast, succeeded at the most difficult task level.Results show that WM for ‘how many’ and for ‘what’ are not entirely separate. Individuated objects are tracked relatively cheaply. Maintaining bindings between indexed objects and identifying featural information incurs a greater attentional/memory cost. This cost reduces with development. We conclude that infant WM supports a small number of featureless object representations that index the current locations of objects. These can have featural information bound to them, but only at substantial cost.     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

The DINA model as a constrained general diagnostic model: Two variants of a model equivalency

The ‘deterministic‐input noisy‐AND’ (DINA) model is one of the more frequently applied diagnostic classification models for binary observed responses and binary latent variables. The purpose of this paper is to show that the model is equivalent to a special case of a more general compensatory family of diagnostic models. Two equivalencies are presented. Both project the original DINA skill space and design Q ‐matrix using mappings into a transformed skill space as well as a transformed Q ‐matrix space. Both variants of the equivalency produce a compensatory model that is mathematically equivalent to the (conjunctive) DINA model. This equivalency holds for all DINA models with any type of Q ‐matrix, not only for trivial (simple‐structure) cases. The two versions of the equivalency presented in this paper are not implied by the recently suggested log‐linear cognitive diagnosis model or the generalized DINA approach. The equivalencies presented here exist independent of these recently derived models since they solely require a linear – compensatory – general diagnostic model without any skill interaction terms. Whenever it can be shown that one model can be viewed as a special case of another more general one, conclusions derived from any particular model‐based estimates are drawn into question. It is widely known that multidimensional models can often be specified in multiple ways while the model‐based probabilities of observed variables stay the same. This paper goes beyond this type of equivalency by showing that a conjunctive diagnostic classification model can be expressed as a constrained special case of a general compensatory diagnostic modelling framework.     

Dynamic perceptual completion and the dynamic snapshot view to help solve the ‘two times’ problem

Perceptual completion fills the gap for discrete perception to become continuous. Similarly, dynamic perceptual completion (DPC) provides an experience of dynamic continuity. Our recent discovery of the ‘happening’ (H) element of DPC completes the total experience for dynamism in the flow of time (FOT). However, a phenomenological explanation for these experiences is essential. The Snapshot Hypotheses especially the Dynamic Snapshot View provides the most comprehensive explanation. From that understanding the ‘two times’ problem (TTP) can be addressed. The static time of spacetime cosmologies has been irreconcilable with the dynamic FOT. Dismissing the FOT as an illusion is unsatisfactory. Therefore, we provide four hypotheses for the TTP.

1) Since cosmological static time demands that all events (cerebral included) are discrete, DPC elements for dynamism should likewise be expected to be discrete and accounted for by a snapshot phenomenology such as the DSV. 2) If temporality can be demonstrated to be similar to apparent motion by being a snapshot phenomenon and not demanding temporal extension it would confirm the DSV and permit reconciliation with static time. 3) If the ‘present moment’ (of the FOT) is subjective as static time theories suggest, it should be possible experimentally for an observer to choose his own ‘present’ by moving (perceptually) to various points in the past with the aid of virtual reality. 4) If dynamism e.g. motion can be precluded without significant information loss or violating physics principles it is a cognitive add-on, thereby contradicting non-static time theories which suggest that time is ‘real.’ We confirm those hypotheses.

     

Dreams that mirror the session1

Dreams in which the analyst appears undisguised almost always depict violations of the setting. Often experienced as special, epiphanic moments, they give a glimpse of an intense, emotional reaction to traumatogenic or otherwise signifi cant events that have occurred during the session or in the most recent previous ones. Probably, the essential aspect of these dreams can be found in the ‘form of their content’. This may be paralleled by the narrative technique of mise en abyme or mirror‐text. The dream appears as a story within the main story and the scene of the analysis is refl ected anti‐illusionistically. The fi ctional structure of the setting is emphasized. Its theatrical self‐consciousness quality is revealed at its best. The author postulates that the transformative therapeutic value of these dreams derives from denouncing the referential illusion of ‘concrete reality’ and of ‘what really happened’. For the analysand, they are an effective (i.e. emotionally intense) opportunity to discover the spatial articulations and the staggering refractions of the inside/outside, the textual/extra‐textual, the psychic reality/material reality. In the continual comings and goings from one term to another, the work of symbolization is reactivated and the subject is constructed. Dreams that mirror the session, from this point of view, provide a model for conceptualizing the analytic work, and their signifi cance goes beyond the specifi c phenomena referred to. A clinical case is given, in which some of one patient's dreams are considered as they occurred over a short period. In one of them, the dream‐within‐a‐dream phenomenon is present.