Human, transhuman, posthuman. Representations of the body between incompleteness and enhancement

"Posthuman" is often used to indicate some position, practice, perspective and vision concerning the future of human beings closely related to the use of contemporary technologies. This contribution would like to analyze some conceptions of the notion of posthuman and to present it as a possible form of "non-anthropocentric" thought which considers technological changes as non-human realities strictly involved in the construction and the definition of what constitutes a human being (and his body) and its predicates. Contrary to anthropocentrism which has characterized Western thought from humanism up to the extreme outcomes of transhumanism, non-anthropocentric posthumanism shows how the human being, who has always been the product of hybridization with the non-human (environment, animals and techniques), is built not only by his own strength but always through his partnership and his environment. The idea of enhancement of the body by technology to reach another stage of human evolution is one of the constant elements characterizing transhumanism. Posthumanism suggests no longer considering the interface with technology as an ergonomic relationship with an external tool that just extends the human body, but as a hybrid, or interpenetration that questions the separation of the body and its centrality. In this perspective, the question is not of simply establishing which is a good use of a technology but, every time, of redefining ourselves in our perspectives and our predicates with regard to what a technology allows and opens up to us.     

孔子“晚而喜易”与其晚年思想的变化

<正>孔子与《易经》的关系是一个古老的话题,从司马迁提出孔子"晚而喜易"后,孔子作《易传》之说流行了近千年,"先儒更无异论"(孔颖达《周易正义序》)。然而,欧阳修《易童子问》的     

‘BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND!’ WITTGENSTEINIAN REFLECTIONS ON RATIONALITY AND REASON

Wittgenstein does not talk much explicitly about reason as a general concept, but this paper aims to sketch some thoughts which might fit his later outlook and which are suggested by his approach to language. The need for some notions in the area of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ are rooted in our ability to engage in discursive and persuasive linguistic exchanges. But because such exchanges can (as Wittgenstein emphasises) be so various, we should expect the notions to come in many versions, shaped by history and culture. Awareness of this variety, and of the distinctive elements of our own Western European history, may provide some defence against the temptation of conceptions, such as that of ‘perfect rationality’, which operate in unhelpfully simplified and idealised terms.     

Can language restructure cognition? The case for space

Frames of reference are coordinate systems used to compute and specify the location of objects with respect to other objects. These have long been thought of as innate concepts, built into our neurocognition. However, recent work shows that the use of such frames in language, cognition and gesture varies cross-culturally, and that children can acquire different systems with comparable ease. We argue that language can play a significant role in structuring, or restructuring, a domain as fundamental as spatial cognition. This suggests we need to rethink the relation between the neurocognitive underpinnings of spatial cognition and the concepts we use in everyday thinking, and, more generally, to work out how to account for cross-cultural cognitive diversity in core cognitive domains.     

超越弗雷格的“第三域”神话

<正>如达米特所指出的:"弗雷格关于思想及其构成涵义的看法是神话式的。这些恒久不变的实体居住在‘第三域’(the third realm),后者既不同于物理世界,也不同于任何经验主体的内心世界……。     

Towards a pluralist theory of singular thought

This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. The first part of the paper identifies a scope problem for the dominant view of singular thought maintaining that, in order for a thinker to have a singular thought about an object o, the thinker has to bear a special epistemic relation to o. The scope problem has it is that this view cannot make sense of the singularity of our thoughts about objects to which we do not or cannot bear any special epistemic relation. The paper focuses on a specific instance of the scope problem by addressing the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. Various possible solutions to the scope problem within the dominant framework are assessed and rejected. The second part of the paper develops a new theory of singular thought which hinges on the contention that the constraints that need to be met in order to think singularly vary depending on the kind of object we are thinking about. This idea is developed in detail by discussing the difference between the somewhat standard case of thoughts about spatio-temporal medium-sized inanimate objects and the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. It is contended that this new Pluralist theory of singular thought can successfully solve the scope problem.     

The simulating social mind: the role of the mirror neuron system and simulation in the social and communicative deficits of autism spectrum disorders

The mechanism by which humans perceive others differs greatly from how humans perceive inanimate objects. Unlike inanimate objects, humans have the distinct property of being "like me" in the eyes of the observer. This allows us to use the same systems that process knowledge about self-performed actions, self-conceived thoughts, and self-experienced emotions to understand actions, thoughts, and emotions in others. The authors propose that internal simulation mechanisms, such as the mirror neuron system, are necessary for normal development of recognition, imitation, theory of mind, empathy, and language. Additionally, the authors suggest that dysfunctional simulation mechanisms may underlie the social and communicative deficits seen in individuals with autism spectrum disorders.     

A comparison of thought suppression to an acceptance-based technique in the management of personal intrusive thoughts: a controlled evaluation

Research suggests that suppressing unwanted thoughts is not possible, leads to a subsequent increase in frequency of the suppressed thoughts, and results in higher levels of distress. Because thought suppression may have negative effects, an alternative, acceptance-based approach has been proposed. The current paper reports the outcomes of two studies. Study I examined the relationships between two naturally occurring strategies of thought management (thought suppression and acceptance), symptoms of psychopathology, and experiences with personally relevant intrusive thoughts. Results showed that those who naturally suppress personally relevant intrusive thoughts have more, are more distressed by, and have a greater "urge to do something" about the thoughts, while those who are naturally more accepting of their intrusive thoughts are less obsessional, have lower levels of depression, and are less anxious. Study II compared three groups (thought suppression, acceptance, and monitor-only groups) on the frequency and distress associated with experiencing personally relevant intrusive thoughts. Results revealed that those instructed to suppress their personal intrusive thoughts were unable to do so and experienced an increased level of distress after suppression, whereas those instructed to use an acceptance-based strategy experienced a decrease in discomfort level (but not thought frequency) after having used such a strategy. These data offer initial evidence that acceptance may be a useful alternative to the suppression of personally relevant intrusive thoughts.     

LANGAGE ET PENSÉE

This paper is devoted to some issues which are to be first examined in order to approach the problem of the relations between language and thought in a positive way. The term “thought” arouses distrust in the psychologists who are attached to the scientific method, because it evokes philosophical presuppositions. However, when the problem is posed in terms of what does happen in the subject or what sort of cultural reality does correspond to a system of concepts, an objective analysis is possible and has been realized in some well-known works. Then, the author emphasizes the fact that any attempt at defiring the influence of language on the development of thought, for instance, demands that both terms should not be dealt with as global entities. Discussing the priority of thought over language, or vice versa, is greatly sterilized as long as these terms are treated so. For instance, intelligence does not necessarily correspond to the same abilities before language — or independently from it — as after language — or when intelligence is informed by it. All the same, language is not a whole: a subject who has low abilities in mere grammatical forms can nevertheless use language in an efficient way. Deaf children offer great opportunities for the study of the role of language in mental development, because, by studying them, one avoids wrong explanations based only on correlations which result from the studies in normal children. The collaboration between linguists and psychologists is discussed. The difficulties which psychologists sometimes meet with the works of linguists are outlined; the author eventually suggests some issues on which the cooperation of the linguist could particularly help the psychologist.     

Young children's rapid learning about artifacts

Tool use is central to interdisciplinary debates about the evolution and distinctiveness of human intelligence, yet little is actually known about how human conceptions of artifacts develop. Results across these two studies show that even 2-year-olds approach artifacts in ways distinct from captive tool-using monkeys. Contrary to adult intuition, children do not treat all objects with appropriate properties as equally good means to an end. Instead, they use social information to rapidly form enduring artifact categories. After only one exposure to an artifact's functional use, children will construe the tool as 'for' that particular purpose and, furthermore, avoid using it for another feasible purpose. This teleo-functional tendency to categorize tools by intentional use represents a precursor to the design stance - the adult-like tendency to understand objects in terms of intended function - and provides an early foundation for apparently distinctive human abilities in efficient long-term tool use and design.     

The effect of relations in paired-associate learning

Previous studies have shown that the cued recall of paired associates is greater when one member of a pair has been apprehended as lying on the other member, as compared with the two having been apprehended as independent objects. The effect occurs when the objects have been perceived, imagined, or described in the relevant relationship. The additional thoughts hypothesis postulates that participants have more spontaneous "additional thoughts" when apprehending a pair in the relational condition. These may provide additional retrieval routes, thereby explaining the effect. In four experiments, the hypothesis was tested under conditions in which a clear unambiguous definition could be specified for an additional thought. The results showed that the greater recall in an "on" condition, as compared with an independent condition, occurs at least in part because more additional thoughts occur in the "on" condition. There was no evidence for any other contribution to the effect. It is argued that the findings question whether relations between objects play a fundamental role in the structure of memory.     

Meaning and mind: Wittgenstein's relevance for the ‘Does Language Shape Thought?’ debate

This paper explores the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology for the two major contemporary approaches to the relation between language and cognition. As Pinker describes it, on the ‘Standard Social Science Model’ language is ‘an insidious shaper of thought’. According to Pinker's own widely-shared alternative view, ‘Language is the magnificent faculty that we use to get thoughts from one head to another’. I investigate Wittgenstein's powerful challenges to the hypothesis that language is a device for communicating independently constituted (or individuated) thoughts. I argue that Wittgenstein offers instead a subtle version of the thesis that language determines thought.     

The effects of feature-label-order and their implications for symbolic learning

Symbols enable people to organize and communicate about the world. However, the ways in which symbolic knowledge is learned and then represented in the mind are poorly understood. We present a formal analysis of symbolic learning-in particular, word learning-in terms of prediction and cue competition, and we consider two possible ways in which symbols might be learned: by learning to predict a label from the features of objects and events in the world, and by learning to predict features from a label. This analysis predicts significant differences in symbolic learning depending on the sequencing of objects and labels. We report a computational simulation and two human experiments that confirm these differences, revealing the existence of Feature-Label-Ordering effects in learning. Discrimination learning is facilitated when objects predict labels, but not when labels predict objects. Our results and analysis suggest that the semantic categories people use to understand and communicate about the world can only be learned if labels are predicted from objects. We discuss the implications of this for our understanding of the nature of language and symbolic thought, and in particular, for theories of reference.     

Predicting the phenomenology of episodic future thoughts

Recent findings suggest that multiple event properties contribute to shape the phenomenology of episodic future thoughts, but the specific role of each property is not yet fully understood. This study shows that different phenomenological features are predicted by distinct event properties. The vividness of an episodic future thought largely depends on the familiarity of its constitutive elements (i.e., the envisioned location, persons and objects), while the visual perspective adopted is instead related to the temporal distance of the imagined event. Cognitive feelings such as the sense of pre-experiencing the future depend on sensory-perceptual qualities, and are further modulated by the personal importance attributed to the event. These findings suggest that the essence of episodic future thought-the sensation of mentally visiting one's personal future-lies, in part, in the relevance of imagined events with respect to personal goals.     

Automatic classification of dysfunctional thoughts: a feasibility test.

The identification of dysfunctional thoughts is a central effort in cognitive therapy. This paper describes the first version of a computer module that classifies dysfunctional thoughts automatically. It is part of COGNO, a system we are developing to give automatic feedback on dysfunctional thoughts. The system uses rules that were developed from language markers identified in a sample of 149 dysfunctional thoughts. The system was tested with an independent set of 112 example thoughts. The system detects the majority of dysfunctional thoughts, but works reliably only for some thought categories. Automatic thought classification may be a first step toward developing natural dialogue systems in cognitive therapy.     

Automatic classification of dysfunctional thoughts: A feasibility test

The identification of dysfunctional thoughts is a central effort in cognitive therapy. This paper describes the first version of a computer module that classifies dysfunctional thoughts automatically. It is part of COGNO, a system we are developing to give automatic feedback on dysfunctional thoughts. The system uses rules that were developed from language markers identified in a sample of 149 dysfunctional thoughts. The system was tested with an independent set of 112 example thoughts. The system detects the majority of dysfunctional thoughts, but works reliably only for some thought categories. Automatic thought classification may be a first step toward developing natural dialogue systems in cognitive therapy.     

伦理,胚胎和干细胞研究

道德是关于规则、直觉、理解和观点的一个复杂系统。而后者影响着我们相互间处理事务的方式。它们交叉地渗入我们的道德思考。这种思维与胚胎、干细胞的伦理密切相关,因为胚胎和干细胞涉及我们对与治疗和移植组织有关的人的生命及其启始问题。就像在许多对待生命及其可以阐释的研究方法方面,要有一个道德的思辩历程一样,解决这些问题,部分地需要讨论,部分地需要回答。只有在我们认定这种讨论能够融入应用干细胞治疗的胚胎及其类源和人体组织的使用中时,我们才会清楚,大多数人体不同部位的干细胞应用是经过了对人的生命启始、我们儿童、家庭进行了思考。     

Meaning and object in Freud's theory of language

This article sets out to challenge the interpretation of Freud's views on the origins of the meaning of language according to which meaning always originates from an act of naming. In Freud's terms, word‐presentations would originally denote object‐ or thing‐presentations and gain meaning through this reference. This interpretation claims that this view was already expressed in Freud's On Aphasia (1891) and influenced all his later theory of language. To oppose this claim, three conceptions proposed by Freud are discussed that strongly suggest the participation of language in the construction of the field of objects: a metapsychological hypothesis (the concepts of word‐, thing‐, and object‐presentation), the explanation of a psychopathological phenomenon (the genesis of a fetishistic object‐choice), and a concept concerning the foundations of the psychoanalytic method of dream interpretation (secondary elaboration). As a conclusion, it is argued that Freud's early views in On Aphasia (1891) can be alternatively understood such as to allow for a different view of language and its relationship with objects.     

Développement conceptuel de la notion d’énergie relative à des objets inanimés et animés chez les élèves de dix à 17 ans

The objective of this work is to study the concept of energy in case where animates and inanimates objects interact. We questioned pupils between 10 and 17 years old with regard to the existence of energy in inanimates and energy consumption by animates. Our results show that pupils use a small number of coherent conceptions dependent on the context. These conceptions develop differently for inanimate and animate objects. In the case of inanimates, some evolution is observed, while for animates the concept evolves slowly. In general, the materialist character of energy, its confusion with force and its attribution, in preference, to animates are among the naive conceptions which constrain the scientific understanding of energy.