Gender and Transference

Despite an early interest, Freud explicitly rejected philosophy, because of its “speculative” character. He struggled with balancing the intellectual appeal of philosophy with the certainty he hoped to find in positivist science. Putting aside the scientific status of Freud's work, the author re-examines Freud's attitude towards philosophy. Failing to recognize the assumptions of his investigations, Freud segregated psychoanalysis from philosophy on the charge that philosophers equated mind with consciousness, putatively propounded unfounded speculations, and assumed false conclusions about comprehensiveness. However, Freud never completely abandoned his initial philosophical proclivities. His own contributions to cultural history, social philosophy, notions of personal identity, and the humanistic thrust of psychoanalysis, demonstrate that he continued to address his earliest interests in philosophical questions. The author elucidates the philosophical complexity of psychoanalysis and concludes that a reconsideration of Freud's self-appraisal of his intellectual commitments is warranted.     

Kontinentales Erbe Und Analytische Methode. Nelson Goodman Und Die Tradition

Goodman's most important contribution to philosophy seems to be his analysis of the relation between facts of science and fictions of art. His view can be seen as a kind of complementary pluralism. That is to say, science and art are two complementary forms of achieving cognition. This position overcame the positivistic view (of his teacher Carnap) according to which the value of art is restricted to the non-cognitive function of expressing emotions. In this paper I compare some of Goodman's fundamental ideas – especially his central conception of exemplification – with their counterparts in Baumgarten, Kant, and Cassirer. Based on this comparison I argue against the tendency to regard analytic and continental philosophy as two completely separated traditions.     

E. W. Beth as a philosopher of physics

This paper examines E. W. Beth’s work in the philosophy of physics, both from a historical and a systematic point of view. Beth saw the philosophy of physics first of all as an opportunity to illustrate and promulgate a new and modern general approach to the philosophy of nature and to philosophy tout court: an approach characterized negatively by its rejection of all traditional metaphysics and positively by its firm orientation towards science. Beth was successful in defending this new ideology, and became its leading Dutch representative in the first two decades after the second world war. Beth also contributed importantly to the method of the philosophy of physics in a narrower sense, by proposing and promoting the semantic approach in the formal analysis of physical theories. Finally, he worked on several specific foundational questions; but he was probably too much of a logician to leave his mark in this area.     

Experience and Reason in Einstein's Epistemology

Albert Einstein insists that his epistemology made his discovery of relativity possible. He believed it was his understanding of the relationship of experience and reason that allowed him to reconsider certain “truths” of physics. Specifically, he believed that reality and thought were independent but related, and that conceptual systems are independent of but conditioned by experience. Failure to understand the relation between experience and reason had, Einstein believed, limited progress in science. His understanding of the relation, on the other hand, enabled him to formulate relativity theory and therefore provides one example of the relevance of philosophy to scientific inquiry.     

Two papers by Michael Fordham (d.1995)

The Journal has decided to publish a selection of previously unpublished papers from the Michael Fordham archives, which are being prepared for publication by James Astor and Elizabeth Urban, and of which the two papers published here are the first, both dating from the 1950s. 'Analyst and Priest' seems to be addressed to an audience of mainly religious people who are interested in the relation between psychology and religion and to whom Fordham is introducing some basic Jungian concepts and ways of thinking. The analyst in this lecture is the advocate of a new science, the priest an established figure with a role in society and rituals to perform. As the paper progresses he refines the differences between priest and analyst in terms of individual development versus a philosophy of life. The paper ends with a plea for co-operation between priest and analyst. 'Analyst and Scientist' was a radio talk given in 1956. In this paper Fordham makes the case for paying attention to the irrational. He draws support from Pauli and Polanyi. His theme is to show the scientific value of the subjective. From this he describes the scientific basis for Jung's comparative method and consequently of archetypal psychology.     

BIRD AGAINST THE HUMEANS

Debate between Humean contingentists and anti-Humean necessitarians in the philosophy of science is ongoing. One of the most important contemporary anti-Humeans is Alexander Bird. Bird calls the particular version of Humeanism he is opposed to 'categoricalism'. In his paper (2005) and in Chapter 4 of his book (2007) Bird argues against categoricalism about properties and laws. His arguments against categoricalism about properties are intended to support the necessitarian position he calls dispositional monism. His arguments against categoricalism about laws are intended to refute the contingent regularity view of laws (even in its sophisticated Lewisean version) and the nomic necessitation view of Armstrong (which involves a contingent necessitation relation). The general position Bird defends is that properties are necessarily related to the dispositions they bestow on their bearers and laws are necessary truths. I consider two of Bird's arguments against categoricalism about properties, and one of his arguments against the regularity view of laws. Maybe other arguments against categoricalism are persuasive. These, I submit, are not.     

Karl Popper,Psychology and Philosophy

This paper intends to re-emphasize the relationship among Psychology, Popper and his Philosophy. Popper, who is often considered as one of the most important philosophers of science, had associations with the discipline of psychology in his early years. Popper was associated with Würzburg school of psychology, especially the psychologies of Külpe, Selz and Bühler. However, there was a change in Popper’s interest from the psychology of discovery to an objectivist epistemology—that is, to the logic of discovery, which he himself acknowledged (1976, p. 55). Popper, not only turned away from psychology, as early as 1930 or thereabouts, he later became one of the most outspoken opponents of a psychological approach to science. This antipathy has worked both ways! Very few psychologists study and discuss Popper. His place in the history of psychology, certainly remains inadequate. But why should psychologists ignore Popper? Instead of turning away from Popper, Psychologists’ efforts should be directed towards bringing into focus Popper, his works and association with psychology. This paper argues and tries to discuss the relationships among Popper, his training in psychology and his philosophy.     

Gustav Shpet and Phenomenology in an Orthodox Key

Gustav Gustavovich Shpet (1879--1937) is undoubtedly best known for introducing Husserlian phenomenology to Russia. He applied to aesthetics and the philosophy of language the principles he had discovered in Husserl's Logical Investigations and Ideas I. But, perhaps without knowing it, he modified the phenomenology he had found in Husserl. His modifications show a thinker who is thoroughly grounded in Russian religious thought of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The result is a philosophy that combines Husserl's analysis of the structure of consciousness with the fundamental Platonism of Orthodoxy, the doctrine of incarnation, and the related notion that matter is to be venerated.     

The value of philosophy: A Canguilhemian perspective

This paper represents a philosophical reflection on the nature and value of philosophy itself. Georges Canguilhem somewhat scandalously argued that the fundamental value of philosophy does not lie in truth. He suggests that truth is a typical value of science because truth is what science says and what is said scientifically. Why would a philosopher depreciate his own discipline? And does he really do so? Or is there a different motivation: to help philosophy to become a much more self-confident voice? And if truth is no longer a value of philosophy, what value fits it better? The article follows Canguilhem in his conception of truth, science, and philosophy. It is against the background of these considerations that the specific revised anthropology of the scientist or philosopher is formed. The main question is what this means for current philosophy and why it could be inspiring for philosophers today.     

Toward a Telic Vision of Human Beings: A Dialogue with Joseph F. Rychlak

Over the past 25 years, Joseph F. Rychlak has developed a unique approach to theory, research, and practice in counseling that he refers to as “rigorous humanism.” His conceptualization of human action is radically different from the mainstream understanding of human beings in scientific theory and research. His position is quite compatible, however, with the views of most practicing counselors. Rychlak's proposals have been instrumental in developing a modified view of science, upon which a research-based understanding of counseling practice can be constructed.     

Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?

Abstract: This article first surveys the established views on Wittgenstein's relation to analytic philosophy. Next it distinguishes among different ways of defining analytic philosophy—topical, doctrinal, methodological, stylistic, historical, and the idea that it is a family‐resemblance concept. It argues that while certain stylistic features are important, the historical and the family‐resemblance conceptions are the most auspicious, especially in combination. The answer to the title question is given in section 3. Contrary to currently popular “irrationalist” interpretations, Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher in all phases of his career, albeit an exceedingly exotic one whose style transcends the limits of academic philosophy in general. On the historical understanding he qualifies because he was influenced by and in turn influenced mainly analytic philosophers. On the family‐resemblance conception he qualifies both because he developed and employed logico‐linguistic analysis and because he initiated the linguistic turn and the distinction between philosophy and science that characterizes one important strand in analytic philosophy.     

The realism that duhem rejected in Copernicus

Pierre Duhem rejected unambiguously the strong version of realism that he believed was held by Copernicus. In fact, although Copernicus believed that his theory was clearly superior to Ptolemy's, he seems to have recognized that his theory was at best only approximately true. Accordingly, he recognized that his arguments were not demonstrative in the traditional sense but probable and persuasive. Duhem regarded even the belief in probably true explanations as misguided. Nevertheless, Duhem recognized that, even if metaphysical intuition does not enter into the content of physical theories, the rejection of hypotheses could be explained only by appeal to common sense. Hence, Duhem held a qualified instrumentalism according to which physical theories are not realist, but the terms of ordinary experience and empirical laws are realist. Accordingly, Duhem rejected the complete subordination of science to philosophy as well as the complete separation of science from philosophy. Duhem's history of cosmological doctrines reflects his belief in the origin of the subordination of science to philosophy and of the struggle to achieve the proper balance without being driven to the opposite extreme of their complete separation.     

李达哲学探索的独特理论个性

李达是中国现代史上少有的一位杰出的马克思主义哲学家,是马克思主义哲学中国化的重要代表人物之一,为马克思主义哲学中国化、为毛泽东哲学思想的形成和发展作出了突出重要的贡献。与马克思主义哲学中国化的其他重要代表人物相比较,李达对马克思主义哲学的探索具有鲜明的独特理论个性。考察、揭示、把握和品味李达哲学探索的独特理论个性,对于深刻理解马克思主义哲学中国化的历程及其内在规律,推进当代中国马克思主义哲学的发展,具有极其重要的意义。     

Making use of creationism. A case-study for the philosophy of science classroom

In this paper, I describe an approach to the teaching of philosophy of science that draws normally reluctant students into controversial issues in the philosophy of science. I have found that the topic of creationism is a good vehicle for introducing students to the more difficult issues in philosophy of science. I explore the use of creationism as a case-study in the philosophy of science and detail my own experience in the creationism debate.     

建立儒家人文主义的学术传统:由文化“复建”到文化“复兴”

本文回顾了作者跟随杨国枢教授推动本土心理学的学术历程,并依据自己的切身体会,提出本土心理学运动必须以科学哲学作为基础。作者身体力行,在最近二三十年间,深入学习科学哲学的理论,逐步建立本土心理学的相关理论。其最终目标,是打算以儒家文化作为基底,吸纳西方近代文明的菁华,“中学为体,西学为用”,摆脱西方学术的宰制,建立“儒家人文主义”的自主学术传统。作者认为,唯有大力发展本土社会科学,建立华人“自主的社会科学传统”,华人学术社群才有可能走出“学术自我殖民”的心态。     

THE EMOTIONS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain ambiguous claims he makes about causation. I attempt to provide a coherent interpretation of his view of causality that is consistent with both human choice and the causal sequence of change. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy.     

Causation, Principle of Common Cause and Theoretical Explanation: Wesley C. Salmon and G. W. F. Hegel

The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon??s concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic, and which can be applied to the issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author??s contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon??s philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science.     

Neo‐Confucian epistemology and Chinese philosophy: Practical postulates for actioning psychology as a human science

The world is growing more interconnected, and Asian societies are increasingly able to play leading roles in global society. However, Asian psychologists and social scientists have yet to draw from their cultural roots to create social sciences able to make a difference in their home societies. This paper articulates an epistemology for the aspirational practice of Height Psychology as a human science informed by Kantian epistemology in dialogue with other philosophies, especially Confucianism and Taoism. The possibility of ‘intellectual intuition’ (direct knowledge of thing‐in‐itself, or noumenon) is allowed in Eastern philosophical traditions that open a more agentic and human‐centred philosophy of science for action that goes beyond natural science epistemologies originating in Cartesian dualism. Kant's practical postulates are invoked to develop a moral and ethical philosophy that through civilizational dialogue can lead to a philosophy of science robustly incorporating culture and human agency. A thought experiment is offered where practical postulates of Chinese culture are held to be yin‐yang cosmology, human‐heartedness, and relationalism. It is argued that these facilitate an holistic science of practice that complements the sophistication of Western methods. Principles and an approach to theory‐building for human science are proposed.     

What did Popper learn from Lakatos?

The canonical version of the history of twentieth century philosophy of science tells us that Lakatos was Popper’s disciple, but it is rarely mentioned that Popper would have learned anything from Lakatos. The aim of this paper is to examine Lakatos’ influence on Popper’s philosophical system and to argue that Lakatos did have an important, yet somewhat unexpected, impact on Popper’s thinking: he influenced Popper’s evolutionary model for ‘progress’ in science. And Lakatos’ influence sheds new light on why and how Popper continually revised one of the central claims of his philosophy of science: the evolutionary account of scientific theory change.     

论牟宗三易学思想的演变

牟宗三的易学是其原创性哲学的重要内容,体现着时代精神。他的早期著作《从周易方面研究中国之元学及道德哲学》,以罗素哲学、数理逻辑、新实在论解读《周易》,阐述了自然哲学和自然主义道德论,对缺乏科学与逻辑并高度意识形态化而成为人性之桎梏的中国传统文化补缺救失;在中后期,面对物质主义和唯科学主义在世界的泛滥,寻求人类的终极关怀,创立道德形上学,其易学即为这一体系的构成部分。牟氏易学的发展既反映了时代的变化,也显示出其视野由中国到世界的逐步开阔化。