Constructive Empiricism Now

Philosophical Studies -     

Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality

Brentano's Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to understand Brentano's Thesis accordingly: It is a piece of advice on how to become introspectively aware of the distinctive feature of mental phenomena. On this understanding of Brentano's Thesis standard objections to it no longer arise.     

Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem

In this paper I articulate a fictionalist solution to the closure problem that affects constructive empiricism. Relying on Stephen Yablo’s recent study of closure puzzles, I show how we can partition the content of a theory in terms of its truthmakers and claim that a constructive empiricist can believe that all the observable conditions that are necessary to make a part of her theory true obtain and remain agnostic about whether or not the other truthmakers for the other parts of her theory obtain. This can be done even though she asserts her theory as if it was wholly true.     

Constructive Empiricism and the Vices of Voluntarism

Abstract

Constructive empiricism – as formulated by Bas van Fraassen – makes no epistemological claims about the nature of science. Rather, it is a view about the aim of science, to be situated within van Fraassen’s broader voluntarist epistemology. Yet while this epistemically minimalist framework may have various advantages in defending the epistemic relevance of constructive empiricism, I show how it also has various disadvantages in maintaining its internal coherence.     

How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism: a Rejoinder

Ladyman, Douven, Horsten and van Fraassen have attempted to defend van Fraassen's critique of abductive reasoning against the arguments offered in a recent piece of mine. My short rejoinder shows two things. First, their counter-arguments fail to refute my original arguments. Their arguments casually move from the actuality of 'empirically equivalent rivals' to the possibility of 'equally good rivals'. But pointing to the existence of the former would do nothing to establish that empirically equivalent rivals are 'equally good' or equally well supported by the evidence. Second, I show that a central claim of their paper, one which three of the four authors see as 'possibly raising serious problems for constructive empiricism and for van Fraassen's steps toward a new epistemology', is very close to the conclusion of my original piece: if explanatory considerations are jettisoned, then even common-sense existential claims are in danger of being unfounded.     

Three Myths of Intentionality Versus Some Medieval Philosophers

Abstract

This paper argues that three characteristic modern positions concerning intentionality – namely, (1) that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental’; (2) that intentionality concerns a specific type of objects having intentional inexistence; and (3) that intentionality somehow defies logic – are just three ‘modern myths’ that medieval philosophers, from whom the modern notion supposedly originated, would definitely reject.     

Ontology According to van Fraassen: Some Problems with Constructive Empiricism

This paper argues the case for ontological realism as against various present-day forms of conventionalist, instrumentalist, cultural-relativist, or anti-realist doctrine. In particular it takes issue with Richard Rorty's writings on philosophy of science – where these ideas receive their most extreme and provocative statement – and with Bas van Fraassen's more moderate 'constructive empiricist' approach. This latter entails ontological commitment to whatever shows up through trained observation or empirical research. However, it refuses to countenance realist claims concerning the existence of (as yet) unobserved entities and their role in explanatory theories premised on putative laws of nature. I maintain that van Fraassen's position is: (1) inadequate to account for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge; (2) self-refuting since often undermined by examples which he himself supplies; and (3) incapable of mounting resistance to other, more wholesale (e.g., Rortian) varieties of anti-realist argument. Only by combining causal realism with a principle of inference to the best explanation can philosophy of science avoid these kinds of hyperinduced sceptical doubt.     

Constructive Empiricism and Epistemic Modesty: Response to van Fraassen and Monton

Bas van Fraassen claims that constructive empiricism strikes a balance between the empiricist’s commitments to epistemic modesty – that one’s opinion should extend no further beyond the deliverances of experience than is necessary – and to the rationality of science. In “Should the Empiricist be a Constructive Empiricist?” I argued that if the constructive empiricist follows through on her commitment to epistemic modesty she will find herself adopting a much more extreme position than van Fraassen suggests. Van Fraassen and Bradley Monton have recently responded. My purpose here is to contest their response. The goal is not merely the rebuttal of a rebuttal; there is a lesson to learn concerning the realist/anti-realist dialectic generated by van Fraassen’s view.     

Intentionality in Intuitive Versus Analytic Processing: Insights From Social Cognitive Neuroscience

A new preliminary model of emotional disorders, derived from basic tenets of emotion theory and new developments in cognitive science, is presented. It is suggested that tightly organized basic emotions stored in memory fire inappropriately on occasion. In individuals who are vulnerable both biologically and psychologically, these emotions may become the focus of anxiety or dysthymia in that the emotions themselves are experienced as uncontrollable and threatening with adequate coping being difficult or impossible. Early experiences with lack of control over one's environment as well as biological vulnerabilities may well determine whether or not one becomes anxious/dysthymic over the experience of basic emotions in an inappropriate context. This model is illustrated in the context of panic disorder and then extended to depression (sadness/distress), stress (anger), and mania (excitement).     

On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism

Two studies explored a theoretical distinction between "blind" and "constructive" patriotism. Blind patriotism is defined as an attachment to country characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism. Constructive patriotism is defined as an attachment to country characterized by support for questioning and criticism of current group practices that are intended to result in positive change. Items designed to investigate these dimensions of national attachment were administered to two groups of undergraduates in separate surveys. Measures of the two constructs derived from factor analysis of the responses proved to be reliable and valid. Blind patriotism was positively associated with political disengagement, nationalism, perceptions of foreign threat, perceived importance of symbolic behaviors, and selective exposure to pro-U.S. information. In contrast, constructive patriotism was positively associated with multiple indicators of political involvement, including political efficacy, interest, knowledge, and behavior. The implications of this distinction for theory and research on patriotism are discussed.     

Classical Intentionality

In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued that the classical conception is more satisfactory than the two modern ones, not only regarding phenomenal adequacy, but also on the grounds of epistemological considerations. In the second part, the paper argues that classical intentionality is not naturalizable, that is, physicalizable. Since classical intentionality exists (in the experiences that display it), the non-naturalizability of classical intentionality implies psychophysical dualism.     

Metaemotional Intentionality

This article argues against two theories that obscure our understanding of emotions whose objects are other emotions. The tripartite model of emotional intentionality holds that an emotion's relation to its object is necessarily mediated by an additional representational state; I argue that metaemotions are an exception to this claim. The hierarchical model positions metaemotions as stable, epistemically privileged higher‐order appraisals of lower‐level emotions; I argue that this clashes with various features of complex metaemotional experiences. The article therefore serves dual purposes, offering metaemotions as a counterexample to an intuitive thesis about emotional intentionality, and examining their intentional structure in its own right.