How to eliminate illusions in quantified reasoning

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of situations described in premises. These models normally make explicit only what is true according to the premises. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences: Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Previous studies have corroborated the existence of such illusions. The present study reports the first effective antidote to them. For example, most people incorrectly answer “yes” to the following problem:Only one of the following statements is true . . . /At least some of the plastic beads are not red. /None of the plastic beads are red. /Is it possible that none of the red beads are plastic? In two experiments, we progressively eliminated this fallacy and others by using instructions designed to overcome the bias toward truth. The difference between the illusory and the control problems disappeared when the participants were instructed to work out both the case in which the first premise was true and the second premise was false and the case in which the second premise was true and the first premise was false.     

The use of sequential probabilities in the segmentation of speech

The present investigation addresses the possible utility of sequential probabilities in the segmentation of spoken language. In a series of five word- spotting and two control lexical decision experiments, high- versus low-probability consonant-vowel (Experiments 1, 2, 5, and 7) and vowel-consonant (Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6) strings were presented either in the nonsense contexts of target words (Experiments 1–3) or within the target words themselves (Experiments 4–7). The results suggest that listeners, at least for sequences in the onset position, indeed use sequential probabilities as cues for segmentation. The probability of a sound sequence influenced segmentation more when the sequence occurred within the target words (Experiments 4–7 vs. Experiments 1–3). Furthermore, the effects were reliable only when the sequences occurred in the onset position (Experiments 1, 2, 5, and 7 vs. Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6).     

The use of sequential probabilities in the segmentation of speech

The present investigation addresses the possible utility of sequential probabilities in the segmentation of spoken language. In a series of five word- spotting and two control lexical decision experiments, high- versus low-probability consonant-vowel (Experiments 1, 2, 5, and 7) and vowel-consonant (Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6) strings were presented either in the nonsense contexts of target words (Experiments 1-3) or within the target words themselves (Experiments 4-7). The results suggest that listeners, at least for sequences in the onset position, indeed use sequential probabilities as cues for segmentation. The probability of a sound sequence influenced segmentation more when the sequence occurred within the target words (Experiments 4-7 vs. Experiments 1-3). Furthermore, the effects were reliable only when the sequences occurred in the onset position (Experiments 1, 2, 5, and 7 vs. Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6).     

Logical reasoning and probabilities: A comprehensive test of Oaksford and Chater (2001)

We report two experiments testing a central prediction of the probabilistic account of reasoning provided by Oaksford and Chater (2001): Acceptance of standard conditional inferences, card choices in the Wason selection task, and quantifiers chosen for conclusions from syllogisms should vary as a function of the frequency of the concepts involved. Frequency was manipulated by a probability-learning phase preceding the reasoning tasks to simulate natural sampling. The effects predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2001) were not obtained with any of the three paradigms.     

A comparison of recognition memory to numerical decision: How prior probabilities affect cutoff location

In two experiments, a recognition memory task, in which subjects judged whether a given five-digit number had been shown previously, was compared to a numerical decision task, in which subjects judged whether a given five-digit number represented the height of a man or a woman. Subjects were found to shift β (the cutoff point along the decision axis) with changes in prior probabilities in the direction specified by signal detection theory in the numerical decision task but not in the recognition memory task. An explanation of the results, in terms of a difference in ? (discriminability) between the two tasks, was ruled out. In contrast, explanations which cannot be ruled out involve differences between the tasks in the amount of practice required for the subject to learn the manner in which the stimuli are distributed along the decision continuum, and differences in the availability of an alternative basis for response other than the decision continuum.     

Illusions in quantified reasoning: How to make the impossible seem possible, and vice versa

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally represent only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence of illusions in inferences. Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Two experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in inferences about what is possible from disjunctions of quantified assertions, such as, "at least some of the plastic beads are not red." Experiment 1 showed that participants erroneously inferred that impossible situations were possible, and that possible situations were impossible, but that they performed well with control problems based on the same premises. Experiment 2 corroborated these findings in inferences from assertions based on dyadic relations, such as, "all the boys played with the girls."     

How children use drawing to regulate their emotions

We examined two ways in which drawing may function to elevate mood in children—venting (expressing negative feelings) and distraction (expressing something unrelated to the negative feelings). We examined the effectiveness of drawing as an emotion regulator when drawing is used to vent versus distract (Study 1) and tested whether the effects found are specific to the activity of creating one's own drawing or generalisable to a drawing activity in which children had to copy another's drawing (Study 2). To induce a negative mood, we asked children to think of a disappointing event. Mood was assessed before and after the assigned activity. In both studies, mood improved significantly more in the distract than in the vent or copy condition. Study 1 demonstrates that drawing improves mood in children via distraction and not via venting. Study 2 demonstrates that this effect is specific to a drawing task in which an image is freely constructed. When a copying task is used, the effect disappears.     

Speed of reasoning and its relation to reasoning ability

The study investigates empirical properties of reasoning speed which is conceived as the fluency of solving reasoning problems. Responses and response times in reasoning tasks are modeled jointly to clarify the covariance structure of reasoning speed and reasoning ability. To determine underlying abilities, the predictive validities of two cognitive covariates, namely perceptual and executive attention, are investigated. A sample of N = 230 test takers completed a reasoning test, Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), and attention tests indicating perceptual and executive attention. For modeling responses the two-parameter normal ogive model, and for modeling response times the two-parameter lognormal model was applied. Results suggest that reasoning speed is a unidimensional construct representing significant individual differences, and that reasoning speed and ability are negatively correlated but clearly distinguishable constructs. Perceptual and executive attention showed differential effects on reasoning speed and reasoning ability, i.e., reasoning speed is explained by executive attention only, while reasoning ability is explained by both covariates. Implications for the assessment of reasoning are discussed.     

How 7-month-olds interpret ambiguous motion events: Category-based reasoning in infancy

This paper investigates the role of static and dynamic attributes for the animate-inanimate distinction in category-based reasoning of 7-month-olds. Three experiments tested infants’ responses to movement events involving an unfamiliar animal and a ball. When either the animal or the ball showed self-initiated irregular movements (Experiment 1), infants expected the previously active object to start moving again. When both objects were moving together in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 2), infants expected only the animal to start moving again. Initial looking preferences for each object did not influence results. When either the facial features of the animal were removed, or its furry body was replaced by a plastic spiral in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 3), infants formed no clear expectation regarding future movements. Based on this set of findings we conclude that 7-month-olds flexibly combine information about the static and dynamic properties of objects in order to reason about motion events.     

How infants use perceptual information to guide action

When infants catch a rolling ball by intercepting its trajectory, the action is prospectively controlled to take account of the object's speed, direction and path. We complicated this task in two ways: by occluding a portion of the ball's path with a screen, and by sometimes placing a barrier that blocked the ball's path behind the screen. In two experiments we manipulated visual information about the barrier and the ball's trajectory to see how this would aid 9‐month‐olds’ performance. Anticipatory reaching was possible but difficult with a partially occluded trajectory; actually catching the ball was aided by full view of the trajectory although timing of reach onset was not affected. Full sight of the barrier and trajectory through a transparent screen prevented inappropriate reaching, whereas sight of the barrier alone through a ‘window’ in an opaque screen did not. We interpreted these results as evidence for decreased performance as cognitive load increased with the loss of visual information. In contrast to anticipatory reaching behavior, search for the ball after it disappeared behind the screen was facilitated by the opaque window condition, confirming previous studies that found superior search with opaque versus transparent screens.     

The use of drawings as concrete referents in conditional reasoning problems

A mixed group containing university students, mostly studying mathematics, and some senior school pupils took two paper‐and‐pencil conditional reasoning tests in varying order with a one‐week interval between the tests. One test consisted of five problems presented entirely in written form. The second test took one of two forms, both identical to the first test except that in the first form inessential drawings were added to the presentation of four of the problems and in the second form drawings, which acted as concrete referents and were essential, were added to the same four problems. Irrespective of the order of testing, subjects' performance on the problems with drawings used as concrete referents was significantly worse than on the corresponding problems presented in written form. Furthermore, the results of the initial testing session showed the school group performed significantly worse on both the form of test with inessential drawings and the form with concrete referents than on the written form. In addition, a group of students with recent training in reasoning significantly outperformed all others. Finally, negative conclusion bias was only observed for the Modus Tollens inference. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How marketers can use celebrities to sell more effectively

The first part of this paper summarises the key points about the use of celebrities in advertising, sets this particular creative technique in context and demonstrates how significant its return on investment can be. In the second part the paper goes on to report a more detailed analysis of the ‘celebrity’ case histories among the winners in the IPA Effectiveness Awards, and how practitioners have applied celebrity use to brands to make exceptional impacts on profitability.     

科技文化在反邪教斗争中的功能解构分析--文化视域下反邪教方式的探析

由科技文化内涵要素所凝聚成的科学价值观与行为规范．对精神文明建设起基础性和先导性作用,在当前反邪教斗争中具有并发挥着其他文化所不能取代的特殊的社会功能。科技文化的弘扬能够从根本上揭露掩藏在现代科学外衣下的邪教的本来面目．帮助人们认清宗教的实质,在日常生活实践中规避邪教：能够逐渐瓦解、摧毁邪教“亚文化”系统的存在与发展的制度与组织基础;能帮助人们树立科学与理性的观念．从思想深处建构反邪教的心理网关。因此,大力弘扬科技文化是当前反邪教斗争中所必不可少的、无可替代的思想武器。     

The use of conditional probabilities in applications of Holland's theory

The hexagon of J. L. Holland (1973, Making Vocational Choices: A Theory of Careers, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall) is a useful heuristic device for predicting congruency and consistency among the six personality/environment types specified by his theory. One limitation of the traditional hexagon is the implicit bidirectionality: the hexagon displays a single distance between two types. People in applied areas may assume a symmetry which does not exist. Examples are given of situations in which a consistent asymmetry occurs; e.g., in the illustrative data presented, C (Conventional) types are more likely to have E (Enterprising) as a secondary interest than E types are to have C as a secondary interest. Implications of such asymmetries are discussed and suggestions made concerning counseling and other applications.     

Reducing cognitive biases in probabilistic reasoning by the use of logarithm formats

Research on probability judgment has traditionally emphasized that people are susceptible to biases because they rely on “variable substitution”: the assessment of normative variables is replaced by assessment of heuristic, subjective variables. A recent proposal is that many of these biases may rather derive from constraints on cognitive integration, where the capacity-limited and sequential nature of controlled judgment promotes linear additive integration, in contrast to many integration rules of probability theory (Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009). A key implication by this theory is that it should be possible to improve peoples’ probabilistic reasoning by changing probability problems into logarithm formats that require additive rather than multiplicative integration. Three experiments demonstrate that recasting tasks in a way that allows people to arrive at the answers by additive integration decreases cognitive biases, and while people can rapidly learn to produce the correct answers in an additive formats, they have great difficulty doing so with a multiplicative format.